Volume 3

The Many-Splendored Society:
Fueled by Symbols

Second edition

This book describes how we motivate ourselves and others by using symbols in speech and script. It can be read on its own.

The book is also the third installment to a larger work in seven planned volumes about social theory and about a many-splendored society that is within mankind's reach.

Also by Hans L Zetterberg

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Published and planned volumes of "The Many-Splendored Society"

Surrounded by Symbols 2009, chapters 1-5
An Edifice of Symbols, 2010, chapters 6-10
Fueled by Symbols, (the present book), 2010, chapters 11-17
Knowledge and Beauty
Wealth and Sacredness
Order and Virtue
Life and the Good Life

For progress and updates see the author's web *www.zetterberg.org*

VOLUME 3

THE MANY-SPLENDORED SOCIETY: FUELED BY SYMBOLS

Hans L Zetterberg

The Many-Splendored Society: Fueled by Symbols

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Preface, Ambition, and Abstract

From Volumes 1-3. To be Updated as Further Volumes are Completed

In this work, the adjective "many-splendored" describes a society with personal freedom and a sparkling differentiation of six self-governing realms: economy, politics, science, art, religion, and morality. When these societal realms are integrated, so that no one realm rules over any of the others, we have, in my view, a good society.

Readers who already have perused the Preface to Volume 1 or 2 can go directly to "Building the Social Order" below.

The Many-Splendored Society deals with emerging categories and spontaneous tendencies in a social science based on properties of language. It is a multi-volume groundwork that might eventually bind in one volume, or one Kindle-type file, as electronic reading devices become ubiquitous on campuses and elsewhere.

Abstract

Volume 1 is subtitled *Surrounded by Symbols*. Here we pursue man's symbolic environment, meeting the basic elements of human living with a minimum of references to other parts of man's biology than his language brain, which is the latest addition in the evolution to the total human brain. Our message is that human selves and their social life and culture depend on, nay, consist of, and/or are organized using symbols generated by the language brain.

Symbols codify societal orders, represent wealth, summarize knowledge, embody beauty, define sacredness, and express virtues. We identify common abuses of language in the form of magic, confabulation, and defensive bilge. An enormous potential of personal freedom is built into this language that so deeply shapes our own lives and our own society. It contains an almost

unlimited number of linguistic germs: any one of us can create sentences that never have been heard before. Its fertile environment, of course, is one of the freedoms of speech.

Taking a telescopic view of total symbolic environments we find recurrent vibrations. We present three proven pulsating strings: tradition vs. modernity, faithfulness vs. instrumentality, and materialism vs. humanism. They are found in many, perhaps most, symbolic environments. Their vibrations have, not a total, but an unusual degree of independence of their contexts of groups, networks, classes, and other social structures. In their various combinations, they give us advice about the Zeitgeist that prevails in mankind's spaces and times.

Taking a microscopic view of single symbols and sentences we find three recurrent usages: descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions. We propose that they should enter into the minimum vocabulary of social reality. In other words, they are fundamental to a social theory.

Surrounded by Symbols introduces two default states of human conditions: First we hold that the urge to preserve social standing and to avoid degradation is more basic than the urge to improve. Second we claim that an emotive choice is initially more typical than a rational choice. These threads of thought will prove essential in our further explorations.

In Volume 2 subtitled *An Edifice of Symbols*, the use of symbols stripped of magic, confabulation, and defensive bilge, will provide us with a set of general categories and dimensions, all based on properties of language, for the study of social reality. The categories are only starting points. The tale of society is how they interlace into processes and systems, i.e. into mankind's social and cultural achievements.

We look at structures of communication, rules and contracts, different stratifications and reward systems, diverse spontaneous orders, and several other social attributes. Most thinking about them comes from celebrated persons in the social sciences of past times, so in this presentation we pass many intellectual

milestones raised by classical writers of social science, from Adam Smith to Max Weber. In the central Chapter 10 of this work, we follow and revise a lead from the latter that has not been fully explored. We spell out and explicate 18 attributes of societal realms. We discover that the same attributes are present, but take on different characters in science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality.

An Edifice of Symbols ends with two summaries in the form of a Periodic Table of Societal Realms, and (starting in the second edition) a Table of Valences of Societal Realms. A chemist might see these tables as kindred to his field, for they have some "periodic" properties of the type discovered in chemistry in the nineteenth century. By knowing the place in a Periodic table of a phenomenon in social reality, we will know a great deal of its characteristics.

The various societal realms have also different attractions to one another, a fact we spell out in our Table of Valences. The latter table tells about ease and difficulty in the collaboration and integration of societal realms. In the long run, a full merger of societal realms results in increasingly wobbly structures. For example, to merge the body politic and the economy into a socialist society creates an unstable mixture. Likewise, we sense instability coming, when the polity merges with the realm of morality into a Nordic-type welfare state.

Let's speak in larger print of Volume 3, which you are now reading.

In the third Volume, *Fueled by Symbols*, we turn from the use of constructing society by language to find out how we use language to inspire human beings to live in the home that language has built. We prompt ourselves by "justifying vocabularies" and we prompt others by "compelling vocabularies." These vocabularies of motives are short pieces of language with remarkable leverage. This use of symbols makes for civilized life, where conflicts are re-

solved, not by force, but by words, and violence is reduced to the minimum needed to defend civility.

We find that different justifications are used in all subdivisions of society that appear in our periodic system of societal realms. Compelling language shapes personalities by constructing vocabularies of identity. We look at some length at other compelling vocabularies that shape regulations and rights, avoidance of social exclusion, preserving a favorable self-image, and upholding the order that upholds us. The compelling and justifying vocabularies lock into each other in most interesting ways. One such way creates the human conscience. Another makes them work together like the left and right part of a zipper, making for a most reliable day-to-day motivation.

Such vocabularies, not Hobbes' strongmen of the state, give societies the motivations to flourish. Very few tasks of a modern state need overriding physical force for their executions. Instead the body politic needs compelling vocabularies, as do the other realms of civilized societies. To follow the temptation to use shortcuts of violence instead of diplomacy (i.e. language) to exercise ambitions and to solve routine conflicts have been political wisdom in past times. It is unfit as the highway to the future. We argue that those who still practice it are literally "uncivilized." They should, if they persist, be overpowered at the hands of the civilized side, which in this case — and this case alone — is justified to use a necessary measure of physical violence.

The end of Volume 3 is a small watershed in our text. At this point both the writer (certainly) and the reader (probably) can draw a sigh of relief. The main part of our analytical effort has come to an end. Numerous interconnected definitions and a good number of propositions, a total of 66

so far, telling how social reality is created and how it works, are now under our belt. There will be additional definitions and propositions to come, but time has arrived to look at some of the lovely wholes that the already covered ones make possible.

With Volume 4 in the series *The Many-Splendored Society*, we begin presenting details about advanced socio-linguistic areas of life, the societal realms. As mentioned, they are science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality. Each is dominated by usage of some specific types of symbols, and thus depends entirely on language brains. In an animal kingdom without language, they would not develop. Already in the first chapter of the first volume, we saw the emergence of these societal realms and their versions in European history. Now we can go into details about their cardinal values, communication structures, different stratifications, specific reward systems, and their diverse spontaneous orders. A striking fact is that they have the potential of becoming comparatively autonomous parts of society, a collective home for individuals that have civic rights, academic freedom, free trade, artistic license, and freedoms of religion and of conscience. Our slogan "Six Realms with Bounded Independence," signals both a discovery and a bias: science, art, religion, and morality are as important in society as are today's favorites, economy and politics.

Volume 4 is entitled *Knowledge and Beauty* and deals with the social reality of science and art. The societal realm of science contains not only descriptive verbalism. It has openings to the mathematical brain; physical nature has a structure that can be expressed in mathematics. Social science, however, is based on a grammar, i.e. on something found in language — but not necessarily in the old school grammars. Both physical and social sciences are dominated by descriptive discourses that help us understand the world.

The societal realm of art is concerned with aesthetic forms of revelations, appearances, and entries (*Erscheinung)* that are wor-

thy of our contemplation. It also depends on descriptive symbolism, but on a different and more emotive kind that opens a door for people to stay in touch with deep expressions of beauty and also with experiences from pre-language stages and worlds.

Volume 5 is entitled *Wealth and Sacredness* and deals with the social reality of economy and religion; we have now come to Mammon and God. Economy with its focus on wealth uses mostly evaluative language; it is not the goods and services we have that constitute our riches but the evaluation of them. We give particular attention to two pursuits of riches: manufacturing and finance, and test the capacity of our approach to social study to account for economic "bubbles."

Religion with its cardinal value of sacredness also uses mostly evaluative language but of a very different kind than the economy. The fact that language organizes identities and that all language-using beings are mortal has given rise to religions in which selves are turned into souls.

Order and Virtue is the title of Volume 6. It deals with the social reality of the body politic and morality. The body politic is focused on the exercise of power, using the tools of legislation and diplomatic treaties, usually phrased in the commanding speech of prescriptive discourse. A many-splendored society is a federation of societal realms. The key to ruling such a society is a 'central zone' where exponents of the six societal realms meet and interact. It is essential that access to the central zone is open to comers. 'Consent of the governed' takes on new qualities here. The borders of a society are set by the reach of its central zone.

The realm of morality also uses compelling imperatives but of a different kind than political legislation. In the past, morality had a strong focus on how we should cope with biological spontaneities, such as sex and violence. In recent times, a new moral focus has emerged in requiring mankind to live so that the physical environment is sustainable, and live so that the animal kingdom can survive. In a many-splendored society comes an additional new moral requirement of authenticity in the cardinal

values of knowledge, beauty, wealth, sacredness, order, and virtue.

In dealing with grand societal realms two topics become interesting: how do they search for hegemony within their society, and how they seek a global reach? Now and then in the text we look at their infightings within a society: state vs. church, religion vs. science, morality vs. law, business vs. politics, et cetera. Furthermore, we discover that these realms are the main actors in the process of globalization that so preoccupies mankind at this juncture of history.

So far, the accounts of societal realms. What remains are some illustrative interpenetrations between the social world, on the one hand, and the biological and physical worlds on the other. Physicians, ecologists, engineers, and military officers use language-based skills to cope with bodily spontaneities, vagrancies of nature, technologies, and organized violence. In the seventh and final volume called *Life and the Good Life,* we go a very short distance beyond our main task of studying what is created by mankind's language capacity (that is almost "the good life" in Plato's sense) and pursue the impact of some more biologically based life areas. This is where needs for food and shelter and sleep give rise to mankind's tradition of living in households. Sex and reproduction give rise to the tradition of living in generational families. Here is also where biological age sets stages for lifecycles.

Ambition

In all, in these seven short volumes we will tell a story — a social theory — of how man's use of language creates the framework for freedom in a many-splendored society. No author, dead or alive, is a supreme lord over his or her own formulations. New generations make their formulations. As George Herbert Mead (1936, 116) said: "A different Caesar crosses the Rubicon not only with each author but with each generation." I have made several reformulations of the classics of social science and humanities to fit into the above schema, and in order to be

more relevant to the contemporary state of knowledge. The classics are treated, not as monuments, but as stepping stones.

In presenting thoughts and evidence from other authors I have tried to cite or mention those who formulated them first or, at least at an early stage, *and*, at the same time, gave evidence that they more fully understood their importance. Sometimes I underline the buildup from the past by mentioning the original year of publication in the Bibliography. You will find more old references in this text than in most others that profess to be up to date in the twenty-first century. I hope this practice will convince readers that there has been much accumulation of knowledge in the social sciences. I have not included the great number of other supporting statements and additional evidence from later dates than the original discovery.

With some ingenuity that at least sometimes goes beyond conventional wisdom, we may discover how our categories can build a set of testable and consistent propositions that give us an understanding of the past and a handle to cope with the future. Not that a future society can be forecasted, but that our options for the present and the future can be less myopically perceived.

The schema presented in these volumes is not the property of any particular academic discipline. In the latter half of my professional life, I have worked mainly outside universities and their somewhat archaic division of disciplines. Without inhibitions, it easy to draw on brain research, rhetoric, linguistics, semiotics, cultural studies, communications, journalism, public opinion research, demography, jurisprudence, political science, economics, business administration, market research, anthropology, history of ideas, as well as sociology, which was my field as a university professor. I hope that deans of liberal arts faculties will take notice: many of the different courses they offer in these fields have a common base; many overlap with one another. A great rationalization of students' study is possible if you can overcome the straightjacket of the historically given borders of university departments.

This text sums up my intellectual struggles searching for categories in a science of human society, and combining them into informative messages. I have thus expressed many of the ideas presented here before, and sometimes with the same formulations as here.

There are differences between ordinary language and the language of learning and scholarship; we specify a most important one in a distinction used by anthropologists between emic and etic accounts (discussed on page 1: 136 et seq.) However, as mentioned, our categories of social phenomena in this work are based on properties of language. This has opened the intriguing possibility to write advanced social science in a way that can be understood by most everyone!

A Short Aid to First-time Readers

While the professional language about social reality can be made compatible with ordinary language, the layout of a book on social science can differ significantly from pages in a diary, biography, or history book. Readers of *The Many-Splendored Society* are asked to cope with three such differences. By self-publishing, I have designed its typography myself, and the advice does not necessarily apply other texts in social theory.

First, unlike a text of a novel or a detective story in which the reader is challenged to keep track of previously presented characters and intrigues, our text contains numerous explicit cross-references, i.e. points referring to previous sections or sentences. Such is the nature of theorizing, even postmodern attempts. A theory is made up of ideas that hang together. To show that they hang together, we need cross-references.

Starting with a minimum vocabulary of grounded fundamentals, we present layers of details built on top of one another. Or, we present an overall system that is built on subsystems that cannot function without one another. These undertakings require a large number of cross-references in the text. Of course, the many admittedly tedious references in footnotes or running

text can be ignored by readers who are uninterested in nitty-gritty congruence of theoretical arguments.

The *Many-Splendored Society* is long in the making. It is satisfactory to publish it piecemeal in several volumes. The latter represent natural divisions of the subject matters that traditionally have been studied on their own. The base of most of our cross-references in the printed version is simply the volume number and page number. For example, the designation "1: 151" leads you to page 151 in Volume 1, where we report that a universally available wide crack of freedom, in an otherwise deterministic universe, is given to mankind by her use of language.

Another base for cross-references is the numbering of chapters. Tables, figures, and propositions include the sequence number the chapter where they first appeared. Starting with the second edition of Volumes 1 to 3, the footer on each page also indicates the id-number and heading of the chapter. While all volumes stand alone, and can be read on their own, the chapter numbers run continuous from first to last volume, also in the interest of easy cross-referencing.

Second, in this text there are a number of tables that do not contain numbers, but are comprised of words. These tables specify classifications, a backbone of theory in all sciences[1]. To construct a straightforward sentence from a cell in our table of words, you must first read the column heads and, then, the row headings and finally and last, you must pay attention to what is written in the cell. Most people do the reverse, and find it difficult to understand the message of a given cell. The text found around some of our informative "tables of words," such as Table 8.2 on page 2: 74 and Table 8.4 on page 2: 92, give concrete guidance on how to read such tables.

A more advanced means of working with classifications is the so-called "semiotic square," a diagram introduced on page 1: 61 as Figure 3.1. Those who find such a diagram incomprehensible can simply read on in the text to find the intended categories. A semiotic square is actually more of a device for the author of a schema of classification than for the reader of that classification.

An illustration of creative use is found in section "A Semiotic Square: The Discovery of Netorgs" (page 2: 72).

Third, some particularly informative sentences in our text are elevated to be numbered and named Propositions; they are also re-listed in an appendix at the end of each volume. These sentences state some well-grounded probabilities about social reality, sometimes supported by historical records or records systematically collected by researchers, sometimes simply convincingly declared by famous social scientists. Other considerations and conclusions solely based on such Propositions also carry some credibility, albeit attenuated, and some such reasoned hypotheses are occasionally included among our Propositions.

The Propositions summarize something of what I believe belongs to what we at present actually *know* from a scholarly study of society. Our Propositions about social reality are not the same as laws of natural science. The latter are immutable, and calculations and forecasts based on them command credibility. Our Propositions can be negated by social designs employed by rulers and free people – but only at a cost and with a human effort.

We introduce our first Proposition one on page 1:47 where we also describe the nature of our numbered and named Propositions. The freedom we have as human beings to rule over them is presented in another Proposition on pages 1:152. Needless to say, in the vast amount of past, contemporary and future literature of social science, there are other schemas of classification and other propositions, many containing different content and better wording than the ones applied herein.

The most important cross-references in a theory are to its various propositions. If a highly relevant proposition happens to belong in different Volumes, we repeat the content of the proposition in the current text, or if need be, we reproduce the entire proposition in a box in the margin.

My Bias and Advantage

The Many-Splendored Society is written for a general public used to serious reading, and for college and university students

and their teachers in a social science. These seven short volumes offer my pick of a chock full of nuts in the form of exciting discoveries about social reality. At the same time, the text is meant to give professional social scientists a framework which is larger than their own specialty.

I will not and cannot hide the fact that I like the vision of a many-splendored society. However, my focus in these pages is not to convey personal preferences, but to give a broad-sided picture both of social reality and of social science.

A work of this kind can only be attempted by standing on the shoulders of giants, as a saying goes. It is also essential to have good people to give you a lift up, and it is particularly important to have many others who in various projects help you to avoid falling off. In the last chapter to last volume of *The Many-Splendored Society: Life and the Good Life*, I attempt to describe how it all happened, and to thank a number of colleagues and friends who have helped me.

The Many-Splendored Society is dedicated to Karin Busch Zetterberg, partner in marriage and research, and my first reader.

Bromma and Strånäset in Sweden and Fuengirola in Spain in the years 2002-2011.

Hans L Zetterberg

Our Typographical Border Signs of Social Reality

The Many-Splendored Society includes some warning signs when the text drifts off its central topic of language-based social reality. They were introduced in the first volume in the section "Approaching Social Reality" on pages 1: 3-5. Here follows a summary.

[BIO] This book does not focus on biological spontaneities and processes, but when needed to understand social reality we bring them in. When we touch the biological base in a more decisive way, we will flag the occasions by a special sign, [BIO], in the margin of the text or after a heading.

[TECH] Homo sapiens are better at using tools than other beings, and the relation between technology and human social reality is fundamental, but it is not the main topic of this work. The impact of technology on social reality has no separate treatment in this treatise; you find it scattered in the text. However, whenever technology is discussed, you will see a [TECH] in the margin or after a heading.

[NAT] Continents and oceans, valleys and mountains, rivers and lakes, sunshine and rain, earthquakes and tsunamis, and numerous other features of nature have great impact on the shapes of human societies. Ecology has recently gained extraordinary attention. This topic, however, is not the center of attention here, but when we bring it in it is marked by a special sign, [NAT] for nature.

[ANIM] A border between man and animals — or between the speaking animal and other animals — is hinted at times in our text. [ANIM] is our fourth and last sign that we have left our central topic of language-based social reality.

[1] A so called postmodern approach has tried to dispense altogether with stable classifications in the social sciences. This can be done by writing in Saussurian symbols, ever changing symbols referring only to other changing symbols. However, there is in any language, and also in scholarly terminology, what we call Meadian symbols, described on pages 1: 54-58. We appeal on page 1: 93 to a generous use of the latter to achieve more stability in our thinking about social reality.

Introduction: Fuel it with Words

A Vision

Let us sum up where we stand.

Human beings are surrounded by the symbols of their languages. In all parts of the world, social reality consists of edifices of symbols, i.e. social structures that we can build, run, and change by using symbols. In civilized societies, we are free to use the symbols of our language in all sorts of ways. We may even use sentences never before uttered, and bring some of them into play to create other sentences and other societal designs, which have never been tried. Thus mankind has diversified its societies. With some effort, I believe that we can ensure that our diversified societies become and remain many-splendored.

A many-splendored society is an edifice built as a hexagon. Each of the outside six walls hangs on hinges. Each opens to special quarters – we call them realms – that are furnished for science, art, economy, religion, polity, and morality. The hinges are the values we call cardinal since they have extraordinary importance. These are knowledge, beauty, wealth, sacredness, order, and morality. All six realms are products of language, structured by language. Six varieties of freedom prevail in this abode: academic freedom, artistic license, freedom of production and trade, religious freedom, civic liberties, and freedom of conscience. Providers and Procurers run their paths between the six sides of the building. The middle court of the hexagon is a Central Zone where men and women of competence, taste, class, piety, power, and virtue meet and inspire. They talk less about one another and more with one another, and they jointly guard the entire nexus of freedoms. The whole arrangement is many-splendored, as a diamond, as long as the sides of the gem are cut in the shape of a hexagon in which none of the six realms overwhelms the other realms.

Figure 1. A Many-Splendored Hexagon and Its Central Yard



A given society extends exactly as far into the world as its central zone is recognized and is inspiring. This is our very definition of society, as presented in the previous volume on pages 2: 211-213. In earlier generations, central zones of imperial and colonial powers had far reaches, at least their political and economic realms. The present generation lives in a time during which another type of global society is emerging. This global society has gone far in the realms of science and art (particularly music); it continues to develop an ever more global economy. By comparison, globalization is lagging in the body politic, and in realms such as religion and morality.

It is important to note that the concept of a society, and particularly a global society, has little or nothing to do with old-fashioned conceptions of "nations," or "nation states." Such notions can never be global. The growth of a global society depends ultimately on the reach of its societal realms. Their reaches by way of communicative symbols can be global.

Motives

How shall we handle human motivation to live in an edifice constructed by symbols? Again the best answer is: Let's do it with words! We fuel and lubricate lives in an edifice built by symbols with other symbols, i.e. essentially with words. These 'vocabularies of motives' are symbols with big effects. They are the topic of this book.

The language used to motivate contains different expressions: some serving as fuels and some serving as lubricants. Both scholars and writers of fiction have distinguished between fuels and lubricants in using vocabularies of motives. The fuels appeal to strong human drives, self-survival or self-assertion of different kinds, for example, in the form of money, power, glory, but also sexual conquests and threats of violence. Lubricants are loftier, pleasing, humane, pious, or emotional arguments, often citing the benefits for everyone, not only for the specific individuals whom we want to influence. Lubricants, more than fuels, are easily cited in public.

Terms borrowed from engineering, such as "fuels" and "lubricants," are usually misplaced in social science. In the human world, however, we deal with situations in which fuels and lubricants are parts of free messages we exchange in conversation with one another. They may be 'vocabularies of motives,' i.e., small sets of words with significant and major consequences. To my knowledge, the phrase vocabulary of motives was first used in social science by the young C. Wright Mills (1940).

In the following chapters, we shall analyze certain important vocabularies used in human encounters to shape, maintain, and change social reality. I shall suggest that vocabularies of motives are of two different kinds. We use 'vocabularies of justifications' to motivate our own actions. 'Compelling vocabularies' are what others use to motivate us, and what we might use to motivate others. These two categories of vocabularies represent enormous forces in shaping man's existence. The leverage of these small sets of words fascinates and mystifies. They epitomize the power of the language brain. Superficially, it may seem that compelling

vocabularies are stronger than justifying vocabularies, but actions can also result from the joint operation of both. In such a case, motivation can be strong enough to compete with bodily spontaneities and, in a majority of circumstances, be strong enough to serve as a substitute for violence as a means of social control.

Justifying and compelling vocabularies have no monopoly in shaping human life. Bodily spontaneities accompanied by lusts or pains have their given impacts. The forces represented by the latter are many: birth, growth, decay, and death; sexual maturation and sex activities of different kinds; bodily prowess; marking territory; finding and maintaining shelter; seeking nourishment; eating and drinking; maintaining body temperature; urination and defecation; cleanliness; resting and sleeping; playing and dancing; courtship and mating; caring for and protecting offspring; aggression and establishing genetic pecking orders; flight and migration; violence, and many others[2].

We choose to refrain from joining the interesting game of assessing the strongest motives of mankind. Our ambition is limited to locating a selection of major motives embedded in the ordinary use of language.

To link a person's actions to those of others by means of language is an old art. There are several recent books on the common uses of language to shape life. One is by Jonathan Haidt (2006) who searched for modern truth in ten ancient ideas of wisdom. Another is by Steven Pinter, who explored a larger number of motivating sayings, all grounded in semantic research, in his book *The Stuff of Thought* (2007). Books like these illustrate that the philosopher John R. Searle (1995), who defined social reality as shaped by language, was right in leaving the further investigation of this field to scientists who test hypotheses and systems against systematically collected evidence.

Again and again we note that it is difficult for an untrained observer to analyze everyday vocabularies. Familiarity, unfortunately, does not breed analytical effort. Instead, it makes us skip

over analysis, as Bo Anderson reminded me during the writing of this book:

> It has been pointed out repeatedly that we are often ignorant about very familiar things. A philosophier ... put it this way: "das Bekannte ist, darum weil es bekannt ist, nicht erkannt". The familiar is not known, because it is familiar. No, it was not Wittgenstein who said it ... but the young Hegel. The "habitus" that governs our daily lives, is a set of perceptual, affective, cognitive and behavioral habits that we take for granted and do not much reflect over. (Anderson 2007).

In the following pages we are not going to take familiar matters for granted. To learn about people's motivation in shaping social reality we will have to be pedantic also about familiar everyday affairs.

The Text Ahead

Our review of motivation in society begins in Chapter 11. (I count chapters from the beginning of the first volume of *The Many-Splendored Society*.) Chapters 11 and 12 are devoted to *justifying* vocabularies, a peculiarly human phenomenon in which we explain to one another why we do what we do. We start with justifications found in the main partitions of social reality, i.e. the different societal realms of science, economy, body politic, art, religion, and morality. We find different justifications for what we do in these different corners of society; not everywhere do people cry out "we do it for money." Sometimes they do it for power, for curiosity, for God's sake, or some other reason. Chapter 12 reviews ideological and universal justifications and ends with justifications embodied in national creeds.

In Chapters 13 to 16 we present *compelling* vocabularies, i.e. what others say about us and tell us to do. We review the far-reaching implications of simple ideas such as the fact that people trust those who are like themselves more than they trust people unlike themselves. We look at the trustfulness of our own self and deal with the survival of individual selves, for example, the avoidance of social exclusion and the preservation of a favorable

self-image. As humans, however, we are also trustful of others, for example, abetting the survival of our beneficial encounters and upholding the order that upholds us.

In Chapter 17, the final one in this volume, we attempt a synthesis of – or, better expressed, find a "zipper" between – justifying and compelling vocabularies. We conclude that ordinary words in the zipped vocabularies actually can arrest a society's disintegration into the chaos of everybody's war against everyone else. Every act of violence signals an existing inadequacy in our vocabularies of motives. To minimize this inadequacy is a civilized pursuit.

The wonderful constructive tool that is language must be protected from being turned into a tool of destruction. Marks of civilized living are found where there are lawful restrictions on "hate speech," on totalitarian "re-education," and on "stalking the soul" to erode the identity of other persons.

Old-fashioned Marxists will have difficulties with this book. Their historical materialism holds that causes in societal history are material. However, here we hold that social reality is shaped by mere vocabularies, albeit grounded in different domains. These turfs are not material, but part of an edifice that is also built by symbols.

This presentation will also create difficulties for political scientists and political philosophers trapped in the idea that the state needs an overriding physical force in order to do its job. Above all, the state needs compelling and justifying vocabularies, as do other realms of society. We begin and end this book with discussions of the use of force versus the use of words.

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[2] [BIO] We hinted at activities of needs and lusts in the discussion on pages 1: 37-40 in Volume 1 of *The Many-Splendored Society: Surrounded by Symbols*. We plan to briefly elaborate on the social impact of some of them in Volume 7 subtitled *Life and the Good Life.*

11. Vocabularies of Justification

Words versus Weapons in Ancient Athens

[BIO] A common alternative to words in shaping community life is physical force, that is, some form of violence involving bodily harm, or threats thereof. At bottom, violence is a bodily spontaneity. It is one of the many activities of need and lust open to humans and other animals. Some of Europe's hooligans, who travel to attend the soccer matches of their teams, can attest that there is pure fun in a physical fight. The frustration of a defeat of their team makes their extra aggression natural, something long known in academic psychology (Dollard, et al. 1939, 12). A much unpublicized aspect of war is that some participants enjoy it. But, to the aversion of even more participants, most wars are conducted by military bureaucratic hierarchies, void of amusement.

Violence can be structured and become a part of the activities of a network or of an organization. The structured violence of police, mafias, terrorist networks, and armed forces is much more significant in human history than any idiosyncratic act of violence done all on its own. The violence of hooligans, mafias, and terrorists can be countered by the violence of the police. The modern military, like the police, is normally used to control violence, not to incite it.

The historian of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE), Thucydides, records a turning point in the civilization of his part of the world when he tells how Athenians prohibited the carrying of arms in the city:

> The whole of Hellas used once to carry arms, their habitations being unprotected and their communication with each other unsafe; indeed, to wear arms was as much a part of everyday life with them as with the barbarians. And the fact that the people in these parts of Hellas are still living in the old way points to a time when the same mode of life was once equally

> common to all. The Athenians were the first to lay aside their weapons, and to adopt an easier and more luxurious mode of life (Thucydides 431 BCE / 1952, ch 1, para 6).

Here started the long – and if you consider, for example, gun control in the United States – still, unfinished, journey to confine the use of weapons in a community to specially trained and regulated marshals and warriors, and to restrict interaction between the inhabitants in such a community to a non-violent, "luxurious" mode of life.

Proposition 3:4 recalled. The Master Trend of Civility and The Master Trend of Rationality: The history of mankind is (a) a slow but increasing expanse of language-based activities, both in absolute and relative terms, in comparison with mankind's pre-language activities, and (b) a slow but increasing proportion of language activities based on rationality, both in comparison with the pre-language activities and in comparison with all language activities. (1: 79)

[TECH] We should separate bodily violence without weapons from violence with arms. Arms are any technological devices to assist violent behavior. Scuffles change character when arms are involved. The Athenians certainly could come to close blows inside the city, but the combatants were not to use swords or other weapons. The name of Alcibiades, a beautiful and strong man and a master of such blows, turns up several times in the records of the City.

Inside the city of Athens, life should be ruled by words, not swords. The study of motivating words was called rhetoric in ancient Greece and Rome. Rhetoric originally dealt with persuasions and oratory, but has in recent centuries been broadened to include all sorts of discourses. Classical rhetoric was made up of "logos," "pathos," and "ethos."

Logos is easy to understand; it means shaping your thinking and speech by rationality, the orderly, efficient, and consistent use of the symbols by the language brain. The orator using logos persuades by reasoning, for example, showing that some premises we have agreed upon lead to definite consequences.

Let us take an example of logos that is modern and that was totally alien to any orator in ancient Athens. I will use this illustration of logos to indicate that it is both possible and easy to improve on classical thinking.

If we agree (1) that over the generations an ever larger share of mankind's acts consists of symbols, and (2) that male and female brains are equally good at the use of symbols, then it follows that (3), over the generations, there will be an ever larger share of gender equality, a reasoning we used . This premise was included in our Proposition 3:4 in Volume 1 of this work, and is reproduced here. This Proposition also purports that rationality actually grows in human history. This is a correction to the Platonic idea that logos is once and for all given and permanent.

Proposition 5:4 recalled. *Emotive Rational Choice:* (a) In scanning a symbolic environment or part thereof man initially reacts to the symbols, if any, that have emotive charges and then to the executive symbols. (b) In this reaction, negative emotive symbols get greater attention than positive emotive symbols. (c) If all symbols are roughly equally executive, i.e. emotive meanings are spread evenly or are absent, man exercises rational choice as otherwise takes place only after overcoming initial emotive reactions. (1: 157)

Pathos used by an orator gives his messages an emotional tone, not just the rational one required by logos. This emotive component may be positive or negative, frightening or comforting. Recent research in social psychology has clarified the processes. We reviewed such findings in a section titled Emotive and Rational Choice (pages 1: 155-159 in Volume 1) and summarized them as Proposition 5:4, which is also reproduced in the margin here. Thus, we have not rejected but have updated the "pathos" of ancient rhetoric with certain contemporary thoughts. Pathos draws easy attention to an idea, but then it takes a follow-up of genuine intellectual effort, i.e. logos, to deal rationally with that idea.

Ethos in ancient times had a meaning that is less obvious to those of us living in the twenty-first century. Ethos stood for the appeal to practices which were honored, skillful, or expertly

executed. An example would be an orator's recollection of Solon's work to replace tyranny with democracy. Solon (638–558 BCE), as you remember, was considered to be the founding father of Athens, and was, thus, loaded with authority.

Ethos, unlike logos and pathos, is not a formal property of the orator's language. It is a property of certain social structures or processes in his society. Today, we are aware – and we will repeat on page 3: 21 below – that there are different kinds of ethos in the various societal realms. These varieties of ethos may be scholarly acumen, commercial or political skills, artistic, religious, or moral virtuosities.

The Greek, in their rhetoric, had some inkling of this in their appeals to the gods. They appealed to Pallas Athena in matters of philosophy and wisdom (what we call science). They referred to Hermes in matters of trade and commerce (economy). They could honor and appeal to Zeus in matters of law and order and defense (the body politic). They pleaded with Apollo for music and to the three muses (the realm of art). The latter eventually developed to require nine different muses.

Those who have read the Periodic Table of Societal Realms (2: 222-223) can locate all the classical forms of rhetoric in abbreviated form here in the Table 11.1 on page 11.. In this chapter, we will show that this table also houses other justifications than those in classical rhetoric.

For several centuries inside ancient Athens, a rule by words and an efficient use of rhetoric had an upper hand over the rule by armed violence. Verbal dominance inside the city was aided by the cultivation of a sense of justice (*dike*) and by a sensitivity to public opinion (*aidos*) which we shall deal with in Volume 6: *Order and Morality* under the heading "Creating Politics."

Nevertheless, the balance between violence and words was precarious in Athenian society, partly because rhetoric could be used also to entice and celebrate armed violence.

Wars against external enemies were certainly supported by Athenian rhetoric. It should be said, however, that this rhetoric was reluctant to celebrate individual military killings. Hellenic

warriors did not wear trophies of the enemies that they had killed as did some of the neighboring barbarians. In passing, we might remember that some Americans indulged in such barbarian practice when they fought their way across their new continent with hand guns, keeping the scalps of the Native Americans they had killed in their belts. The contemporary armed forces of the United States, however, have returned to a more Greek concept of military honor; soldiers are not decorated with Medals of Honor for a large number of killings, but for brave, tactical deeds, rescuing comrades, holding the front line, and the like.

Table 11.1. Appearances of Logos, Pathos, and Ethos in the Periodic Table of Social Reality.

A		1	2	3	4	5	6
		Science	Economy	Polity	Art	Religion	Morality
B	Critical symbols	<----------Pathos------->					
C	Cardinal values	Knowledge	Wealth	Order	Beauty	Sacredness	Virtue
G	Rationality	<----------Logos---------->					
	<----------Ethos---------->						
K	Organizations	Scholarly acumen	Commercial skills	Ruling skills	Artistic virtuosity	Religious virtuosity	Moral virtuosity
L	Networks						
M	Mass media						
N	Netorgs						
O	Makers						
P	Brokers						
Q	Takers						
R	Providers						
S	Procurers						

The letters and numbers in the margin are taken from The Periodic Table of Social Reality on pages 2: 222-223.

Wise men among the ancient Chinese, like those in ancient Greece, did not rejoice in slaughtering enemy armies. The objectives of the enemy were to be thwarted, and this could be done in more or less efficient ways. Based on war-time experiences before and during the unification of China, Sun-Tzu writes:

> The art of warfare is this: It is best to keep one's own state intact; to crush the enemy's state is only a second best. --- (T)he best military policy is to *attack strategies*; the next to attack alliances; the next to attack soldiers; and the worst to assault walled cities. --- Therefore, the expert in using the military subdues the enemy's forces without going to battle, takes the enemy's walled cities without launching an attack, and crushes the enemy's state without a protracted war (Sun-Tzu c. 300BCE/1993, 111 italics supplied).

There are more favorable options to employ for the military to win than to use armed forces to outright slaughter the enemy, states this most famous student of military endeavors.

In ancient Athens, we note another innovation favoring the rule of words over the rule by arms. The Greeks actually tested prohibition of the most lethal weapons which killed at a distance. These were arrows and catapults in those days. The Romans introduced restrictions on the export of breast plates; a type of regulation that has a modern ring. Disarmament and prohibition of the spread of certain lethal weaponry have an older history than most of today's advocates of such measures realize.

Modern disarmament at the time of this writing has a long and difficult agenda (Blix, Hans, Chaiman, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission 2006). The foci on arms reduction, inhuman weapons, and restrictions on international arm trade make us often forget the second factor in the equation of "rule by words, not arms:" namely, to develop the symbolic environment in societies so that *use of language becomes a more effective and definite way to achieve the order of a society than the use of armed violence*. This requires the embedding of rules by words, not arms, in all parts of the social structure. This is a much more demanding task than both conventional rhetoric and the sophisticated superficiality of modern public relations. This embedding also goes beyond modern diplomacy, as it must penetrate the total population[3]. The total population, not just diplomats,

should actually also enjoy some version of "diplomatic immunity" from intrusion by force from state agencies.

Most individual violence is triggered by external situations, although the roots and force of the violence may be found among bodily spontaneities of genetic and glandular needs and lusts. Many violent situations, involving individual or collectivities, can be avoided by social designs, which keep us from the temptation to use violence.

Domestic violence is prescribed in some religions, an uncivilized practice. The civilized way is to solve conflicts by words. In the closeness and privacy of small modern families, there are few designs available to avoid the lead-us-not-into-temptation-of-violence. This may account for the high level of domestic violence recorded in the diaries of patrolling police officers who happen to care; not all do.

At any rate, individual violence is not particularly efficient in social interactions. This is why non-violent individual acts in society vastly outnumber violent acts (Collins 2008).

A main avenue in ensuring peace for mankind is a civilizing substitution process in which structured non-violence replaces structured violence. The serious form of violence, as mentioned, is police power, military or paramilitary organizations and networks. Their violence is acceptable only when it assists the civilizing substitution process, not when it reinstates a rule of swords and puts mankind back to square one.

Let us turn to the topic of vocabularies of motives to learn more on this score before we return to the coping with violence.

Asking for Justifications

When people act in their encounters, they simultaneously, if prompted, speak to justify their acts. The simplest justification is an appeal to tradition: "We have always done it this way." It sometimes happens, of course, that people may have nothing to say and that the act is not traditional; then their act may be seen as arbitrary. The latter is rarely tolerated. "Arbitrary justice" is no justice. "Arbitrary killing" is worse than any other killing. "Arbi-

trary grading" in schools represents a random judgment which is worse than no grading.

Paul F Lazarsfeld found a social psychological goldmine in justifying sentences. He developed "the art of asking why," the asking for justifications, into what he called "reason analysis." In an early paper on consumers' choice among brands of soap and other products (P. F. Lazarsfeld 1935), he found that in any purchase on the consumer market, influences from earlier encounters with products are recalled, relevant attributes of the product are evaluated, and self-reported motives of the buyer can be recorded. At the core of this talk is the researcher's "accounting scheme" that listens to what the actor preferred, liked, and disliked about his previous choice or situation, what he preferred, liked and disliked about his prospective choice or situation, and, equally important, what kind of triggering event caused him to change his course to the latter alternative. Lazarsfeld used the same scheme in a study with Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet (1944) on political choice, e.g. voting for candidates for president. His student, Peter Rossi (1955), used the scheme in a thesis *Why Families Move* that rightly became appreciated.

In working with this type of analysis on interview data, I have found it rewarding to incorporate our distinction between emotive and rational choice (page 1:155-158). All three elements, the previous, the prospective, and the trigger, carry more or less of rational and more or less of emotive charges.

Conversions

In a political conversion from one party to another or one ideology to another, the emotive charge of the trigger event, for example, a political scandal or "affair," may be decisive. In his mind, however, a convert could long have been aware, not only of the public views of his own party or candidate, but also of the views of an opposition party and candidate. A conversion means that two views change places in his mind. New views become his professed ones after a conversion triggered by the feelings aroused by the political scandal. This can happen suddenly, but the process of learning and thinking in new ways has

been going on a considerable time prior to the conversion. William James had already in 1902 noted that the process of conversion is apparently similar in cases of religious persuasion and political convictions (1936, 207).

In a democracy, a party's loss from a political scandal depends not, primarily, on its publicized wickedness or heinousness, as most journalists and commentators believe. The main effect on party standing of a scandal is a function of the number of party followers who, prior to the scandal, have become familiar with an alternative party. In the main, political scandals are trigger events for changes of political preferences that have been long in the making.

It is a sad commentary on education in social science that survey researchers and pollsters, in particular, keep assuming that the *research* question "Why did you make this choice?" is one single *interview* question. The research problem involves at least three separate interview questions: previous choice, prospective choice, and trigger event. If you, in addition, have to measure the emotive charges of each of these, you will need even more interview questions.

Misplaced Choice of Justifications

In a fresh approach in French sociology, Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot have revived and greatly expanded justifications as their focus:

> Justifiable acts are our focus: we shall draw out all the possible consequences from the fact that people need to justify their actions. In other words, people do not ordinarily seek to invent false pretexts after the fact so as to cover up some secret motive, the way one comes up with an alibi; rather, they seek to carry out their actions in such a way that these can withstand the test of justification (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991, 38 in the 2006 English edition).

These scholars show that different parts of society promote different justifications. The various social worlds in which we move have their specific justifications. We may smile at justifica-

tions that are misplaced and ignore them. Here are three examples from Boltanski and Thévenot. The authors say that "it should be intuitively obvious that there is something incongruous or awkward about each one" (*op. cit.* page 227).

At home, to get his children's attention, a father presents a glowing picture of his ability to direct a project at work.

At a meeting, a chapter secretary suddenly appears on the podium, takes the floor and speaks passionately; he lets his imagination run wild, uses bizarre wordplays, and finally confesses that he is unsure of his own thinking.

In a workshop, a machine operator offers a gift to an expert who has come to measure the production capacities of the machine for which the operator is responsible, and asks the expert to write a recommendation for his son, a well-mannered computer technician who is unemployed.

The authors give these examples their keen analytical explanations. We can repeat them using the slightly different terminology of Volume 2 of this treatise, *The Many-Splendored Society*.

The first example is an attempt of a father to use a justification from *City Life* in *Folk Life*. A father in his family and household cannot justify his claim that his wife and children obey him by saying: "Pay attention to what I say because I made good deals on the market yesterday." This justification may work to support an argument with his co-workers on his job in a Gesellschaft, but not in his domestic setting which is a Gemeinschaft. The distinction between the two was worked out on pages 2: 148-153.

The second example is a small scandal caused by using *emotive* language in a situation that calls for *executive* language. A rational executive process in a civic organization is interrupted by a kind of emotive behavior and personal confessions that are justified in a sect. The otherness of formal organizations and sects was presented on pages 2: 87-90.

The third example shows confusion between justifications in an industrial *organization* and in a personal *network* of acquaintances. Gifts and requests for recommendations for a family member belong in the latter, not in the former. The division be-

tween organizations and networks was discussed on pages 2: 73-87.

Misplaced justifications occur also in public policy discussions. For example, certain critics of the restrictive measures taken in the United States in the wake of the 9/11 terror — such as airport security, monitoring of the Internet, checking cell phone traffic — argue that the measures lack justification because only 3,000 people were killed by the collapse of the Twin Towers, while 40,000 Americans die each year in automobile accidents. The incongruence here is that 3,000 died in an attack on the American way of life, while the 40,000 died in practicing the American way of life.

The Scope of Justifications

Balzac, Tolstoy, Proust, Joyce and the other great novelists are ahead of anthropologists/sociologists in the endeavor to map justifications. The same is true for Shakespeare, Molière, and the great dramatists. Sophocles' drama *Antigone* presented the Athenians with a clear example of the clash between the justifications used in the family and those used by the state. Oedipus' daughter Antigone follows the wishes of any family to give her brother Polyneices, a fallen rebel, a worthy funeral. Athens' ruler, Creon, follows the dictate of statecraft to strip the enemy of all honors. Based on this principle, he justifies his decision to throw the body of Polyneices to the dogs. The conflict cannot be resolved: the tragedy is built into a differentiated society in which different arenas use different justifications.

The scope of the task to study justifications thus looks huge. Some justifications may be confabulations invented ex post facto. We have learned to discount their authenticity in social science, just as we discount the verbiage of magic and defensive bilge (1: 63-77).

[BIO] Biological spontaneities and categories also produce justifications. You can justify acts by reference to your hunger, need of sleep, and escape from danger, in fact, any activity involving lusts and pain. Thus, lists of bodily spontaneities – such

as the one found in Volume 1 in our Table 2.1 on page 1: 39 – can be used to identify and classify biological justifications. "I didn't come to the party because I had to sleep," is such a justification. We know that a blanket use of bodily spontaneities as justification for anti-social behavior is rare, or non-existent, in all cultures. Cultures influenced by Islam and Christianity are particularly strict in sexual matters.

When bodily spontaneity becomes embedded in symbolic environments and meets its norms and compelling vocabularies, particularly those with many "Do's" and "Don'ts", the well-known traumas of childhood arise: the learning of toilet practices, table manners, the suppression of incestuous impulses, the control of tantrums, fighting and other forms of violence. They result in *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, "civilization's discontents" as Sigmund Freud (1930) taught us.

We may well call the social norms used to control bodily spontaneities 'Unbehagen norms.' (In the more developed ethics they are part of a complex of 'norms of hygiene.') Some Unbehagen norms may be more necessary than others; each culture and each generation seem to have opinions about this. However, the freedom for the language brain that we have discovered (and celebrated) does not imply freedom for the pre-language brains. Outside the realm of modern art and the *vie de bohème*, justifications to explore the limits of Unbehagen norms are not generally deemed to be self-evident. The justification "I could not resist the temptation" usually states a truth, but is not normally an acceptable justification. We shall deal with justifications grounded in the non-language brain and biological, physical, and technological realities in Volume 7. Here we shall stay within social reality.

Needless to say, some justifications are always dated, and some are questionable. To "justify justifications" is a continuous chore of intellectuals. For example, the idea that older brothers are superior to younger brothers, and that all brothers are superior to their sisters requires justifications. Such justifications were available in old times, but are not available to a modern

Western intellectual in a civilization in which all essentials in society depend on language abilities that do not differ significantly between grown-up brothers of different ages, nor between brothers and sisters.

The ambition of the social scientist, as opposed to the goals of writers of novels and dramas needing concreteness and detail, is to reduce the multitude of individual justifications to a small number of categories.

Boltanski and Thévenot demonstrate with their book that a systematic study of justifications requires a conception of a broader society. They divide society into six worlds: The Inspired World, The Domestic World, The World of Fame, The Civic World, The Market World, and The Industrial World. Each one is shown to have its vocabulary of justifications. An update of the rewarding research using these categories has been provided by Dahlberg (2010, 63).

We will use our own division of social worlds, which is more detailed, but easily reconciled, with that of Boltanski and Thévenot. This division is found in our Periodic Table of Societal Realms. This division of social reality was our crowning task in the previous volume on pages 2: 222-223. It is a table of 108 cells, partially reproduced as Table 11.1 on page 3: 11 above.

Each cell in the Periodic Table of Societal Realms depicts people sharing something or doing something different than the people in all the other cells. Such differences tent to require justifications. Thus, from each cell of the Periodic Table of Societal Realms you can hear distinct and different justifications for carrying out the tasks typical of that cell.

We can bring some order into the sea of genuine justifications by first looking, not at single cells in our tables, but by looking for 'home turfs' of justifications. Any use of a justification outside its home turf is "misplaced" in the sense of Boltanski and Thévenot. To sustain the use of a justification outside its home base people may need to resort to motivation from authorities, or from use the force of compelling vocabularies, or from a use of deprivations or violence.

We find home turfs across rows or columns in many tables we have presented in this work. The Periodic Table of Societal Realms is particularly useful in this respect. 'Home turfs' can now be defined as adjacent cells in the rows or columns of this Table.

To match justifications to their home turfs is a rewarding pursuit. It will clarify the notion that "interests never lie," an idea that is usually attributed to Marx or Lenin, but is not, as far as I can tell, a literal quote from either, but is, rather, an apt summary of a central aspect of their view of politics.

We talk about a 'lasting symbolic environment' to refer to any language used during a span of several generations. A 'differentiated symbolic environment' is one in which we find all kinds of language, specifically, both a tri-section of descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive language and a bi-section of executive and emotive language (1: 145-150). A most general Proposition on "Categories of Justifications" may read like this:

> Proposition 11:1. *Categories of Justifications*: In lasting and differentiated symbolic environments, there is a tendency for justifications to emerge as common features within 'home turfs' of a social structure, i.e. adjacent cells of rows or columns in the Periodic System of Social Reality. Outside these "home turfs" justifications are as a rule not spontaneous and need support of compelling vocabularies or other rewards and punishments to function as motivation.

Our proposition on Categories of Justifications delivers some well-known "ethos" that was present already in ancient Greek rhetoric.

We learn from this Proposition that justifications have 'home turfs' in which they emerge. Now we can turn to the Periodic Table of Societal Realms (abridged above on page 3: 11 as Table 11.1, full version on pages 2: 222-223 in Volume 2) and discuss the justifications that are hidden in its combinations of cells in columns and rows. We shall be selective here and only take up a few of the logical possibilities that exist in this way of specifying Proposition 11:1.

Cardinal Values as Motives

Knowledge, wealth, order, beauty, sacredness, and virtue are what we call cardinal values and they occupy Row D in our Periodic Table. The cardinal values figure often in mankind's justifications. In chapter 10 (in Volume 2) we learned that they are language products that are specific to the societal realms of science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality

There is a very special quality to these values. You do not need a mass of statistics and history to appreciate this. From everyday life we know that that knowledge is preferable to ignorance, that wealth is preferable to poverty, that order is preferable to chaos, that beauty is preferable to ugliness, that a life with transcendent or sacred meanings is preferable to a life devoid of meaning, and that virtue is preferable to iniquity. Everyday life is an affirmation of its cardinal values.

> Proposition 5:5 recalled. *Evaluative Motives*. Humans in a shared symbolic environment are (a) inclined to act to preserve the customary evaluations they receive in this environment, be these high or low, and (b) they are inclined to act so that they avoid receiving more unfavorable evaluations than these. (1: 164.)

Apparently, the special quality is a motivating quality in these values. In other words, to have more of a cardinal value is preferable to having less. We will elevate this idea as our most important separate Proposition in the study of vocabularies of motives.

> Proposition 11:2. *Motivations from Cardinal Values:* In lasting and differentiated symbolic environments, there is a tendency to develop a preference for more, rather than less, of cardinal values, i.e. of more knowledge, more wealth, more order, more beauty, more sacredness, and more virtue.

Here we see a true force of human history.

The seventeenth century was a "grand century" in Europe, and it is referred to in this manner in French history. An even more general belief in progress became the hallmark of the

eighteenth century, the period of European Enlightenment. This belief made justifications in terms of grand or gradual improvements in knowledge, wealth, order, beauty, sacredness, and virtue seem natural.

The goal of the European religious realm had long been paradise. With the Enlightenment, paradise moved from heaven to earth and was extended into all societal realms. Paradise was nothing less than knowledge generated and delivered, wealth generated and delivered, order generated and delivered, beauty generated and delivered, sacredness and republican virtue generated and delivered.

This is what made Europe a temporary winner on the global scene during two recent centuries[4]. This is what had made China the winner in previous centuries.

The motivational significance of cardinal values makes them figure prominently in the vocabularies which people use to justify their actions. These justifications follow two models:

"I (we) did it to reach and secure more of a cardinal value."

"I (we) did it to avoid losing a cardinal value."

The loss of an amount of a cardinal value affects human motivation more than a gain of the same amount. Proposition 5:5 on page 1: 164 in Volume 1 and reproduced above summarizes evidence of an extra impetus in humankind in its effort to avoid any degree of degradation. Sentences of the second model may provide a stronger justification than the first.

Justification by Cardinal Values

We may add two additional aspects of social reality when we explore the justifications that come with cardinal values, namely the *lifestyle* that is typical of the bearer of the cardinal values, and a measure usually called *stratification* of the cardinal values, i.e. a measure that tells if a bearer, individual or collectivity, possesses or controls more or less of a particular cardinal value.

In Table 11.2 we have listed various categories such as lifestyles, cardinal values and their stratifications that reproduce the corresponding justifications.

Table 11.2. Justifications by Cardinal Values.

A		1	2	3	4	5	6
		Science	Economy	Polity	Art	Religion	Morality
C	Lifestyles	Learning buffs	Money centered	Civic minded	Aesthetes	Believers	Passionate
D	Cardinal values	Knowledge	Wealth	Order	Beauty	Sacredness	Virtue
E	Stratification	Competence	Class	Power	Taste	Piety	Rectitude
	Justifications	*Learned justifications*	*Economic justifications*	*Political justifications*	*Aesthetic justifications*	*Religious justifications*	*Moral justifications*

Learned Justifications

From the cluster of cells from A1 to E1 in Table 11.2 we hear lines of learned justifications: "We did it to obtain better knowledge about X." "We did it so that we would not to lose our intelligence about X." These are justifications typical among those who practice the lifestyle of Learning Buffs. Thus, in everyday life they may justify a subscription to the weekly news or science magazine, and they may justify a quick report of our change of address to the subscription office to ensure we keep receiving the magazine by referring to the search for knowledge. To learn a foreign language and to keep it usable is also justified in this manner. The amount of knowledge available in the modern world is unprecedented. The justification of curiosity instilled in formal schooling competes with justifications from institutions outside the educational system, i.e. "the school of hard knocks," and from justifications at "the school of social media," as well as justifications learned from the conventional mass media. A form of learned justification refers to the reputation of the

source of information. An appeal to a statement from a scholar or an intellectual who, within a field of knowledge, is well reputed for his or her competence (Cell E1) is a better justification for a belief than an appeal to a controversial scholar or to an amateur scholar or to an intellectual with known biases.

Learning Buffs have developed the search for knowledge into a lifestyle. They have dedicated their lives to learning ever more. Their self-image is shaped by how much they know. We find them in libraries, in study groups, at the bookstore shelf for non-fiction, in archives, and in laboratories. For them, learning is not a phase in life: it is a life-long mission. They are exceptionally eager to uncover facts and connections are their discourses. They subscribe to journals such as Scientific American and National Geographic or their counterparts in other countries. On Internet they were the first to use and develop the Wikipedia. In their reading they prefer non-fiction to fiction, and in their viewing they prefer documentaries to plays. They are attracted to education and to the realm of science. (1: 40)

The Money-Centered have a lifestyle focused on wealth. They pay attention on making money, saving money, investing money, and per-haps above all to spend money. Quick to spot their own needs or the needs of others, they scan the horizon for quality, novelty, value for money, or outright bargains. They may be quality consumers, or bar-gain consumers, pioneering consumers, or consumers of the tried and true. Producing or consuming, they know prices, and they can tell what is profitable or not. They may spend more time on the business pages and advertisements of their newspaper than on politics and culture. They are attracted to the realm of economy. (1: 41)

These types of justifications are common in the lifestyle we call Learning Buffs (Cell C1), one of the many-splendored lifestyles. They are drawn to education and science. You find them in libraries and as students in adult evening courses.

Economic Justifications

From Cells A2-E2, we hear lines of economic justifications:

"We did it to increase our income and capital."

"We did it to avoid losing money."

These are justifications typical among those who practice the lifestyle of the Money-Centered. They are persons who since John Stuart Mill's days have been called *Homo economicus.* Others than Mill, made "economic man" popular as a creature of modern city life (Gesellschaft) rather than folk life (Gemeinschaft). In a Gemeinschaft, economic transactions are more based on reciprocal du-

ties than on individual profits. In a Gesellschaft, by contrast, Money-Centered lifestyles are legion.

The use of the language of the economic man as justifications is so common in modern society that we have mostly ceased to analyze and contemplate it. It takes extreme cases to make us stop and wonder. For example, there are Japanese workers who, in the new century, say that they prefer to work nights rather than daytime since hourly pay is better at night. Then they spend long hours at their computers looking in the modern way for bargains on the Internet — while daytime work-places in the manufacturing and shopping areas may be undermanned.

Political Justifications

The Civic-Minded discuss politics, and they may turn up at demonstrations, for they believe it is important to manifest their views in order to try to influence events; on balance, however, discussions are more important to them than mere manifestations. Nor are they averse to working within their movement or party; they will readily plunge into committee work or act as chairperson. They prefer to associate with like-minded people engrossed in politics and community life, and many of them have little time for small talk. They are attracted to public administration and to the realm of body politic. (1: 42)

From Cells A3-E3 in our Table, we hear words of political justifications:

"We did it to achieve a better order of things."

"We did it to avoid disorder and chaos."

These are justifications typical among those practicing the lifestyle of the Civic-Minded.

Order is a general characteristic and should not be confused with any specific order, such as a dictatorship, kingdom, or presidential republic. At the height of the cold war Samuel Huntington wrote:

> Communist totalitarian states and Western liberal states both belong generally in the category of effective rather than debile political systems. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union have different forms of government, but in all three systems the government governs. Each country is a political community with an overwhelming consensus among the people on the legitimacy of the political system. In each

> country, the citizens and their leaders share a vision of the public interest of the society and of the traditions and principles upon which the political community is based. All three countries have strong, adaptable, coherent political institutions: effective bureaucracies, well-organized affairs, working systems of civilian control over the military, extensive activity by the government in the economy, and reasonably effective procedures for regulating succession and controlling political conflict. These governments command the loyalties of their citizens and thus have the capacity to tax resources, to conscript manpower, and to innovate and to execute policy. If the Politburo, the Cabinet, or the President makes a decision, the probability is high that it will be implemented through the government machinery (S. P. Huntington 1968, 1).

All participants in the Cold War agreed that order is better than disorder. Nations with less order were called "soft states" by Gunnar Myrdal. Their governments cannot require much of their citizens and are nearly incapable of enforcing their legal order and collecting authorized taxes. Soft states, Myrdal observed in the 1960s, are common in developing countries:

> There is an unwillingness among the rulers to impose obligations on the governed and a corresponding unwillingness on their part to obey rules laid down by democratic procedures. The tendency is to use the carrot, not the stick. The level of social discipline is low compared with all Western countries — not to mention Communist countries. In India the "soft state" is often rationalized and even extolled by associating it with the Gandhian ideal that social reforms should be brought about by a change of heart, not by compulsion and violence (G. Myrdal 1968, 277).

After World War II soft states emerged in Southern Europe. Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal transformed themselves from dictatorships to democracies. They were less able to eradicate nepotism and corruption. In Spain, the democratic governments could not wipe out the Basque terrorists. In Italy, they could not stamp out mafias. Softness marred tax collection and budgeting.

It came to the fore as late as in the early 2010s as a crisis for the Euro Zone.

Another variety of soft states emerged in Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire in 1991. The subjugated nations were reborn, and state enterprises were hastily privatized, but a large part of the huge civil service remained intact. The ambitious among the surviving civil servants in the newborn nations no longer had to serve as controllers of people's destinies and opinions. They teamed up with oligarchs, the new robber barons of private economic powers, and set examples for less ambitious colleagues in how to run corrupt soft states with an unpredictable and arbitrary order.

It is wrong, however, to assume that states are the only homes of order and softness. Some societies in Africa have apparently flourished successfully without a state altogether or, more probably, with an infinitesimal state by our standards. Villages and clans provide the order, and ethnicity endows a common identity.

Inside a society, realm norms are justified in roughly similar ways as state laws. For example, dietary norms in a religion are upheld by religious functionaries, only rarely by civil servants and the courts of the state. Organizations in all societal realms – firms, religious congregations, voluntary associations, and criminal gangs – also enforce their own by-laws, i.e. their version of internal order to prevent internal chaos. The justification here concerns policies embedded in the organizations in "the civil society" in Hegel's original sense, i.e. nearly everything outside the state.

The different academic, economic, and political justifications that we have reviewed so far are used primarily in executive institutions. Let us now turn to more non-instrumental aspects of societal living.

Aesthetic Justifications

Cells A4-E4 in our table is the home of the sounds of aesthetic justifications. Their typical format is:

"We did it to find or to make something or someone beautiful."

"We did it to avoid the ugly."

These are justifications typical among those who practice the lifestyle of Aesthetes.

The "someone" in the above model of justifications may also be oneself. Then we create narcissistic justifications to dress and to style hair in a fashionable way, to make dental and dermatological facial changes, and to celebrate body culture.

Aesthetes have a lifestyle that constantly makes them look for opportunities to stop and contemplate something beautiful or artistic. Aesthetes need art in order to feel good about themselves and life, to reveal and tolerate the drabness and imperfections of everyday living. In many ways it is true that anything — food, pots and pans, furniture, housing, sewing, boxing, sex, conversations, ice hockey, marching, military battles, and what have you — can be more or less artistic. An aesthetic lifestyle can permeate all aspect of living. The Aesthetes may themselves be performing artists, but need not at all be. If available, they visit art galleries and museums, frequent concerts, the theater, and the ballet. They are informed about dramas on TV and on video, or of recent pieces of fiction, have an eye for interesting architecture and for beauty in the home. When choosing a vacation destination they prefer Florence to a beach resort. They are attracted to the realm of art. (1: 41)

With an aesthetic justification, the hours spent in the park, or in the street café seem more valuable than the hour spent earning overtime pay or, even the hours spent in volunteer civic work. Not only artists, but flâneurs and collectors use aesthetic justifications to transform the boring into something interesting worthy of our contemplation. Such a transformation was the vision of the Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard (1843) when he wrote about aesthetes. He saw them as a first stage of personality development to be followed in maturing individuals by an ethical and a religious stage.

Religious Justifications

From Cells A5-E5, we hear religious justifications. In a pure form, they may read:

"We did it to come closer to the sacred."

"We did it to avoid a meaningless profane living."

These are justifications typical among those who practice the lifestyle of Believers.

To the extent that the sacred is seen as a product of the human symbolic environment, we can see closeness to the sacred in certain observances, our own and/or those of others. The sacred may be observances of holy days, attendance of holy cults, practices of sacrifices, pilgrimages to holy places, and visits to honor the deceased at their burial grounds. Religious justifications in social life take the form of excuses from normal, profane pursuits when participating in such acts.

The Believers want to walk through life in touch with a transcendental virtual reality of heavenly lights and messages. They have a lifestyle concerned with spirituality. They develop their courage to face ultimate issues such as the existence of suffering and death, and the final evaluation of a person's life. They have well developed cults to cope with the memories of the dead. They are found not only around traditional religions but also among the followers of new belief systems that have gained ground in secularized parts of the world. They are attracted to the realm of religion. (1: 42)

The Compassionate practices a lifestyle of doing welfare and doing good. Many are reformers with ethics and virtue as their lodestars. Or, they are Good Samaritans acting spontaneously or consistently to help when they see suffering. Their self-image is that of a person who aims to act decently in all situations, and who strives for a clear conscience. Humanitarian movements, social welfare agencies, voluntary organizations and religious or secular charities are the anvils for their good deeds, not to speak of the many sacrifices made to aid members of their own families. They are attracted to civil society and to the realm of morality. (1: 43)

Some religions maintain that their God has a plan for mankind and/or a plan for every individual. The perception of this plan may be used to justify suppressions of free will, of freedom of speech, of freedom of movement, and also of the free pursuit of both secular cardinal values and of biological spontaneities. This type of thinking is referred to as a fallacy; this fallacy makes humans less than they obviously are. Conceptions of deities that are more congenial and appropriate to a many-splendored society are reviewed in Volume 5 of the Many-Splendored Society, in which we shall study the pursuit of sacredness.

Moral Justifications

From Cells A6-E6 in our Periodic Table of Societal Realms comes moral justifications:

"We did it to pursue our ideals and virtues."

"We did it so that we would not lose our authenticity and compassion."

We have postponed considerations of schools of ethics to Volume 6 of our work and stay here with simple lists of virtues as the core of morality. The Chinese may want to start such a list with Confucian virtues. The Jews think first of Talmudic virtues, and others would place still other desirable qualities at the top of such a list. Personally, I would like to see honesty, authenticity, and compassion on top of my list of virtues. In the Western world, Aristotelian and Pauline virtues have been folk wisdom during the ages: justice, courage, temperance, prudence, hope, faith, and love. Virtues are the "customs of the heart" of civilizations.

To appeal to a virtue as a justification for an act presumes that the virtue is an established custom in the symbolic environment. Such appeals are worthy of particular consideration when the appealer is authentic, and not a hypocrite.

Summary and Implications of Justifications in Societal Realms

We can now summarize our discussion of justifications in societal realms as a formal proposition; our first special case of Proposition 11:1 could read as follows:

> Proposition 11:3. *Justifications in Societal Realms*: In lasting and differentiated symbolic environments, there is a tendency for justifications to emerge as learned, economic, political, aesthetic, religious, and moral justifications in the respective realms of science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality.

The vocabulary of justifications used and accepted in a specific societal realm (or in another life area) is its 'ethos.'

The justifications we have illustrated above permeate the societal realms and give each realm its appropriate ethos. Ethoses

that are characteristic of science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality are distinct and different. A differentiated society has not one ethos, but several. Furthermore, if a differentiated society also is many-splendored, no ethos is considered more important than another.

Some Detours of the Presently Domineering Societal Realms

In the beginning of the twenty-first century, ethoses of the economy and of the body politic continue their domination in the advanced societies. Since they are intrinsically different, Big Business and Big Government compete for what they think is the ultimate glory.

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the leading politicians in most countries borrowed or guaranteed loans excessively, so that they became major actors in the economy, in addition to their role in the polity. "Sovereign debt," once a specialist term, became an ever-present reality and used in newspaper prose.

The normal competition between the body politic and the economy, particularly in the United States, turned into an abnormally large amount of aid from the body politic to bail out banks in order to "save the payment system." At the same time, the Obama presidency moved toward government sponsored health care. A moral justification is required to give health care to everyone, regardless of their ability to speak for their case, their ability as patients to pay, or their willingness to return to the work force when recovered.[5] Initially, the "Obama care" was thought to be possible by some Yankee ingenuity (or magic) without raising the tax level to that of the European welfare states. Thus, resorting to what is labeled Big Government, a hegemonic *realm of the body politic*, both the problems of banking in the *economic realm* and the problems of healthcare in the *morality realm* should be solved.

The long struggle about the responsibility for health care in the United States became one between the ethos of the body politic ("let the government do it") and the ethos of the economy

("leave it to business to solve it") and the ethos of morality ("leave the responsibility to the community and civil society"). Our conviction that societal realms have considerable autonomy (expressed in Proposition 10:1 on page 2: 167) suggests that this brand of struggles tends to become one without a permanent winner. We have also argued (in Proposition 10:14 on page 2: 242) that sweeping efforts to resolve such issues by merging societal realms tend to disintegrate.

Justifications with reference to a cardinal value and its related priorities in one societal realm cannot easily be used in alien realms. Consider, for example, the justifications that make reference to "equality" among citizens in a democratic body politic. It has some obvious and smooth uses in a democratic society: everyone should be ruled by the same laws, everyone should be tried in the same court system, and everyone of age should have the right to vote. However, to move this language of equality from the realm of the body politic to the realm of public morality is highly problematic. To claim that everyone has the right to the same standard of housing, the same level of wages, the same distance to a local store, et cetera about other amenities, meets resistance.

A justification with reference to equality works well in its home turf, the realm of the democratic body politic. But it meets resistance as being unreasonable or inappropriate in the economic realm. The justification can survive in its new context only if supported by continuous compelling vocabularies, i.e. active persuasion and propaganda, or more commonly, by legislation enacted despite the opposition of the propertied and privileged classes.

The generality in this process of misplaced justifications creating contention and inciting change can be stated as a proposition of its own:

> Proposition 11:4. *Consequences of Inappropriate Justifications*: When a justification from one realm is used in other realms, (a) it appears inappropriate to the participants in the other realms, and (b) loses motivational force in the new realms,

and/or (c) is actively resisted there, and/or, (d) is pressured to change itself to come in line with appropriate justifications of the new realms.

Some inappropriate justifications surface easily. They emerge from the fact that some elements from an alien realm are normally embedded in every realm to facilitate its smooth functioning. We have called this "embedding" on pages 2: 187-188 and specifically "sideshow intrusions" in Proposition 10:9 on page 187. In a modern society, economic justifications – those about money, or about goods and services with monetary value – intrude deep into science, art, religion, and the body politic. Capitalism is not only the proper name of the economic realm – which is fine and correct -- but has become the name of the whole society and its civilization – which is unfortunate in my view.

Awareness of What is Missing

Our study of justifying vocabularies in societal realms points to a possible design of society in which all societal realms are born equal and born with equal rights, that is, what we have called a many-splendored society. It is clearly arbitrary to claim that one particular realm – say, religion, or the economy, or the body politic – entails all the justifications that everyone needs and must embrace. Such claims belong in the many detours of history.

A way out of this superstition is that the participants in each realm develop an 'awareness of what it misses' and an 'awareness of one's own grunginess' in relation to other realms. Jörgen Habermas (2010) coined the phrase the 'awareness of what is missing' when dealing with the relation between reason and faith, especially between philosophy and religion.

A scientist must, thus, become aware that something is missing when she or he simply ignores religion, or when he routinely begrudges the less smart but very rich businessmen. Those involved in business must be aware that something is missing when they ignore art and begrudge politicians. The politicians

must be aware that something is missing when they do not take morality into account, or when they begrudge all bonuses in the reward system of business. The artists must be aware that something is missing when they remain uninvolved in both politics and business or begrudge both. Religious individuals must be aware that science has the monopoly of any empirical based cosmology, and they must not begrudge the fact that redemption can also be experienced by attending a tragedy performed in a secular theater. The moralists must realize that they may miss legitimate joys of money, power, and sex. The moral virtuosos must not begrudge the religious men and women who have come to terms with the inevitable earthly death of all individuals, the morally good as well as the morally evil.

A new ethos emerges when and where the active people in various societal realms have achieved awareness of each other's cardinal values and when they have stopped begrudging or ignoring the cardinal values of any realms alien to them. The aware people do not only talk *about* one another, but talk *with* one another.

In my view, those who are aware of what is missing are particularly qualified for a place as leaders in the central zone of a modern society. It is not easy to find such persons. But it is easy to lament about their absence.

For example, where are those who, with consistent dignity, help those who are very poor, very unqualified, laud in their blasphemy, and void of taste and morals? How many politicians are able and willing to talk with those in other realms in a mutual mode of sharing concerns, listening, and learning; realizing that they have no automatic right to rule over them? Without learning or relearning that business is not everything in life, how can graduates of big and famous business schools qualify for the central zone of their society?

In the beginning of the twenty-first century, many feel called to rule, but few seem to meet the criteria for participation in a central zone. One has to be aware of what is missing to qualify.

[3] On the difficulty for diplomacy to be accepted by the general public, see the section on the Panama Canal Treaty in Volume 6 of *The Many-Splendored Society: Order and Morality*.

[4] In our main chapter on the realm of science in Volume 4 we will deal with the fact that many leading European intellectuals in the same centuries described the victory as a something that has gone astray and degenerated. This is a reshuffle of texts between the first and second edition of these volumes.

[5] In Volume 6 of *The Many-Splendored Society: Order and Virtue* we will discuss these and other aspects of public welfare that are rebated or costless for clients.

12. Ideological and Universal Justifications

Justifications in Communication Structures

We have seen that different justifications are used in the big societal realms of science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality. Each one of these realms has its own organizations, networks, and media. We met their separate communication structures in Chapter 8 and summarized them in Table 8.1 on page 2: 69. It turns out that thee communication structures in due course also develop unique justifications. Let us explore this:

> Proposition 12:1. *Justifications in Communication Structures:* In lasting and differentiated symbolic environments, there is a tendency for different justifications to emerge in, respectively, organizations, networks, and media.

Organizational Justifications

Organizations have, by definition, a minimum of two ranks, leaders and members, but most organizations have a more elaborate hierarchy and division of labor. Members become concerned with hierarchical control, personal rank and honor, identification with the organization, be it a dynasty, nation, academy, church, or corporation. Even organizations operating in a large modern market economy show some of these traits, so typical of pre-capitalist societies based on motivations of honor and by goals reached through a show of courage.

Organizations occupy Row K in our Table of Societal Realms. Turning to justifications in organizations we encounter organization men who "have left home, spiritually as well as physically, to take the vows of organization life, and it is they who are the mind and soul of our great self-perpetuating institutions," to use the words by William H Whyte (1956). He sees the same trend in American organizations from every societal realm:

> The [business] corporation man is the most conspicuous example, but he is only one, for the collectivization so visible in the corporation has affected almost every field of work. Blood brother to the business trainee off to join Du Pont is the seminary student who will end up in the church hierarchy, the doctor headed for the corporate clinic, the physics Ph.D. in a government laboratory, the intellectual on the foundation-sponsored team project, the engineering graduate in the huge drafting room at Lockheed, the young apprentice in a Wall Street law factory…. Whatever the differences in their organization ties, it is the common problems of collective work that dominate their attentions, and when the Du Pont man talks to the research chemist or the chemist to the army man, it is these problems that are uppermost…. They are wry about it, to be sure; they talk of the "treadmill," the "rat race," of the inability to control one's direction. But they have no great sense of plight; between themselves and organization they believe they see an ultimate harmony and, more than most elders recognize, they are building an ideology that will vouchsafe this trust.

"Our bosses wanted this done" is a typical justification in an organization. The rising business giant IBM in the post-World-War-II era came to symbolize the hierarchal home of organization men and their lifestyle and justifications.

We recall that advanced organizations are staffed by both administrators and technicians (page 2: 76). They have recourse to different justifications. The administrative bureaucrats justify their actions by referring to instructions from their superiors, or to resolutions of ruling congresses. “We have our rules,” say bureaucrats around the world.

The professional technocrats can use an additional justification; they can justify their actions by pointing to facts and reason. For example, a professional technocrat wants to be able to criticize that which he considers to be superstition, be it in regard to the dangers of the use of pesticides, the availability of investment capital, or the health risks of using prophylactics, et

cetera. These technocrats are dependent on a certain kind of freedom of opinion, namely the freedom of appeal to rationality. With its help, they can free themselves to some extent from the powers-that-be and from the administrative bureaucracy.

For technocrats to appeal wholly to science would result in a weakened plea. (A general principle behind this assertion will be summarized in Proposition 12:2 on page 49.) When technocrats work in industry, trade, or finance their expert knowledge is relevant only if they *also* see to the economic justification of their scientifically grounded arguments. An impression from my experience in the field of market research is that even superb research training may be counterproductive without a business background or business training. It becomes a full asset the day a researcher on the job has absorbed some business ethos.

If technocrats work with or consult with a government agency or a political party they must, to be effective, consider the legislative mission of the administration or the political mission of the party when applying scholarly justifications. The same is true about the scientific consultants who are engaged by the United Nations to advice on poverty, climate, nuclear disarmament and other areas of UN policy. A body politic manned by pure "whiz kids" – such as President Kennedy's intellectual advisors in the era of the Vietnam War – may prove to be a path to disaster.

The exercise of professional freedom by technocrats, bounded to their specific area of expertise, has been fairly well established in modern states. In authoritarian or totalitarian states, however, the process has been regularly threatened by one of the characteristics of "Stalinism:" the subordination of the technocrats to administrative bureaucrats. You can actually assess the degree of Stalinism in modern organizations and states by assessing the degree of influence of the administrators over the technocrats.

Both bureaucrats and technocrats can depart from these rigid patterns if they are allowed to guide their actions by the goals of the organization, in addition to its by-laws, or even above and

beyond the rules of the organization. Then, skilled leadership can produce quicker and probably, also, more effective results.

Network Justifications

Whyte's basic observations are still generally valid. However, since he wrote *The Organization Man* (1956) numerous women have joined their ranks in the labor force, and a new study would have to be renamed "The Organization Men and Women." Another major change is that the focus of many corporate organizations has changed from production to sales. Corporate headquarters are getting smaller, and more staff and authority have moved to those parts of the corporation that are close to the customers and more knowledgeable about their needs. Sales mean markets, and markets mean networks.

The Networking Men and Women of the twenty-first century compete successfully with the Organization Man of the twentieth century. Motivations are now less based on honor and more on self-interest, and goals are achieved less by courage and more by cooperativeness, tact, and politeness. This shift seems true in all societal realms, not only in business.

The justifications common in networks (Row L in the Periodic Table of Societal Realms) reflect the fact that networks contain more peer-to-peer relations than do organizations. Such relations facilitate informal social contacts, the lifeline of networks.

"We have talked to everybody about it" is a common justification heard in networks: "The whole gang agreed," "We touched all the bases." Such justifications state the claim that networks are the main sources of public opinion, as Lowell (1913) discovered a hundred years ago and we noted on pages 2: 80-85. References to public opinion are superior justifications in many complex contexts. Public opinion has become a main justification for political decisions in modern democracies, and non-democratic rulers also appeal to public opinion, but only when it suits them.

Media Justifications

"We read it in the paper", "It was on TV," "I found it on the Internet". The references to media as authorities and sources of justification in everyday life are legion.

The media-mediated justifications compete with those provided in families, schools, peer groups, religious and civic organizations, and work life. One should not assume that published justifications reign supreme. However, to obtain favorable publicity for actions, or for causes that are in need of public justification, is a mainstay of the modern PR-industry. This industry is, nowadays, so skilled that it takes a genuine effort to distinguish the opinions it plants from opinions emerging spontaneously in networks. The present methods of pollsters are unable to separate the two.

Mass media (Row M in the Periodic Table of Social Realms) need justifications for their own activities, as has been apparent in our discussions on journalism on pages 2: 94-104. A justification commonly heard in mass media, speaking in their own cause, is "the public's right to know." This is not a justification to publish anything. However, it is generally agreed that political democracy depends on the transparency of the state. The media in a democracy are to report all the wrongdoing of the state and all that the state neglects to do, not just the new and beneficial actions of the state. Then, you will have an informed electorate, capable of deciding whether a government shall be awarded a new mandate or is to be forced to leave office. But note that the reverse is not true; here is a drastic asymmetry. Citizens have the right to a private zone. A civilized government has no general right to enter the private zones and register the doings and conversations of citizens. The duty of the government is rather to uphold the human right to such a private zone, as we repeated on pages 2: 30 and 2: 38-41.

Do media have a general right to spy on people, under the umbrella of "the public's right to know" when the state has no such right? No, that would make the media a non-democratic agency in a democracy. Are the media exempt from the general

prohibition to invade personal privacy? No, of course not. To plant a journalist as a mole or spy in an organization or network to be reported on cannot be a general policy in a civilized editorial office. Such "walraffing" may be a case of civil disobedience by a professional author who is prepared to take the full legal responsibility (see page 3: 144 below). In a civilized society, amateurs finding or exploring wrongdoings can report them to professional journalists working in serious news groups, and such informants can expect to remain anonymous. Laws on freedom of the news media shall protect journalists from having to reveal their sources to authorities, and laws shall prohibit authorities from investigating journalists' sources. Unfortunately, these rights are far from universally honored.

Democratic politicians have difficulties here. They face an asymmetry that they must accept. Media have every right to know all about what goes on in the politician's office and in their private life to the extent it affects their office. Even so, politicians have no right to know anything about what goes on in an editorial office, nor do they have any right to spy on journalists. In the case of other citizens, they have no right to spy, with the only exceptions of spying on suspects in a properly instituted criminal investigation.

Also important to clarify: do mass-media (including bloggers) in a democracy have the right to enter uninvited into *non-political* realms of society, such as family life, scientific laboratories, artists' studios, business boardrooms, worshipping congregations, or voluntary associations with a moral agenda? In principle, the answer in a civilized society must be: No. Media, like all others, needs an invitation to be allowed to enter such non-political realms and particularly non-political private spheres. When media in a democracy enter non-political realms, they do well to have familiarized themselves about the values of these realms of society, a topic sadly neglected in journalism training.

A case history from 1914 is worth a study. A Parisian socialite and wife of a politician, Henriette Caillaux, shot dead the editor of *Le Figaro*. The paper had published a letter with allegations,

not only about her husband's politics, to which she could not object. But the paper also printed details of her own adultery, something that made her furious. She admitted the killing, but was not held guilty of murder by the Court.

Anyone in a free society may take photos and videos and make drawings of any person who is in a public place. This is not illegal in liberal countries, but there may be something uncivilized about a rushing paparazzi crowd of photographers getting pictures of a celebrity who happens to be in a public place. (Some countries impose restrictions on any crowding that disturb the public; this could make certain types of paparazzi behavior an offense.) Of course, if and when a celebrity poses for a photographer, the two can make a deal about the disposition of pictures and fees. In several countries, there are mandatory requirements imposed on photographers to have permission to publish unsolicited photos of celebrities. This is a common offense and a quite serious one if the pictures are used in marketing, even in the promotion of photo-based magazines.

The strictures on mass media to respect privacy clash with the press lords' right to make money. Justifications often clash in this manner in a modern society.

Justifications and Ideologies by Makers, Keepers, Brokers, and Takers

Creating, preserving, distributing, and receiving cardinal values are the functions of the persons we called Makers, Keepers, Brokers, or Takers. We introduced them in chapter 10 on pages 2: 183-187. Now we shall explore how they justify their activities in different ways.

The Makers of cardinal values – be they researchers, entrepreneurs, prophets, or what have you – develop something new in their societal realm. The Makers generally take pride in their distinctiveness. They create new knowledge, new laws, new sources of wealth, new expressions of art, new morals, new forms of sacredness. If everything old were to be preserved, or were everyone to be or think alike, there would be little or no

possibility of creating something new. Their justification is "I found it. It is mine/ my contribution."

The Keepers are the guardians of the cardinal values, people like librarians, database operators, bankers, judges, critics, clerics, and ethicists. They distinguish between knowledge and superstition, wealth and poverty, between what is legal and illegal, between the beautiful and the ugly, the sacred and the profane, the ethical and unethical. Their justifications center on "We did it; we have separated the good from the bad."

The Brokers in the various societal realms: teachers, salesmen, bureaucrats, performers, preachers, and moralists perform tasks that need fairness. A teacher should not have favorites, but should treat all alike. A storekeeper should not have one price for locals and another for strangers. State functionaries should not be discriminate between citizens, but should treat all the same. Theaters, concerts, art exhibits, and museums should be open to all, not just to elites. Most major religions offer salvation to all, not just to chosen people. The moralist allows no one to be exempt from ethical principles. "We are fair."

During the twentieth century, the ideology of the Takers made significant inroads. After 1968 they could for the first time on a large scale get acceptance of justifications that could successfully compete with the ideologies of the Makers, the Keepers, and the Brokers. The Takers of the cardinal values of knowledge, riches, power, et cetera, usually insist that everyone can and should partake of them. They follow a typical norm of a hunt of older eras, that everyone should share in the kill – the person who went along on the hunt as well as the person that brought down the game, those who participated in the hunt as well as those who stayed at home to keep and mend things in the village. In the end, everyone should benefit from the hunt. Equality in respect of life's capriciousness in modern days brings this old norm to the fore. "We shared equally in the task."

Ideologies from the Turfs of Functionaries

A striking fact is that the justifications of Makers, Keepers, Brokers, and Takers can become central ideas in some common ideologies. An 'ideology' is a cluster of beliefs. The beliefs in full-blown ideologies center on justifications. Everything a social scientist knows about justifications should, therefore, also apply to ideologies. In addition to justifications, ideologies have all or most of these attributes:

they should be internally consistent, preferably form a system;

they should cover a broad spectrum of social issues;

they should justify actions that are consistent with their words;

they should last long, preferably live on from one generation to another;

they should be featured in some publication, promoted by a political party, or interest group, and preferably have well-known personalities supporting them.

With all the trimmings of an ideology, a justification becomes very powerful.

Ideologies are different from the dialectic priorities that generated the six mentalities that we studied in Volume 1, pages 1: 112-121. Ideologies grow out of a structural base, a turf defined by the positions of its persons in the social structure and the justification we find in their speech. The mentalities in our survey are vibrations in the symbolic environment that move back and forth over all turfs, all cells in our Periodic Table of Societal Realms. A more Marxian approach fits the study of ideologies; while a more Hegelian approach fits the study of mentalities. The interplay of the two is still an almost virgin field of research.

The social bases of some important ideologies in the modern world are found where the Makers, Keepers, Brokers, or Takers and their justifications of cardinal values are found. Table 12.1 reminds us of some typical ideologies of Makers, Keepers, Brokers, and Takers and their home turfs in society.

Table 12.1. The Major Functionaries Inside Societal Realms and Their Most Congenial Modern Justifying Ideologies and Creeds.

	M	N	O	P
	Creating, preserving, distributing, and receiving cardinal values			
	Makers	Keepers	Brokers	Takers
1	Scholars	Librarians	Teachers	Students
2	Entrepreneurs	Bankers	Salesmen	Consumers
3	Legislators	Judges	Bureaucrats	Citizens
4	Creative artists	Art critics	Performers	Fans of culture
5	Prophets	Learned Clerics	Preachers	Seekers
6	Source of hi norms	Ethicists	Moralists	Decent people
Ideology	**Individualism:** develop what is new and what is your own	**Meritocracy:** merits are individual & separates high from low	**Universalism:** give equal rights and equal opportunities to all	**Egalitarianism:** give equal rights and equivalent outcomes to all
Creed	Manchester Creed Liberalism 1	Chinese Creed Liberalism 2	American Creed Liberalism 3	Socialist Creed , Liberalism 4

The column headings are abbreviated from Table 10.2 on page 2: 187. The letters and numbers in the margins are the same as in The Periodic Table of Societal Realms in Volume 2, pages 2: 222-223.

The second row from the bottom in the table in Table 12.1 presents four ideologies. In fact, the justifications by Makers, Keepers, Brokers, and Takers, respectively, shape very well-known ideologies: individualism, meritocracy, universalism, and egalitarianism. These ideological concerns are different from one another, but each one expresses an internally consistent justification from its perspective. One should not be misled by the circumstance that they all are called "liberalism" by their proponents.

Let us review each in turn.

Individualism: A Justifying Ideology of Makers

The need for individuality among the Makers can develop into a general ideology justifying that everyone should always be permitted to be different, rather than alike. In their school days,

creativity, rather than memorization, promotes Makers. Individualists want self-regulation rather than centralized steering. They often prefer networks to organizations, markets rather than bureaucracy. The minimum of central authority (sometimes called "good institutions") which they need should primarily protect ownership and copyright, uphold contracts and free trade. This ideology suits business and industry and is sometimes promoted by their representatives as the best for the entire society.

The congenial ideologies of the Makers are varieties of individualism. This vocabulary of individual uniqueness, usually unafraid of novelty, and not without some "Looking out for Number One," is the main line of justifications used by Makers. What they promoted was liberalism in the *first* meaning of liberalism, i.e. what we now often call "libertarianism" in the United States and "neo-liberalism" in Europe. In historical economic contexts, it is "Manchester liberalism," or, simply, the teachings of Adam Smith.

Meritocracy: A Justifying Ideology of Keepers

Makers pass on the cardinal values they create to Keepers – librarians, bankers, judges, critics, clerics, and ethicists – who are accustomed to discriminating between high and low, new and old, civilized and uncivilized. In social reality, i.e. in the language-dependent parts of society, this implies a denial of ascription, i.e. inherited and unchanging positions. (In biological reality, such ascriptions cannot be denied.) A sure mark of emerging meritocracy is a call for a republic to take the place of a kingdom and any leadership based on the linage of an aristocratic family. The result is an ideology that the proponents continued to call liberalism, but it had some characteristics of a discriminating meritocracy typical also of modern-day conservatism. The latter is an ideology of hierarchy, honoring the very best, and treating also others with dignity, i.e. seeing what is particularly good about any person, not just what is equal.

The Keepers' desire for stability can develop their hierarchical view to a societal ideology that seeks to keep and stabilize all

differences in society, based on merits or not. A Keeper, such as the great Confucius in China, emphasized not only differences between those who are qualified and those who are unqualified, but also the ascribed differences between men and woman, between young and older people. His important distinction between exemplary persons and ordinary persons has probably too many ascribed elements to fit a modern nation.

Proponents of the ideology of meritocracy often prefer an organization with stable ranks of which the top ones are open to the best of comers. They prefer this order to a market that can create disorder and troublesome new riche. However, truly consistent Keepers accept not only the hierarchy in organizations. Provided they clearly separate winners from losers, Keepers also accept networks in the form of markets. And markets are usually good at separating winners from losers. Keepers who in this way defend capitalism call themselves "liberal." This is a *second* meaning of liberalism.

Universalism: A Justifying Ideology of Brokers

The Brokers incorporated fairness in their ideology. Equal rights and equal opportunities became their congenial ideologies. In the language of societal analysts, the Brokers in the various realms of society promote universalism. They themselves continued to call their version "liberalism." This is a *third* meaning of liberalism.

A universalistic ideology, when fully developed, strives to eliminate arbitrariness from life. Young and old, men and women, immigrants and native-born are to all receive the same treatment. All should also have the same external conditions at the start of life. But afterwards, talent and merits will decide one's fate. He who invests more time and energy should also receive more when the results are distributed. Supporters of this ideology are amenable to interventions from a central authority who levels playing fields and gives everyone a chance to achieve results, in rural as well as urban areas, in rich and poor neighborhoods, and in countries with different levels of overall development.

A public school system for all students without tuition charges, and with no separate schools for the privileged, was introduced in many countries as part of transitions to democracy and transitions to socialism. Meritocracy with equal opportunities became a worthy goal. However, this modernistic ideal of the Brokers has not ruled alone. Measures in favor of the Takers have taken over, at least temporarily.

Egalitarianism: A Justifying Ideology of Takers

An ideology that primarily appeals to modern Takers of cardinal values is based on a radical egalitarianism that demands equal or equivalent outcomes for everybody, not only an equal start for everybody. When equality in the outcome becomes a common justification in society, the states and other authorities are called upon to minimize differences due to fate. Solidarity means that the good and the bad turns in life be shared. There must be no class differences. Income should be redistributed between rich and poor. In the United States, this is called "liberalism". This is the *fourth* meaning of liberalism; in Europe, it is usually called "socialism" or "social democracy." This ideology, like that of conservatism, normally gives organizations priority over markets. Labor unions are typical organizations with egalitarian values. They set up cartels on the labor market to negotiate high wage levels, but equal wages for the many who have roughly equal jobs.

All the above ideologies – individualism, meritocracy, universalism, and egalitarianism – flourish in City Life, in Gesellschafts. They are in opposition to the particularism or partiality that prevails in Folk Life, in Gemeinschafts. In the Gemeinschaft, family members, neighbors, or clan members are viewed as more valuable than outsiders. (More differences between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft were reviewed on pages 2: 113-122.)

Partiality persists even in modern societies. Even a contemporary man values his family more than other men's families, and so do women. Contemporary nationalism and chauvinism are replete with elements of partiality: my country, right or wrong! A milder form of partiality can be found in the esprit de corps in

certain professions, even those where universalism is dominant in client relations, for example, among doctors, lawyers, and teachers.

To summarize:

> Proposition 12:2. *Justifications and Ideologies in Creating, Preserving, Conveying, and Receiving Cardinal Values*: In lasting and differentiated symbolic environments in a Gesellschaft, there is a tendency for different justifications in the form of ideologies with motivational force to emerge among Makers, who create cardinal values, and tend to favor individualism; Keepers, who guard and preserve cardinal values, and tend to favor meritocracy; Brokers, who distribute cardinal values, and tend to favor universalism; while Takers, who benefit from cardinal values created by others, tend to favor egalitarianism.

Another way of stating this proposition is to say that the home turf of individualism is the site of the Makers in modern society. The home turf of meritocracy is the Keepers. The home turf of universalism is the Brokers. The home turf of egalitarianism is the Takers. We can reformulate the Marxist doctrine about the never lying economic interests to a general concept that justifications heard on the different home turfs in a society always favor the home team.

To explore different faces or stages of liberalism has been a favorite field of scholarship among philosophers and historians of ideas. If you look at the variety of home turfs in the Periodic Table of Societal Realms, the complexity of their task can be fully appreciated. Academic, economic, political, artistic, religious, or moral realms cheer their own. Liberalism means different things in these areas. Those who work in organizations, markets, and media express different justifications. Liberalism justifies each category in very different ways; the disparity between its use in public administrations and in markets is striking. Creating, preserving, distributing, and receiving cardinal values, as we have seen, brings out different justifications. Liberalism gets a different voice on each turf.

The label "liberalism" has become so rich in content that, without specification, it is ambivalent, even useless for most scholarly purposes. It is also well to remember that liberalism is generally given several other attributes, in addition to the four versions in Figure 12.1 that set the focus for our discussion. Most of the additional faces of "liberalism" relate to freedom, to modernity, to property rights, or to features of a Gesellschaft.

One could, of course, also say that wherever a free use of language creates social reality, we have "liberalism." One could say that the differentiation of society into self-governing societal realms is a kind of "liberalism." Thus the tag "liberalism" can also be put on corner stones of a Many-Splendored Society.

To people in the Western world, the word "liberalism" apparently has more of an emotive than an executive meaning, to use the terminology of this writing (on pages 1: 145-150). Outside the towers of scholarship, the mention of liberalism is less a set of doctrines, but it is a hallelujah word for some and a curse for others.

The Rise of the Takers and the Predominance of their Justifications

According to the general retrospective judgment at the turn of the century, the 1900s was the "century of the ordinary man." The breakthrough of democracy, women's liberation, the solidarity of the welfare state with the weakest members of society, and aid to poor countries are usually cited as evidence. In our terminology, it is the "Era of the Rise of the Takers."

Others have called this period of history "the century of democratic man," and list the entitlements won as the principal testimonials to progress. Among them, the children's convention of the United Nations is instructive. Here is a humanitarian catalogue over the rights children should enjoy just because they are children, irrespective of whether or not they want to learn or contribute something, be nasty or kind, stay at home or run away from home, go to school or go AWOL.

Takers, who benefit from cardinal values created by others, tend to favor a policy of redistribution. The expressed voices of disadvantaged Takers do not tell untruths any less than do the rich lie in the protection of their advantages. Both speak their respective interest.

In 1929 Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish philosopher, described the coming dominance of Takers as a revolt of the masses (La rebelion de las masas). The masses acquire a good deal of what he called "the psychology of the spoiled child."

Many decades later we recognize Ortega y Gasset's prediction in a modern child of a Taker, who says "Mommy, I don't like arithmetic," and the mother answers, "Yes, dear, then you don't need to take math in school." And both believe in the magic that the child will, nevertheless, acquire all necessary understandings of nature, technology, and society, now as before.

In recent decades in many countries, Takers who are fixated on the issue of radical egalitarian rights and practices constitute a significant share of the personnel of schools, social agencies, correctional institutions for young offenders, et cetera. They are not known for energetically asking or helping their clients, be they children or adults, to make an effort to mend their ways. Without a bad conscience, they can betray their clients with eloquent words about injustices in upbringing and equal rights of everyone to the benefits of modern society.

Ideologically Motivated Collaboration and Contention

Collaboration between ideologies is not unknown. School teachers as Brokers of knowledge embrace the ideology of universalism. As such they want their teaching to give all pupils an equal chance, but they realize that some will learn more than others so that the outcome will be unequal. Most schools also require their teachers to act as Keepers, i.e. to favor qualification standards and to support the grading system (ranks) set up by school authorities. Some rankings come natural to any observing teacher and stem from a biological fact that some children are born with more intelligence than others. The meritocracy of

Keepers induces teachers to differentiate school classes, separating good achievers from poor ones, and also to favor the practice that teachers shall give marks to pupils of all ages, even the youngest. It easily happens in this collaboration between universalism and meritocracy that the original universalism becomes attenuated.

We shall try formulating some general hypotheses for such conflicts as a Proposition.

> Proposition 12:3. *Contentiousness in Justifications used Outside Its Home Turf*: When a justification from a turf of a cardinal value is used on the turf of another cardinal value, (a) it arouses contentions, and if victorious, (b) it loses some motivational force, and/or (c) takes on features of justifications that are normal in its new environment.

Our presently "really existing and competing ideologies" of self-professed liberalism, conservatism, and socialism are historically linked to special parts of social reality. They are tied to the different 'home turfs,' of creating, preserving, distributing and receiving cardinal values. None of these justifications and ideologies is self-evident as lasting global winners. Although all profess to be the chosen one, they are, in the end, tied to their bounded turfs and unable to become universal in fact, only in their wishes.

If Proposition 12:3 is valid, the messages of liberalism, conservatism, and socialism, at least their executive parts, were bound to become attenuated in the process of seeking hegemony and national and global reach. The pragmatic "non-utopian intellectuals" (noted in 1: 104) then stand to gain on the cultural scene. An emotive component of the old ideologies may survive longer. The hallelujah-element in the words "conservatism," "liberalism," and "socialism" still survives in Europe and some other places at the time of this writing, while their original executive meanings have become blurred and faded.

If any of the traditional ideologies of liberalism, conservatism, and socialism incorporates a bigger dose of universalism, a specialty of Brokers, the odds of prolonged ideological life might

improve. If the twentieth century was the era of the Takers, the twenty-first century might well be the era of the Brokers. We seem to have entered a great age for trade and diplomacy and learning.

Universal Social Justifications

[BIO], [NAT] Is any justification known to mankind that has an inclusive turf and a universal appeal? Yes, in biological reality there are several such justifications. For example, we would justify many things concerning our biological reality of nutrition, sex, age, sight, hearing, and general health. In physical reality there are others, such as a suitable temperature for survival. Avoiding drastic climate change is emerging as a universal justification in the twenty-first century.

We shall postpone dealing with universal justifications about biological spontaneities, technological innovations, and the justifications in coping with nature to Volume 7: *Life and the Good Life*. In social reality, which is our topic here, there are two universal justifications that deserve special attention, justification by freedom of speech and justification by human dignity.

Justified by Freedom of Speech

The first universal social justification is the freedom to use symbols, primarily that special human proficiency, language. We are free to use sentences and narratives to reconstruct old social realities, reaffirm existing social realities, and/or create new social realities, even such realities that are previously unheard of. This means that we have a wide crack in an otherwise deterministic universe. This important idea was discussed on pages 1: 152-155 and summarized in Proposition 5:3 on page 1: 152.

The model for justifications by freedom of speech is "I (we) can express this in public; to tell something in public is never forbidden." In the spirit of John Stuart Mill, we may extend freedom of speech from our free passing on of our information and observation to others, to a related justification: to seek and receive information from others.

Freedom of speech applies also to ideas that we dislike, even to ideas we happen to know are false, such as superstitions and beliefs in inherited superiority of a race, a sex, or a level of seniority. "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it," is a saying, attributed to Voltaire, probably falsely so. However, it points to a necessary part of the full freedom of speech.

We define 'dictators' as those who allow only those opinions which they approve of to be expressed. Dictators do not merely dictate what we are to think and say, they have an irresistible penchant to infiltrate groups, publics, audiences and crowds with informers. They use secret police to maintain their monopoly of approved opinions.

The fight against dictators and their censorship must be won by each generation; unfortunately, there is nothing natural and God-given in freedom of speech. The present generation has to win this fight also in the new arena of the Internet.

Justified by Human Dignity

The second universal social justification in social reality is hinged to the dignity of all human beings. "We did it to preserve our dignity and the dignity of our fellow beings," is a universal justification.

With 'dignity' as the loadstar, men and women confirm the best they know about the ones they encounter. The struggle to achieve an individual lifestyle becomes sustainable only if it is imbued with human dignity in contacts and interaction with other lifestyles. Dignity adds something indispensible to the pursuit of the cardinal values of knowledge, beauty, riches, sacredness, order and morality. Wealth, power, competence, good taste and religious and moral aptitude requires that the individuals imbued with these advantages treat those having fewer such advantages with complete dignity.

Dignity is enhanced by moral imagination. The rule of Spaniards – not always observed -- to "treat everyone as a marquise until he proves the opposite" is a first step in a civilization of

dignity. It applies also in the era of democracy. No one has more than one vote in the general elections, and no one is to have more than one vote. But this does not mean that you are necessarily as well-behaved as the next person and sensitive to her and his dignity. The polite person is always better than the impolite one.

Without the element of dignity, the hierarchies of conservatism and meritocracy are unbearable. In a hierarchy without dignity the lower ranks are forced to accept a lower degree of self-respect than those in the higher ranks. And in the higher ranks one sees an arrogant self-image as someone more distinguished than others. However, with dignity in communication between the ranks, everyone supports respect for all humans. In spite of the fact that the hierarchy's members are not equal, one treats each other with politeness and respect.

Without a contribution of dignity, liberalism's individualism is insufferable. A formal limit on the individual's unhindered progress is applied when others are damaged by that individualism. But when individualism is combined with dignity the limits are more closely defined. Already when an individual begins to be insensitive to other people's integrity, then the limits of individualism have been reached. The individualist must respect other people's dignity when he explores the boundaries of his individualism; otherwise, he will be unbearable around others, although he does not actually injure anyone.

It is important to realize that dignity cannot be reduced to equality or merits which we have discussed above as justifications for creating, preserving, distributing, and receiving cardinal values, the tasks of Makers, Keepers, Brokers, and Takers. Being equal does not, of course, imply a lack of dignity. But dignity has the advantage that it can also be combined with societal values other than equality, for example, hierarchy and individualism.

Equality is the core of socialism's societal order. Certain of equality's ideological proponents claim that poverty is eliminated more easily if it is shared equally by everyone, thus making a

concentration of riches rather than a concentration of poverty a major policy problem. More interesting, nations in the richer world as well as states of the United States do well as egalitarian. Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett (2009) find that smaller differences between rich and poor (for example, measured as lower Gini-coefficients) are correlated with fewer social problems. Infant mortality, crimes, mental illness, drug addiction, teenage childbirth, illiteracy, poor grades in schools, and obesity are statistically more prevalent in places with bigger rather than smaller differences between rich and poor inhabitants and households. Such statistics should not be dismissed.

The discoveries by Wilkinson and Pickett do not necessarily mean that government policies to equalize incomes are the best solutions to all these problems. With equality as the only loadstar, many solutions as regards societal problems in our economy, politics and public administration, courts, educational institutions, public health and family life are, in fact, blocked as equality cannot tolerate individualism and hierarchy.

With dignity as the loadstar, we can tolerate individualism and utilize also a hierarchy as solutions to our societal problems. Such a consideration seems beyond the thought horizon of Wilkinson and Pickett. To me, it is obvious that a hierarchical institution may be necessary to cope with, say, criminality. Also, an individualistic setting may promote, say, better school achievements. Equality is fine, but it is no all-purpose solution for mankind's problems. Solutions to all of our difficulties cannot be achieved if we rule out all hierarchy and individualism.

Priority among the Two Universal Social Justifications

Justifications by freedom of speech can come into conflict with justifications by human dignity. In such cases dignity takes a clear precedence over freedom. Freedom of speech, thus, does not apply to any form of hate speech. Rules against hate speech are set precisely by reference to human dignity. Such rules are badly needed in any new arenas of human communication, from the male arrogance on the agora in ancient Athens, to the bullying and hatred on the Internet in modernity.

Unwarranted attacks on a person's honor have for centuries been subject to both private and public reactions, particularly in higher strata of society. Hate speech is a crime in the civilized world. Speech enticing to violence against people who are physically or mentally handicapped or belong to sexual, ethnic, or religious minorities are serious crimes. To inveigle genocide is a crime against humanity; we must never forget The Holocaust.

Societal Creeds

As mentioned, each major societal realm and its parts develop, rather effortlessly, a congenial ideology and justifications appropriate to its own home turf. However, with appropriate support from a central zone, an ideology can spread over an entire society. We then approach the phenomenon of 'societal creeds'.

The American Creed

Societal creeds are the most comprehensive vocabularies of justification. Gunnar Myrdal made such a creed innermost to *An American Dilemma,* his study of race in the United States. The American Creed is a cluster of ideals centered on liberty, equality of opportunity, and various specific rights, such as freedom of speech and private property. They found their first expression in the revolutionary vocabularies among the elite of gentlemen, who sought the independence of the colonies from British rule. They were written into The Declaration of Independence, The Preamble to the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. The political parties that later emerged in the United States could disagree on most anything, but not on the American Creed. The creed spread from the central zone to all parts of the country.

> These principles of social ethics have been hammered into easily remembered formulas. All means of intellectual communication are utilized to stamp them into everybody's mind. The schools teach them, the churches preach them. The courts pronounce their judicial decisions in their terms. They permeate editorials with a pattern of idealism so ingrained that the writers could scarcely free themselves from it even if they

> tried. They have fixed a custom of indulging in high-sounding generalities in all written or spoken addresses to the American public, otherwise so splendidly gifted for the matter-of-fact approach to things and problems (Myrdal 1944, 4).

By the joint effort of all these forces, the American Creed is embedded in the social structure of the United States.

The immigrants from various backgrounds learned the principles of the creed and accepted them. Even the descendants of the black slaves came to embrace them and talked about America as the land of the free, the land of opportunity, and the flag that symbolized the equality of all men. In the United States public support of the Constitution is generally higher than the public support for presidents and political parties. The Supreme Court is not only the ultimate arbiter of legal disputes; it is also the guardian of the Constitution and has the corresponding prestige.

No European or Asian country has a societal creed as explicit and extensive as the American Creed. However, the Chinese Creed of hierarchies and merits, originally formulated by Confucius, has a much longer history than the American Creed.

Several European attempts at national creeds have been discredited by history, such as Mussolini's fascism based on a conception of the historical Roman nation, Hitler's Nazism based on the Germanic race, or Lenin's communism based on the right to rule by a nomenclature from the presumably virtuous working class. These creeds of the twentieth century were based on particularism, the belief in a special quality of certain people and the inferiority of all others. The American Creed, by contrast, is based on universalism.

Some more lasting minor creeds in Europe have found homes in small countries, such as the belief in a foreign policy of "neutrality." Switzerland, Sweden and Austria embraced this policy, but at the time of this writing it has been abandoned by the latter two nations. In its heydays in these three countries, any foreign policy that was said to violate "neutrality" was ruled out, usually prior to any serious analysis and a full public discussion, as soci-

etal creeds tend to be "sacred" and beyond debate. The public opinions these creeds embody are 'untouchable opinions.'

The Swedish Creed

The American creed of freedom, individualism, and egalitarianism is well known and justifies the American way of life. The Swedish creed of equality is very different as a justification of another way of life. It is not a middle way between capitalism and communism, as the American journalist Marquis Childs called it in 1936. At the turn of the millennium, all Nordic countries were found in a separate cluster.

A World Values Study at that time depicts Germany (Eastern and Western parts) and the Scandinavian countries as outliers in their map (matrix of factor scores) of values. These countries fall as far from traditional values as you can get (Inglehart and Baker 2002, 29). The very corner of the value map with the Nordic countries is often chosen by value researchers to show the direction in which global values are moving. Denmark is also the reference society for Francis Fukuyama's history of the social order (2011). The Swedish case, the most extreme of the outliers, became very familiar to me as a local pollster and a participant observer. I will present the case in full as it had developed in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

The central factor in the Swedish national creed is 'consensus about institutionalized equality.' One must pronounce all of these words in one go as if this is a new concept, not one word at a time.

Consensus, in and of itself, is no problem. It is usually seen as an asset in society. A risk arises with a consensus only if its content is poor and unrealistic. In such a case, one does not see how crazy a policy can be, as everyone accepts the situation. It could be thought that we are marching all together, with precision, toward disaster. Such was the case in the early 1990s when Sweden fought tooth and nail, and at great costs and 500 percent interest, to defend the illusion of its expensive currency, the *krona*, prior to its inevitable devaluation.

Neither is there any problem with institutions, even if we can, with all right, complain about their lack of flexibility and the enormous amounts of detail in their rules and regulations, and the slowness of the administrators chiseling away at all of these rules. Institutions are needed as the skeleton of the societal body.

Neither is there anything wrong with equality. Equality's values facilitate enjoyable social contact. This is also true for those of us who believe that both efficient hierarchies and creative individualism are entirely necessary. This is what my 1977 message to the Congress of the Swedish Employers' Confederation said:

> When we meet a work colleague, we do this as a superior, equal or subordinate. Our exchange, purely socially, in this context depends partly on our position. As a competent manager we are treated with a certain degree of consideration and respect from the ranks "below us", and the subordinate receives the same consideration from the manager. (It is incorrect to believe that a subordinate only experiences suffering from being in that position). Both respect and care are based on positively valuing others. The interaction between the superior and subordinate has been extensively studied. There have been fewer investigations of what happens between equals.
>
> Perhaps it is so that only equals have "fun" together. More specifically: only equals play together. When a superior and a subordinate meet, they work in a given manner. Play is only possible between equals and functions, consequently, as an upholder of the ranking structure. Sometimes, bosses ignore their position and play as equals with their subordinates. In a similar manner, the content of the work activity is easily turned into play and fun if the bosses are not present. There is something to be said of the claim that the first condition for job satisfaction is the absence of the boss. However, play cannot continue forever. Play ceases as soon as someone stops acting like an equal or as soon as a tactless comment makes

> the playing participants aware of the existing differences in rank. (Zetterberg 1977)

Institutionalized equality is, on the other hand, something other than playful equality. It is a characteristic of a structure, not a personal value.

The union movement in Sweden does not allow an 18 year-old to be president of a union, a 19 year-old is not sent as a delegate to the union congress. And a 20 year-old is not among those determining whether a strike is to be sanctioned by the central union organization. However, these youths are to have, practically, the same salaries from their employers as the employees who are old enough to assume the representative and decision-making roles on behalf of the union. In other words, equality does not apply to the union's internal politics (internal circumstances) only to its external politics (negotiations with counterparties). Here we see a glimpse of a paradox.

The same union movement pushing for equality harder than any other entity in Sweden is, in reality, one of the world's least equality-based institutions of its type. Its management has the sole power to negotiate the members' economic conditions. The results of these negotiations are not presented to the members for a vote of acceptance or rejection. Even worse is the fact that the powerful LO, the central organization of the blue-collar unions, and other union groupings, lock up the members' weapons – the right to strike – in their central headquarters. Without the central organization's decision, no strike of any meaningful scope can take place. But demands on the rest of society from this non-equality-based organization are very egalitarian. A key motto of the labor unions is a "wage policy of solidarity" (awaiting further mention in a section of Volume 5). Other measures of the public welfare bureaucracy abound to remedy precarious situations of workers with low income. In all, the institutional equality of the Swedish creed requires top-down controlled, hierarchical organizations.

A closer look at mass media also illustrates institutionalized equality. Two journalists are never the same. There are individ-

ual differences in terms of their choice of topic and style. The good editorial staffs are full of creative individualists. In Sweden, editorial staffs are comprised primarily of individualists who believe in and proclaim equality.

Editorial staffs in all countries are hierarchical and the Swedish ones are no exception. As the time to go to press nears or the report is to be broadcasted, a chief editor becomes an all-powerful captain with the ultimate decision-making right to determine what is to be included and what is to be excluded from the journalists' creative efforts.

The telling aspect in Swedish journalism is that the message from this hierarchy staffed by individualists is egalitarian. News material expressing faith in authorities or sympathy in the case of inequality is reduced to small commentary or is degraded to the "Letters to the Editor" status. The same often applies to news material that expresses forceful and happy individualism; such can, in addition, be easily accused of smacking of egoism. The social state's instances of nastiness towards its clients, the inherited biological nature of much behavior, the state support to the literary world's unbelievable capacity of creating junk literature, these topics cannot be reported as this would discredit equality. In journalism's professional ideology, there is an integral element of egalitarian politics; good journalists should disclose hidden power hierarchies, and report conspicuous differences in living standards. Media managers focused on securing large editions and high listener and viewer ratings agree. They believe that the masses have egalitarian values and that a way to success for their media is to appeal to these values.

A closer look at social welfare policies comes to similar conclusions about the institutionalization of equality. "Welfare", as this term is used in Europe, refers, not to ”dole,” but to a number of recurrent practical problems known to all societies: How shall we take care of children and the young who cannot yet look after and support themselves? How shall we deal with sick, disabled or handicapped that cannot do normal work? How shall we help elderly who can no longer fend for themselves?

When one studies Nordic social policies one finds, on the one hand, that the requirement of assistance to the needy is not the only decisive factor. There are two other driving factors; the first is a desire to be independent of the market. Nordic welfare policies have often been designed by expert advisors and politicians who do not want people to be too dependent on the market for their income. Consequently, they have seen to it that during his working years, it is relatively simple for an individual to leave the market for short periods, due to illness or to take care of a sick child, for a longer period of time when children are born, or for studies. With consideration of more chronic symptoms, people can exit the labor market for good with early retirement. The state's tax revenues provide the equivalent of a salary. Welfare's products become rights (entitlements, not goods or services on a market). In this manner, one rejects the market economy and creates a privileged group who is exempt from the requirements of a labor market. The process is called "de-commodification." A pioneering analysis of decommodification was made by Esping-Andersen (1990, 54) who also created an index of decommodification that made international comparisons possible.

In addition to the dream of an exemption from the demands of the labor market, the dream of equalization has formed Swedish social policy. This is important in social legislation to a degree which is actually on a par with the role played by the clear desire to help those in need.

Anders Borg (1992) has cited a number of examples of political equalization measures in Swedish welfare policy. In this context, housing policy should not just help the homeless and those living in the streets. It is also to provide "the entire population" with sound, reasonable, well-planned and appropriate housing (SOU 1974:17, 70). Family politics is not to help only problem families. It is "a step in the overall effort to decrease differences in living standards" (SOU 1972:34, 8). Health and hospital care is not to just to cure the sick. It is to prevent care being dependent on "nationality, sex, age, education, the capacity to pay" (SOU 1979:78, 22). This also applies to pensions, unemployment benefits, day care facilities, transport service for the elderly and

handicapped, and many, many other areas. It is equality, which is the basis of this approach. Talking about welfare has functioned very well as justification when non-socialists are to be convinced to accept equalization policies.

As far as I can understand, the costs of equality in the Swedish social programs are on the level with the total costs for helping and caring for children, for caring for the sick and handicapped and for caring for the elderly. Also in a welfare state many needy do not receive sufficient help. It would appear that the Swedes, at the end of the 1900's, allowed people in the deepest need to be without sufficient help in order to, instead, use the resources for major equality-creating measures aimed at income equalization via welfare legislation.

In the market place, Swedish companies, like other companies, are chasing, very consciously, a bottom line in the accounts evidencing a high level of profit before taxes. But outside this pure commercial activity, other Swedes are also chasing what is for them an unconscious and evasive goal, specifically, low so-called gini coefficient, the economists' and sociologists' measure of class and income differences, with low coefficients indicating small income differences.

Swedes employed in the public sector who personally may support hierarchy or individualism rather than equality are easily included in the staffs of the bureaucracies that promote institutionalized equality. Institutions engaged in welfare are, in practice, government bureaucracies, commercial services, or maybe oligarchies in civil society. In Sweden, they normally undertake equality policies in addition to their humanitarian tasks.

However, none of Sweden's major welfare institutions appear to be masters of equality in their internal relations. They are all more or less hierarchically organized, or they depend on the individualism of the market. The efforts of their staffs are not results of personal ideologies, be they respect for hierarchy, love of individualism, or commitment to equality. Swedes employed in the national insurance administration, unemployment offices, civil services in municipalities or county councils, journalists at

the large publishing houses, teachers of school children, artists in the system of museums and galleries, academics or writers with government grants and stipends – all these persons are co-actors in the institutions of the Swedish welfare state, and they support and justify equality, regardless of what they, themselves, think.

Sweden is, in brief, full of non-equality based institutions and entities preaching equality and administering measures and purporting views justified by equality. Swedes are proud of this national creed and think it is natural and self-evident, just as Americans are proud of their creed and think it is natural and self-evident.

Our general conclusion is that *national creeds promote justifications and ideologies beyond the home turfs of these justifications and ideologies*. This nullification of the general tendency expressed in Proposition 12:3 about an attenuation of justifications outside home turfs is possible by the application of social designs. Such designs may confirm Lévi-Strauss' conclusion, that myths do the thinking for us. (See pages 1: 48 and 1: 154-155 on social designs and 1: 59 and 1: 139-140 on Lévi-Strauss' myths, both in Volume 1: *Surrounded by Symbols*.)

After our analysis of national creeds, Mary Douglas' words no longer sound mysterious: "So let no one take comfort in the thought that primitives think through their institutions while moderns take the big decisions individually. That very thought is an example of letting institutions do the thinking" (Douglas 1987).

This ends our introduction to justifying vocabularies.

13. Compelling Vocabularies of Likes and Dislikes

The Xenophobic Impulse

[BIO] Xenophobia apparently contains sediment of bodily spontaneity; we instinctively raise our guard when we encounter new people different from ourselves. People trust people who are like themselves more than they trust people unlike themselves. It is sufficient if we *appear* as alike or different for this rule of thumb to apply. This impulse in our biology can be noticed in social life as a germ of emerging patterns of avoidance of the unfamiliar or foreign.

The initially biological spontaneity enters social reality, and we record this as a Proposition:

> Proposition 13:1. *Likeness-liking and Dissimilarity-dislike:* In an *initial* phase in encounters, people tend to develop a more favorable evaluation of those persons who are described as, or appear as, being like themselves than they do of persons unlike them, who tend to receive a more unfavorable evaluation.

The consequences of this tendency are seen in proverbs, such as "birds of a feather flock together." Counteracting observations are also well known in sayings such as "opposites attract." Such contradictions attest to the fact that the tendency stated in our Proposition is weak and only initially valid in encounters, and that it involves exceptions, often due to influences from other tendencies or social designs based more on executive considerations than initial emotive impulses.

In the 1930s and 40s, the marriage markets in the American Midwest provided some of the first systematic empirical evidence of personal like and dislike. Local studies there showed that ethnically homogenous partners in marriages expressed more love for one another than spouses in ethnically mixed marriages. Reuben Hill found this by exploring life histories (Becker

and Hill 1948) and Harvey Locke (1951) confirmed the finding by interviews using questionnaires.

In the new century, evidence from 30,000 interviews from across the United States collected by Robert D. Putnam, a high-profile social scientist, shows that diversity and solidarity are negatively correlated in virtually all aspects of American community life which normally are considered to be desirable. In localities of greater diversity and variety, his respondents demonstrate:

- Lower confidence in local government, local leaders and the local news media.
- Lower political efficacy — that is, confidence in their own influence.
- Lower frequency of voting registration, but greater interest in and knowledge of politics, and a higher level of participation in protest marches and social reform groups.
- Less expectation that others will cooperate to solve certain dilemmas involving collective action (e.g., voluntary conservation to ease a water or energy shortage).
- Less likelihood of working on a community project.
- Lower likelihood of giving to charity or volunteering.
- Fewer close friends and confidants.
- Less happiness and lower perceived quality of life. (Putnam 2007).

Putnam places considerable blame for the decline in community spirit on mass media. He found that "more time spent watching television" and greater agreement that "television is my most important form of entertainment" are typical responses in communities with great diversity.

Probably, the majority of Putnam's readers — I for one — would have wished for the opposite results of this research, or at least for zero-correlations of diversity and solidarity with extraneous circumstances factored out.

Compelling Vocabularies of Ageism [BIO]

Age matters. It is an inescapable biological fact that the human body is small and weak in the beginning years of life. Usually, the human body is also frail during its final years. Sexual maturity takes years before its onset in the human being, longer than is the case for other animals of similar size. Chronological age also sets a limited period for childbearing in a women's life. Other stages in life are more set by social realities than physical time or biological realities.

Our understanding of old age has become dominated by medical diagnoses of failing bodily functions, deteriorating memory, and dimming of the senses. We shall give biology its due, but only the study of the interpenetration of the social and biological gives us full understanding. The biological and social differences in age activate the likeness-liking proposition, and the result is segregation between age groups.

A linguistic mechanism of structuration of age seems to be present in all known societies (2: 1). In childhood and adolescence, age grading is particularly important. We notice the operation of the likeness-liking proposition on children's playgrounds as spontaneous alliances of age peers. The age of sexual maturity is an important divide in adolescence. But as adults, many of the feverish celebrations of birthdays in our society are non-events; only some may signify a real change.

In the last three decades of the twentieth century, the discrimination of older persons in Western culture acquired a name of its own, 'ageism.' This name is apparently difficult to translate into Mandarin since China has other traditions. The term was originally used about discrimination of seniors on the labor market and in their treatment by health services. Ageism is also used about the stereotyped and infantilizing language that elderly often encounter in social life in our society. When teenagers are discriminated, and do not get adult privileges and treatment fast enough, the label ageism has also been applied. We shall postpone the treatment of age in life-cycles to Volume 7.

Compelling Vocabularies of Racism [BIO]

A significant exploitation of the likeness-liking proposition has been made by what we called the Third Principle of Magic (1: 72). This proclaims that what holds for the part also holds for the whole, and vice versa. Compelling vocabularies of racism have developed on these grounds.

As we know, a great variety of stereotypes is linked to genetic markers such as differences in the slant of eyes, skin color, thickness of lips, the size and curvature of a nose, et cetera. Viewed against the background of the entire human genome, these genetic differences are clearly extremely trivial. By no means do they define biological man, nor do they tell us anything essential about social man. But we have been very good at magically assuming that they do. The social consequences of these beliefs and vocabularies are evident in a reinforcement of the tendency described in the likeness-liking proposition. Our third magical principle has simply entrapped mankind, and allowed the small genetic differences in human parts to make us believe in insurmountable racial differences in humans as a whole.

Thus, the differences between human races as conceived by earlier generations are not a deep, but rather a superficial ("skin-deep") division of mankind. The old thought that races are profoundly dissimilar is wrong. The entire genetic history of mankind, the great migrations, wars, and slave trade, which spread Homo sapiens' basic characteristics to all corners of the globe, are now well documented (Wells 2002). This journey that mankind has made across the world is marked by great historical events, mostly wars and technical innovations, and by the emergence of realms, such as administration and politics, economy, science, art, religion, and morality. In addition to these developments, the journey is marked by certain superficial changes in genes, which can now be easily measured, and, for all societal purposes, be ignored. But our penchant for magical thinking has made biological triviality the cause of societal worthiness. The story of "race" is a tragedy wrought by an enormous illusion.

What has been called human races are not even different species. All people now alive are evidently variations of one, just one, biological species. Black and White, Jew and Gentile, Chinese and Indian can mate and produce offspring, a fact which qualifies them as a single species according to one of the standard Darwinian criteria.

The Neanderthals, who had one chromosome less than Homo sapiens, are at the time of this writing, considered by most counts to have constituted another species than Homo sapiens. This, however, is not quite certain since Homo sapiens apparently share some DNA with Neanderthals. Perhaps the offspring of couplings between Neanderthals and Homo sapiens had difficulties to survive. Perhaps the majority of these children aborted naturally. Or, perhaps they turned out to be sterile, like the mule. Or, perhaps the Neanderthals succumbed in a war or epidemic or natural catastrophe. A definitive history of their extinction remains to be written.

Now we know that Black and White, Jew and Gentile, Chinese and Indian, and any pair of Homo sapiens you would care to mention share the same genetic structure, give or take a few recent and superficial aspects of DNA. Mankind's descriptions of fellow human beings could focus on the broad genetic similarities, and in a hundred years or two I think they might. However, at present we are still apt to focus on the superficial externally visible genetic differences, a remnant of magical thinking. zzz

Compelling Vocabularies of Sexism [BIO]

The likeness-liking proposition would hold that each sex would like itself more than it would like the opposite sex. Friendship between men and friendship between women are indeed most natural. However, the effect of the strong sex drive may easily overwhelm the likeness-liking tendency among heterosexuals of age.

We have noted several times, that there is no rationale for an unequal status between men and women in a society primarily built on language brains. There are only unimportant differences

between the language brain of men and women. We have emphasized this base of gender equality (pages 1: 81, 1: 88-89).

[BIO] The female language capacity may possibly be inherently superior to that of men. The reverse may hold for mathematical capacity. The present methods of measuring intelligence components give men and women the same average, but with a slightly larger standard deviation from that mean for men than for women. This would indicate that there are somewhat more very unintelligent men than very unintelligent women, and that there are a few more very intelligent men than very intelligent women. I don't think one should be too certain that these small differences are genetic until we have measurements of several generations in which men and women have lived as equals.

In evolutionary history, when non-language brains were dominant, it is probable that the physically stronger and faster males could dominate females, and that the females in periods of late pregnancy, childbirth, and nursing needed and sought community help to gather food and to secure support in cases of danger. Some of this help came from males. Such a relation between females and males may have been in effect prior to the evolution of the language brain. No one can be certain about these matters, and spuma and defensive bilge about sex differences and sexual history always abound.

What we do know and have also already noted (page 2: 15) is that no *immediate* gender equalization occurred in societies in which the language brain came to dominate. Athens at the time of Socrates exhibits an extreme subordination of women under men, at the same time as language-based realms such as drama, philosophy and science, had an unprecedented development. The rival Sparta, more fully organized for wars, actually seems to have held their women – "the mothers of soldiers" – in higher esteem than did Athenians.

Broad-scale equality between men and women is a recent development, with roots in Europe and North America. A United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women was enacted in 1979. Thirty years later

180 nations have ratified this Convention. The Muslim countries have been late signers and Iran and Qatar had yet to sign at the time of this writing.

The Convention is an example of a social design. The wording of the Convention does not meet Hohfeld's (1913) criteria for genuine rights which we discussed on pages 2: 31-39. It does not specify any legislation, nor any administration or other entities having the duty to enforce the rights of women, and, most important, it does not specify any sanctions to those who do not deliver and enforce the equality of women. This is left to signatories to implement, and it is so far ignored by many countries.

Modern gender science is not a peripheral part of social science. It is full of illustrations of the starting thesis of the theory in *The Many-Splendored Society* that "social reality" is created by language; we mentioned this already on the third page in our first volume subtitled *Surrounded by Symbols*. In the main, the creation of social reality is achieved by a device we called "linguistic structuration." This mechanism is introduced on the first page of our second volume, subtitled, *An Edifice of Symbols*. A sexist linguistic mechanism of structuration (pages 2: 1, 2: 6) has been at work in creating significant differences in positions, ranks, and roles of men and women in which males usually outrank females. The same linguistic mechanism of structuration is now being put to work to counteract sexism by promoting gender-neutral language.

'Sexism' is the modern term standing for discrimination due to gender. It should not be confused with discrimination due to sexual orientations such as homosexuality and bi-sexuality, that we will deal with in Volume 7.

It is easy to see how unconscious and insidious the assumption of subordination of women to men actually is. When a man acts this subordination out in speech or gestures, he may not notice what he is doing until others remind him of the fact that he is engaged in discrimination violating the modern norm in advanced countries of equality between the sexes. More on 'structural discrimination' in a moment.

The Multitude of Like-Dislikes

What will remain when age, race and sex are discounted is a number of other diversities. These produce a large number of illustrations to the likeness-liking proposition.

Persons speaking the same language tend to like each other more than they like persons with different languages. The first pillar of a nation is a common language. Vocabularies and pronunciations make a clear difference.

Persons who share the same myths of their origin and history tend to like each other more than they like persons with different myths about their own origin and history. A second pillar of a nation is a common history. This history does not need to be accurate for the people involved to like each other more than other people, but it must be shared and believed to be the truth.

Persons in the same strata in society tend to like each other more than they like persons in other strata, be they higher or lower. In all class consciousness, there is an element of preference for one's own class and a distrust of other classes. This tendency may drown in the feeling of envy in lower classes when they get to know life in higher classes and when justifications of universal equality have entered the opinion climate.

Persons who share the same lifestyle tend to like each other more than they like persons with other lifestyles. For example, the civil society is full of associations and networks in which people enjoy meeting to sing, to sew, to garden, to collect stamps, play chess, et cetera.

This list of germs of likes-dislikes could be made much longer. The Periodic Table of Societal Realms (2: 222-223 in Volume 2) presented a fuller picture of differentiation of advanced societies. A member of any cell in this table can be said to have a small, initial personal inclination to like other members of the same cell more than members of other cells. It is particularly important to note that the six columns of the Table that delineate the borders of science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality are also borders of likes and dislikes. Likes and dislikes have helped shape also this fundamental differentiation of social real-

ity into different societal realms. Persons who are engaged in the same realm tend to like each other more than they like persons engaged in different life areas. In general, they rate people in their own realm as more trustworthy than those in other life areas. For example, businessmen tend to like other businessmen more than they like priests, artists, politicians, and scientists.

Of all the societal realms, religion is one of the strongest sources of likes and dislikes, regardless of the degree to which some religions officially preach brotherly love. In the societal realm of religion, one cannot talk about the likeness-liking proposition as a weak tendency. This may be due to the claim of each religion to ultimately define the over-all judgement of a person's life, and to load this evaluation with strong emotive meanings. The different world religions do not do this overwhelming task in a uniform manner. They arrive at different conclusions and have different visions of an afterlife.

Religious conflicts may accelerate and persist if politics enters and reinforces the division. The Sunni majority and Shia minority of Muslims have a deep rift of likes and dislikes, a conflict that is more political than religious in origin. It dates from the way Muhammad's succession was arranged. Muhammad had been a merchant, a war lord, a ruler of a city, and a Prophet. The Shia faction wanted a succession in which these leaderships, particularly the religious and political ones, stayed within his family also in future generations.

Compelling Vocabularies of Inclusion and Exclusion

Our Proposition of Likeness-liking and Dissimilarity-dislike talked about an initial emotive reaction in social encounters. In the instances when such an initial reaction turns into something organized and executive, we have left mere liking and disliking and approached 'inclusion' and 'exclusion.' In sociological writings the included are often called 'in-group' and the excluded are called the 'out-group.'

As we have seen, the emotive impulses of the like-dislike are legion. It is important to note that only a small share of the huge

number of initial impulses of liking and disliking people who are different turn into systematic inclusion or exclusion rationally organized. When they do develop into inclusion or exclusion, however, the initial emotional element sets the tone. Then they turn into a more rational process of opinion formation.

Inclusion

Many identities are of an incidental nature invoked by any common experience: "We who have lived through the time of the Vietnam War," "We who have heard (and seen!) Elvis alive," "We who have read Aristotle." Any autobiographical account must deal with a large number of such incidental identities. When "the we" in such sentences gets a proper collective name for use among ourselves, and if need be, for teaching outsiders, then our identity is no longer incidental but has some stability and duration. It takes some time to establish collective identities and be able to say "We are Americans," "We are Buddhists," "We are diplomats," "We are working class."

Any “we-are-talk” readily harbors a good proportion of myths (with or without magic) about our glorious past achievements. The myths elaborating collective self-esteem are legion: exaggerations about a heroic past of our nation, dreams of being the chosen people, fantasies about a great record of our ancestors, memorable victories of our team, et cetera. To see ourselves as uncorrupt others see us is not a natural state in mankind’s identities, but of course, a desirable one for researchers and others committed to realism.

Strivings toward a more universal inclusion are found in many religions, perhaps most notably in Buddhism. Christianity also gives clear instruction. We are told that a seminar Jesus held for his students and some others was interrupted by the arrival of some of his family members.

> While he yet talked to the people, behold, his mother and his brethren stood without, desiring to speak with him. Then one said unto him, Behold, thy mother and thy brethren stand without, desiring to speak with thee. But he an-

> swered and said unto him that told him, Who is my mother? and who are my brethren? And he stretched forth his hand toward his disciples, and said, Behold my mother and my brethren! For whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother. (Mathew 12, 46-50. King James' version.)

This effort to include more than kin in the identities of brother, sister, father, and mother is the paradigm of moving from particular to universal identities. But ultimately, in any process of inclusion there appears exclusion: in this particular case, all those who do not recognize a heavenly father. The included may then treat the excluded, not as family members, but as dogs.

Exclusion

Any statement of the type "We are..." has an implicit "You are not..." Any collective identity, thus, establishes an inclusion and an exclusion of beings. In this way, we stereotype categories such as Greeks and Barbarians, Jews and Gentiles, Muslims and infidels, natives and immigrants, an endless train of inclusions and exclusions. The category "All humans" is no exception since it excludes "All other animals." The category "All beings" includes also animals but excludes "Non-beings," i.e. material artifacts, however memorable and valuable they may be.

To draw strength from having a common enemy is a common strategy, and it may be used in labeling identities. Then the very base and name of an identity may be what it excludes. The "anti-slavery movement" was a label that abolitionists used to identify themselves. A name such as "the non-socialist government," could be used by a coalition government of bourgeois parties in Scandinavia. Anti-Semite may be an identity.

Strong expressions of exclusion hit those who collaborate with enemies. The strike-breaker is called blackleg in England and scab in America. A total of 28,750 Norwegian "quislings" — named after their leader, the fascist Vidkun Quisling — who had collaborated with the Nazi occupation of Norway in World War II, were arrested after the war and prosecuted, some under ques-

tionable retroactive legislation. Two hundred of them were condemned by the attorney generals to the ultimate exclusion from society, the death penalty. An intense public debate about the use of the death penalty pursued, and only twenty, including Quisling himself, were actually executed. In this debate, the nation engaged in name-calling, not only of the quislings, but also of "the silk front" who were against all death penalty and the "the ice front," who insisted on it as the proper penalties for traitors.

It is worth remembering that the "you-are-talk" readily harbors a portion of our third principle of magic in setting up collective identities. What is true of one part is believed to be true of the whole. You find one Democrat in the United States, who is immoral and this is, then, traded so that all Democrats are next-to immoral. You find one Republican, who is stupid and, then, the saying has it that all Republicans are, in one way or another, stupid. In good schools, such magic is not condoned: children are told that you must never say that another child or another group of children is immoral or stupid; you should say that what he or she said or did on a particular occasion was immoral or stupid.

Emotive Choice of In-group and Out-group

Inclusion or exclusion, like any other choice, may be based on emotive choice or rational choice, as explored on page 1: 155-158. In all, they follow the route delineated in Proposition 5:4 that we have reproduced on page 3: 9.

In-groups and out-groups are described in executive language like other collectives, but usually also with so called "independent emotive meanings," a concept originated with Charles Stevenson 1944) which we introduced on page 1: 147. The very mention of Yankees and Latinos, or Microsoft and Apple, may evoke emotions, positive for some, negative for others. For others such words are neutral. Any initial emotiveness, however, has consequences for the way in which we view identities.

Proposition 13:2. *Shadows of Emotive Choice:* In encounters, the emotive charges found in the initial encounter will separate participants into in-groups and out-groups and color the description and evaluation of their acts.

The young Robert K. Merton observed his fellow-Americans in the 1940s and describes vividly how "the very same behavior undergoes a complete change of evaluation in its transition from the in-group Abe Lincoln to the out-group Abe Cohen or Abe Kurokawa:"

> Did Lincoln work far into the night? This testifies that he was industrious, resolute, perseverant, and eager to realize his capacities to the full. Do the out-group Jews or Japanese keep these same hours? This only bears witness to their sweat-shop mentality, their ruthless undercutting of American standards, their unfair competitive practices. Is the in-group here frugal, thrifty, and sparing? Then the out-group villain is stingy, miserly and penny- pinching. All honor is due the in-group Abe for his having been smart, shrewd, and intelligent and, by the same token, all contempt is owing the out-group Abes for their being sharp, cunning, crafty, and too clever by far. Did the indomitable Lincoln refuse to remain content with a life of work with his hands? Did he prefer to make use of his brain? Then, all praise for his plucky climb up the shaky ladder of opportunity. But, of course, the eschewing of manual work for brain work among the merchants and lawyers of the out-group deserves nothing but censure for a parasitic way of life. Was Abe Lincoln eager to learn the accumulated wisdom of the ages by unending study? The trouble with the Jew is that he's a greasy grind, with his head always in a book, while decent people are going to a show or a ball game.
>
> Was the resolute Lincoln unwilling to limit his standards to those of his provincial community? That is what we should expect of a man of vision. And if the out-groupers criticize the vulnerable areas in our society, then send 'em back where they came from. Did Lincoln, rising high above his

> origins, never forget the rights of the common man and applaud the right of workers to strike? This testifies only that, like all real Americans, this greatest of Americans was deathlessly devoted to the cause of freedom. But, as you examine the recent statistics on strikes, remember that these un-American practices are the result of out-groupers pursuing their evil agitation among otherwise contented workers. (Merton 1949, 186-187. Quote was deleted in later editions.)

Such transformations of the evaluative language leading to inclusions and exclusions create cleavages in society and are well-known obstacles in the interaction between in-groups and out-groups.

Rational Choice of In-group and Out-group

An individual's prospects of inclusion or exclusion in an encounter will greatly depend on the opinions he will express in the encounter. A managed choice of expressing opinions can be a ticket to inclusion; a mismanaged choice can be a ticket to exclusion.

In classical works of social science, public opinion is usually conceived as a property of a collective, an expression of the collective's conception of its role in history. Individuals could have a, more or less, correct interpretation of this volonté générale, to use Rousseau's term. If their interpretations were too deviant, they become viewed as being stupid, unaware, false, insane, or, at worst, criminal and a danger to society. In totalitarian and authoritarian states, volonté générale is referred to as "public opinion" not because it is the sum of what everyone says; it is referred to in this manner because the members of the central zone of the society believe this opinion expresses the destiny of their society.

However, Rousseau gave another meaning to public opinion, volonté de tous, the will of all. In this case, opinion is an attribute of individuals, not of the collective. It can be questioned and discussed, and it can be summed up in numbers pros and cons of issues, i.e. majorities and minorities. In contemporary demo-

cratic states accustomed to pollsters, volonté de tous is called "public opinion." This is the usage which is common today.

With his two terms, Rousseau managed to be the father of both totalitarian and democratic ideologies. The totalitarians overrule volonté de tous by referring to their conception of a volonté générale. The democrats restrict volonté générale to a basic social creed with a limited list of common values, such as universal human rights, particularly freedom of speech.

Eliminating the metaphysical qualities of volonté générale, but otherwise following the lead of Rousseau, we classify opinions into two categories:

> Proposition 9:2 recalled. *Normal Scanning in Encounters:* In any social encounters, the participants (a) scan each other for the descriptive language in use, particularly utterances that present opportunities or threats for them, (b) scan others for the evaluative language in use, particularly opinions about individuals such as themselves, and (c) scan others for the prescriptive language in use, particularly for any norms that may apply to themselves. (2: 121)

opinions we *must* express in order to be included in a collective, use its name as our identity, and/or represent it to others,

other opinions that we *may* express without being disliked by, isolated in, or exiled from our collective.

Encounters of people, directly or via media, are the birthplace of shared opinions. An acid test of the existence of a public opinion about the issue of X is the answer to the question "Have you ever heard of this? Have you ever talked about it?"[6] Opinions may be hidden or public. The hidden opinions are only expressed in encounters with those closest to us, or in the privacy of a voting booth. What you write in a private letter or express to your family in the seclusion of your living room is not necessarily public opinion. The term 'public opinion' refers usually to collective, customary opinions about an issue expressed in public, i.e. views freely expressed as well to relative strangers.

The German opinion and media scholar Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1980) formulated a theory she called "the spiral of

silence." It is demonstrated in a series of events, which follow when a person enters into an everyday encounter with strangers. Newcomers to a social encounter will notice opinions prevailing among the others in the encounter. We have noted and amended this idea in the proposition Normal Scanning in Encounters, reproduced here. Rather quickly, newly arrived can scan and sense a "climate of opinion" prevailing in the small talk of an encounter.

If the prevailing opinions in an encounter are alien to a newcomer's own views, a normal reaction is to withdraw from the encounter. There is no need to withdraw from the conversation if the topic is innocent, such as the weather. However, if the topic focuses on partisan and alien political, religious, moral, or artistic views, some may want to withdraw. This voluntary exclusion is an option that Noelle-Neumann does not delve on. Her favorite example of encounters stems from the old era of long trips on European railroads in which six to eight persons are seated face-to-face in compartments. It is difficult to withdraw from such compartments, and they do not facilitate staying silent, such as with the seating arrangements in a bus or an airplane. In face-to-face confinement, however, an interesting process begins. Those who have never been on the old-fashioned trains will recognize processes from dining parties or conversations in pubs and cafés, perhaps also from academic seminars.

If the prevailing views in the confined encounter seem solid and rigid, then most newcomers lean to the views expressed in the encounter. At least temporarily, the newcomers express some understanding of the views of the others, and may actually assimilate them as their own. This is done out of an ever present “fear of isolation” according to Noelle-Neumann. Others have argued that this is done to “avoid cognitive dissonance” (Lewin 1948) or to “avoid insecurity” (Coleman 1990). At any rate, a heated argument is thus avoided and the conversation in the encounter remains polite and safe.

If the prevailing opinions in the conversations in the encounter seem uncertain or in a state of fluctuation, the newcomers try

to say something acceptable and reasonable that does not isolate them from the others. They avoid the risk of being excluded from the mainstream of the conversation, and they avoid upsetting the exchange.

If newcomers feel that their own views are losing ground in a conversation (or in society at large) they express them with increasing hesitation. Eventually, they may turn silent. It is easy for the public to become traitors to a losing cause. Socially unsupported opinions suffocate in encounters and tend to turn their original supporters to silence. If the opinions remain unheard of also in mass media, then Noelle-Neumann's "spiral of silence" has brought them to a pre-mature death also in the larger society. Mass media are not omnipotent in creating opinions, but in the struggle of survival of opinions journalists have a more decisive role, as we noted on page 2: 107.

If the newcomers find that their own views are in general ascendancy within an encounter, they express them more freely, and also with more conviction. It is easier to argue in line with an ever more supportive climate of opinion than against the trend. It is easy to be a convert to a winning cause, the so-called bandwagon effect.

People vary in their subjugation to these processes and in their mastery in using these processes. Noelle-Neumann (1983) measured "the strength of personality" to separate the leaders from the followers in opinion formation in encounters. The scale covers efforts to make others accept someone's opinion, a process first approached in a work called *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno, et al. 1950).

Opinion formation in an encounter is also affected by the presence of self-reliant persons in the encounter, something to which Noelle-Neumann gives scant attention. On this point, we need to amend the theory of the spiral of silence. Let us again quote Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay from 1841: "It is easy in the world to live after the world's opinion; it is easy in solitude to live after our own; but the great man is he who in the midst of

the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude" (page 3: 271).

Opinions in our encounters are not only shaped by Noelle-Neumann's strong persuasive personalities but also by the strength of Emerson's resistant personalities participating in the encounter. However, one cannot take it for granted that resistant personalities outnumber persuasive personalities when the issue is exclusion.

Christian Anti-Semitism

The identity "Christian" appeared a generation or two following the above (page 75) episode in the Gospel about inclusion. This identity apparently emerged based on "you-are-talk" in the nearby Hellenic metropolis Antioch. Here the followers of Jesus, in typical big-city lingo, were referred to as "Christfreaks." "Christ" is Greek for the Hebrew word "Messiah." It is also the favored designation of Jesus used by Saint Paul, a person well at home in Antioch.

Not all the Christians in Antioch were of Jewish descent. The Jews in Antioch had acquired the privilege of skipping the otherwise mandatory attendance at the seasonal worship of the Roman city-gods. The Christians of non-Jewish background claimed and obtained the same privilege. They also stayed away from the worship of Juno and consorts. This brought them to near disaster in 70 ADs when a serious Jewish uprising in Jerusalem against the Romans made the Jews in the Empire, and particularly those in the nearby region, persecuted as enemies of the state.

To save themselves, the Christians in Antioch of non-Jewish background publicly announced that they were not Jews; in fact, they joined in loudly denouncing the Jews and their uprising. This was probably the first public outburst of Christian anti-Semitism. The unholy alliance between the Roman state and non-Jewish Christians in Antioch became a holy alliance when Christianity became the state religion.

The alliance of the Roman state and the Christian Church harbored a continuation in European anti-Semitism. James Carroll (2001) reminds us in his much discussed volume *Constantine's Sword* how churches, unrestrained by the body politic of the day, maintained anti-Semitism not only in ordinary social and civic life but by organized pogroms, and ghettoes. When the Nazi-state made Holocaust its policy, a secular state rather than the churches put this dark warp in European history to a horrible level of ultimate exclusion.

Through the centuries, the "you-are-talk" about Jews found a defensive bilge that included many projective items. One recurrent example is the labeling of Jews as "Christ-killers." In reality, of course, the Romans, not the Jews, had executed Jesus. That would have been a deadly truth to shout in Antioch and elsewhere in the Empire. Even the Evangelist, writing a century after Golgotha, played it down.

Structural Discrimination

It is noteworthy that newcomers into encounters tend to accept that which has been previously defined in the encounter. In this way, we arrive at the striking situation that a newcomer or someone from a new generation without a personal dislike of a group, may, nonetheless, act as if they dislike these persons. People who may have personally overcome a dislike of certain people can, nevertheless, treat these same people inequitably due to an existing discrimination built into the language in use.

As individuals, many modern males accept with all their heart that men and women should be treated as equals. In a society, in which all essential activities are based on language, this is the only reasonable position, as women are equally or better skilled than men in the use of language and its symbols. But in practice, these modern men discriminate against women due to the inequities built into the prevailing definitions of women's positions and roles in family, work, and public life. The absorption by newcomers and new generations of prevailing derogatory ascriptions result in what is called 'structural discrimination.'

Structural discrimination of immigrants is common. Schierup (1995) has argued that the "Negros" of *An American Dilemma* (G. Myrdal 1944) is the equivalent of illegal immigrants, and their likes in European city ghettos. Myrdal's experience is repeated in Europe: the lion's share of discrimination cannot be explained by any number of psychological, cultural, and ethnographic studies of minorities, nor by any normal degree of xenophobia in mankind. Only through studies of structures that are routinely maintained by society at large, i.e. among the majority, can lasting and blatant discrimination of minorities be understood. This is convincingly shown for Sweden by the sociologist Tom Burns and his coworkers (2007).

The message of Swedish polls is that personal dislike of immigrants in Sweden is modest and declining in the host population. But discrimination in practice is pervasive. Burns emphasizes immediately that the processes also work in the reverse. "A prejudiced person, even a racist, can act neutral and non-discriminatory in his occupational role" (p. 1). Employment is a key to counteract structural discrimination of immigrants: work for the host population and work for the immigrants, and common workplaces for both.

Countries such as the Scandinavian countries have followed the lead from their strong labor unions, which oppose immigrant labor. The many foreign-born in Sweden and Denmark by the end of the twentieth century had mostly been admitted as a quota of certified refugees and their later reunited relatives. These groups of immigrants become hotbeds of structural discrimination as immigration reception officials, employers, and unions failed to quickly integrate the refugees into the labor force. Needless to say, it is easier to integrate foreigners who immigrate in order to work than foreigners who are refugees from persecution and wars.

The linkage of occupation to a non-discriminatory reception of immigrants is particularly clear in the occupations we call bureaucratic, technocratic, or professional. Professionals incorporate roles characterized by high specialization, high impersonali-

ty, low or one-way contingency, low emotivity. (All these less than wonderful words were defined in section on "Social Relations." in chapter 7 pages 2: 53-58.) A judge in his courtroom or a physician in his practice may not be able to always keep out all of his personal likes-dislikes, but at least he is trained to do so. Even the Muslim medics and paramedics in the British National Health Service who were linked to the bombing in July 2007 of Glasgow Airport, and an attempted bombing of the London Underground, had records as professionals in terms of dealing with patients and their individual medical needs, regardless of the religion and race of the patients. Only in their role as amateur agents of jihad did they plan to kill randomly the infidels and other innocents.

Decisions taken by certain administrative bureaucrats who are informed of resolutions taken at party congresses, and thus involve no independent intellectual effort, may not necessarily be non-discriminatory. Professionalism is a better handle to use against discrimination. Decisions among technocrats or professionals are also based on academic knowledge, a fact which should help these professionals toward objectivity.

Is it true, then, that countries with a higher portion of bureaucrats, technocrats and professionals have lower levels of discrimination? Data on this is available but lacks conclusive analysis. Some studies show that the opposite may occur. If there is racism or sexism in biomedical knowledge taught to medical students, the doctors become trapped in structural discrimination. If there is racism or sexism built into the legislation and procedures taught to law students, judges, prosecutors, and lawyers become trapped in structural discrimination.

Structural discrimination is not a hydra, the legendary creature that grew two new heads for each one that was cut off. However, structural discrimination is insidious and requires vigilance.

Social Designs Coping with Dislike and Exclusion

The natural tendency to be initially alert towards differences in those we encounter does not mean that mankind is born to be trapped in racism, nationalism, ageism, sexism, and the like. The generally weak tendency of the likeness-liking proposition is modified by a variety of human designs making it stronger or weaker.

A strengthening designs may be hate-mongering. We discussed hate-mongering justifications on page 56 above, and have just illustrated it with the phenomenon of anti-Semitism. Hate mongering may feed the shibboleth that diversity brought by immigration is the root of all evil: neighborhood crime, family disintegration, political strife, degradation of the mother tongue, and what have you. The weakening designs, on the other hand, may be the newer multi-cultural shibboleth that flourished at the turn of the twentieth century and promulgated that ethnic diversity enriches our society: neighborhood, corporation, party, church, et cetera.

Social design to undermine discrimination often requires us to define people in terms of age, sex, race, ethnicity, and then to set quotas, formulate anti-discrimination laws, et cetera. These processes fix our attention on diversity in our encounters, rather than focusing our attention on similarity. There is an obvious risk that such a cure prolongs the disease. What a diversified mankind seems to need to do to stop personally disliking one another is to keep totally silent about irrelevant dissimilarities. Easier said than done.

The personal like-dislike responses can be embedded in collective preferences. Likes and dislikes become integral parts of social beliefs, public sentiments, and social norms, i.e. elements Table 6.1 in Volume 2, page 2: 13. When this happens, the like or dislike you have toward certain people is not only yours; they become customary and "everybody" in your circle shares them with you. From there on, the social beliefs, public sentiments, and social norms become included in the language shaping the positions and roles (2: 47-58). Now the like-dislikes becomes part

of an ascribed identity of certain people, and they shape the way you are expected to treat these people. This is a way to explanation the existence of structural discrimination in our theory of society.

Edward Said (1978) argued that "The Orient" is, in a large measure, a Western construction full of structural discriminations. During the Nineteenth, and into the twentieth century, the Orientals were generally depicted by Europeans either as outright criminals, or as lazy, false, and sexually obsessed non-criminals. Said holds that the top authors and scholars of the West thought along these lines, but I think it was rather the pulp writers who did so and spread the image.

At any rate, Orientalism had nothing to do with reality. Said says that this construction suited the ambitions of British politicians, when the Ottoman Empire, after centuries of rule, had lost its tight grip over the Orient. My impression is that this ascribed identity also suited the need of European media to create attention and produce large editions by focusing on negative emotive symbols, more than on positive emotive symbols, giving readers an emotive choice, rather than a rational analysis, of news from the Orient. All in all, orientalism is a creation of the process of "Emotive and Rational Choice", a Proposition reproduced above on page 3: 9.

Compelling Vocabularies of Ethnicity

The ethnic differences between a human and her or his fellow human develop due to upbringing and living in different places with different histories and cultures. Ethnicity combines history and biography, the socially defined humans and the biologically defined humans. Like it or not, this makes a difference in its consequences. One cannot dismiss it as a superstition.

You can open any inquiry about someone's ethnicity by establishing a person's parentage, place of birth, and upbringing. There are profound differences between growing up in, say, Mexico or in Texas. Some of these differences are linguistic, economic, and educational, i.e. of a kind that can be erased by two

or three generations through integration policies. But certain differences are more profound, as Octavio Paz (1961) has shown in a well-known essay, and are virtually built into life and selves.[7]

Ethnic dislike surfaces in two ways: when persons with a different ethnicity enter your encounters, and when you find yourself in encounters dominated by other ethnicities. The former may be a result of emigration, the latter a result of immigration. Ethnic like-dislike, thus, occurs pursuant to mobility and may become pervasive in any modern society. Ethnic bonds of liking override the anonymity of city life.

The ethnic dislike can result in neighborhood changes, whereby one ethnic group succeeds another in a residential area. Short of strict legislation fanatically enforced, ethnic ghettos are seen as impossible to avoid in a world of mobility. Sociologists living in Chicago in its peak years of immigration at the beginning of the twentieth century developed an elaborate theory of the zones of the city shaped by the "invasion and succession" of the various ethnic and differently colored groups.

Ethnicity and Immigration in the United States

Canada and the United States left their continent of North America open to all comers, particularly from Europe, in a liberal immigration policy. As predicted by the likeness-liking proposition, the inhabitants in the American colonies, and later in the United States, looked more favorably upon persons like themselves, than upon the native Indians, who were more unlike themselves. The colonization of North America was undoubtedly marred by elements of ethnic cleansing of Native Americans, as we have mentioned in the opening chapter of this work (1: 26).

In the nineteenth century, the United States was the foremost representative of liberal immigration. The country had revolted against European traditionalism and hierarchy and had proclaimed that all men were created equal. The Statue of Liberty

was raised in 1886 and greeted immigrants from the Old World with the inspiring words of Emma Lazarus:

> *Give me your tired, your poor,*
> *Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,*
> *The wretched refuse of your teeming shores.*
> *Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me;*
> *I lift my lamp beside the golden door.*

In the United States of 1900, with a population of 76 million, a total of 10.3 million was foreign-born, and 15.6 million were offspring of foreign born. A total of 34 percent of the population was, thus, being assimilated. It was impossible to maintain these proportions. Immigrants from southern and eastern Europe did not fit into the American communities as easily as had immigrants from western and northern Europe. Again, we see the operation of the likeness-liking proposition.

Progressive politicians did not want any of the authoritarian thinking of the Old World replanted in the New. But they were ill informed. In an early, and now classical, work on immigration, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918-20/1958) W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki showed that, although the Polish peasants did shape an ethnic subculture differing from the established American culture, this new culture also diverged from the old Polish culture which they had left behind by, among other things, being less patriarchal in family life and less autocratic in community life.

After World War I, American immigration laws became more conservative. Since World War I, the United States has, thus, been partial to immigration from countries having an ideological heritage from the French and English revolutions and, therefore, involving immigrants who can more readily accept America's own heritage of freedom. In 1924, quotas were introduced cutting immigration from a spontaneous inflow of over one million per annum to a controlled entry of, first, 358,000 and, finally, 154,000 annually. The laws favored immigrants from Europe over those from Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Within the European quota, immigrants from western and northern Europe

were favored over those from southern and eastern Europe. At one point, it was seriously proposed that the ethnic composition of the population be exactly maintained as reflected in the somewhat dubious Census in 1890.

The motives were partly racial and partly cultural. The racial argument for immigration restrictions eventually became invalidated. The individual differences within each race are so enormous that using racial criteria to determine whether an individual is to be allowed to immigrate would lead to egregious inequities. The cultural arguments have, however, survived as did the concept that every society has the "right" to preserve its own distinctive character.

An immigration law introduced in 1990 set the annual quota at 700,000, or 0.3 percent of the population, plus extra quotas for refugees, determined each year. This law did not change the position permitting immigration as long as it does not overwhelm America's distinctive character.

At this time at the end of the twentieth century, most immigrants come to the United States from Latin America, and substantial numbers of them enter the United States illegally. They are Christians, the same religion as the majority Americans practice, a fact that facilitates integration. Their language is Spanish, a world language commanding pride among its speakers. They appear to be less motivated than many earlier immigrants to the United States to adopt English. This implies that certain southern parts of the country have an unexpected situation of, de facto; having two, parallel languages throughout several generations.

Ethnicity and Immigration in Europe

Europe cannot imitate the liberal history of immigration to the United States. Europe in historical times has never been a nearly empty Continent, open to all comers as after the ethnic cleansing of the American Indians. Europe's major native ethnic groups have remained intact, and are historically rooted in different geographical regions. In Europe, ethnic groups cannot be quick-

ly integrated into a melting-pot of the American kind. Only slowly will the European countries take in a limited number of outsiders and allow a fusion of their cultural heritages.

Going back some centuries, we observe the slow but powerful integration processes in several regions in Europe. For example, in the north-eastern part of present France, a natural center emerged in Île de France, where the land was fertile and many navigable rivers flow in different directions. There certain clans of Franks, a Germanic tribe, managed to subjugate a very divergent number of neighboring Romans, Celts, and Burgunds. When sufficiently united, these groups took on the Normans, Bretons, Basques, Corsicans, and some Catalans.

For a long time, the French language was not universal at local level, where other forms of various Romance languages were spoken, such as Picard, Champenois, Bourguignon, Gascon, Provençal. It is said that the people of Marseilles, where Provençal lingered on, could not understand *La Marseillaise*, the present national anthem, composed in 1792 as "War Song of the Army of the Rhine." A few solders from Marseilles belonging to this army had learned sufficient French to sing the song so energetically during the revolutionary march on Paris that it was nicknamed "the Marseillaise."

In medieval Spain, the process of fusion of regional identities and languages was fired by the struggle between Muslims and Christians. A process similar to the one in France has since taken place; actually, it is still under way — and continues to meet with resistance. In parts of Eastern Europe, and particularly in the Balkans, struggles between ethnic identities have also been the order of the day; it had not ceased by the turn of the century in 2000.

On a larger scale, a process of integrating identities to a common identity for all of Europe is noticeable; this may have been helped along in recent years by the pan-European media and pan-European institutions and projects. However, the latter seldom reach deep into peoples' hearts. This is clearly the case of

the European Union, a project of the political elites, not the broad masses.

In Europe, with the possible exception of France, you may be seen as and called “foreigner” — not merely "foreign-born" as in the United States and Canada — even after you have acquired citizenship in your adopted country. European languages generally lack a common term, such as the designation “American,” enjoyed by all citizens of the United States, irrespective of their ancestry or country of birth. Identities which people in the United States may take pride in, such as Afro-American or Italian-American, have no counterparts in Europe. Designations such as Afro-German or Afro-European, Chinese-Italian or Chinese-European are unknown or odd in Europe, at least at the time of this writing.

In most countries in Europe around the year 2000, the balance between births and deaths implies a decline in the population, unless it is balanced by a higher rate of immigration than emigration. Most geographical areas surrounding Europe are Muslim, a minority religion west of the Ural Mountains and north of the Mediterranean. Inside Europe, Albania, Bosnia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan are predominantly Muslim. Immigrants from Muslim areas are not as secular as native Europeans; in fact, they often become more religious in their new country than they were in the old, since this supports them in a novel, and sometimes, tough environment.

In the beginning of the twenty-first century, Europe has an elderly population that may need more immigrant labor than North America. The ethnic and religious gap between the newcomers to Europe and the resident Europeans seems greater than the gap between the predominantly Latin immigrants to the United States and resident Americans. To this circumstance must be added the huge differences in the historical conditions for immigration between North America and Europe.

[6] Opinion pollsters have several proven ways, unfortunately mostly unused, to find out if their respondents have learned about and/or discussed an issue in a public prior to the answers are given to interviewers and tabulated as public opinion. We shall take up this topic in dealing with politics in Volume 5.

[7] A common question in a census in countries with many immigrants is, “What is your ethnic background?” This question becomes difficult to answer for later generations due to the many mixed marriages. Survey researchers have used additional questions to establish ethnicity: "Where were you born?" and "Where did you grow up?" “What kind of neighborhood?” As these usually result in similar answer, questionnaires may be simplified to contain only one of them. Often researchers include the lingering ethnicity indicated by the question "Where were your father/mother born?" and "Where did your father/mother grow up?" In some countries these are sensitive questions; in others they are answered routinely.

14. Compelling Vocabularies of Self-Images

Individual Identities: Self-Images

There is considerable complexity in the emergence and dynamics of selves. Those who are engaged in developing psychological theory will not be unemployed by the simple statements on the topic in this book. We shall deal only with certain aspects of the human self that are needed to understand what happens in the larger society.

By means of our basic terms of language use − description, evaluation, and prescription − and a distinction between habit and custom, we have explicated the concepts cognitions, attitudes, and exhortations in the previous volume; their everyday meaning is found to be good enough (2: 12-16). A special class of cognitions, attitudes, and exhortations of considerable interest are the ones an individual applies to himself. “I-am” sentences define an individual self. The sum of these 'self-cognitions,' 'self-attitudes,' and 'self-exhortations' ("I am the hostess," "I am attractively dressed," "I shall entertain my guests") for a given person constitutes the individual 'self-image.'

Self-images include memories of how persons have described and evaluated themselves in past times and their hopes as regards what they prescribe ("should be") in the present and near future, and how they describe and evaluate their future selves. All these terms are attributes of language, and as usual, language implies a freedom to cook up new sentences that have never been heard or used before. Thus we can “edit” our own selves.

We also have a more or less good reminiscence of our own self in times gone by. The so-called "memory" behind the experience that, once you've touched a hot stove, you rarely do so again is a purely bodily conditioning that a child can experience, before it has acquired a language. This is not the same as the memory in

Saint Augustine's *Confessions*, the first great memoir in Western literature, and a 100 percent product of language. It is the latter kind of memory that social reality depends on.

Collective Identities. Images of Us and Others

The self-images we have discussed are expressed by sentences of the type "I am ...." Let us now turn to sentences of the plural type "We are...." Such sentences define collective identities, images of us and of other people. In large measures the compelling vocabularies about individual identities will also apply to collective identities.

In human history, societies organized on the basis of collective identities — including collective memories and hopes — have been the rule, while societies based on individual identities have been the exceptions. In medieval times, European and other societies were, by and large, based on collective identities: estates, guilds, fiefs, villages, parishes, et cetera. Many such collectivities had a limited but real autonomy (Eigengetzlichkeit) in making their own rules independent of any central power.

Still, in the not so distant past, less than 250 years ago, Europeans lived in kingdoms. Their identities rested often less on being the king's subjects, and more importantly on their membership in a family or clan living in a named hamlet or village. They identified themselves mostly by a family name and the name of their place of residence or birth, and they had a position in a rural class structure. (See, for example the chart on page 2: 204.) If they lived in cities, they got their identity by family name and occupation.

Individual identities became mainstream in the countries affected by the French and American revolutions and embraced the ideologies of liberalism. This liberal period promoted individual identities and as we know, the emphasis on individual identities has spread into many countries. However, it must be emphasized that, so far, this period has lasted only a short time. In Western Europe, we can count political individualism, individual wealth creation, and freedom of individual artistic and

scientific pursuits only as one, or one and half, century old. In the United States, it is more than two centuries old. What so many people take as self-evident is, still, a mere flash in recorded history.

It is too early to tell how long this grand structure based on individual identities will last. The number of democracies in the world certainly has multiplied in the twentieth century. However, by the turn of the century in the year 2000, the *individualistic component* in the democratic development in Europe and North America is dawdling because of a widespread acceptance of people seeking recognition as collectives, not as individuals. Their collective identities are fixed to a variety of markers such as gender, color, religion, language, region of birth, ancestry, ethnicity, sexual inclination, union membership, age and any other grouping that can be framed in a modern language. These groupings seek, and are given, recognition, not as individuals, but as women, as Afro-Americans, Muslims, Québécois, immigrants, indigenous people, homosexuals, et cetera. In the name of multiculturalism many liberals have accepted a return to an almost medieval form of organizing society as independent estates and guilds and similar structures, rather than forming society based on independent persons. This process of "identity politics" removes contemporary societies in subtle ways from its liberal model with individualized meritocracy.

The Looking-Glass Self

The uniqueness of an individual is not only a matter of a, more or less unique combination of genes, but is also a unique combination of her or his encounters with other individuals, past or present. This we were told a hundred years ago by Georg Simmel, the German sociologist (Simmel 1908/1923, ch 6).

His American contemporary, Charles H. Cooley (1902), was the first to explore cogently the idea that a person's self is a mirror-like reflection of what others think of him, thus discovering that society and personality are, at least in part, two sides of the same coin. This became known as the Theorem of the Looking-Glass Self.

A unique set of encounters creates unique self-conceptions. The early encounters of family, friends, and neighbors were referred to by Cooley as "primary groups." These are the people we encounter first in life, and they have an easier impact than later encounters in the long process of developing the self.

The Cooley theorem covers three special cases, depending on whether we deal with descriptions, evaluations, or prescriptions. It makes some difference to the self-image of a medical student, if on his visit to the ward, he is greeted by nurses and patients with "Good morning, young man" or "Good morning, doctor." In one school of medicine where first year students have considerable contact with patients, it was found that 39 percent of the students who felt their "patients" thought of them as doctors also described themselves primarily as doctors, in contrast to 6 percent of those who felt their patients thought of them as students (M. J. Huntington 1955).

As to the effect of evaluations on the self-image, it is an old observation that kings and aristocrats tend to have a favorable view of themselves. And low-status persons tend toward low self-esteem.

As to prescriptions, we have an inclination to tell ourselves to do in terms of what others in our encounters want us to do. A school superintendent's conception of what he should do is thus a reflection of what the students and their parents in his school think he should do, what his colleagues in his professional association think he should do, what his school board thinks he should do, what his family wants him to do, et cetera (Gross, Mason and McEachern 1958). His conception of what he should do is much more than just the formulations in the job description when he applied for the job as superintendent.

Needless to say, exhortations from such various directions are often a source of strain and conflict inside the self and in the groups. In almost any job, the personal will to perform is grounded in more than expectations from the boss. To "work to rule" may be a personal compulsion. It may also be a pressure put on employers by a labor union. The exaggerated compliance

to all prescriptions issued by management is a sure way of not getting much accomplished. This is true both when the requirements are defined by the employee herself or himself, or by the union. A job becomes more efficiently executed when expectations from coworkers and customers/clients/suppliers are added and integrated by employees with autonomous selves.

Modifications of Cooley's theorem of The Looking-Glass Self have been made by several thinkers. Some, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and William James, actually made their contributions by writing prior to Cooley's formulation. One might perhaps say that Cooley should have paid more attention to them.

Self-Reliance

The process of seeking a self of one's own was central to the thinking of American philosopher Emerson. In his classical essay "Self-Reliance" from 1841 he held that "What I must do is all that concerns me, not what the people think." Emerson stressed that nothing at last is sacred but the integrity of your own mind, and that you should insist on acting in accordance with your own convictions and never just imitate others.

Self-reliance is evolved in many ways; among them is confrontation with pristine ideas, for example from Christianity or Greco-Roman philosophers. Self-reliant people are not arrogant. They have rather developed a healthy resistance to the tendency to conform automatically. In other words, they have developed designs to counteract the impulses follow public opinion and to conform to what we learn from selective scanning in encounters. (Proposition 9:2 reproduced above on page 3: 80.)

Multiple Selves

In 1890, also prior to Cooley formulating his theorem, William James had expressed the motivational significance of evaluations by others, in his famous dictum: "A man's social me is the recognition which he gets from his mates.... Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of these images, is to wound him" (James 1890, Chap. 10, Section

1b). James' thesis, of course, has also a positive aspect: to build up rather than hurting any of these selves is to please a fellow human.

Temporary deviations from the pattern "one person, one self" are well known in folk wisdom, for example, we know that drugs may bring out a different person: "he is not himself tonight, he is drunk." Use of pseudonyms has been approved in certain pursuits such as art and espionage. The rule in Europe, in contrast to much of Asia, has been that a person has only one true self.

James' view of a person allows him or her to have multiple selves. You may then express one self to one person and another self to another person, and, as a result, you may receive contradictory directives and divergent approvals. This has not been seen as sound and healthy in Western traditions. A basic requirement in this part of the world for a developed self is that a person should coordinate the multiple selves he may have developed into one consonant self. Eastern traditions and religions have been much more open to multiple selves.

Significant Others

An important supplement to Cooley's reasoning is based on the common observation that some people can claim quite rightly that they do not care much about what people in certain encounters think about them. But there are other encounters where the opinions of others about us are exceedingly important to us. These are the opinions of our "significant others," to use the term introduced by George Herbert Mead (1934). We do not really know a person well until we know who his or her significant others are.

On this score, Cooley agrees with Freud and many psychologists who attach special importance to how people in our childhood, especially our parents, view us and our behavior. Longtime members of primary groups usually obtain some significant others in these groups. For example, the significant others may be old-fashioned parents or authoritarian teachers who

equip children with a mental gyroscope that will inform them throughout life, whether or not they are deviating from behavior that would meet with the approval of their parents and teachers.

In the 1950s social scientists recognized that increasingly large numbers of Americans wished, above all, to gain the approval of their "peer groups" — others who are similar to them in age, occupation, et cetera rather than approval from parents and teachers. David Riesman (1950) called such people "outer-directed," in contrast to the traditional "inner-directed" types. The outer-directed lack gyroscopes, but have instead sensitive radar screens that signal what those around them think.

We may go on to supplement Riesman's typology of significant others by including those from the historical past and by significant others from the near future. There are some individuals for whom historical models and ideals remain a reality. These significant others may be the heroes of your nation, Jesus, Muhammad, Buddha, or your famous great grandfather or great grandmother whom you never met.

There is also the possibility that one's significant others can be anticipated contacts in future social encounters, or even figures of the imagination. It is not only in fairy tales that a girl may make herself beautiful for the prince, who will come — one day. An assiduous small businessman may adapt his present decisions to what he anticipates that the big bank president or industrial leader would expect — one day. Or the artist, misunderstood or ignored by his contemporaries, may persevere in creating, bolstered by the conviction that critics and the public will appreciate his work and recognize his greatness — one day. In like manner, a politician who aspires to become a statesman may anticipate the judgment of future historians. In other words, the opinions of "anticipated significant others" may also have great influence on our lives.

The I [BIO]

George Herbert Mead made several extensions of Cooley's theory of self[8]. We have already mentioned his notion of "signif-

icant others." He also gave the self an explicit base in a person's bodily spontaneities; he called it 'the I.' It belongs primarily in biological reality and not in social reality. However, Mead, to the astonishment of his fellow humanists, believed that "the course of history can be profoundly changed by the least probable element, the unconscious and unpredictable 'I'."

Conversations with the Self

More important, Mead went far beyond the ideas that a self-image is molded by the unique set of encounters we have or have had, and that the significant others in these encounters fully shape our selves. It is also shaped by us ourselves, more specifically by our own ability to edit our self-image and stay firm at the result.

As people find out that they have selves they begin to communicate with them. This ability to communicate with one's own self may not be unknown to higher animals, but it is a skill that mankind is especially good at, particularly when they have learned a language.

Mead argued that children using this ability can develop 'generalized others' to cope with the selves that others present them with. In the games children play, they take the position and roles of the others – parents, siblings, neighbors, playmates, and others who have presented them with selves. The generalized other is an actual or perceived common and consonant point of view by a person about the view that his significant others hold about her or him.

Reservations are in order about the validity of the idea that "generalized others" can be so easily formed. Perhaps the process can work well in a Gemeinschaft with its lasting relations and reasonably homogenous culture, but most children would have difficulties to mold a generalized other in a Gesellschaft with differentiated societal realms and numerous short contacts.

Herbert Blumer used Mead's idea about conversations with the self to build a sociological theory he called "symbolic interac-

tion." Blumer is lyrical about the advances of social science that come with Mead's reasoning:

> Mead's picture of the human being as an actor differs radically from the conception of man that dominates current psychological and social science. He saw the human being as an organism having a self. The possession of a self converts the human being into a special kind of actor, transforms his relation to the world, and gives his action a unique character. In asserting that the human being has a self, Mead simply meant that the human being is an object to himself. The human being may perceive himself, have conceptions of himself, communicate with himself, and act toward himself. As these types of behavior imply, the human being may become the object of his own action. This gives him the means of interacting with himself—addressing himself, responding to the address, and addressing himself anew. Such self-interaction takes the form of making indications to himself and meeting these indications by making further indications. The human being can designate things to himself—his wants, his pains, his goals, objects around him, the presence of others, their actions, their expected actions, or whatnot. Through further interaction with himself, he may judge, analyze, and evaluate the things he has designated to himself. And by continuing to interact with himself he may plan and organize his action with regard to what he has designated and evaluated. In short, the possession of a self provides the human being with a mechanism of self-interaction with which to meet the world—a mechanism that is used in forming and guiding his conduct. (Blumer 1969, 62)

The ideas that Blumer extracted from the George Herbert Mead has made Mead a more cited person in the field of sociology than he is in his own field of philosophy. Mead's approach to social interaction became a second cornerstone in the Chicago School of Sociology; the first had been the division of communicative structures from Ezra Park that we earlier have presented (2: 68-71).

Toward Authentic Selves

In his thinly disguised autobiographical writing, *Les mots*, Jean Paul Sartre tells how his sister (in the novel called Anne Marie) became totally emerged in the opinions of the significant others in her primary groups:

> Anne Marie, the younger daughter, spent her childhood on a chair. She was taught to be bored, to sit up straight, to sew. She was gifted: the family thought it distinguished to leave her gifts undeveloped; she was radiant: they hid the fact from her. Those proud, modest bourgeois were of the opinion that beauty was beyond their means or below their station; it was all right for a marquise or a whore. Louise's [Anne Marie's mother] pride was utterly barren: for fear of making a fool of herself, she refused to recognize the most obvious qualities of her children, her husband, and herself. Charles [Anne Marie's husband] was unable to recognize beauty in others: he confused it with health. ... Fifty years later, when turning the pages of a family album, Anne Marie realized that she had been beautiful. (Sartre 1964, p 8)

Anne Marie can be seen as a straightforward illustration of Cooley's theory from 1902 of the looking-glass self. Cooley held that others in your primary groups edit, through their words, your definition of yourself, i.e. how you describe yourself, how you evaluate yourself, and what you prescribe for yourself as your personal will, your goals and aspirations. Even so, there is a further story. By merely sketching the picture of his sister, Sartre shows that Cooley's idea cannot be the full story of the human self: all people are obviously not like Anne Marie. For anyone with a language can take hold of the definition of herself or himself. We hold that all humans are born with a language instinct with inherited descriptive, evaluative and prescriptive components. With no more than your mother tongue you have the tools to edit your own self.

In the United States, the serious commercial corporations running the Internet dating markets for a fee screen self-descriptions in order that criminals and known psychotics are

kept out. But they cannot guarantee that self-presentations in their on-line dating services are free from inaccuracies. In all self-editing, more highly evaluative attributes tend to be exaggerated. Women tend to underestimate their weight and age. Men tend to overestimate their educational level, income, and height. A more serious deception is that at least 13 percent of online male suitors call themselves single but are apparently married (Epstein 2007). The different goals set by date-seekers has set and prescribed for and by themselves — sexual pleasure, companionship, marriage, et cetera — may also be deceptively presented. Divorced American middle-aged men are apt to seek marriage, while divorced women are now more inclined to seek companionship with sex; they do not want to (again) be tied down to household responsibilities (Hacker 2003). In dating pursuits, as elsewhere, self-prescriptions call for performance and are tested by performance.

While the brother of Anne Marie did not believe in a language instinct in Chomsky's sense, he took hold of its tools and developed and defined himself on his own terms. A key personal achievement of Sartre is his own self-edited life with an authentic self. For example, Sartre struggled with the problem of being an intellectual and, at the same time, being a performing leftist activist. During World War II, after a brief period as a war prisoner, he joined Simone de Beauvoir and others in the founding of the underground resistance group, Socialisme et Liberté. After the war, he worked against his own government to facilitate Algerian independence. He supported Fidel Castro's Cuba against the United States and made Che Guevara his hero. He helped prisoners of the Islamic revolution against the Shah of Iran. He led an international opposition to the Vietnam War. However, he drew a line against joining the Communist party, and was satisfied with being an active fellow traveler. All this was accomplished while he maintained his roles as philosopher, playwright, and novelist — he became a Nobel laureate in literature.

To have the courage to act out in one's personal life the prescriptive parts of an authentic self is the ultimate test of its au-

thenticity. A central contribution of Sartrean philosophy is a refined concept of the authentic self that required some conscious performance, sometimes even in the form of choosing inaction rather than action; Sartre refused the Nobel Prize. Literature, he had concluded, was a bourgeois escape from acting in the real world.

There are bounds to the editing and strengthening of people's self-narratives. Like all narratives, the edited self-image consists of descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions. Descriptions of your own self may be selective and adjusted for the purpose at hand, but an edited self can still be void of deception and thus contribute to an authentic self.

In a celebrated book, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Erving Goffman (1959) demonstrated how we idealize and mystify ourselves to get attention and admiration from others. In our terminology, we could say that we are tempted to fill our self-descriptions with spuma, defensive bilge, and magic[9]. All of this must be avoided in order to achieve an authentic self.

In the development of the human personality, from the looking-glass self to the authentic self, there are other unavoidable struggles. Excessive love of the looking-glass self idealizes the parents (Mama Mia! and Oh mein Papa!). This may promote an extreme sense of being grandiose. These people do not have to achieve; they are grandiose by being born to such grandiose parents or with such grandiose relatives, or in such a grandiose race, nation, church, or people. On the other hand, the idealization of the parent(s) is such that one feels that one can never live up to them — with the resulting self-editing as a failure.

Excessive love of the self becomes pathological narcissism. These people believe that the world is made just for them. Then, to use the language of Freud, the libido withdraws from all objects outside of the self. Such persons may organize the cult of their own personality. They make uncharitable leaders (Maccoby 2007). Chairman Mao Zedong of China is an extreme case of narcissism in action. If you include his planned starvation of the farmers to reach his goals of agricultural exports, Mao

may have put to death 70 million of his countrymen (Chang and Halliday 2005).

Let us sum up our reasoning so far and compare it to Sigmund Freud's more well-known ideas:

An authentic self is built of several components. We, first, have a person's bodily spontaneities, that is, 'the I.' In the main it does not belong to social reality but to biological reality. It resembles Freud's unconscious ego which he also grounded in biology. Second, we have Cooley's looking-glass self. This is 'the me as defined by others'. Third, we have the emerging self-interaction that is 'the me with whom I talk.' This is what Blumer celebrates in the quote above. Fourth, we bring our different selves as defined by others into one and the same self by creating 'generalized others.' In its consequences, the generalized other is similar to Freud's "superego," but the processes of the respective developments are different. Fifth, we have to resist a lasting temptation to draw in spuma, defensive bilge and magic into the presentations of our selves. If we fall for the temptation we develop 'the me who deceives,' exhibiting Sigmund Freud's (1930) psychopathologies of everyday life and Anna Freud's (1936) defense mechanisms. If we resist such temptations, we can claim to have an 'authentic self.' Sixth, we have the results of confrontations, if any, with pristine or ideal versions of living, 'my self-reliant self.'

We can simplify the story of selves as a Proposition.

> Proposition 14:1. *The Development of Individual Identities:* a) People have a tendency to develop 'looking-glass selves,' i.e. self-images that are synonymous or consonant with public views about them in their social encounters, particularly their encounters with significant others. (b) By using language, they, then, modify these self-images in varying degrees to become their 'edited selves,' which normally are further adjusted by physical, biological, or social realities to become their 'authentic selves.'

The "we-are-talk" has the same roots in social psychology as the "I-am-talk." This gives the struggle for collective identity a

great significance as a motive shaping history, just as the struggle for individual identity shapes motives in an auto-biography. Proposition 14:1 applies not only to individual identities but with adjustments also to collective identities.

> Proposition 14:2. *The Development of Collective Identities:* a) People have a tendency to develop their encounters into collective identities that are synonymous or consonant with public views about them. (b) By using language, they, then, modify these views in varying degrees to become their "edited collective identities."

Collective identities have the same dual sources as the self, and it is not necessary to accept everything that others say about us. Self-editing is an option also for collective identities. Females brought up in a setting where the phrase "women are the weaker sex" is an axiom, may form a feminist cell that embraces a group-authored, opposite credo that "women can do as well as often better than men." And honest males must agree with this judgment in an era when the language brain dominates the shape and function of society.

We have given as much emphasis as possible to the idea that the basic freedom of mankind rests with every human's ability to formulate sentences that no one else has formulated before. Or, as it was stated in Proposition 4:3 in the section on Freedom and Responsibility in Volume 1: human beings are free to invent new sentences and narratives, some previously unheard of, which shape their selves, their relations to others, and their society. The above-mentioned opportunity to edit one's self into an authentic self has become very important to recent generations in the West. It often seems as if this interest in reconstructing the individual is given higher priority than political, academic, and artistic freedoms. To “realize oneself” has become a dominant value in the West.

The characteristics of biological man change slowly with the Darwinian evolution. The human selves, however, change much faster. These selves are dependent on what goes on in the symbolic environment at the place and time at hand. Thus, we reach

the conclusion that only through understanding the history of symbolic environments can we understand the development of the selves. With this insight — rare among psychologists — it becomes evident that the study of the self must be a study of the history of ideas. This is well illustrated by the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, who has explored the development of selves in Occidental history. The Europeans could open an inner room, as happened on a large scale at the time after the Renaissance and Reformation, when the inner-directed selves became more common and competed with outer directed-selves (Taylor 1989, Ch. 11). The history and theory of non-European selves is still largely unwritten. Toward the end of *The Many-Splendored Society* (Volume 7) we deal with life courses, and will again touch upon the development of selves.

Toward True Selves

"This above all: to thine own self be *true*" is Polonius' advice to his son Laertes in Shakespeare's play Hamlet. This is advice on how to act when Laertes is going abroad for the first time in his life, not a definition of a self that is "true." He is merely advised to stay with his given looking-glass self and his authentic self.

There actually exist "true selves" that may emerge and integrate with and sometimes even dominate over both the looking-glass self and the authentic self. The story of young Moses suggests that he was not aware that he was born a Jew, or that his background was a captured foreign labor force in Egypt. It required extraordinary efforts and circumstances for him to emerge with the strength of a true self to liberate his people.

In modern times a person's sex can be changed to achieve a truer self. For example, a person who has been raised as a man and has tried to develop a self-image as a man, may have the essentials of a woman, and may need a sex change operation. Some or all of this truth might have been possible to sense when nobody was watching, and also when pondering and perhaps fearing what others might guess or think. A definite truth is provided by medical examinations.

In the most useful sense we may say that a 'true self' is an integration of the looking glass and authentic selves with all biologically given aspects – not only the drives and glands of "the I" – and all biographically given aspects of a person – not only the edited ones.

Among many other things, the true self includes a person's sex and sexual orientation in choosing partners. This gives a liberating meaning to the admonition to be true to thine own self.

Preserving Self-Images

Much fuel for human actions runs in a channel from the social to the personal. Both Cooley and James saw here a very broad avenue for the social construction of motivation. Also, in modern ego-psychology we, again and again, find the idea that man acts to realize and defend his self-image. The conception of oneself is viewed as a relatively stable core of the complex of a human individual. Preservation of this core is seen as a factor governing other activities.

We may recognize many other sources of human motivation, many inherited and some acquired. So did Cooley and James. The preservation and development of a self-image shaped by others may not be our strongest motive. Its great significance lies in the fact that it is the one motive that can be very readily manipulated by others. To give or withhold food, sex, or to inflict capital punishment are very cumbersome and costly. To give or withhold evaluations, such as praise or blame for an action, deference or disdain to a position, is simple and cheap. The opinion of others is an easily used master key to a person's motivation. A major secret of human motivation thus lies in language, primarily evaluative language.

In our self-image, aspects other than our self-evaluation may also have motivational significance. We act to preserve also our self-descriptions (the cognitions we have about ourselves) and our self-prescriptions (the exhortations we give ourselves, that is, the expression of our will). However, the preservation of self-

evaluations seems, by far, the most potent. Thus, we may in many contexts of this writing make a deliberate simplification by saying that we act to maintain self-evaluations, rather than the entire self-image.

Concern with evaluations received from others is a broad tent under which we shall soon find such things as preoccupation with approval, recognition, admiration, good will, esteem, love, rank, honor, as well as all the honorific garnishing that comes with money, power, competence, holiness. It is abundantly evident in the hubris, the excessive pride that ancient Greek dramatists assumed to be the root of all human disaster. And it is equally evident among the forces that lift men to new heights of achievement in the economy, in polity, science, art, religion, and morals. In short, a desire for favorable evaluations goeth before a great rise, as well as a great fall.

Collective identities have much of the same psychology as individual identities. Many members of low-ranking ethnic groups develop "self-hatred," as Kurt Lewin (1948, Ch. 12) explained. In the White Man's World of the twentieth century, a number of Non-Whites came to hate themselves for being colored. As a collectivity, they felt hated by society, and this is reflected in their self-evaluations. In a similar vein, within the same ethnic group, lower classes tend to develop a less favorable self-image than do the higher classes.

The conclusion flowing from the combination of the idea of a looking-glass self with the idea of preserving one's self-image is that man acts to maintain the favorable evaluations he receives from others. This can be done in various ways; we shall specify three:

> Proposition 14:3. *Identity Maintenance:* People act to maintain their individual and collective identities by (a) activating their repertoire of actions searching for designs maintaining the public view of them in their social encounters, and/or (b) make more valued actions visible and less valued actions invisible, and/or (c) generate defensive bilge.

The maintenance of language-produced identities may extend beyond a person's lifetime. We will deal with the self after death, the 'soul,' when we turn to the study of religion. Let us here comment on some of the conditions suggested in the Proposition of Identity Maintenance.

Enter Designs

Designs to maintain our self-image may come either from the repertoire of past actions or from the repertoire of imagined actions. Victorious or traumatic memories of a past, and plans and daydreams of a future, are the stuff that shapes our deliberate actions in the present.

The sum total of actions in all encounters experienced by a person may be called his or her 'repertoire' of past action. This repertoire grows with the number of encounters we have with others differing from the people we have met in certain encounters. The repertoire grows with education and travel, with the reading of fiction, with the films and plays we see. In general, city life entails more encounters than rural life. At the time of this writing, the emergence of electronic encounters through the merger of cellular phones and the Internet browser is reshaping the repertories of the human race.

Our action repertoire normally expands with age — this is one reason why older people usually are wiser than younger — but it may also be reduced over time by amnesia, senility, and the drying-up of imagination. One reason for our concern with the biographies of the persons we study derives from our need to know their action repertoires: we want to know their past encounters, what they have seen and done. Some actions within our repertoire may be imaginary, in addition to those in which we have actually engaged. Reading biographies and fiction, listening to tales and anecdotes, watching others in real life, on stage or on screen, all these experiences enhance our action repertoire. People with perception, intelligence, empathy, and imagination can take special advantage of such possibilities to broaden their action repertoire.

Identity Maintenance does not assume that a person will do "anything" to maintain his self-evaluation; it merely suggests that he will do something within his action repertoire to achieve this end. There is also a repertoire of imagined actions. The latter repertoire encourages creativity that is not readily available in behaviorist theories of learning or in the theories in economics and sociology that have been built on them, for example (Homans 1950) or (Skinner 1953). Of course, when one is at a loss about what to do one may conceivably perform a random array of actions to see which one works or is rewarded. Normally, however, we simply think about a situation, have daydreams or fantasies, doubts, and hesitations. This is basically a play with symbols (and the images they represent), in which we try to ascertain in our imagination how the various alternatives within our repertoire stack up. We may release trial balloons to outsiders, but most trials remain in our brain as our private, unspoken simulations. Thus, within our action repertoire — that is, all actions we know from past encounters or can imagine — we choose the ones most compatible with our self-image. This is a main avenue to maintaining a good standing and a good self-image. The actions we choose need not be repeats of past activities; they may be unique, creative, and original within our life span.

Enter Visibility

Only actions that are "visible," that is, those that can be seen or described by others in our encounters, can be evaluated. Thus, people tend to make visible their favorable attributes, and exaggerations enter social life. They may also exaggerate them as we noted on page 494. Furthermore, of course, to avoid unfavorable evaluations, men are apt to keep some actions or attributes hidden. In this way, certain evasiveness seems to enter all social intercourse.

It follows with equal logic that men concerned with maintaining a given level of evaluation will tend to reject anything but modest flattery and to keep a very favorably evaluated action or attribute somewhat under the barrel. In this way, understate-

ments become part of social intercourse. At the time of this writing, there seems to be among many intellectuals in the British class society a climate of condescension in the original sense of lowering oneself below one's accustomed and achieved level. They seem scared to admit that they have a superior knowledge, taste, and class, and they excel in working class jargon and working class judgments of the good things in life (Walden 2006, Ch 4).

The fact that variations in visibility have motivational significance is one of the bases for the power of publicity. The manipulation of visibility of actions is known as a gentle yet effective device to change people's behavior without issuing new prescriptions or appearing "bossy." A manager of an employment agency could drastically change the behavior of his staff by posting statistics on the number of placements they had achieved rather than the number of interviews they had held with those seeking employment (Blau 1955, 34-44).

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[8] The fact that Mead distanced himself from Cooley on matters of the latter's solipsism has led many commentators to think that he rejected also Cooley's social psychology. This is not the case; he builds on it. (Misheva 2009, 165-166).

[9] Spuma, defensive bilge, and magic are distortions of language that serious students of society must learn to identify and avoid. They are reviewed on pages 1: 63-77. Their relations to science will be further discussed in Chapter 19 in Volume 4.

15. Compelling Vocabularies with Scales of Evaluation

Vocabularies of Honor

The old idea of "honor" appears in two guises, says the German historian and anthropologist Dagmar Burkhart (2006). One is extrinsic, i.e. the good words others speak about us. Another is intrinsic, i.e. the good opinion we have about ourselves.

Burkhart traces these throughout European history to the present. There is an almost bewildering variety. In olden days many extrinsic honors were given in royal ceremonies, knightly and bourgeois festivities. In more recent history intrinsic honor has become more prominent. Burkhart cites a self-reliant Bismarck addressing the Reichstag on November 28, 1881 as a full-blown example: "My honor rests in nobody's hands but my own, and no one can overload me with it. My own honor, which I carry in my heart, is completely sufficient for me, and nobody is a judge over it and can decide whether I have it or not." (p.96). Intrinsic honor presumes an authentic self.

Burkhart finds several changes in the vocabularies of extrinsic and intrinsic honor on the German scene, and I think they can be found in many other modern countries as well:

> The change of the concept of honor and of its related use consists of the fact that ascribed characteristics of a person (birth, age, sex, et cetera), as well as his position in the strata or functional groups of a society, have lost weight as relevant criteria for assigning honor. Ever more, the dominant criterion for respectability has become restricted to conditions of personal achievements and morality. At the same time, some characteristics of the old honor term, which were independent of morality and aligned with outward appearances, entered into new substitute terms as social prestige or image. After the overuse and perversion of the term honor in the time of the Nazis, a person who today

> addresses the semantics of internal or external honor prefers expressions such as honesty, fairness, integrity, self-respect, pride, respectability and/or decency for intrinsic honor, and appreciation, respect, prestige, reputation, renown or status for extrinsic honor. Honor was replaced by esteem and disgrace by discrimination. Remainders of old ceremony and what "is appropriate" can be found, on the one hand, in the state ceremonials and/or protocol and, on the other hand, in books of etiquette and/or in online-advice about manners. Common phrases like "Upon my honor!" or "Upon my conscience and honor!" are nowadays exclusively assigned to the area of pathetic rhetoric (Burkhart 2006, 114 translated here).

In a world drenched by the mass media, honorific rewards depend primarily on publicity. In fact, at the turn of the century the general public routinely confuses honor with publicity, and so does the PR-industry.

Be they past or present, extrinsic or intrinsic, the common denominator in all vocabularies of honor is the evaluation of persons and their actions.

Deconstructing Social Evaluations

An evaluation is a complex communication — see Figure 15.1 — that cannot be understood unless we know three separate components:

A unit (u). This may be a grade in school, a currency, items of visible consumer goods, a rank in an organization, et cetera.

An anchorage point (z). This may be the grade in school that marks the line between pass and fail. At other times, it is not fixed in advance but is estimated, for example, the average standard of living, the typical rank for one's age group in an occupational career.

An evaluative score (e). Here we become specific, and speak of, for example, a B-plus student, a boy with a generous allowance and car of his own, the president-elect of an organization, a salary of $8,000 a month.

The score, E, is the actual evaluation, but is clearly dependent upon the size of the units and upon the location of the zero-point.

Figure 15.1. Components of a Scale of Evaluation



The scale of evaluation remains stable only as long as a person's encounters employ the same units and the same anchor point. It is not only the words or "proxies" indicating an honor that change in Burkhart's history.

Units, U, may change. Better tests allow for more discriminating grades in schools than A, B, C, D, and F, and we may assign grades in the form of percentiles ranging from 1 to 100. Car models and other status symbols may change to make it easier (or more difficult) to see what is plain and what is fancy. Personal distinctions and ranks may multiply. In the typical caricature of a Latin American army, the number of generals may approach the number of privates. Changing units make for inflation or deflation of evaluative scores.

Anchorage points, Z (for zero), may also change. A new admissions policy may bring an influx of very bright students so that the level of knowledge required for passing a course is pushed upward. The standard of living may rise so that every student has a car. The number of vice presidents may rise so that a promotion to vice president is less extraordinary among the executives of the corporation. A puritan religious or moral revival may reset the border between good and evil. Shortly we will present a "redemption process" that resets anchorage points.

The fact, that an evaluation is a function of the size of units in use and of the location of the anchorage point employed, makes honorific reward flexible. When we deal with extrinsic honor, the units, the zero-points, and the scores are, in principle, visible to others. Intrinsic honor is more of an enigma to outsiders. When can we know that a person has acquired an authentic self, sorted out his priorities in different life areas and realms, and come to peace with himself or herself, so we can know how he or she receives the praise or blame constituting social control in a human society? There is certainly room for serious study of biographies in the study of society.

The Range of Fairness

George C. Homans' (1961) so-called Justice Proposition says that anger occurs in a man when his rewards are less than proportional to his investments. The theoretical importance of the Justice Proposition is not that it predicts when people become angry — although this is admittedly useful to know — but that it provides one point of equivalence between different scales of evaluation. This point of equivalence is the minimum reward for a given investment needed to avoid anger. By knowing this critical amount of reward, we may begin to compare evaluative scores from different encounters. However, the Justice Proposition is rather metaphorical, particularly since "investment" has no clear meaning outside the economy. Moreover, to convert scores from one evaluative scale to another, we need a minimum of two points of equivalence, and the Justice Proposition provides only one. Let us, therefore, extend and generalize the Homans' Proposition to serve our purpose.

We define a person's 'commitment' to a set of actions as the extent to which his self-image is dependent on his engaging in these actions. We know that a man is highly committed to the writing of poetry if he feels less than himself in periods when he is unable to form his verses. If his failure to write does not affect the way he feels about himself, then his commitment is low. Commitment, thus, implies that a person has "invested his ego" in some activities, that they are relevant and important to him.

The relation between commitments and rewards may be reviewed in the four combinations of the table in Table 15.1.

Table 15.1. Emotive Reactions to Commitments and Rewards.

Type	Commitment	Social Rewards	Reaction
1.	High	High	Neutral
2.	Low	High	Positive Emotive
3.	High	Low	Negative Emotive
4.	Low	Low	Neutral

Homans' Justice Proposition says that the third type represents angry men. He mentions more in passing that the second type carries happy feelings.

Anger is a large word. The third type may not really be angry, but may merely grieve or be irritated over his bad fortune. The second type may not really be happy, merely a little elated over his luck. However, it seems clear that we might expect an emotive reaction when commitments and rewards are no longer commensurate. The quality of the emotions involved will vary in the second and third type, but a psycho galvanometer would give a higher reading in the second and third types than in the first and fourth, where the reading would be more neutral.

Thus, we have two emotive points in a reward scale, and we have extended Homans' Justice Proposition to read:

> Proposition 15:1. *The Emotive Sense of Fairness:* If the evaluations a person receives for a set of actions in encounters become (a) disproportionately smaller than his commitment to these actions, then he tends to show negative emotive reactions, while (b) if they become disproportionately larger than the extent of his commitment to these actions, he trends to show positive emotive reactions.

If granted a given commitment, the two emotive reactions thus obtained, define a kind of freezing point and boiling point for any reward scale of evaluation. Evaluations falling within the range between these points are thought of as “fair” or "just"; evaluations outside this range are “unfair” or "unjust." Not to confuse it with the “justice” of the valid law of the land we may here choose to talk in terms of “fairness.”

Anomie

All scales of evaluation have a range. This is the difference between getting an A or an F in a college course, the gap between the very rich and the very poor, the distinction in military life between the private and the general. Through our encounters, we become accustomed to a rather limited range: most students never meet another student whose typical grade is F; most people know no one who has an income of 10 million dollars a year, nor anyone with an income of 100 dollars a year; most people in the army do not know generals, nor privates facing dishonorable discharge. Our encounters usually provide us with a limited, not a full, range.

When a person acts to maintain the evaluation he receives in his encounters, this means, to begin with, that he maintains the evaluation within the limited range to which he is accustomed.

To be thrown outside this accustomed range through a sudden loss of social station and resources, a sudden catapulting promotion, or stroke of financial luck, makes an ordinary man lose his bearings. As a plant or an animal accustomed to a temperate zone runs the risk of perishing when suddenly transplanted to a tropical or arctic climate, so does a person also run into danger when suddenly thrown below or above his accustomed range of evaluation. The territory outside this accustomed range was defined by Durkheim (1897) as 'anomie.' There is an upper and a lower anomic range (Figure 15.2). The concept has been used by many since. I would select the explications by Merton (1957, Ch. 4) and Ginsberg (1980) as decisive.

Figure 15.2. Scale of Evaluation with Anomic Ranges.



Society normally functions only within the accustomed boundaries. Beyond the boundaries is a world in which one meets confusion, chaos, panic, desperation. Here are no accepted norms, no applicable evaluations, and no accustomed anchorage points for judgments. Major disproportions between commitments and rewards will throw the individual outside the customary range of his scale of self-evaluation, that is, into a state of anomie. Hence our proposition of The Emotive Sense of Fairness applies, and we might conclude that anomie is also characterized by a variety of emotive reactions.

It is the sudden change outside the accustomed range that brings about the anomic state. If the shift upward or downward is slow, there is time to acquire new anchorage points and units of evaluation, and thus extend one's scale to realms about which one had not previous knowledge. Even those who rather suddenly find themselves in an anomic range, but manage to survive the first confusion, eventually set up new "scales" that fit their new circumstances. It is instructive to contemplate a skid row, a run-down section of a big city with many *long-term* alcoholics, drug addicts, and the homeless. These seem so anomic to the outsider (including some sociologists who have written about them). However, upon closer analysis they manifest their own distinct scale of social evaluation and a hierarchy of status based upon it (Wallace 1965).

To be thrown into anomie can be likened to the experience of a person who finds the letters preceding A and following Z in their newspapers. The text is bewildering. The letters preceding A may form delightful words, and the letters following Z may form horrible words. Irrespective of the words formed, the readers cannot orient themselves outside of the accustomed alphabet. Everything is fluid.

Durkheim (1897) found that suicides become more common at times of financial crisis and recession, and that they are more frequent among widows and widowers. The explanation of the latter is simple enough: a person is deprived of the rewards and support, he has become accustomed to, and becomes so unhappy that he annihilates himself. But Durkheim's data of that time indicated that suicides increase when there is a strong economic upturn and many people suddenly become richer; and that suicides rise among divorced persons, that is, among people who after a great deal of suffering finally succeed in escaping from unhappy marriages. It is this paradox that leads Durkheim to his theory of anomie.

We eat and become sated: a purely biological process means that we no longer feel hungry. But human social needs are different, according to Durkheim. Our needs of happiness, social rewards or, for example, status have no natural saturation point. The low score on the scale is negative infinity, and the highest score is positive infinity. The saturation points are determined, not by our biological nature, but by society. Our fellow human beings can thwart or encourage ambition; they may tell us not to rise above our station, or they can exhort us to seek the good life.

Anomie in Albania

In the early 1990s, the world could observe how Albania was struck by anomie. Democracy and the market economy are celebrated achievements of the Western World. When Albania gained these features, chaos resulted. The transition from Maoism and dictatorship to Mercedes Benz and democracy led to confusion and despair.

The Albanians were told: "Place your savings in our national chain letter scheme and see how fantastically fast they will grow." Advertised as "the new capitalism," as many as eight out of ten households seem to have been victims of this racket. Albania, the poorest country in Europe, was to become as wealthy as Italy, where the average citizen was 50 times as rich as an Albanian. In the beginning, things went well. Some Albanians became so enthusiastic that they sold their houses to obtain more money to invest in the racket. They were trapped in that which Durkheim called the crisis of riches, i.e. exaggerated expectations and claims.

In a normal situation not beset by anomie, society's rewards to the individual fall within a range that does change, but slowly. Society keeps its promises. Life in poor countries is also guided by a range that is normal for them. The investment scheme in Albania cast many of its citizens outside this zone.

Society's control of the saturation points in a system of rewards can also be shaken by a sudden and unexpected loss of resources. This happened in Albania when the bubble in the racket burst. The crisis of wealth became the crisis of poverty. Albanians were confronted with the incomprehensible and horrible words after the end of the alphabet. They could not understand what had happened. In this kind of desperation and panic people become rebels, but confused rebels without a goal.

There is a simple way of summing all this up:

Proposition 15:2. *Threats of Anomie:* A sudden relocation of people to anomic ranges of their scales of evaluation slows or stops the functioning of justifying and compelling vocabularies in the society.

Anomie is a poison both of personalities and of civilized society. It undermines all vocabularies of motive.

Achievement Motivation

The fact that some people are inherently more striving, competitive, and ambitious than others is a fact of biology, related, among other things to basic levels of hormone production. A

more interesting fact is that sometimes an entire society, community, or life area, or age group becomes more achievement-oriented than another. We need to know the conditions under which everyone's motivation to maintain favorable self-evaluation is transformed into a general ambition of a collectivity to enhance its evaluation.

Such general achievement motivation occurs when people have to keep up with a slowly changing reward system. For example, changes in the units and anchorage points of scales of evaluation are inherent in the age-grading that prevails in all human societies. The infant — at least, a physically fine infant — can count on a great deal of love or appreciation without regard to how well he performs. However, as he grows older, more effort and ingenuity are needed to maintain the evaluation so freely accorded during childhood; with age, the anchorage point moves upward until adulthood and old age mitigate its thrust. For the young in all societies, some age grading is a fact of life.

Societies in which prosperity, knowledge, and other institutional values are expanding are also ones in which the anchorage points for the corresponding reward patterns are pushed upward. In such societies, one has "to keep up with the Joneses" to maintain evaluation. Here, as in age grading, the process is largely beyond the individual's control.

The crucial element in such instances is our encounter with persons using different units and anchorage points in making their evaluations of us. Higher anchorage points and/or more inflated units of evaluation force us to achieve. We may write about General Achievement Motivation in this way:

> Proposition 15:3. *General Achievement Motivation:* Within the same symbolic environment, persons are likely to engage in those actions within their repertoire of actions, which enhance the evaluation they receive to the extent that the associates in their encounters, in the course of time, use higher anchorage points and/or more inflated units of evaluation.

We may see a motivation to achieve as one through which we maintain our relative evaluation. Either, persons pass from one

biological or social stage and meet higher established expectations at the next stage, as is the case in age grading (a status-sequence) from childhood and upwards. Or, their society changes so that anchorage points and units move must, like Alice in Wonderland, run faster and faster to stay in the same place. In both cases, we derive their motivation to achieve from the motivation to maintain a self-evaluation.

In the case of age grading, you may slow or stop the need to achieve via an initiation rite into adulthood, signaling that you are now grown-up and do not have to increase your learning every year. As an adult, you may have special rights to property, privacy and what not, and you take on responsibilities to serve and provide for yourself and your family and assume duties to follow community laws. There are, to be sure, needs to adapt to, but in a stable society, there is no requirement that adults continue to be driven by the achievement motivation grounded in the age grading years, provided the scales of evaluation in their society remain stable.

Rank Equilibration

The age grading mentioned above is a status-sequence. Let us now consider motivation in status-sets, the different positions we hold at one and the same point in a life cycle.

Each position in a person's status-set has a more or less explicit rank. An assistant teacher in a school receives an inheritance and buys the best house in the neighborhood where the teachers of his schools live. In the local association of house owners, he rises to become chairman and initiates decisions binding upon the homeowners from his school. He enters politics and is elected to the town council. He is still an assistant teacher and cannot be promoted because he has not completed certain courses and lacks certification from a teacher's college. His education and occupational ranks are, thus, low, compared to his ranks as home owner, member of an association, and as a politician. During many days in his life, his ranks differ depending on the positions in which he acts. In the long run, he did not find this entirely comfortable. He extended one vacation, so he could go to

summer school in a college in another town and secure a teaching certificate. Now his occupational rank as a regular teacher is more commensurate with his other positions.

The teacher's action can be analyzed from the perspective of our basic thesis of Evaluative Motives (Proposition 5:5 recalled on page 21). Humans are (a) inclined to act to preserve the customary evaluations they receive in their symbolic environment, be they high or low, and (b) they are inclined to act so that they avoid receiving more unfavorable evaluations. From the Cooley Theorem of the Looking-glass Self (Proposition 13:1), we could even assume that our teacher's self-esteem goes up and down as his day proceeds involving his different positions.

> Proposition 15:4. *Rank Equilibration in Status-sets:* Persons with a status-set of different ranks tend to act to equalize them (a) so that they match their previously achieved customary evaluation, or (b) if they live under conditions of achievement motivation (i.e. higher anchorage points and/or more inflated units of evaluation), to raise their lower ranks to the level of their highest rank.

Clause (b) is the special condition in which General Achievement Motivation (15:3) is present. Here, rank equilibration becomes an attempt to raise all positions in a status-set to the level of the one with the highest rank. It is interesting to note that North American sociologists, without exception, as far as I can tell, assume that this is the universal case. The honor of formulating the discovery of rank equilibration goes to one of them, Gerhard Lenski (1954).

Ascribed status such as sex, race, and ethnicity cannot be equilibrated. We expect sex differences to be eradicated in a society dependent on language brains. However, as long as females have lower status than males, the women who reach the top of their fields will suffer from a lack of equilibrated ranks. Likewise, we expect that racial or ethnic difference, such as being Jewish or Afro, will fully lose importance as such biological trivialities become understood.

However, in the long meantime, the persons from a lowly ethnic group who rise to the top of the ladder in economy, science, or art, will suffer from rank disequilibration. The same might happen when persons with low ethic rank marry into high status families. Expressions of protests and defensive bilge seem close at hand among those who are permanently disequilibrated because of an ascribed status.

In the process of social mobility, people at any time are in a position in which they have a set of statuses, some of which are high-ranking and others of which are low-ranking. In this situation, they are likely to be constantly suffering in their lower ranks from blows to the self-esteem built up in their higher ranks. Thus, mobile persons with one ascribed status are more likely than others to engage in defensive bilge to rescue their self-esteem. In severe cases, they become masters of projection and over-compensations, transvaluations, aggressions, or other forms of defensive bilge. Such persons, then, are predisposed toward extremist views. The extreme leftists-destructionists, for example, may have low ethnic status but have achieved a higher educational status. The extreme rightists-chauvinists may have the reverse status-set: high ethic status, at least in their own eyes, but low occupational standing. These and other political consequences of social mobility in a world in which you concurrently hold different ranks have been explored by Anderson and Zelditch (1963, sec 2.3).

Rank and Realm Equilibration

Can rank equilibration turn into realm equilibration and thus promote the equality between societal realms that should characterize a many-splendored society? If Procurers and Providers (2: 188-192), i.e. those who have occupations that link different realms, find realm equilibration useful and profitable, the answer might be Yes. As far as I know, the problem has not been systematically explored by researchers.

In this text, we have mentioned two personages who have had deep involvement in several societal realms, Augustus (1: 8-11 in Volume 1) and Muhammad (above on page 3: 74). Augustus had

been supreme military commander, speaker and leader of the senate, the high priest, and the judicial ombudsman in Rome. He used this status-sequence to give hegemony to the body politic over all other realms. He became a Roman Emperor, a totalitarian ruler, with no or very limited interest in realm equilibration.

Muhammad had been a merchant, a long-time Prophet, war lord in Medina, conqueror and city ruler of Mecca. In this status-sequence, he gave religion the hegemony over all the other realms. There seems to be no early original Arabic word to describe a split between temporal and sacred power. Thus, there is no handle on realm equilibration and no link to early rank equilibration.

We are told by Tomas Gür, a Swedish journalist and social critic, that the modern Arab word for democracy is, *la'ikiya,* derived from the Greek *laiko's* which means "belonging to the people." But this word lacks currency among the general public in the Arab world and is impossible to use in ordinary conversations and in a survey questionnaire. In cases like this, pollsters should use circumlocutions in asking about concrete democracy for example, "What do you think is most important: that our rulers follow the will of the people as revealed in elections, or follow the will of Allah as revealed by the imams?[10]" However, questions of this type are apparently inappropriate and confusing in the Muslim world. The separation of state and church is an unknown or at best unfinished business in Muslim countries; ordinary Muslims can rarely understand the issue. Without separation of the different societal realms, we cannot talk about their equilibration.

As we know (from page 3: 80 above), it has been difficult also in the West to separate public opinion as Rousseau did in "volonté générale," something embedded in the very social structure of the society and understood mainly in its central zone, from public opinion as "volonté de tous", the will of the majority of the general public. Communists and fascists in Europe, Asia, and Latin America have only understood the former as "public opinion."

It is said that Goethe was the last of the Europeans, who could personally command positions in all societal realms. He was a great Maker in science (theory of color), art (novels, drama, and poetry), and polity (Privy Councilor of Saxe-Weimar). He reached the top in all three realms. He was also an outstanding Keeper in the economy of Weimar, a keen Broker of morality, and he was a Taker in non-Christian religion. These positions were not part of his career, his status-sequence, but were more or less held simultaneously by Goethe in his most active years, i.e. these positions constituted a status-set. Thus they were subject to equilibration, as stated in Proposition 15:4.

One might say that Goethe lifted artistic pursuits in Germany to the level and rank that were customary for practitioners of statecraft. Long after his death, he still inspired bourgeois Germany to focus on *Geist und Geld*, culture and money, not just money as in Manchester. It is less certain that he helped to elevate the status of German scientists.

Goethe's breadth of achievement is no longer possible. The societal realms in today's advanced societies are too complex and too large. Even to be a good Taker in all of them is not entirely easy. There are not enough people like Goethe in the world. We have to look beyond rank equilibration in status-sets to make modern societal realms more equal.

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[10] I suggested this opinion question in 2002 at the annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research in Saint Petersburg, Florida. A pollster experienced in Arab countries said that this question could not be used there.

16. Compelling Vocabularies Supporting Order

Let us now turn to more altruistic aspects of social motivation: looking out for others. Our first set of motives to choose words and actions to gain approval from others in encounters is soon supplemented by a second motive to choose words and actions maintaining encounters and protecting their ability to produce public views, values and norms.

So far, we have dealt primarily with the individual aspects of motivation: looking out for ourselves. Much of what we have said seems to support the view that everyone is on the lookout for Number One. But in reality, one cannot look out for the self without attention to others. Even the master of the cynical approach, Erving Goffman (1967), admits that we also attend to our fellowmen and want to preserve something from our meetings with them. We then need a common value scale to record their views of us.

Without a relatively stable scale for the evaluation of people and their actions no one would be able to maintain a self-image of the Cooley type. As mentioned, there is no poison in society as noxious as anomie. If we fall prey to it, we can no longer be solid social beings. The old idea “conserve the social order and the social order will conserve you” expresses a wisdom that is probably derived from anomic periods and situations. Or, in the words of Aristotle's *Politics* (350 BCE, Book 5:9): "Men think ... that freedom means the doing what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, 'according to his fancy.' But this is all wrong; men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution; for it is their salvation."

We may accept Aristotle's thesis to the extent that it means avoidance of anomie. For example, in anomic situations, the regularities that constitute the core of academic social science no

longer apply. The structures of political science and jurisprudence no longer hold when a government is beleaguered by anomie. The economists' routine prognostications become worthless when the anomie of general panic has the marketplace in its grip. Many know it intuitively, and Kadushin (2005) has demonstrated formally, that a sense of safety, i.e. avoidance of anomie, is a key motivation behind the activities in socially small groups. Our motivation to preserve our good standing in our encounters presupposes that the encounters will continue to take place, and that they can produce reasonably stable public opinions. Such a process is aided by significant others, be they historical, primary, peers, or anticipated.

The normal processes that keep a society out of anomie can be summarized in the propositions for Maintenance of the Evaluative Order. On the surface, they look as if they are taken from a conservative manifesto. However, on a closer look it becomes apparent that they apply with equal force to maintain a radical social movement. It must be said, however, that these propositions need to be subject to more empirical tests in all three of the following steps mentioned here:

> Proposition 16:1. *Maintenance of the Evaluative Order:* People in the same symbolic environment (a) tend to give support to their accustomed scales of evaluation, (b) tend to preserve the encounters containing these scales, and (c) the latter tendency is enhanced to the extent that the encounters contain messages from significant others.

Two complementary tendencies, one is more cynical, looking out for the survival of our individual selves, and the other is more trustful, looking out for the survival of significant others. These two tendencies may compete with one another, or may complement one other, making the outcome difficult to predict.

Convergence

Prior to the mid-1900s there was a widespread belief that man had an imitation instinct. This belief made it easy to explain uniformity. This view was challenged by Miller and Dollard (1941)

in a thorough book entitled *Social Learning and Imitation*. This book held that social rewards were decisive in the phenomenon of imitation. Unrewarded imitation could not be empirically documented or the available documentation could, at least, be questioned. Learning theories based on conditioning or reward/punishment came into vogue.

In the new century, with Giaccamo Rizzolatti's discovery of "mirror neurons" in the brains of monkeys, a new understanding of imitation is emerging. V.S. Ramachandran summarizes:

> He recorded from the ventral premotor area of the frontal lobes of monkeys and found that certain cells will fire when a monkey performs a single, highly specific action with its hand: pulling, pushing, tugging, grasping, picking up and putting a peanut in the mouth etc. different neurons fire in response to different actions. One might be tempted to think that these are motor "command" neurons, making muscles do certain things; however, the astonishing truth is that any given mirror neuron will also fire when the monkey in question observes another monkey (or even the experimenter) performing the same action, e.g. tasting a peanut!

Parents in different parts of the world often claim that if they stick their tongue out to their newborn, then the baby will do the same to them. At the time of this writing there is no firm confirmation of the existence of "mirror neutrons" in human beings. But there are many speculations about a return of an imitation instinct as a useful explanation in social science. For example, we may, here, gain an understanding of the rapid acquisition of a vocabulary by infants. However, as we have seen (1: 140-145), acquiring a grammar, the rules for relating the words of a vocabulary to each other, represent a much more complex procedure. And the creation of entirely new words by a Shakespeare is still more complex. But mirror neurons may help us up to the point when vocabularies are acquired.

In formulating some propositions about convergence in encounters let us allow for both imitation and socially rewarded

learning. These propositions summarize past findings and predict future ones. It should be readily acknowledged that some of the propositions — if taken by themselves — are painfully trivial. The findings in this field have not been particularly startling. However, when the joint implications of all of these propositions have been spelled out, many conclusions appear more interesting.

In any encounter, there is a push, however small it may be, toward consensus and this push can be strengthened by rewards.

> Proposition 16:2. *Socially Rewarded Convergence:* (a) Persons have an inclination to express communications that harmonize with customary and/or habitual communications found in their encounters, and (b) this tendency increases when others in these encounters have favorable public views (shared evaluations) of them.

Let us discuss this strain towards consensus in an encounter for the three varieties of communications we earlier delineated, descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions. The confirmation was obtained already in the 1930s by experiments in the social psychology of perception.

A classic experiment by Sherif (1936), tested the effect of social influence on the so-called autokinetic effect. In an otherwise totally dark room, a fixed light spot appears to move around. This illusion is due to small movements in the eye of the viewers. Subjects, unaware of the nature of this illusion and separately viewing the light, described its "movements" in a rather consistent manner; that is, they developed rather stable cognitions about the length of the "movement." Sherif noted that these cognitions differed from person to person. He joined persons with differing cognitions, two by two, into encounters. They were asked to describe the length of the "movement" to each other. Each subject then compromised his earlier cognition in the direction of that of his experimental mate.

In a skilled experiment by Back (1951) subjects were given three rather ambiguous photos and told to write a story about

them. To make sure that the stories would differ, certain details on the photos varied. When two subjects had written their stories, they met in order to tell their versions of the three photos to each other and to discuss them. When they were separated again and asked to rewrite their stories, the new versions had a greater degree of similarity. So far, the experiment reveals only what we have learned from the Sherif experiment. However, Back introduced an important variation. Some of the students were given more favorable evaluations than others. For example, some were told that psychological tests about the kind of person they were and that the kind of person they liked had been successfully used in the selection of their experimental partners. In other words, these students were made to feel that they liked each other very much. Others had their self-image built up through reports that their laboratory instructors considered them superior. A third group, the control subjects were not given any such favorable public views. The results show that those who had been favorably evaluated accepted their partner's descriptions of the three photos to a greater extent than the control subjects. As predicted by clause (b) in our Proposition 16:2, a greater degree of social influence on the participants' cognitions was accepted in the encounters in which the members received favorable evaluations.

A second body of knowledge concerns the convergence of evaluations. The first study formally documenting a tendency toward evaluative convergence was published by Sims and Patrick (1936). They ascertained some attitudes toward Negroes (now we say Afro-Americans) among students in the North (Ohio) and among students in the South (Alabama). They found, as expected, that the Northern students had more favorable social valuations of Afro-Americans than the Southern ones. They also located 115 students from the North who had enrolled in psychology classes at the University of Alabama. The students came South as freshmen with attitudes practically the same as those of the Ohio students, but as time passed their attitudes approached those of the typical Southern students, until in the

junior and senior year, when their attitudes did not differ significantly from those of their Southern classmates.

Another early study of college students shows that the more favorably evaluated students were those who accepted a greater degree of the public sentiments in their student community. Theodore Newcomb (1943) studied attitude changes at Bennington College, a campus community in which public sentiments were liberal, while most newly arrived students had conservative attitudes. As predicted by the hypothesis tested by Sims and Patrick, the new students exposed to the liberal climate of the campus tended to change their attitudes toward more liberal ones. For example, during the 1936 election campaign 62 per cent of the freshmen but only 14 per cent of the juniors and seniors evaluated the Republican candidate as the worthiest; conversely, 29 per cent of the freshmen and 54 per cent of the juniors or seniors were for Roosevelt and 9 per cent of the freshmen as compared with 30 per cent of the juniors and seniors were for the Socialist or Communist candidates.

While this overall trend in the data is obvious, it is equally clear that not all students accepted liberalism to the same degree. Additional information allows us to account for some variations in the students' acceptance of liberalism. We know the public esteem in which the students held one another. They were asked to state the names of those deemed most worthy to represent the college at an intercollegiate gathering. Those who received five or more nominations scored, on average, 65 points on an attitude scale measuring liberalism, and those who were less favored to represent the college had an average of 37 points. As predicted in clause (b) of our Proposition on Socially Rewarded Convergence, those who received more favorable public views, showed a greater convergence of attitudes.

The third special case concerns convergence of prescriptions. It is well-known that children often reiterate the rules they hear. And loved children are said to accept the rules more than less loved ones. Is this also generally true among adults? Neal Gross and his co-workers (1958) found that consensus on role prescrip-

tions for a school superintendent was highest among those who were satisfied with the encounters they had had in their capacity as superintendents, in meeting parents, politicians, teachers, et cetera. If this satisfaction is a consequence of the favorable views they received in these encounters, this piece of evidence fits the idea of prescriptive convergence and the way it depends on the views of others.

Circular Emotive Actions [BIO]

Herbert Blumer, the Chicago scholar who turned George Herbert Mead's philosophy into the sociological school of symbolic interaction, also contributed to the understanding of the behavior of crowds. Crowd actions converge in an encounter as any other communicative actions, which we already know from the above Proposition on Socially Rewarded Convergence. In addition, actions in face-to-face encounters are known to enter the spiraling process that Blumer called Circular Reaction:

> This refers to a type of interstimulation wherein the response of one individual reproduces the stimulation coming from another individual and, in being reflected back to this individual, the stimulation is reinforced. Thus, the interstimulation assumes a circular form in which individuals reflect one another's states of feeling and, in so doing, intensify this feeling. This is well evidenced in the transmission of feelings and modes among people who are in a state of excitement. (Blumer 1946, 170).

In an encounter, a converging person affects the others so that their emotive actions are reinforced. The mutual stimulation assumes a circular form in which individuals reflect one another's states of feeling and, in so doing, intensify the same feeling. Those who have bought into this hypothesis frequently forget that it cannot claim validity for all actions and reactions. It is perhaps indicative that most writers define circular reaction in terms of any ´response´ and then go on to give examples of emotional responses. So also Blumer, himself:

> The expression of fear through bellowing, breathing, and movements of the body, induces the same feeling in the case of other cattle who, as they in turn express their alarm, intensify this emotional state in one another. It is through such a process of circular reaction that there arises among cattle a general condition of intense fear and excitement, as in the case of a stampede (*ibid*).

Blumer sees his circular reaction also among cattle in a state of alarm. Thus, the reaction is not dependent on a language brain. This is the first explicit borrowing of (amateur) physiology from the animal kingdom that we make in our theory. We, like Blumer, need this as circular reactions have consequences for human symbolic interaction. Emotively loaded language easily enters into the circular process. We will restrict our borrowing from physiology to emotively charged symbolizations.

> Proposition 16:3. *[BIO]. Circular Reactions:* When participants in a face-to-face encounter converge their emotive communications according to Proposition 16:2 clause (a), they enter into the spiraling process of circular, emotive, converging reactions.

This is well evidenced in the transmission of feelings and moods among people who are in a state of excitement or social unrest. A vivid example of highly contagious expressive behavior is furnished by religious revivals. Here is an account of a revival which occurred between the years 1797 and 1805 and had its center in Kentucky in the American West.

> A great number were seized with an impulse to leap or jump.... Some became cataleptic and remained in that condition from a few minutes to several days. Many were affected with the "jerks," a spasmodic contraction of the muscles which sometimes caused the head to turn from side to side with such rapidity that the features were indistinguishable; sometimes the whole body was affected and the head was jerked backward and forward so violently that the head almost touched the floor behind and before, and the reversal of the motion was so sudden that the hair, if it was long, would crack and

> snap like a lash....Others, drawn double, with head and feet together, rolled round and round like a wheel, and still others were dashed to the ground and bounced from place to place like a football.... Others hopped about like living frogs....Many others fell suddenly to the earth as in an epileptic fit; this was called "the falling exercise." One person's falling seemed to be the signal for others.... It was very contagious. Where these vast crowds were assembled; the number of those affected ran into the hundred....There was another class known as the "barkers"... people would get down on all fours and bark and growl like dogs... would get down in front of the preacher and bark as long as he preached. At first those who had the barks felt very much humiliated at being compelled to do a thing, that seemed so degrading, but later they were regarded as possessing a larger measure of the Holy Spirit The /holy laugh/ was another peculiar feature....Sometimes while the sermon was in progress half the congregation would be laughing aloud in the most serious way…for they regarded it as part of the worship (Cleveland 1916, 101-102), quoted in Lindesmith and Strauss (1949, 490-491).

Agitators and rabble-rousers are aware of circular reactions in their audiences. It is an element in rock festivals, political street manifestations, business panics, war hysteria. The process is not limited to negative emotions. Also joy, laughter, and flirtations are subject to circular reactions. They are found in communal affairs, such as quilting bees, harvest dances, and religious pageants, where the relative weakness of the individual is "traded up" for the strength of the hive.

Reinforcing Encounters by Circular Reactions

We have noted the tendency of people to maintain encounters with significant others, be they historical, primary, peers, or anticipated. To maintain such encounters creates a sense of safety for the members.

The circular reactions give a special force to the tendency to maintain encounters. Sociologists such as Émile Durkheim

(1912) and historians like William H. McNeill (1995) have studied what happens when a number of people are drawn together in shouting, singing, and rhythmic dancing. A warm feeling of togetherness spreads throughout the crowd, personal conflicts are temporarily forgotten, and the physical properties of the setting become loaded with a special charge shared by all participants. McNeill asserts that the participants are later able to cooperate more easily and are better able to withstand the hardships involved in survival. Durkheim holds that they may develop a kind of elementary shared religion.

> Proposition 16:4. *Maintenance of Encounters and Emotive Reinforcing of Encounters:* People have an inclination (a) to choose those words and actions within their repertoire maintaining their encounters with significant others; (b) this tendency is reinforced by the extent to which they share in (or have shared in) encounter events in which the relative weakness of the individual has been collectively "traded up" by circular reactions.

Emotive actions, such as shouting, singing, and rhythmic dancing, are not limited to undifferentiated societies. Aspects of emotive actions appear in community singing, among cheering crowds at sports events, at rock galas, in street demonstrations, among marching, singing troops, and in many other settings. One should not underestimate the social forces unleashed by such events.

[TECH] The process of circular reaction can be manipulated by mechanical means. In the early 1950s Charles R. Douglass invented “canned laughter,” the artificial laughter accompanying many TV shows to replace or amplify the reactions of studio audiences. The first machine was over half a meter high and worked liked an organ. Using a keyboard the operator could select the nature of the desired laughter and the sex and age of the laughing; using a foot pedal he determined the length of the laughter. The apparatus became known as the “lauff box.” In the beginning it was used in episodes of the “Jack Benny Show” and the “Lucy Show.” Modernized and miniaturized versions have

since been built into the control panels of many TV studios. Later electronic laugh generators became miniaturized and were built into chips placed in microphone stands. In the new century, they are available as tools for professional entertainers and as toys for children.

Little is scientifically known about the termination of a circular reaction. Probably most reactions stop due to exhaustion or satiation among the participants. Or, they stop due to an overwhelming physical police force.

Compliance

'Compliance' is the extent to which an action (communicative or physical) obeys a prescription. The extent to which boys and girls actually do finish college indicates their compliance with the norm that "all young people should have a college education", should be differentiated from convergence. Convergence and compliance are two main problem areas in the study of conformity. Confusion arises, however, if they were not treated separately, as each has its own principles. So far, we have studied the copying of communications (convergence). Now let us turn to the obedience to prescriptions (compliance).

Torgny Segerstedt (1948, 23) formulated a dictum: "Uniform behavior must be regarded as a result of social norms acting as causes." We have already noted that bodily spontaneities must be excluded from his thesis (1: 66). To appreciate its significance, one needs to know that as late as the 1920s and 1930s the majority of social psychologists of stature assumed that an "imitation instinct" accounted for compliance (Miller and Dollard 1941, 289-318). Actually, as we have seen, imitation explains initial convergence, and then a pleasing self-image rewards and reinforces the convergence. But to echo a prescription from an encounter is not the same as obeying the prescription. Imitation may be the basis of convergence, but not necessarily of compliance. This is the rationale for separating convergence and compliance.

Persons have a natural inclination, however weak it may be, to develop habits complying with the social norms in their encounters. This tendency is normally supported by others in the encounter. Humans seem to have an impulse to be intolerant of deviants, at least initially. A main research problem is not to document this tendency but rather to explore the circumstances mitigating it.

Socially induced compliance includes a bundle of separate processes, which usually operate jointly, but single ones can at times occur without the other. The basic tenant is that persons who are appreciated in an encounter also tend to obey its norms. Any visible deviation in social behavior that someone commits has consequences; not only for the perpetrator, but for the people he has hurt or offended. Deviations usually cause collateral damage; they affect people other than the violator and his immediate victim. The victims' relations to their families, neighbors, workmates, or friends may be affected more or less temporarily. The circumstance that individual deviations affect entire encounters, networks, and groups has several consequences.

The first result of a violation of a norm is that the norm is reiterated by most everyone who is affected. "One should not do that!" resounds from many quarters, not only from the immediate victims. If you disobey you will be told to obey. This is a spontaneous reaction in which most everyone tends to act as a little preaching policeman. Second, the perpetrator is given a negative evaluation, "Shame on you!" This informal or formal punishment is deliverable by anyone involved in the encounter, not only the victims. Third, the perpetrator is expected to compensate the victim for suffering and losses. This may be formalized in laws on indemnity and may be part of jurisprudence, but is also found outside the courts in informal groups.

The perpetrator of a violation of norms may also begin making amends by saying "Please forgive me!" At this point we approach a fourth important consequence of deviance. Social pressure emerges on the perpetrator that he makes amends for his deviant act towards all affected persons. This is called 'restora-

tive justice.' It is not regularly included in European judicial proceedings, but a punishment in the form of a period of community service may be included in a court verdict. In the United States, restorative justice is formalized in some parole hearings in which the victim's entire family has the right to provide opinions. Recent legislation in New Zealand regarding convicted juvenal offenders breaks new ground by requiring guided sessions of personal confrontations between the convicted and those affected by the crime. In spite of the fact that little research is being undertaken on restorative justice in everyday life, we include it in one of our numbered propositions on "Socially Induced Compliance.

> Proposition 16:5. *Socially Induced Compliance:* (a) The more favorable evaluations a person receives in an encounter, the more he is likely to conform to the prescriptions in the encounter. (b) When a person in an encounter deviates from its customary prescriptions (norms) the others in the encounter tend to articulate the prescription. (c) The more persons comply with the prescriptions in an encounter, the more favorable evaluations they tend to receive from others in the encounter, and the less they comply, the more unfavorable evaluations they tend to receive. (d) A member of an encounter that violates norms and thereby hurts other members is met by an expectation (a new norm) that requires him to compensate the victims in proportion to the damage he has caused. (e) The compensation shall be given not only to the victims but also to the victims' significant encounters that have been affected by the violation (restorative justice).

The first systematically collected data set supporting the hypothesis of rewards for compliance was collected in the 1930s by Roetlisberger and Dickson (1939) on workers in the Western Electric Company, and in the 1940s by Whyte (1943) on members of a street-corner gang in the town of Norton, Massachusetts. In the Bank Wiring Room of the Western Electric Research Program, the workers were paid at piece rates. They developed several informal social norms on restriction of production, in order to maintain good pay rates for modest efforts. In a re-

analysis of the findings of the study, George C. Homans (1950, 140-144) discovered that the workers who complied with such norms were more popular than those who complied with management's norms as regards working at a faster pace. In a similar re-analysis of the study of the Norton street-corner gang, Homans (1950, 179-181) made more explicit than the original author, the fact that those who conformed most closely to the gang norms, rather than to the norms of adult society, tended to be more appreciated by the gang and could assume leadership of it.

It is worthwhile to restate a string of conclusions that starts with the idea that a favorable evaluation from others in encounters translates into a more favorable self-image, something we act to preserve. One way to preserve it is to follow the norms in our encounters, an act which produces a favorable reaction, while to violate them produces a negative evaluation. Thus, encounters encourage us to conform to their norms. We may conform here without threats of physical force or material rewards. Favorable evaluations do the job. Such is the simple secret of social life in a civilized setting.

The Defense of Encounters: Punishment

Why does a majority in an encounter punish a deviating minority by assigning them an unfavorable evaluation? In a famous passage, Émile Durkheim argued that punishments were more necessary for the law-obeying than for the criminals. The maintaining of encounters occurs because people do not want to be traitors to those encounters upholding their self-image. If persons in an encounter do not give an unfavorable evaluation to those deviating from a norm in the encounter, they lower their own self-evaluation. We may say that people tend to punish the noncompliance they encounter to maintain their own favorable evaluation.

The implications of this process are perhaps best seen if they are stated in the negative mode:

Proposition 16:6. *First Principle of Social Punishment:* In social encounters people tend to maintain their self-evaluation by giving negative evaluations of those who deviate from the norms in the encounter.

In other words, deviations can only be tolerated at the price of lowering the evaluations received by the compliant participants in an encounter. If a person deviates from a norm but, nevertheless, retains a favorable evaluation, the entire scale of evaluation is rocked, so that everyone in the encounter is degraded a notch.

We see from this reasoning that tolerance of deviations is not a natural trait in language-using mankind. Tolerance of deviations from beliefs, values, and norms is an acquired virtue where it exists, requiring special effort. This is obvious to a pious Muslim:

> Instead of speaking of genuine toleration, it would be more accurate to say that in so far as Moslems are tolerant, this attitude marks a perpetual victory over themselves. By recommending toleration, the Prophet put them in a state of permanent crisis, resulting from the contradiction between the universal significance of the [Muslim] revelation and the acceptance of the plurality of religious faiths. (Lévi-Strauss 1955, Part 9).

Unlike a great deal of what is stated in this chapter, the idea expressed in this notion of social punishment is not entirely obvious as common sense. It takes a special effort to realize that the core of the moral order is a certain scale of evaluation, often embedded in justifying vocabularies, and that to uphold this scale, we degrade deviants and subject them to exclusion.

Vocabularies Coping with Degrading

Civil Disobedience

Civil disobedience is an active, polite, and non-violent response to disliked laws that one chooses not to follow. It provides practical actions for persons whose justifications have been offended by compelling norms or authorities, and who therefore

perceive a right to disobey the offending law. One can also say that civil disobedience implements Verdrass' thesis that persons whose dignity has been offended by laws or authorities need not obey the offensive laws or directives (2: 30).

If the civilly disobedient, "the resistors," are caught by the police, they refuse to move. They may try to make the violence used by the police during their capture visible to the media. If drawn into court, they get new opportunities for protests and publicity for their cause. The process has been used by movements for independence (India), against laws of racial segregation (American South and South Africa), and against drafts into wars considered unjust (Vietnam). Henry David Thoreau inspired this practice of canceling social norms in his essay *Civil Disobedience* (1849/1993) which presents his reasons for having refused to pay taxes as an act of protest against slavery and against the Mexican-American War.

Civil disobedience is an organized activity that requires knowledge and preparation by the resistors. It is an accepted way to change norms in a modern society, but only if the resistors, if and when caught, are prepared to take the full prescribed consequences of the existing laws they want to have abrogated. They must be psychologically prepared, not only for criminal charges, but for the negative opinions that the law-abiding always ascribe to deviants according to the above mentioned First Principle of Social Punishment (Proposition 16:6). However, the resistors may become heroes if their activity ends with the invalidation of a disliked law.

An outstanding example is "the mother of the civil rights movement" in the United States, Mrs. Rosa Parks, an African-American seamstress who had been a secretary to the President of NAACP, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. On the 1st of December 1955 she was arrested in Montgomery, Alabama for not standing and letting a white bus rider take her seat. Protests lasting eleven month were organized by Dr. Martin Luther King, pastor of a local Baptist Church. On November 13, 1956 the US Supreme Court declared that Ala-

bama's state and local laws requiring segregation on buses were illegal, a landmark decision that changed the country.

Accumulation of Negative Self-appreciation

In the Prologue of Goethe's drama Faust, The Lord says to Mephistopheles: "Men ever errs the while he strives." Deviations from social norms are always a possibility. In a human society, everyone is a temporary sinner, or a potential deviant. Everyone can be subject to degrading due to deviance.

All of our propositions about compliance are stochastic in nature, dealing with what is likely to happen, not with what is certain to happen. The more prescriptions people meet in an encounter, the greater the likelihood that they will deviate from at least a few of them. Very active people run into more prescriptions and are more likely to become deviants. For example, within a few years, school children who had scored high on a scale measuring hypomania, were found more likely to end up in the records of juvenile courts or similar records than were children who scored lower (Hathaway and Monachesi 1963).

A simple logic of combining Social Punishment with the Cooley Theorem gives us an important derivation: deviations from norms tend to lead to negative self-attitudes.

> Proposition 16:7. *Second Principle of Social Punishment:* People who deviate from the norms in social encounters and, nevertheless, remain in these encounters develop unfavorable self-images.

It is inevitable that people tend to accumulate a certain amount of negative self-appreciation because of their inability to live up to all the expectations from others, and to all the norms and expectations men encounter. Moreover, the universal human need to preserve a good self-image pressures men to purge themselves from these low self-evaluations. Herein lay some compelling dramas of human interaction.

Excuse

The easiest way of purging ourselves of the accumulation of negative self-evaluations caused by our inability to comply with all norms is to relax the prescriptions. 'Relaxation' of a prescription might be conceived as changing its position on a continuum from absolute prescription ("you must") toward permission ("you may") and cancellation ("do as you please"). It is always possible to be excused from obeying one norm if you can appeal to another important norm. A bored guest at a luncheon may excuse himself by referring to another engagement, thus upholding the norm that appointments shall be kept.

When physicians certify that a person is sick, he or she is to be excused from normal obligations. However, the fact that "grounds" are required for these excuses implies that the process is under some form of social control.

Prescriptions are also canceled outside the framework of socially accepted grounds. The significant fact about delinquent gangs is not that they have new norms, but that they have cancelled the established norms of adult society and have done so without the approval of anyone but themselves. Relaxation or nullification of society's norms in these youth groups takes place when the groups are relatively isolated from established society and rarely have encounters with representatives of adult society providing them with a positive self-image.

Ostracism

There are limits to the use of excuses, some obvious enough. Excuses solve the problem of accumulated negative self-attitudes only when they are applied across the board in every encounter which an individual experiences. If not, then, we are back at the starting point: if a person deviates from a norm, albeit canceled in some encounters, but nevertheless, retains a favorable evaluation, the entire scale of evaluation is changed so that everyone else in the encounters, who did not cancel the norm, now receives a lower self-evaluation. How does a man rid himself of his accumulated negative self-attitudes in this situation? It

would be presumptuous to pretend to know the complete answer to this question.

Ostracism is the banishing of an individual from an encounter, from a particular group, or, from an entire society. However, the word has become more than a term for exclusion.

Ancient ostracism was a formalized practice of exclusion in the fifth century BCE in Athens. On a chosen occasion almost each year, the citizens could vote to implement ostracism. On a clay fragment (oyster) they would write the name of any citizen whom they thought dictatorial or obnoxious. Provided the name appeared more than 6,000 times, the individual had to leave town. The ostracized were allowed to keep their property during their exile, and could return without stigma after ten years. This ostracism was a procedure which defused actual or potential conflicts. It was based on the formation of a public opinion, not on a court procedure.

In modern times ostracism has taken on another meaning. It stands for a practice of exclusion, combined with degradation. Here, two different vocabularies of motive are joined into one, a very powerful brew.

Modern ostracism is a routine in popular entertainment and in news media. In TV shows, we can follow a group in a situation with elements of stress, romance and competition. One after another of the participants is declared a failure and pushed out of the group by their own fellow participants — often with secret ballots as in ancient Greek ostracism.

In the media, the news often consists of reporting someone as a failure in sports, politics, business, arts, morality. Once the journalists and editors of one medium have defined a juicy failure, others join in running the same news, preferably with new details. A competitive media drive gets under way, and the sensibilities of the journalists and their bosses are blown away in a circular reaction in the open office landscape of an editorial office. The victim is "hanged out." There is a sense of elation in the editorial offices if the hunt causes the hunted to step down from a position or go through a humiliating public excuse. And more

often than not there is a sense of relief among the general public. On a closer look this is often not just bullying but a redemption ritual.

Victimization and Redemption

Bullying and crucifying someone in one sense or another, provides one possible resolution to negative self-images that people have accumulated by simply living in society. This process has been known at least since the sixth century BCE, when some of the defeated Jewish people were forcefully taken to Babylon as slaves or guest workers. The cycle of redemption with public bullying is not necessarily a religious phenomenon (Duncan 1962, Ch. 9). However, it is hard to find a better told version of victimization than the one provided by Deutero-Isaiah, the second author of the Isaiah chapter in the Bible, here in King James English version:

> He was despised and rejected by men, a man of sorrows, and familiar with suffering. Like one from whom men hide their faces he was despised, and we esteemed him not. Surely he took up our infirmities and carried our sorrows, yet we considered him stricken by God, smitten by him, and afflicted. But he was pierced for our transgressions, he was crushed for our iniquities; the punishment that brought us peace was upon him, and by his wounds we are healed. We all, like sheep, have gone astray, each of us has turned to his own way; and the Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us all. He was oppressed and afflicted, yet he did not open his mouth; he was led like a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is silent, so he did not open his mouth. By oppression and judgment he was taken away. And who can speak of his descendants? For he was cut off from the land of the living; for the transgression of my people he was stricken (Isaiah 53:2-8).

To understand victimization and redemption as a secular process one must keep in mind that a scale of evaluation, although present in most every encounter, cannot be read as easily as a

window thermometer: the gradations are not so concrete, and the zero point is not clearly marked. People, instead, arrive at the majority of their readings by invidious comparisons. Mr. X is better, worse, or equal to a certain comparison person. If one can lower the evaluation of a visible comparison person, who is far enough removed so that one does not drag oneself down in the process, one enhances one's own evaluation. This is a resort for those who have accumulated negative self-evaluations and need to return to their over-all favorable self-evaluations. They accomplish this through a rite.

A comparison person, "the victim," who has a known and visible position on the prevailing scale of evaluation, is selected and subjected to exclusion. He or she is publicly and forcibly downgraded and smeared. The net effects are that the anchorage point of the scale of evaluation moves downward; the evaluation of the participants is, in this way, restored to its former level; and the accumulated negative self-attitudes are canceled. The rite of redemption, thus, resets the gauges of evaluation in encounters to comfortable levels. The victims serve to keep the self-evaluations of the victimizers intact. The redemption process is probably the most remarkable one of mankind's vocabularies of motives. It may play out in front of a public who also senses new self-evaluation.

In more old-fashioned vocabulary, guilt due to disobedience is atoned by ‘victimization’, by unburdening guilt onto a sacrificial scapegoat. You are no longer the deviant; the deviant is the victim. We, the bullying failures, are still upholding the order that upholds us. In all victimization, others pay for your sins.

The victim who is to be sacrificed is chosen in two ways: either you find them among the most polluted, or you find them among the least polluted. At Golgotha, you have both kinds of victims; Christ as the clean sacrificial agent surrounded by two polluted scapegoats from a prison.

Kenneth Burke found support for these views in the classics of world literature, ranging from Genesis and Sophocles' Antigone to Dante's Divine Comedy, Shakespeare's Othello, and Kafka's

The Castle. Being himself a poet in addition to a critic, he could summarize his theory in a poem:

Here are the steps
In the Iron Law of History
That welds Order and Sacrifice:

Order leads to Guilt
(for who can keep commandments!)
Guilt needs Redemption
(for who would not be cleansed!)
Redemption needs Redeemer
(which is to say, A Victim!)

Order
Through Guilt
To Victimage
(hence: Cult of the Kill)

This poem is what should be left on a blackboard and in the notebooks of the students after the professor has lectured on what is known as “the cycle of redemption." This is not a magical process, as many think. It has its empirical base in social measurements of evaluation. It represents a forced change in a scale by which we are measured in social life.

The cycle of redemption is not an exclusive religious or moral process as many think; it can be induced not only by priests but by any dramatist, professional or amateur. The core of the process is revealed as forced changes in a scale of evaluation that has a zero point and unites measuring approval and disapproval. Such a scale was shown and discussed on pages 3: 116-118. It helped us understand the enigmatic process of anomie. We shall now use it to reveal the workings of the even more mysterious process, that of degradation and redemption.

In Figure 16.1 there is a graphic rendering of the process among bullying school children; it can easily be translated into mathematics if you can stand to be that cool about a tragic condition of human living.

The actors in the first version of the drama depicted below are an abuser plus some of his or her peers as spectators, and a vic-

tim, who is better than the bully in schoolwork and in social standing, and who does not hide this fact.

Figure 16.1. Resetting Scales of Evaluation by Redemption Cycles.

A. Redemption by Using Clean Victim

The abuser is low (-1) on an evaluation scale and responds by degrading a clean victim with harassments.



Resetting Scales of Evaluation by Redemption Cycles



Although the abuser's situation in reality has not changed, his position on the scale of evaluation improved from -1 to +2.

Below is a more common situation in which an already low-rated victim is further de-graded. Like in the previous situation the onlookers share vicariously in the up-grading of the abuser.

B. Redemption by Using an Already Unclean Victim

The abuser is low (-1) on an evaluation scale and responds by degrading a lower-rated unclean victim with harassments.



Resetting Scales of Evaluation by Redemption Cycles



Although the abuser's situation in reality has not changed, his position on the scale of evaluation much improved from -1 to +2.

The cycle of redemption is a way by which the anchorage point of a scale of evaluation can be moved downward so that everyone except the victim feels more comfortable. A catharsis occurs. The bullying crowds end up feeling good, a fact that makes it so difficult to stop bullying.

Ostracism is well-known to children in a school or on a playground when someone is singled out and subjected to collective bullying and name calling, sometimes also physical abuse. Among adults, ostracism can be found at workplaces, in house-

holds, associations, congregations and neighborhoods. Here the exclusion may also use foul language but also the form of systematic exclusion, i.e., ignoring someone, sending her or him to Coventry. Furthermore, here the abuse may become physical, as in racial or ethnic thrashing. That is why civilized countries criminalize hate speech.

The process of bullying is roughly the same in schools and places of work. Early research and theorizing focused on the psychological consequences for the victim (Leymann 1989). Later the focus has also included the considerable operational costs to organizations that poison their internal functioning by not immediately putting an end to any emerging process of bullying. In some countries (e.g. Sweden) schools can be fined for ignoring mobbing. In other countries (e.g. France) victims of mobbing at their workplace can go to courts that may rule that their tormentors are criminal.

The cycle of redemption also answers an age-old philosophical question as to why civilized people enjoy seeing tragic plays at the theatre. In his book *Why Does Tragedy Give Pleasure?* the English Shakespearean scholar A. D. Nuttall (1996) carefully dissects how catharsis and mimesis reinvigorate readers and theater audiences, the majority of which are not evil-minded.

When mass media publicize a person as a failure or deviant, the editors and their audience are fueled by needs to restore or enhance their own self-esteem and to uphold the order that upholds society. The acting of the journalists is lubricated by appeals to constitutional liberties allowing them to investigate, ostracize and victimize the powers that be, by references to the public's right to know. In fact, the journalists officiate in ancient and often murky rituals with vocabularies of ostracism and redemption. Sadly lacking in both classical scholarship and modern social psychological education, journalists are often not aware of what they do in their "drives."

Destructive Use of Language

Self and identity are *created* by language, particularly in socially small worlds, primary groups. This was a main message in Chapter 14. Now is the time to add an uncomfortable but inevitable thought: *self and identity can be destroyed by language*.

Our review of the great possibilities to use words in conflicts instead of violence has actually resulted also in instances when words are causing violence. Physical violence among humans is close at hand (but restrainable) in several civilized products of the language brain, for example, in vocabularies of likes and dislikes, inclusion and exclusion. In jurisprudence violence is present as legitimate violence by police and correctional officers. Violence emerges also in the cycle of redemption with a "cult of the kill," to use the words of Kenneth Burke that we soon shall cite in full.

The ostracism among children in a school or on a playground was easily observed. Among adolescents and adults, verbal ostracism can be found at workplaces, in households, associations, congregations, and neighborhoods. Here the exclusion may also use foul language but also the form of systematic exclusion by silence, i.e., ignoring someone, sending her or him to Coventry. Furthermore, here the abuse may become physical, as in racial or ethnic thrashing. That is why civilized countries criminalize hate speech.

Bullying in Socially Small Worlds

When persons receive unwanted, persuasive attention by others it is called "stalking." In California stalking was found in the pre-history of several high-profile murders. This opened the way in the 1990s to enter stalking in the criminal code. Other jurisdictions in the United States have followed suite. Legislation against harassment by stalking is also found in Japan and Europe. A particularly appropriate punishment is the prison, i.e. an isolation of the stalker from the victim. A similar function has a prohibition of the stalker to enter within a specified distance of the victim's house and workplace. The latter punishment has

been made an option for the courts in some countries to punish sexual harassments of women. It can be combined with electronic devices that track a person's movements. It is, in effect, a modern kind of "deportation" of criminals, as used in legislation of old times.

In many cases stalking involves physical abuse and rape. Our concern here is the stalking and harassments without bodily violence but with words. It appears that severe purely verbal ostracism in socially small worlds is quite common in modern society. The phenomenon was brought to general attention in 1998 by French psychiatrist Marie-France Hirigoyen in a short book *Le harcèlement moral, la violence perverse au quotidien* based on a small number of cases at work places and in families but with a profound analysis of them. It sold 450,000 copies in France and twelve years later has been translated into 28 languages, in itself a good indication of the generality of the phenomenon that words can destroy selves and identities. The American edition was given the telling title *Stalking the Soul: Emotional Abuse and the Erosion of Identity* (Hirigoyen 2000).

Dr. Hirigoyen is explicit that her profession gives little help to mend these types of relations. Nor is a mediator of help; how can you mediate between a compulsive killer of a soul and his or her victim? The cases we consider here need psychological help to understand that they must leave these relations.

The American publisher added a chapter by Thomas Moore, a psychotherapist, to the English translation of Hirigoyen's book. It would also have been helpful with an added chapter by an American judge, divorce lawyer, or a lawyer specializing in employee abuse, provided, of course, that the author has enough experience with clients in this type of hell.

The French legislation that came into effect after Hirigoyen's book is straightforward: the abuser is simply judged for what has actually happened. No proof is needed of any intention by the abuser to destroy. No prolonged arguments by psychologists and psychiatrists about the motivations of the conflicting parties that are so common in the United States need to enter a French

verdict. Prison for the boss and generous indemnities to the victim is the penalty when the proven abuser is a governmental agency or business that has used mental harassment to make someone quit his or her job or union office. In the case of abuse in a family, the verdict might be that the abuser is locked up and/or deported from the neighborhood, or subject to other restrictions that hopefully prevent any resumption of the abuse of the victim in the future (Zaremba 2010).

Bullying in Socially Big Social Worlds

Let us not shy away from the possibility that the use of naked violence and the use of compelling vocabularies join forces to work to the same end. This is a recurrent theme in dystopias such as Aldous Huxley's novel *Brave New World* (1932) and George Orwell's novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949). The theme is evil: preventing free people from developing. In Huxley, babies are conditioned from birth. In Orwell, adults are isolated inside a totalitarian symbolic environment of indoctrination.

Freedom of speech must be suspended for such processes to work. This requires physical coercion. One must also suspend freedom of physical movement, so that the subjects cannot move away from indoctrination. This requires surveillance and more physical coercion. The procedures are usually called "re-education," or "rectification," or some other term hiding the element of coercion. These procedures can be collectively organized and uniform, or they can be individually tailored and detailed.

Mao Zedong's re-education program during the Cultural Revolution 1966–1976 illustrates primarily the former. City dwellers were forced en masse to live in rural districts to purge themselves of bourgeois sentiments and to learn how to live collectively. The Chinese Communist Party also arranged local public sessions with forced attendance of people who, more or less, were arbitrarily called bourgeois or rightists. They were ridiculed and degraded for their views, along with renegades from the party. The spirit and self-evaluation of captured men were broken by bodily exercises, such as being hanged by arms and legs like an airplane. The spirit and self-evaluation of captured

women could be broken by removing their hair, a shameful appearance in China. These so called rectification campaigns and programs ended in suicides for some, and for most others, in begging to be taken back into Communist grace and communion (Fairbank and Goldman 2006).

The individual approach to re-education is illustrated by the treatment of Pu Yi, who was enthroned as Emperor Xuan Tong at the age of three — the tenth emperor of the Qing Dynasty and the last emperor of China. The House of Qing was toppled in 1911. The disposed emperor collaborated with Japanese invaders. After World War II, he was returned from exile in the Soviet Union into the hands of Mao, who decided to re-educate him. Pu Yi was declared "reformed" after ten years in a Fushun War Criminals Management Centre in Liaoning province.

We recognize in both this collective and individual re-education, not primarily the power of the torture-like behavior that was used, but the merciless use of compelling vocabularies against captive persons. For example, here is the application of Propositions 13:1 on Dissimilarity-Dislike, 14:1 on The Cooley Theorem of the Looking-glass Self, 15:2 on Threats of Anomie, 16:2 on Socially Rewarded Convergence, 16:4 on Identity Maintenance, and 16:5 on Socially Induced Compliance. We also recognize the good feelings that the tormentors achieved by processes of victimization and redemption. This means that the cruel re-education actually was a pleasing experience for "the re-educators," and improved their morale.

In this work on social science, I shall not go into the details of the receipts used for so called re-education or rectification in authoritarian regimes. That would be too near the equivalent of publishing the instructions for building atomic bombs in a textbook of physics.

Ostracism of the Middle Way

A half-way redemption by using clean victims is provided by 'levelers.' They were originally democratically inclined English sects opposed to church hierarchies. In the process of redemp-

tion, they do not push clean victims below their own station. They stop the process at the point on the scale of evaluation where they find themselves. Everyone thus becomes equal.

The ethos of levelers can be found in many places. In 1933 the Danish-Norwegian writer Aksel Sandemose wrote a novel called *En flyktning krysser sit spor* (A Refugee Crosses his Tracks). It takes place in the town of Jante, a thinly disguised version of Sandemose's own hometown, Nykøbing on Mors Island in Denmark. Here the "Law of Jante" clearly dictates redemption by bringing every illuminate down to the same level.

> *Du skal ikke tro du er noe. (You shall not think that you are special.)*
> *Du skal ikke tro du er like klok som oss. (You shall not think that you are as smart as us.)*
> *Du skal ikke tro du er klokere enn oss. (You shall not think that you are smarter than us.)*
> *Du skal ikke innbille deg du er bedre enn oss. (Don't fancy yourself as being better than us.)*
> *Du skal ikke tro du vet mer enn oss. (You shall not think that you know more than us.)*
> *Du skal ikke tro at du er mer enn oss. (You shall not think that you are more important than us.)*
> *Du skal ikke tro at du duger til noe. (You shall not think that you are good at anything.)*
> *Du skal ikke le av oss. (You shall not laugh at us.)*
> *Du skal ikke tro at noen bryr seg om deg. (You shall not think that anyone cares about you.)*
> *Du skal ikke tro at du kan lære oss noe. (You shall not think that you can teach us anything.)*

The Law of Jante is said to apply to all of Scandinavia during the entire transition between agricultural Gemeinschaft and an industrial Gesellschaft. In 1969 in Sweden, the Jante law became a political program with Alva Myrdal's so-called *Equality Report* presented to the Social Democratic Party Congress (A. Myrdal 1969). The law argues that equality should not only mean equal opportunities for all citizens, but also a more equal outcome of

their efforts. The standard statistical measure of the economic equality of outcomes, the so-called Gini-coefficients, shows the Scandinavian countries with top scores in several international comparisons.

Redemption makes everyone except the victims feel better. A middle-way redemption with ostracism, fueled by a passion for equality of the outcome, also results in more favorable self-images. In 1974, George Gallup conducted the first worldwide poll in which people were asked about how happy they were. At that time, the Scandinavian countries turned out to be the happiest. This finding is repeated in certain other international polls on happiness.

Surprisingly, the utilitarian's goal of the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people can be achieved by ostracism being stopped at half-way redemption. The widespread good feelings reported by those who practice The Law of Jante encompass a particular kind of happiness.

Is this happiness, achieved through the Jante way, worth it? My answer is, No. The Jante Law puts a dead hand over mankind's growth in the different societal realms — in Scandinavia and elsewhere. In a differentiated society there is great joy in becoming rich, powerful, and learned. In a good differentiated society – the one we call many-splendored – there is excitement in acquiring an exquisite taste, or, in finding closeness to the sacred. In a many-splendored society there is a justified pride in a moral rectitude achieved as a matter of course and conscience. A many-splendored society is the very opposite of Jante.

An Etic Conception of Compelling Vocabularies: Totems and Deities

What did we actually study when we took up compelling vocabularies for analysis?

Compelling vocabularies is a technical term describing language with significant leverage to shape actions, selves, and societies. It is an emic term, not an etic one, to use a distinction from anthropology which we earlier have discussed (Volume 1

pages 1: 136-140). Emic vocabularies are used by the people we study; etic vocabularies are the jargons of the scholars and students who do the study.

What do people in their own words call such sets of words as compelling vocabularies? What do they call the sum total of what hits them with an almost overwhelming force, that is hard to resist? What is this powerful phenomenon that defines their identities and steers their lives?

A clue to the answer was found by Émile Durkheim (1912) when he did research on Australian totemic religion. A common answer to such questions in primordial societies is to mention a totem or deity. Totems, Gods, and devils have the attributes of being overwhelming and steering man's life. The Australian aborigines, says Durkheim, were "not deceived when he believed in the existence of a moral power upon which he depends and from which he receives all that is best in himself: this power exists, it is society." Durkheim's classical conception became that "God is society, writ large." We could use a more manageable and precise formulation: "the Gods are emic names given to compelling vocabularies, writ large."

We will pick up this thread when we deal at length with religion in Volume 5. Here it suffices to mention that this important discovery does not exhaust the content and meaning of the realms of morality and religion.

17. Justifying and Compelling Vocabularies Writ Large: Conscience and Non-Violence

Zipping Justifying and Compelling Vocabularies

We recall that 'vocabularies of justifications' are words used to motivate our own actions. 'Compelling vocabularies' are words that others direct toward us to motivate us to engage in an action.

We reach the pinnacle of social motivation when we add appropriate justifications to compelling vocabularies. A compelling vocabulary is one string of words, the justifying vocabulary is another. Justifications are not necessarily echoes of the compelling words. In general, justifications contain more cognitive elements than compelling vocabularies. The two may have some synonymous ideas and, also, some different ones. They are like the left and right parts of a zipper, and the part with the pulley of the zipper is the compelling vocabulary. Sociologists may recognize these parts as somewhat similar to "culture" and "structure" in the way British sociologist Margaret Archer (1996) has used these terms.

Figure 17.1. A Zipper Joins Justifying and Compelling Vocabularies of Motives.



When matched, joined, and closed all the way, the zipped garment is tightly held together as if it were made of one cloth. The compelling vocabulary is now consonant and virtually synonymous with the justification, although the words used may differ in places. This is the ideal type of social motivation. The dual strings of compelling vocabularies and justifications mirror one another, like a dual helix in DNA. The action promoted by this grip is presented and ready to be reproduced without deviance, unless stopped by external factors. Many psychologists and sociologists have presented this situation as one of the "internalization" of norms or of culture, norms moving to the inside of an individual, a misleading image in my view.

In real life, a zipper is not always in place and working. In 2005 a large area of New Orleans, Louisiana was chattered by a big storm called Katrina. Barriers against the rising waters of the Gulf were broken. To escape the rising waters people had to leave their homes in a rushed evacuation. Much looting occurred in the abandoned neighborhoods. Federal troops were brought to the scene to keep order.

In 2011 a tsunami devastated the Japanese east coast. The high barriers raised against the waves from the common under-sea earthquakes were this time insufficient. People abandoned their homes, rushing for life to higher areas. Many succumb in the wave and in crumbling houses. To the amazement of many outsiders, no looting was reported in the abandoned towns in the following days and weeks.

In Louisiana the zipper was week between the compelling vocabulary of property right and the justifications respecting property. In Japan it was strong.

We have several types of matching and mismatching between compelling vocabularies and justifications to consider. Table 17.1 is intended to bring some order into the details.

The cells in the table represent different likelihoods of convergence and compliance. The general rule is stated as Proposition 17:1.

Table 17.1. Crossing Justifying and Compelling Vocabularies.

		Compelling vocabularies: regulations (jurisprudence, rights, and laws), vocabularies of likes and dislikes, identities and honor, vocabularies supporting self-images that can cope with anomie and with degrading		
		Encouraging	Absent	Discouraging
Justifications: by cardinal values, turfs, ideologies, organizations, networks, media etc.	Encouraging	A	B	C
	Absent	D	E	F
	Discouraging	G	H	I

The ideal type of motivation is represented by case A in the table. The same action is encouraged both by compelling vocabularies and justifications. The state tells the amount of tax to pay and the citizens whose legislature has enacted the tax lay accept it as a justified levy.

Proposition 17:1. *Consent of the Governed:* In a symbolic environment, the greater the consonance between compelling vocabularies and justifying vocabularies, the greater the likelihood (a) that convergence is realized in any related descriptions, evaluations and prescriptions; and (b) the greater the likelihood people comply with prevailing prescriptions.

Case I in which both discourage an action is also of this strong kind. Cases A and I together represent "consent of the governed." You want what you are told and you are told only what you want. There are no divine rights for kings, dictators, or colonists to single-handedly rule, nor for presidents, prophets, or millionaires. John Locke emphasized that a government's use of coercion in ruling is acceptable only if it rests on the consent of the people. This idea, as we all know, was central to the found-

ing fathers of the United States and to the insurgents in the French Revolution.

The creation of the consent of the governed is a key to efficient and lasting leadership (2: 58-67). To reach agreement on how situations should be defined, what values and goals shall be pursued, and giving directions on how they shall be realized are standard tasks of leaders. Now we have learned from Proposition 17:1 that a joint use of justifying and compelling vocabularies creates consensus and compliance. This means that we have also learned what can make leadership easy and sustainable.

Case B in Table 17.1 illustrates a person's justification without support from a compelling vocabulary, or meeting resistance from other actors. Here, persons are free to act without any resistance according to their chosen justifications. In case H, we have a mirror situation where an individual's justifications meet no resistance from compelling vocabularies in his encounters. A choice of being a vegetarian is ideally of this kind, but at times group pressures may intervene.

In cell D compelling vocabularies encourage something that has no counterpart of justification. In cell F they discourage something that has no corresponding justification. Most of the time in such situations, convergence and compliance take place anyway; after all, the vocabularies are compelling. However, in the reasoning of the individuals involved, this is an option of convergence and compliance. When no one is watching, no harm is felt at disobedience. Such is the situation of the fawners who adopt to their significant others when they are observed by them, but otherwise ignore their wishes. We have met a related case in the American, who never cheat at cards played in the socially small world, but without ado accepted unearned money to which he is not entitled from a public crib known as the "Gover'ment" (2: 125).

In cases C and G the justifications and compelling vocabularies are at odds. Individuals in these predicaments are torn between the compelling vocabularies in their encounters and the justifications that are products of their own language brains. In

the instances marked C, the justification encourages and the compelling discourages. In G, the compelling from outside encourages and the justification resists. Such cases are often called "conflicts of conscience."

We recall that Alfred Verdrass, a spokesman for natural law, preferred that conscience rules over compelling laws in all conflicts involving human dignity. Our presentation of civil disobedience on page 3: 144 above illustrates the implementations of conditions in cell C of Table 17.1. Strong justifications, such as the American Creed, were ultimately victorious in the civil strife against legal discrimination of Blacks in The United States.

Periods of prolonged and visible discrepancies between long established justifications and the compelling vocabularies in actual use may easily become crises focused on some "affair." In the Dreyfus affair, for example, the justifications of the majority of French citizens were contrary to the anti-Semitism and public lying by the establishment. Émile Zola's famous open letter "J'accuse" on January 13, 1898 to the French President made the discrepancy visible in a most effective manner. Again the ultimate outcome was in favor of the justifications, rather than the compelling vocabularies that were carried out at the time. One may, in the same vein, cite the role of Alexander Solzhenitsyn whose chronicles of Stalin's tyranny by police, courts, and prison camps undermined the Soviet regime.

We may summarize one of these insights into a very tentative Proposition of Dominance of Justifications. At present, I must admit that this seems based on more hope than solid evidence.

> Proposition 17:2. *Dominance of Justifications:* In prolonged conflicts over human dignity between vocabularies of justification and compelling vocabularies, the former tend to prevail.

Discarded Reifications

After the above discussion, we should be ready to dispense with two reifications in social science. We have been taught that "internalization" is a real and actual embedding of social norms into a human personality. But it is, rather, a relation, a positive

correlation, between two language products: compelling vocabularies and justifications. We have also been taught that "conscience" is an actual faculty, a compass that shows how we ought to behave. Even so, conscience apparently stands for cases where justification overrides other considerations. Thus, conscience is also a relation between creations of language.

It happens in science that reified concepts become unnecessary. To astronomers and physicists, ether was once a medium filling all unoccupied space; it transmitted heat and light, just as air transmits sounds. Ether, as we now know, turned out to be non-existent, and finally in 1905, Einstein's special theory of relativity eliminated the need for the medium of ether and replaced what ether was supposed to explain with equations.

Mankind's transmission of heat and light was not affected by this change in physical theory. Likewise, the behavior of mankind will not necessarily be affected by a scrapping of the reifications of the phenomena of internalization and conscience in social theory.

Civilization: Compelling Vocabularies instead of Violence

When our view of man and fellowman is inspired by our pre-language brains, any community can seem to be founded on murders, massacres, and rapes. Cain clubs Abel to death, Romulus kills Remus. Zeus rapes Europe. In this view, the key elements in the social order are to identify enemies, to celebrate the in-group, to exercise sexual appetites, and to defend and extend territories by organized violence.

When our view of a society is inspired by our language brain, the situation is different. Now, we see man and fellowman exploring and persuading one another about their relations, their environment, and their mutual survivals. In this view, the social order begins when people gather in the Commons to discuss mutual problems and decide how to cope with them. Their talk may, of course, be dominated by magic and spuma, and may not help them much in solving

their real problems. We like to think that civilization is characterized by a minimum of such diversions.

In his book *The New Leviathan,* Robin George Collingwood (1942) describes "civilization "as a context in which reasoned debate between individuals of different standpoints can evolve without bigotry and bloodshed. This was a brave definition in that year because it pointed at both Hitler's Nazism and Stalin's communism as plainly uncivilized.

Violence has many faces. Not all violence is naked; some violence carries clear symbols and messages. A fortification — particularly in the form of an old-fashioned castle — is not necessarily only a response to the violence of an enemy. Our discussion of stratification and rewards in the economy suggests that the castles may also serve as conspicuous consumption of a king who bent on impressing others with his wealth and standing. A battle of armies may be imbued with symbols as a "drama" carried out in a "theatre" of war.

Without losing meanings embedded in sentences with many swearwords, one can reduce the number of curses, as do polite and well-bred people. What you mean can be made perfectly clear with, or without, the bad language. The same is true about violence that carries meanings. The violent content can be reduced and compensated for by an increase in the content of symbols; thus, civilization is incremented.

[BIO] In the new century we can achieve the delineation of civilization with the help of brain research. Societies have four options in using the non-language brain, with its resources of physical violence, and the language brain with its resources of justifying and compelling vocabularies:

1. Let the non-language brains battle non-language brains, e.g. violence against violence, one person's sexual urge against another's, my tribe's war dance against your war dance.

2. Let the non-language brains battle language brains, e.g., use violence to suppress opinions and human rights; turn parliamentary debates into shouting contests.

3. Let the language brains battle with the non-language brains, e.g. in non-violent resistance, in humanitarian preaching against reliance on weapons of mass destruction.

4. Let the language brains battle other language brains, e.g. settle arguments by words instead of violence.

A society is civilized — and defined by scholars as civilized — when its main line of coping with conflicts involves meeting words with words, and I mean words alone (Option 1) As we have noted on page 3: 7, the ancient Athenians made this choice for life inside their city. The Romans continued the effort to keep their capitol free of warriors. Only by invitation could its own army march through Rome in a parade of triumph. "Ballots rather than bullets" is the modern version of this credo.

Organized violence such as armed men, police actions, guerrillas, may rightly be used in rebellions and wars against governments and groups denying the nexus of human liberty that reads freedom of speech and opinion and includes academic freedom, economic freedom, civic freedom, artistic freedom, religious freedom, and freedom of conscience. Furthermore, violence might be justified against those who use freedom of speech to entice violence against peaceful others. To use words to incite violence against civilized people is not civilized.

Non-violent resistance to an enemy using violence (Option 3) advocated, for example, by Mahatma Gandhi is also a civilized design. Resistance is not civilized, however, when non-violent words are met with violence and are suppressed by violence (Option 2).

It may seem self-evident that Option 1 with raw power against raw power is inherently uncivilized. And so it is, and so it has been in most instances. However, as we just implied, it is a civilized duty to meet violence with violence when, and only when, it is necessary for the survival of civility. Then, the civi-

lized part of mankind must have the ultimate right to utilize force to fight the uncivilized threatening the supremacy of the language brain, which gave us human dignity and the rights of man.

This is a harsh message, and it is easy to find those who disagree. Jane Addams, a great American social worker and organizer of women's peace movements saw any war in the name of democracy or civilization as a blatant self-contradictory argument. She led the popular opposition against President Woodrow Wilson in the United States in 1917 when he took the United States into the First World War on the side of England and France against Germany.

When the war was over and the victors called a peace conference in Versailles in 1919, Jane Addams was the key individual behind a women's conference which took at the same time and which included participants from 14 countries. This women's conference in Zürich, Switzerland successfully opposed that the victors should establish a food blockade threatening women and children in Germany's and Austria's cities. In resolutions sent to Versailles the participants protested against the hard peace terms which Germany would be forced to sign. They pointed out that the enormous war damages compensation, which Germany would have to pay, would destroy the German economy and create both hate and the desire for revenge amongst the population. The Zürich conference joined forces with "Women's International League for Peace and Freedom," a federation that established its headquarters in Geneva and count Jane Addams as the great pioneer of pacifism.

President Wilson congratulated Jane Addams when she received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931. He did not necessarily imply that she had been right in opposing his entry of the United States in the war. He certainly had had second thoughts about that decision. However, he had reason to feel that it was right of the US to enter and settle the nationalistic war in Europe that affected not only borders and development in Europe but the borders, trade, and developments in the whole world, cluttered

as it was at that time with European colonies. But Addams' opposition to the vengeance of the peace treaty and her work to end conflicts by diplomacy of humanitarian measures were most laudable and deserved the Prize. Her protests about the rule of vengeance in Versailles were justified, as it nearly nullified Wilson's achievements with the war.

Military violence is a civilized duty as a last resort against those using violence to suppress freedom of expression and movement. But most wars in history have been fought over other issues. They were avoidable wars that, with the spread of civilization, were replaceable by an efficient use of compelling vocabularies.

Compelling violence of the past is, to a considerable extent, already replaced by compelling vocabularies. Practitioners of contemporary history and statistics keeping track of what happens in the world can write reports to Pete Seeger's tune with the query "Where have all the soldiers gone?" The World Wars of the twentieth century, with a huge number of men in arms, seem inconceivable in the early twenty-first century. Such is at least the prospect in an age that may be called "The Century of Diplomacy."

Unfortunately, as we have noted, media and their journalists find it more necessary for their survival to publish what is disturbing, rather than that which is normal, so most people in the world do not seem to realize how civilized mankind has actually become.

An Axis of Pre-language and Language Brains [TECH]

Powerful forces in society come into play when the pre-language brains and the language brain pull in the same direction. This happens, for example, when the language brains organize collective action to build and maintain shelters and temples — most dramatically illustrated when mankind built its pyramids. This also happens when language brains organize collectives of people to use concerted violence — that is, organ-

ize for mankind's wars. Like it or not, most states have evolved within borders set by wars.

Let us repeat that organized violence is a far graver problem than spontaneous acts of violence. A small organization or network that does not shirk from using violence can subdue a whole society that has lived peacefully and has learned to avoid violence as far as possible. The Chinese civilization had its Great Wall to keep out violent invaders; the Wall was to separate people ruled by primordial impulses from the Chinese own civilized way of life. The Wall was originally about 5,000 kilometers long, built of stone, wood, grass and dirt and was renovated and extended under the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) to some 6,400 kilometers. Now bricks were produced in kilns set up along the wall. The bricks were transported to the construction project in the mountains by men, donkeys, and mules carrying them on their backs, and also by goats with a single brick around their necks.

Like the Chinese of the time, many see the Great Wall as a kind of border between territories ruled in the main by reptilian brains, and territories ruled primarily by language brains. The emperors' military force elaborated by language brains stayed superior to the force of invaders dominated by pre-language brains. Regardless of its military merit, you can also see the Great Wall as a kingpin, or a symbol, for the sense of security and superiority of the Chinese civilization (Lovell 2006).

Organized violence today — by states, mafias, or terrorist networks — has at its disposal cheap technical, chemical, and biological weapons that can be transported anywhere on earth. It can effectively kill, paralyze, and subjugate civilized people. Prevention is both difficult and extremely expensive — as was the Great Wall of China.

Caution about the Designation "Civilized"

Our notion of being civilized joins descriptions in social science with some evaluations common in public criticism.

As scholars we define 'civilized' as a descriptive term, meaning something guided, not by pre-language brains, but by language brains preferably stripped of magic, spuma, and defensive bilge. To be "civilized," however, is not only a descriptive attribute; it is also a value judgment. Myself and numerous others welcome the hidden values involved in the notion of being civilized. Others do not. They want to stay in touch with more corporal impulses of their reptilian brains, including the ability to inflict pain and death on others. They often do so with a sense of elation. And, they celebrate those who can do so without any feelings of pity or remorse. In modern politics, they are called fascists. They are insults to civilized living.

Given our terminology, it is not at all certain that a religion is civilized. Here is an illustrative hadith:

> Abu Huraira reported Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) as saying: The last hour would not come unless the Muslims will fight against the Jews and the Muslims would kill them until the Jews would hide themselves behind a stone or a tree, and a stone or a tree would say: Muslim, or the servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me; come and kill him; but the tree Gharqad would not say, for it is the tree of the Jews (Sahih Muslim, Book 041, Number 6985).

This full-fledged illustration of our fourth principle of magic — that all happenings and creations are willed by some being — and its blatant anti-Semitism constitute a clearly uncivilized position. A hadith is a saying collected in the Middle Ages but attributed to Muhammad, or considered endorsed by him. A hadith is authenticated by questioning people who based their knowledge on earlier authorities attributing the utterance in question to the Prophet or his circle. We would be better to treat most hadiths as valid for Muslims during the high middle ages, rather than at the time of the dawn of Muslim religion in early middle ages.

It is a mark religious progress when religions leaders ”reign in” peripheral dogmas and cults that are uncivilized; this pro-

cess is not religious degeneration, as religious radicals are apt to say.

In the twenty-first century a new "specter" has swept over the Western World, the ugly face of terrorist violence by Jihadists, holy warriors, who are often called "Islamic" to distinguish them from more peaceful Islam and from Islamite civilization[11]. It is quite correct to call the suicide bombings of civilians in the name of the Islamic holy war as uncivilized. And, of course, it is correct to label suicide bombings by Tamil Tigers of Hindi persuasion uncivilized. And we have every right to pin the label uncivilized on many fierce religious wars in Christian history. The civilizing of the religions of the world is an unfinished business for mankind. So far, Buddhism seems to have come the longest way, but perhaps at the expense of general social mobilization (2: 145).

The sectarian Muslim violence in India, Iraq, Israel and some Western cities is, ironically enough, financed by the diversion of European, American, Japanese, and Chinese payments for oil, for which all the latter have had an insatiable demand. Financed by these funds, Islamic ideas from the Wahhabi sect in Saudi Arabia have found their way into selected mosques of almost all Muslim countries, shifting the attitude of Islam from peace to assertion, and providing support to radicalized young men.

It is another important observation in the early twenty-first century that rulers everywhere, with access to an abundance of oil income, become less interested in the democratic consent of the governed than rulers who are dependent on tax money from their governed. Venezuela under Chaves and Russia under Putin are illustrations at the time of this writing. One should not expect the leadership in oil economies, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, or the Sudan, to be eager for a transition to rule by the voice of the people as long as the rest of the world is dependent on their oil and pays them good prices for it, so that they do not have to ask their own people for any substantial tax support.

The Zipped Vocabularies of a New Leviathan

Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, and Sartre have contended that if there is no God, everything is permitted. This may be true as stated — although it is actually a common misquote since none of them made such a statement in these particular words. However, it is more certainly true if specified in our way: without "God = compelling vocabularies" the life of man would become "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". The latter were the memorable words that Thomas Hobbes used when he in *Leviathan* (1651, Chapter 16) described societies without any all-powerful sovereigns; those societies degenerated into a "war of all against all." Leviathan is an unbeatable monster.

Hobbes gave the sovereign's realm, the body politic, an exceptional position in society. Only by its power and its resources of violence could peace be obtained and retained. In a differentiated society and in a many-splendored society, however, we see the polity as just one realm among others. We may now use Hobbes' same words, not to present an image of societies that are without Hobbes' Leviathan-like sovereigns, but societies without compelling vocabularies. This would be societies that lack regulations (jurisprudence, rights, laws, and contracts), vocabularies of likes and dislikes, identities and honor, and societies that lack vocabularies supporting self-images that can cope with anomie and with degrading. In societies lacking these elements, life for humans would indeed be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

We suggest that compelling vocabularies locked in by justifications can substitute for much organized violence in human societies, something that cannot readily be said of animal societies without a language. There is just so much force in compelling vocabularies and justifications that much violent force may be unnecessary. In the new century, we know enough social science to challenge a brute force by the use of zipped vocabularies of motives.

Compelling vocabularies, locked in by a zipper with justifying vocabularies, not all-powerful sovereigns with their resources of

violence, are the requirement of a society in which human life is raised above the level of everyone's war against everyone else. This is an important conclusion.

We have reached the end of Volume 3 of *The Many-Splendored Society*. We can at this point look back at a presentation in three volumes of a general theory about the extraordinary role of language in the construction of social reality.

For the next three volumes, we have planned separate studies of six societal realms, namely, science and art, economy and religion, polity and morality. These monographs will be guided by a vision of a many-splendored society in which these realms are born free and equal.

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[11] Since I first wrote this in 2005, elections have been held in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both places, but particularly in Iraq, the first election was accompanied by guerrilla warfare, including many suicide bombers from Islamic groups who had a minimal interest in resolving political conflicts by discussions and the ballots. After an initial rally after the 9/11 Al Quida attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, the publics in North Americas and Europe, faced with a sad aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq, have shown a diminishing resistance to Jihad violence. It will be noted by future historians that the political left in the United States and Britain, following their original (and civilized) opposition to a poorly planned and executed occupation, did not support civilization in the form of democratic elections when they were held in Iraq (Cohen 2007). The European response in the beginning of the 21st century to Jihad lacked conviction. The same might eventually be said also of the American effort in the post-Bush era. If so, it will remain as a historical mission of India or China to civilize violent Islamic movements and curb their most violent roots, the Wahhabi tradition in Saudi Arabia, of which Al Quida is the most well-known expression.

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