The Many-Splendored Society

Volume 1
Surrounded by Symbols

Third edition

This book describes humanity's unique environment of symbols in speech and script, and it tells how freedom in using symbols creates and changes social reality. You can read it on its own.

The book is also the first installment to a larger work in seven volumes about social theory, and about a many-splendored society that is within human reach.

To Karin Busch Zetterberg

Also by Hans L Zetterberg

On Theory and Verification in Sociology (also in Spanish, Japanese, and Swedish)

Social Theory and Social Practice

Arbete, livsstil och motivation

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Published and planned volumes of "The Many-Splendored Society"

Volume 1. Surrounded by Symbols, 2009, 3rd ed. 2013, chapters 1-5 (the present book)

Volume 2. An Edifice of Symbols, 2010, 3rd ed. 2013, chapters 6-10

Volume 3. Fueled by Symbols, 2010, 3rd ed. 2013, chapters 11-17

Volume 4, The Pursuit of Knowledge, 2013, chapters 18-28

Volume 5. The Pursuit of Wealth and Order

Volume 6. The Pursuit of Beauty, Sacredness and Virtue

Volume 7. The Pursuit of Life and the Good Life

For progress and updates see the author's web www.zetterberg.org

THE MANY-SPLENDORED SOCIETY
VOLUME 1
SURROUNDED BY SYMBOLS

Hans L Zetterberg

The Many-Splendored Society: Volume 1. Surrounded by Symbols
3rd edition

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A BOOK PROJECT: THE MANY-SPLENDORED SOCIETY

Preface, Ambition, and Abstract
Volumes 1 through 4 of *The Many-Splendored Society*.
To be updated as further volumes are completed.

In this work, we use the adjective "many-splendored" to depict a society with personal freedom and a shining differentiation of six self-governing realms: economy, politics, science, art, religion, and morality. A good society, in my view, joins these societal realms so that no one rules over the others.

Our claim is that the main division of social reality is not the two classes of workers and bourgeoisie, as Karl Marx thought, but rather the above six societal realms. As mentioned, they are science, art, economy, religion, polity, and morality. (Class, of course is a mighty stratification within the realm of economy; other realms have also significant stratifications but of other kinds.) A certain specific type of symbols dominates each societal realm. Consequently, the realms depend on what human language brains can produce. In an animal kingdom lacking advanced language, these realms can hardly develop.

Abstract

The Many-Splendored Society deals with emerging categories and spontaneous tendencies in a social science based on the properties of language. I admit being happy whilst writing this text, sharing with the readers a chock full of nuts of exciting discoveries about social reality. I write for a public of serious readers in all walks of professional life, and for college and university students and their teachers in any part of the social sciences. At the same time, the text provides professional social scientists a framework larger in scope than their own specialty.

The entire study has seven planned books of which this is the first. Each volume has a topic of its own. You can read it on your

own with or without the other volumes. In total, the seven volumes will add up to a panorama of a many-splendored society that not only is within the reach of humanity, but is on a path on which we have already come a long way. When this project is finished, the seven volumes will appear in one comprehensive and integrated treatise, and/or in one Kindle-type file.

Volume 1 (chapters 1 – 5)

Let's speak in larger print of Volume 1 of *The Many-Splendored Society*, the 3rd edition (2013) of which you are now reading.

This Volume has *Surrounded by Symbols* in its title. Here we pursue humans' symbolic environment, addressing the basic elements of peoples' lives with a minimum of references to those aspects of biology other than the human language brain, the latter being the latest addition in the evolution of the functions bound in the entire human brain. Our message is that symbols of the unique human language brain develop our social life, our culture, and ourselves. Symbols codify societal orders, represent wealth, summarize knowledge, embody beauty, define sacredness, and express virtues. Immense are the tasks that mankind's symbols provide.

In this Volume, we clear the decks for this immensity by identifying common abuses of language in the form of magic, confabulation, and defensive bilge. We want to avoid these in exploring a scientific vocabulary for the study of society, its grounds, and scaffoldings.

A huge potential for personal freedom comes with using language. This freedom shapes our own lives and our own society. Our language contains an almost unlimited number of linguistic germs: any one of us can produce sentences that no one has ever heard of before. The fertile envi-

ronment of language is, of course, freedom of speech. Language gives humanity a wide crack in an otherwise deterministic universe. Human language is an opening to our freedom.

Taking a first telescopic view, we find some intense bursts of symbolic activity in the so-called "axial civilizations" of China, India, and the Occident in the period 800 to 200 BCE. We follow mostly the resulting development in Europe from its Greek, Roman, and Jewish roots. I admit having found pleasure in experiencing the social world from a European perspective. Of course, I too, have a bounded, but real, despair over the shortcomings in European history: its falling into cases of religious and political tyranny, its economic exploitations at home and abroad, and I never forget that Nazism and Stalinism are European products. Europe, with its long record of anti-Semitism (3: 83-84), casting a whole people as a contamination of humankind, can never be held up as a model for other civilizations. It is, however, unwarranted that so many intellectuals today are ashamed of the entire European heritage and its North American continuation with a unique elaboration after the American Revolution. Where else do we find richer experiences of many-splendored societies?

Taking a second telescopic view of symbolic environments, we find some recurrent vibrations. We present three pulsating strings: tradition vs. modernity, faithfulness vs. instrumentality, and materialism vs. humanism. You find these themes in many, perhaps most, symbolic environments. We can also map them by sociological questionnaires. Their vibrations exhibit an unusually high degree of independence vis-à-vis their context of groups, networks, classes, and other social structures. In their various combi-

nations, these strings provide distinct hints about the Zeitgeist prevailing in humankind's spaces and times.

Moving to a microscopic view of single symbols and sentences, we find three recurrent usages: descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions. We propose that these usages should enter into the minimum vocabulary of social reality. In other words, they are fundamental to a social theory.

A so-called postmodern approach has tried to dispense entirely with stable classifications in the social sciences. By writing in ever changing symbols referring only to other symbols that are also changing, i.e. what we call Saussurian symbols, we could achieve this questionable feast. To avoid this quagmire, there is, in any language, and in scholarly terminology as well, what we call Meadian symbols, depicting something other than just other symbols. We appeal in our first Volume to social scientists to use a generous number of the latter to achieve enhanced stability in thinking about social reality (1: 98-99).

Surrounded by Symbols introduces two default states of the human condition. These make small, but important, modifications in the economic axioms presently ruling most thinking about societies. First, we hold that the urge to preserve standing and to avoid degradation is more basic than the urge to improve (1: 190). Second, we claim that an emotive choice is initially more typical than a rational choice (1: 182). These small and seemingly trivial modifications to old doctrines have major consequences. These threads of thought are essential to our further explorations.

A Preview of Future Volumes

Volume 2 of *The Many-Splendored Society: An Edifice of Symbols* (Zetterberg 2010, 3rd ed. 2013), contains a taxonomy of the social

reality created by ordinary language. A standard use of symbols stripped of magic, confabulation, and defensive bilge, provides us with a set of general categories and dimensions for the construction of social reality.

The categories we need for the study of society have, often, some degree of materiality, such as a building serving as a home when you study a household. Nevertheless, the life in the building is, in the main, governed by categories involving symbols and is, in effect, "symbolic interaction," the name of one of the best schools of American sociology (2: 69) and (3: 102-103).

The tale of society is the manner in which these categories interlace into processes and systems, i.e. into humanity's social and cultural achievements. Most worthwhile thinking about this comes from celebrated individuals in the social sciences of the past, so in this journey we experience many intellectual milestones achieved by classical writers of social science, from Adam Smith to Max Weber.

In *An Edifice of Symbols,* we look at the place of statutes and contracts in human affairs and the spirit they produce in societies in which they are allowed to dominate. To study the major difference between a law-dominated society and a contract-dominated society comprises a promising territory for future scholarship and for finding future political agendas.

We pause to consider universal human rights. We identify collectivities, i.e. certain common structures of communication such as organizations, networks, and mass media. We pay special attention to mass media, one of the "demons" that happens to govern much of modern lives.

One of the simplest divisions of human living separates folk life from city life, or Gemeinschaft from Gesellschaft, two German expressions used by Ferdinand Tönnies over 100 years ago. In time, these terms have become household words also among English-speaking social scientists. Repeatedly, the social scientists have added to their meanings. We present Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as master clusters of social life, which help us understand phenomenon such as corruption, invisible contracts

inside organizations, and also many contentions in civil wars, as well as some conflicts between social movements.

Following a lead from Max Weber that has been largely unused, we discover that stratifications and reward systems, diverse spontaneous orders, and several other social attributes are different in different realms of social reality. That is, they vary in science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality, the constituent parts of a many-splendored society.

The central parts of *An Edifice of Symbols* is the Periodic Table of Societal Realms (2: 222-223) and a Table of Valences of Societal Realms (2: 230-231). A chemist might see these tables as kindred to his field, for they have some "periodic" properties of the type discovered in chemistry in the nineteenth century. By identifying the place in a Periodic Table of a phenomenon in social reality, we also identify a large number of its characteristics.

In the main part of Volume 2, we demonstrate that the different societal realms can be described in terms of the same categories, for example, cardinal values, communication structures, stratifications, reward systems, and spontaneous orders, et cetera, described in the rows of The Periodic Table of Societal Realms. Each realm is unique in having its own distinct cardinal value, its special communication structure, unique stratification, separate reward system, and its own type of spontaneous order. People with matching lifestyles and who have passionate cardinal commitments such as "the spirit of capitalism" in the economy, "the spirit of discovery" in science, or "the spirit of justice" in the realm of morality are great promoters of their specific realms.

A condensed copy of our Periodic Table of Societal Realms for a modern society is found below on page 1: 38. This table illustates the total scope of our efforts in this work. Details will follow in Volumes 4–6 in which we describe the societal realms of science, art, economy, religion, body politic and morality in terms of the rows in the Periodic Table of Societal Realms.

The various societal realms have different attractions to one another, something we spell out in a Table of Valences. The lat-

ter table illustrates ease and difficulty in the collaboration and integration of societal realms.

In the long run, a full merger of societal realms results in increasingly wobbly structures. For example, merging the body politic and the economy into a socialist society creates an unstable mixture. Likewise, we sense instability in the air when the polity merges with the realm of morality into a Nordic-type welfare state.

Volume 3 (chapters 11 – 17)

The third Volume, *Fueled by Symbols* (2010, 3rd ed. 2013), shifts from the use of constructing society by language to examining how we use language in order to inspire human beings to live in the home built by their language. We prompt ourselves by "justifying vocabularies," and we prompt others by "impelling vocabularies." These motivating vocabularies are comprised of short pieces of language with remarkable leverage. This use of symbols makes for a civilized life, in which conflicts are resolved not by force, but by words, and where violence is reduced to the minimum needed to defend civility.

We find that different justifications are in use in all of the subdivisions of society appearing in our Periodic System of Societal Realms. Six justifying vocabularies are unique to each of the societal realms of science, art, economy, religion, polity, and morality. These realms are responsible for their own legitimacy. No sovereign or divine force grants them justification.

Within each realm in modern societies, four justifying vocabularies comprise competing ideologies: individualism, meritocracy (a hierarchy based on achievement, not birth as in an aristocracy), universalism, and egalitarianism.

Compelling language shapes, amongst other things, personalities by constructing vocabularies of identity. We look at some length at other impelling vocabularies shaping social inclusion and exclusion, preserving a favorable self-image, and maintaining the order upholding us. These impelling and justifying vocabularies lock into each other in very interesting ways. One

such link creates the human conscience. Another makes the vocabularies work together like the left and right part of a zipper, resulting in a most reliable human motivation in day-to-day living.

Such vocabularies, not Hobbes' strongmen of the state, provide societies with the motivation to flourish. Very few of the tasks to be undertaken by a modern state need overriding physical force for their execution. Instead, the body politic needs to cultivate compelling and justifying vocabularies, as do the other realms of civilized societies.

In past times, the use of shortcuts involving violence, instead of diplomacy (i.e. language), in order to exercise ambitions and solve routine conflicts was perceived as political wisdom. This is unfit as the highway to the future. We argue that those still practicing this approach are, literally, "uncivilized." Likewise, it is uncivilized to use language to incite violence (“hate speech”), to convert imprisoned enemies by a torture of words (“brain washing”), as is the use of words to erode the self-integrity of others in daily life (“bullying”). The civilized parties should overpower such practices, if they persist. In the latter case, it is justified to apply a necessary measure of police and military violence.

Volume 4 (chapters 18 – 27)

The loveliest wholes in society are our societal realms. With Volumes 4 to 6 in this series we start to present the details of each societal realm as we know them in advanced societies. Already in the first chapter of the first volume of *The Many-Splendored Society*, we sketched how these societal realms appeared in European history; now we go into detail regarding their cartography.

A striking fact is that societal realms have the potential of becoming comparatively autonomous parts of society, a collective home for individuals who have civic rights, academic freedom, free trade, artistic license, and freedoms of religion and of conscience. A slogan, such as "Six Realms Born Free and Equal," signals both a discovery and a bias: science, art, religion, and

morality are as important in society as are today's favorites, economy and politics.

Volume 4 of the *Many-Splendored Society* has two parts: Part 1 takes science as an example of *Societal Realms and How They Emerge.* Part 2 is titled *The Pursuit of Knowledge.* This deals with the social reality of contemporary science.

The fact that science gets more attention than the other societal realms, and is presented in a binding of its own in *The Many-Splendored Society,* is purely pedagogical; this is not any claim that science is the most important societal realm. The realm of science is, however, the most recent one making up social reality, and is much younger than economy, polity, art, and religion. Science is well documented; in fact, its Makers thrive on publicizing findings. In the case of science, we can learn from its recorded history how a societal realm begins and grows. Therefore, we shall dissect science in more detail than the other realms in order to help us to a fuller understanding of the nature of societal realms, the large building blocks of many-splendored societies. What we learn will be particularly useful when we deal, in Volume 6, with the societal realm of morality. In Western civilization, morality is in the process of becoming independent of religion and emerging as a full-fledged republic of virtue at the core of civil society.

We devote Part 1 of Volume 4 to distill from the history of science certain general principles about the rise of societal realms. A new realm is initially likely to assume selected features from already existing realms. The emerging societal realm of science showed copying from the realm of religion. In later times, an emulating from the guild system of the pre-capitalism economy took place. The first who practiced science, the so-called natural philosophers, typically viewed the search for knowledge as a calling. Not unlike the priests in "the religions of the book" — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam — studying God's Scriptures, the first men of science, and a few women, not to forget, studied God's Nature. The first generation of professors at research uni-

versities, however, became monopolists, somewhat like bygone masters of commercial guilds.

A case history of the attempt to merge the societal realms of science and religion in creating a medieval cultural synthesis, an ideal Catholic society in the outlook of Thomas Aquino and his followers, is included in Part 1. This merger proved to be unhinged as the realm of science grew. An important piece of evidence supporting a very central proposition in *The Many-Splendored Society* is: Full-scale mergers of societal realms (including their cardinal values, stratifications, organizations, networks, media, et cetera) tend to create instable structures that deteriorate over time. (Proposition 10:14, clause (b), on page 2: 242.)

Science is a very rational pursuit. Scientists, however, are human beings working under the same language-dependent conditions as other human beings. For example, the struggle to formulate and gain acceptance of "the present standpoint of science" has much to learn from the struggles to achieve consensus in other realms of society. Distortions in and corruptions of science are shown to follow the same paths as in other societal realms.

Turning to modern science, we note how the German universities in the nineteenth century created a new home for science by making competence in research, rather than in learned teaching, the criterion of appointment of professors, thus moving most serious research into a reformed structure for higher learning. These universities formalized the meaning of academic freedom, and became a model for scientific pursuits all over the world. They also incorporated the Napoleonic idea that universities should be open to all qualified students, regardless of their kinship and their class background. We trace the modification of these ideas into the graduate schools of the American research universities of the twentieth century.

The enormous success of applied research in medicine and engineering still has a big base at universities. However, the recent growth of the societal realm of science has its momentum in

applications. Increasingly, research, nowadays, takes place outside the universities in the context of varied applications.

We take time to study the stream of technical innovations and find that it consists mostly of new combinations of old innovations. A full acceptance of innovations in society is found in rather shorts periods of history, marked by values of materialism and pragmatism.

Volumes 5–7 (incomplete)

Volume 5 will be entitled *Wealth and Order* and deals with the social reality of economy and the body politic, those two societal realms which in recent centuries have received most attention by historians and journalists.

Economy, with its focus on wealth, uses mostly evaluative language; it is not the goods and services we have that constitute our riches, but their evaluation. We give particular attention to three rather different pursuits of riches: manufacturing, service, and finance. The latter has made the lion's share of modern money, the fiat money, a strict language product not tied to gold or other material phenomena. We believe that the understanding of the functioning of symbolic environments, which is an ambition of our text, is essential to a science of economy and, in particular, of finance.

The body politic is focused on the exercise of power, using the tools of legislation and diplomatic treaties, usually composed in the commanding speech of prescriptive discourse.

A many-splendored society is a federation of societal realms. The key to running such a society is a 'central zone' in which exponents of the six societal realms meet and interact. It is essential that access to the central zone is open to all comers. 'Consent of the governed' takes on new qualities here; the soft power of consent of the self-governed societal realms becomes essential.

In Volume 5 we also take up a modern attempt to merge the societal realms of economy and polity in creating a socialist society in the outlook of Karl Marx and his followers. Such attempts

proved inefficient and unstable, as have other attempts to merge societal realms.

Volume 6 of *The-Many-Splendored Society* will deal with the emotively loaded societal realms of art, religion, and morality. Part 1 of this volume is titled *The Pursuit of Beauty and Beyond.* The societal realm of art is concerned with what Germans call *Erscheinung*, i.e. aesthetic forms, revelations, appearances and entries that attract our emotive attention and are worthy of our contemplation. Symbols of emotive descriptions make up art, but far from all emotive descriptions qualify as art. We often hear that art expresses what we cannot express in words. Modern artwork often searches below the roots of language, before it is born on the tip of our tongues. But not always — such a view would exclude literature from art.

Art does depend on descriptive symbolism, but of a different and more emotive kind that opens a door for people to stay in touch with expressions revealing previously unseen aspects of beauty, and of experiences inherited from pre-language stages and worlds.

Part 2 of Volume 6, is titled *The Pursuit of Sacredness,* and is a sociology of religion. Religion, with its cardinal value of sacredness, also uses largely evaluative language, but a language of a very different kind than that of Mammon, so familiar from our study of economy. Religion, like fiat money, is a language product. It will be with us as long as we have language. The fact that language organizes identities, and that all language-using beings are mortal, has given rise to religions in which selves are turned into souls who remain in our symbolic environment beyond the demise of the body.

Part 3 of Volume 6 is titled *The Pursuit of Virtue*, and deals with the realm of morality. This realm uses impelling imperatives, but of a different kind than in politics. We will make an effort to disentangle the seemingly self-evident merger of religion and morality. Such a merger was far from natural in antiquity. It is, by and large, without substance outside the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. We advance the

thesis that such a merger inhibits the flowering of both religion and morality.

At times, morality has had a strong focus on how we should cope with biological spontaneities, such as sex or violence. In recent times, a new, moral focus has emerged in requiring mankind to live so that the physical environment is sustainable, and to live in such a manner that the animal kingdom and plants can survive. In a many-splendored society, there is an additional new, moral requirement of authenticity in the cardinal values of knowledge, beauty, wealth, sacredness, order, and virtue. The way these cardinal values support or hinder one another remains a key issue in this series of books.

The six societal realms have certain relations to one another which are particularly worthy of study. Among the issues which are interesting: how do societal realms search for hegemony within society, and how do they seek a global reach. We have plenty of opportunities to look at infightings within a society: state vs. church, religion vs. science, morality vs. law, business vs. politics, et cetera. Other issues here are classical, for example, how does progress the cardinal value of one societal realm spill over into others? Is it true, as Sorokin argued, that advances in scientific truth results in more artistic beauty and more moral virtue?

We will pay special attention to efforts to merge realms; each of the volumes 4, 5, and 6 contains a case history of attempts to merge realms. Our major discovery in this effort is that merged realms — such as socialism, which merges economy and polity — are intrinsically unstable. Furthermore, we discover that our six realms are the main actors in the process of globalization preoccupying humankind at this juncture of history.

So far, the grand story of societal realms and their interrelations in this book project.

What remain are some notes on the interpenetrations between our main topic the social world, on the one hand, and the biological and physical worlds, on the other. Physicians, ecologists, engineers, and military officers use language-based skills to cope

with bodily spontaneities, vagrancies of nature, technologies, and violence. In the seventh and final Volume of The Many-Splendored Society, entitled *Life and the Good Life,* we progress a short distance beyond that which is created by mankind's language capacity (that is "the good life" in Plato's sense) and pursue the impact of some biologically based areas of living (that is, "life"). The latter is where the requirements of food and shelter and sleep give rise to humanity's tradition of living in households. Sex and reproduction give rise to the tradition of living in generational families. It is also here where biological age sets a stage for lifecycles with different phases from infant to elder. Most interesting is the development of bodily skills into the social institutions of athletics, such as running, swimming and jumping, as well as sports involving certain types of technology such as tennis, golf, bicycling, and sailing. Team sports, such as ball games, give rise to a range of issues related to the main topic of our concern, i.e. social reality shaped by language.

In these seven volumes of *The Many-Spendored Society*, we will tell a story — a social theory — of how man's use of language creates a framework for freedom and creativity. Each of these seven volumes is planned so that it can be read on its own, and it has its own pagination. Each volume is also an installment in the larger project about the theory and practice of a many-splendored society.

Notices

With some ingenuity that, at least, sometimes goes beyond conventional wisdom, we may discover how these categories can establish a set of testable and consistent propositions providing us with an understanding of the past and a handle to cope with the future. This is not to say that a future society can be predicted, but, instead, that our options in the present and for the future can be less myopically perceived.

To obtain a total view of society a contemporary scholar might have to draw on a many-sided collection of accumulated knowledge. The list is long and can be made longer: anthropolo-

gy, brain research, business administration, communications, cognitive science, cultural studies, demography, human geography, economics, gender science, hermeneutics, history and history of ideas, journalism, jurisprudence, linguistics, market research, political science, public opinion research, rhetoric, semiotics, and sociology. The schema presented in these volumes is not the property of any particular academic discipline in the social sciences. In the latter part of my professional life, I have worked mainly outside universities and their somewhat archaic division of disciplines. At many times, I have dealt with problems outside my specialties of sociology (my field as a university professor in the United States) and public opinion research (my livelihood in Sweden). I believe this has been a favorable condition for these volumes.

I hope that deans of liberal arts faculties will take notice; many of the courses they offer have a common base and many overlap with one another in applications. A major rationalization of students' time and curriculum is possible if you can overcome the straitjacket of the traditional university departments.

Faculties, of course, need specialization for their research and for assessing professional rewards. (In fact, they are often driven to over-specialization, as shown on page 4: 134-135). During their first college years, students do not require such specialization. Even graduate students in the social and cultural sciences might benefit from an advanced integrated course, taken parallel with their specialized courses. In such manner, they will understand how their chosen major field of study integrates with other specialties.

The creation of a general social science course at college level and finding research-oriented professors to teach such courses is not easy. Max Weber, the great German scholar, active a hundred years ago, noted in a speech to students seeking a scientific career (cited on page 4: 30) that it is unrewarding to try to integrate and interrelate varying scientific areas. Weber, himself, had contributed to such efforts in political science, economics, history, jurisprudence, comparative religion, and other special-

ties. He accomplished most of this in periods in which he had no university duties in any of these specialties. His standing in the world of scholarship is in large measure due to his (admittedly partly unfinished) integrative and interrelating work that he called "sociology," and which we here call "social science."

My Bias, Advantage, and Gratitude

I will not, and cannot, hide the fact that I like the vision of a many-splendored society. However, my focus in these pages is not to convey personal preferences, but to give a broad picture of social reality, and to provide an image of what we presently know of it in social science.

A work of this kind can only be attempted by standing on the shoulders of giants, as the saying goes. It is also essential to have good people to give you a lift up, and it is particularly important to have many others who, in various projects, help you to avoid falling off. These volumes may stand as a token of appreciation to a number of colleagues and friends who have helped me. They include teachers, colleagues, graduate students, clients, learned and lay friends. Too many of them get this thank-you-note posthumously.

My teacher Torgny T Segerstedt at Uppsala University, gave me and a number of fellow students a total commitment to the spirit of discovery. Among the latter were Georg Karlsson, Ulf Himmelstrand, and Bengt Rundblad. Segerstedt had also given similar inspiration to Erik Allardt from Finland. We all wanted a new scientific sociology, and we received help from each other along that route. My teachers at University of Minnesota, F Stuart Chapin, Don Martindale, Arnold Rose, and Stanley Schachter, set the tune of my subsequent social studies and reinforced my commitment to the spirit of discovery.

My colleagues at Columbia University, particularly, Sigmund Diamond, Amitai Etzioni, Johan Galtung, Herbert H Hyman, Paul F Lazarsfeld, Juan Linz, Robert K Merton, Seymour Martin Lipset, Guenter Roth, and David Sills entered my "internalized

reference group" in sociology; thus they have, unknowingly, been ever present in judging my writing. Guenther Roth confirmed the choice of Max Weber as my intellectual house god; Weber is an imaginary Chairman at virtual meetings of my reference group. Later, my colleagues, Saad Nagi and William Petersen, at Ohio State University entered this group.

In the 1980s and 90s in my native Sweden, I was a member of a "professor circle" called Ratio, which had purposes that gave them status as new members of my virtual reference group: Erik Dahmén, Tor Ragnar Gerholm, David Magnuson, Torgny T Segerstedt, and Stig Strömholm. The group was sponsored by Sture Eskilsson of the Swedish Employers' Federation (SAF), and it was administered by Carl-Johan Westholm; he later became Secretary General of the Mont Pelerine Society, and he has been a long-time friend of *The Many-Splendored Society*. The Ratio circle was in charge of an annual retreat and seminar, and a yearly selection of the publication (usually translated into Swedish) of a lasting book in international social science. From this experience, I wanted, and still want, to accomplish something that this group would think worthwhile.

Without an intellectual house god such as Max Weber and the above groups of scholars, *The Many-Splendored Society* would not have been written. A real-life reference group has been Richard Swedberg and Emil Uddhammar who evaluated my early writings as editors of the collection *Sociological Endeavor* (1999), and who have continued to inspire the present writing.

Some 30+ doctoral students, whose dissertations I have assisted, have taught me as much as I have managed to teach them. They include, among others, Alexandra Åhlund, Charles J Hanser, Murray Hausknecht, Terrence K Hopkins, Barney Glaser, Charles Kadushin, Imogen Seger Colborn, and Nechama Tec. To this group belongs also Murray Gendell who in 1961 became my co-author in a collection of statistics about the United States, in which we, for the first time, classified societal realms in the same way as became standard in *The Many-Splendered Society*. He

has also been a close and helpful reader of two volumes of the latter.

To select and edit manuscripts for Bedminster Press in the 1960s taught me a great deal, and brought me in rewarding touch with scholars such as Vilhelm Aubert, Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Alf Ross, Pitirim Sorokin, Herbert Tingsten, and Aaron Wildawski. From this period dates also a long association with the late Greta Frankel as editor and occasionally co-author of papers. She helped me to search a style for the first edition of the first Volume of *The Many-Splendored Society*, taking advantage of the fact that social reality fully depend on language, a property of all readers! A writer about social reality has actually a huge advantage over writers on physical and biological reality. Greta Frankel and I had an idea of a sophisticated writing about social reality that any reader, reasonably well skilled in the use of ordinary English, should be able understand. At least, in principle, that is.

As a long-time member of Gallup International Association, I have had the privilege of friendship and full access to the advice of Dr. George H Gallup in all matters of opinion polling, national and international. Many in his circle of friends and collaborators became my helpful colleagues; I will describe the Gallup world in another publication. In the broader field of public opinion and value research, I have learned much from studies in collaboration with Daniel Debomy, Alain de Vulpian, and Helène Riffault in France, Giampaolo Fabris in Italy, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, and Burkhard Strümpel in Germany, and Gordon Heald, Elizabeth Nelson, and Robert M Worcester in Great Britain, and Daniel Yankelovich in the United States. I have learned much from Michael Maccoby about leadership, and from Peter Schwartz about future studies.

Several collaborators and visiting scholars at Sifo, my former social and market research institute in Stockholm, have left marks on my thinking. They include Tom Burns, Stefan Dagler, Ralph Ginsberg, Berth Jönsson, Evelyne Huber Stephens, John Stephens, and Herman Wold.

At Sifo, a resident team of competent and committed colleagues included among many others Hans Alfredsson, Ingrid Berg, Karin Busch, Håkan Gartell, Stig Holmer, Ulf Isander, Karna Larsson-Toll, Anders Leion, Alf Sjöström, Mari-Ann Persson, and Bo Winander,. We conducted national and international applied social and market research. Our clients were corporations in forestry, agriculture, manufacturing, transport, service, finance; bureaucracies, royal commissions, political parties, unions, employer organizations, parties of court cases; voluntary associations, churches, charities, interest groups; and we polled on behalf of media, and, on our own initiative (hopefully) on behalf of the general public. Contacts with this range of clients brought us much needed knowledge as regards how a total society works; a type of knowledge that is not easily available when you are confined to a department at a university. To team up with research directors for Xerox, Shell, and IBM gave invaluable insights, not only in the advancing role of technology in bureaucracies, but in corporate globalization. I particularly remember the eye-opening collaboration with Ulf Berg of IBM. Also, studies for Coca-Cola, whose research director, Richard Halpern, I had met and admired as a doctoral student at Columbia University, gave unusual insights, not only in global marketing, but in global anti-Americanism and how to cope with such phenomena. No one of these clients is forgotten, but Pehr G Gyllenhammar, at his days as head of Volvo, must be also be named. He had not only knowledge of his fields of business, but an unusually comprehensive view of modern global society. The latter can be also said of his staff director, Bo Ekman, my successor at Sifo and the founder of the Tällberg Foundation.

The many drafts of *The Many-Splendored Society* has benefitted from continuous comments by Bo Anderson, a friend and colleague from Uppsala and Columbia University. Volume 1 benefitted also from suggestions from his wife, Rhoda Kotzin, philosopher at Michigan State University. Patrik Aspers introduced me to the post-Bourdieu phase of French sociology and Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, which reshaped Volume 3 into

the division between compelling and justifying motivations. Helena Streijffert has been helpful at many points, and particularly in the writing in Volume 4, by sharing her experiences as a university administrator both in central government bureaucracy and on local campuses.

Many colleagues have commented on earlier editions and present sections of the *Many-Splendored Society* and on papers that have been revised for inclusion in the manuscript. Special thanks and fond remembrances go to the contacts with Håkan Arvidsson, Edmund Dahlström, Rune Barneus, Mattias Bengtsson, Hans Bergström, Margaretha Bertilsson, Lars Dencik, Wolfgang Donsbach, Anita du Rietz, Gunnar du Rietz, Inger Enkvist, Rolf Englund, Karl-Olof Faxén, Evert Gummesson, Thomas Gür, Ingrid Heyman, Erland Kruckenberg, Anita Kruckenberg, Rita Liljeström, Carl Johan Ljungberg, Lorenz Lyttkens, Roland Poirier Martinsson, Torjus Midtgarden (at the time as an anonymous peer reviewer), Helena Rivière, Bengt Rundblad, Fredrik Sterzel, and Birgit Stolt.

Ulla Daggfelt, Eva Bojner, Gösta Bojner, Gustaf Ekholm, Weine Jarnevall, Peter Kockum, Inga Lidén, Rolf Sjölinder, Lars Söderberg, Ingemar Tommos, Jan Westerlund are some who have given me very helpful comments, not in their occupational roles, but as general readers, a most welcome audience.

My brother Göran Zetterberg and my daughter Anne D Zetterberg have filled me in on the pursuit of art. My brother Nils Zetterberg has been a knowledgeable partner in business. My son Martin C Zetterberg has filled me in on the pursuit of both engineering and finance.

The Many-Splendored Society is dedicated to Karin Busch Zetterberg, partner in marriage and research, and my first reader.

Bromma and Strånäset in Sweden and Fuengirola in Spain in the years 2002–2013.

Hans L Zetterberg

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME 1: LAYMAN'S SOCIETY AND SOCIAL REALITY

Suppose you ask an educated acquaintance the question "What is a society?" Some will say that society consists of housing, clothing, food and water supplies and other means to cope with the vagrancies of nature in the forms of changing seasons, warm days and cold nights, dry deserts, dense woods, sunny periods and flooded periods, and so on. Tools, carriages, weapons, energy systems, and other aspects of technology are included in their conception of society. They have pointed at the *physical* aspects of society and at humanity's attempt to cope with nature. Tailors, builders, machine operators, and engineers, become central persons in their view of society.

Others will mention that society is any and all human beings, how they enter society at birth, find survival by eating plants and animals, try to stay healthy and strong, but eventually face decline and death. These observers of society have pointed at the *biological* reality of society. They see all the providers of biological necessities — from hunters, anglers, and farmers to food retailers — as central persons in their view of society. Moreover, their lives include occasional turns to physicians and other professionals for help in coping with problems of living.

Still others, rather few, but joined by many professional social scientists, will mention something that goes beyond the biological and physical worlds as we usually conceive of them. They would agree, for example, that a sequence of conception, birth, nursing, and weaning represents a biological reality of parenthood. To carry out this sequence they also agree on a physical reality of housing, clothing, water, and energy. However, they could also include something else in scrutinizing parenthood. They may have heard someone say to them "I pronounce you husband and wife." They may have given a child an individual name: "Mohamed" or "Mary" or some other name considered appropriate in their community. By some complex

legislation, the children are given the right to be called "Americans" or some other designation of citizenship. When their parents accepted that the children were *their* children, they also accepted some responsibilities for their support and care, and health, as well as obligations to make certain payments on their behalf, and rights to make some decisions on their behalf when the children were minors. Furthermore, modern parents are expected to send their children to school and to warn them that if they drop out, they will be unable to get employment in many occupations. Unless they live in a full-fledged welfare state, parents, in return, expect some support from their children in old age. Moreover, upon the deaths of the parents, their children receive some or all their property as inheritance.

Table 1.0. What Goes into a Human Society?

SOCIAL REALITY	TECHNOLOGY	BIOLOGICAL REALITY
Social events and struggles, Organizations, markets, media, classes, nations, states, etc.	Tools, instruments, weapons, Non-human energy from wind, water, fossils , etc.	*Humans* Male, female; children, adults, elderly, Sleep, eating, drinking, shelter, etc.
PHYSICAL REALITY		
Materiality, Nature as given and/or cultivated		*Animals* domestic and/or wild

Lay persons do not have a summary name for the codifications of what parents are or what they shall do and what shall be done to them, including all these dictums of citizenship, schooling, employment, property, inheritance, et cetera. A professional social scientist might call it the *social reality* of parenthood.

The term social reality can also be applied to performances other than that of parenthood, and include broad phenomena such as states, media, markets, classes, et cetera.

The columns in Table 1.0 show how a layman might apportion the content of a society. It certainly makes some sense. Its

underlying logic is the conventional wisdom that says that man is better than other animals at using language and at using tools.

Our ambition in this work is to create a more scholarly elaboration of social reality than what is found in everybody's current version. However, the table reminds us that any nonprofessional knows that society is more to than items placed under the heading social reality.

Approaching Social Reality

In this book project, we will pursue, not the total society, but its social reality. Our main thesis is that social reality consists of symbols in communicative acts. This seemingly odd but not entirely uncommon assumption can be traced in American pragmatic thought from Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803 – 1882), William James (1842 – 1910) and George Herbert Mead (1863 – 1931). This American tradition met with a European one when John Langshaw Austin (1911 – 1960), a leading British philosopher of language, in 1955 gave the William James lecture at Harvard University with the title "How to Do Things With Words" (Austin 1975). At that moment, two congenial currents of thought, one American and one European, began to join forces in defining a strategic role for humanity's use of language acts. One very readable result is a book entitled *Construction of Social Reality* (Searle 1995) by an American philosopher trained in British linguistic philosophy by Austin.

John R Searle realized that a future devolvement of the study of the use of symbols to construct social reality is less a task for philosophers but should be a main assignment in a social science based on empirical research. This is actually a vision that several social scientists since long have practiced off and on. It had received a reminder and a revival by Peter L Berger in the United States and his collaborator Thomas Luckmann in Germany (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The German philosopher-sociologist Jürgen Habermas opened up a fuller scope of social reality based on communicative actions that also included

struggles between classes, emancipation, and modernization (Habermas 1965).

In still earlier days, I met with other ideas about a language base in for social realty. Allow me to trace my own route in thinking about social reality, also running from Europe to America.

I was fortunate to have as my first teacher of sociology Torgny T Segerstedt, a Swede who had been a professor of philosophy. His intellectual roots were in the Scottish Enlightenment; his main interest was the study of the role of language in society. His first book after the doctoral dissertation was called *Verklighet och värde* (1938) addressed the issue of "reality and value," and his second major book with the title *Ordens makt* (1944) was a study in the psychology of "the power of words", also available in German. These books included reviews of two authors that seemed to have very celebrated ideas: the great European linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure and the great American philosopher of language, George Herbert Mead. However, it was not until 1949 when I had entered graduate school at the University of Minnesota that I read *Cours de linguistique générale* (1916) and *Mind, Self and Society* (1934) in their full original shape. The impression was lasting. To honor them, I have labeled two types of symbols in Chapter 3 with their names, although my definitions of these concepts are not entirely orthodox.

Both these pioneering books were not worked put into script by their authors. They were edited by their students from lecture notes, and, in places, they are not particularly obvious reading. I decided to check also some other writings, not only by the two celebrated authors, but also by their editors. How had the editors handled and elaborated the heritage of their great masters?

Mead's editor, and author of a long introduction, was Charles W Morris, a semiotician and a philosopher in the American pragmatic tradition. In his 1946 book, *Signs, Language and Behavior*, he divided the actual *use* of language into what he claimed was a universal and inclusive classification. "These usages may be called in order the *informative*, the *valuative*, the *incitive*, and

the *systemic* uses of signs. These are the most general sign usages; other usages are subdivisions and specializations of these four. "(Morris 1946, p 95, italics in original).

de Saussure's editor and collaborator was Charles Bally, and in his book *La langage et la vie* (1913) I found a wonderful comment on the meanings of the phrase "It is raining" which I reported in my MA-thesis (Zetterberg 1951). Bally's illustrations put the phrase "It is raining" into all Morris' categories. "It has now started to rain" is informative. "The weather is bad" is valuative. "Shut the window!" is incitive. The scope and usefulness of such interpretations overwhelmed me.

Here then emerged a tri-section of descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions of language that turned out to be fundamental in daily symbolic interactions, as well as in the discourses that create economy, politics, science, art, religion, and morality, i.e., the realms of a many-splendored society.

A Preview of Volume 1 by Chapters

Chapter 1 is an old-fashioned attempt to learn a lesson from history and is an excerpt from history, isolating a streak in the development of European social reality. In several ways, the Roman Republic (510 – 50 BCE) resembled the beginning of a modern society. The Republic, however, gave way to the hereditary empire of Augustus in which a political realm ruled supreme over the rest of society. Still, after the fall of Augustus' empire a significant streak in European history moves toward six self-governing societal realms: polity, religion, economy, art, science, and morality. If fully developed, these would form what we call a proper Many-Splendored Society. We note, however, that the European Union is not on a straight road to this end.

With this historical glimpse in mind, we introduce our way of writing, and turn in Chapter 2 toward the bases of social reality in the human brain. We come to the manifestation of the language brain, and first note some lifestyles emerging from using language brains. Six of these lifestyles are more language-

dependent than are others. They correspond to the emerging societal realms we distilled in European history. Since they are products of the universal human brain, all civilizations house them, not just the European one.

In Chapter 3, we explore the use and misuse of language and its symbols. We try to learn how to strip language from confabulations, defensive bilge, and magic. In this manner, we secure a language suitable for both civility and scholarship. This language may incorporate mundane and pristine symbols, and we take special note of those specialized in the use of such symbols who we call intellectuals. Vocabularies differ in different times and places because daily life differs. For example, we observe that today's language has a growing share of binary vocabularies, zeros and ones, from the IT-industry and the Internet. In political discourse, friendships, outward appearances, diets, even religion, the symbolic climate tells you either to like, or to dislike. Nuances are lost; look at social media, such as Facebook.

Chapter 4 deals with some regular long-term vibrations in total symbolic environments which intellectuals exhibit, and often enough, include almost everyone else. These shifts are swings between stability and novelty, fidelity and pragmatism, as well as materialism and humanism. They allow us to reach a stable classification of the elusive *Zeitgeist*, the value climate of a particular time and place.

Chapter 5 returns to the close microscopic study of symbols and sentences. It searches for the minimum technical vocabulary needed to study social reality. We begin with a lead from linguists and anthropologists who separate information from mundane accounts in fieldwork (emic sentences) from the analytic language of scholarship (etic sentences). We continue to draw on linguistics, recalling theses by Noam Chomsky about language, and about how language is learned.

Any use of language, we argue, tends to differentiate into a trisection of descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive usages, each of which contains a bisection of executive and emotive components. This is our minimum vocabulary needed to study

social reality; the rest we can borrow from other sciences. The chapter ends with a hint of how such ideas about language lead to a program of research and writing on Many-Splendored Societies.

Our Typographical Border Signs of Social Reality

Sometimes it is interesting to reach beyond social reality in a presentation such as this one; sometimes it is plainly necessary to do so to understand a problem. I will put up some warning signs when my work drifts off its central topic of social reality.

[BIO] We will find that the border between social reality and biological reality is unstable. In a situation of stress, for example, hormones and generic reactions of "flight or fight" easily overrule the guidance we set from our frontal lobe by our thinking and language. This book does not focus on biological spontaneities and processes, but when needed to understand social reality we bring them in. When we touch the biological base in a more decisive way, we will flag the occasions by a special sign, [BIO], in the margin of the text or after a heading.

[TECH] The impact of technology on social reality has no separate treatment in this treatise; you find it scattered in the text. However, whenever we discuss technology proper, you will see a [TECH] in the margin or after a heading.

The fact that the technology sign does not appear on every relevant page in this text means most often that I am ignorant or forgetful, but sometimes an omission means that there are openings for future applications of technologies that may change the way we live.

[NAT] The border between social reality and physical reality also seems blurred, but only as long as we believe in magic. In point of fact it is a sharp border. Continents and oceans, valleys and mountains, rivers and lakes, sunshine and rain, and numerous other features of nature have a great impact on the shapes of human societies. Ecology has recently gained extraordinary attention. This topic, however, is not the center of attention here, but when we bring it in, a special sign [NAT] for nature marks it.

[ANIM] A border between man and animals — or between the speaking animal and other animals — is hinted in the lower right corner of Table 1.0. [ANIM] is our fourth and last sign that we leave our central topic of the language-based social reality.

1. The Losing Spell of Augustus

Gaining Hegemony

The Roman Republic (510 – 50 BCE) had elected leaders rather than kings. It had checks and balances between classes (patrician and plebeian) and life areas (trade, defense, religion, et cetera). It had authoritarian families and relied on slavery; otherwise, it had a rather unique structure in the antique world that at least somewhat approximated what we shall call a many-splendored society.

The Roman Republic is included among the civilizations that we call "axial." They have had bursts in a common master trend of civility and rational symbolic activity that occurred almost simultaneously in several locations in Asia and Europe. (Our review of the axial civilizations begins on page 1: 104 below.)

The Republic belonged to the Roman citizens. Their power was housed in various *comitae,* that is, citizens gathered in council. Most of them were not permanent, but whenever judges or administrators and leaders of emerging realms of the Republic needed grounded decisions, they could assemble relevant councils. The comitae gave their advice after deliberation. Voting by citizens was a foundation of the Republic.

These popular councils were in continuous struggles with a permanent council of elders (patricians), *Senatus.* Senators did "vote with their feet," in the original meaning of these words. When deliberating an issue, they walked on the senate floor to stand near the orator whose position they preferred. A senate majority, particularly one in line with the views of an important comitae, had a strong legitimacy. The Senatus was thus the most important advisory body determining legislation and decisions on appointments in the city and land of the Republic.

The logotype SPQR is preserved on many of Rome's ruins and stands for *Senatus Populusque Romanus*, that is, "the Senate and

the People of Rome." It bears witness to the importance of both sources of authority.

Two consuls with one-year terms of office had the executive power in the mature Roman Republic. They were the high commissioners responsible for administration in different sections of society. To hold these highest offices in the Roman Republic you did not have to belong to families with wealth from land or trade, or with hereditary political connections, or have experience as a military commander. Cicero, for one, rose to his consulship in 63 BCE from humble origins based on his proven skills in some high-profile legal cases. In all, this organization of the Roman Republic allowed people to have different priorities and follow different life courses, pursuing different cardinal values.

In difficult times, such as facing war, natural catastrophes, epidemics, this distribution of power became impractical. To overcome the difficulties and to preserve the Republic then became a dominant concern shared by all. With war on the doorstep, the regular power structure was superseded by the appointment of a dictator for a six-month period, during which he enjoyed unlimited authority in all spheres, not only the military.

Polybius (c.200 – 118 BCE), a Greek historian who became a prisoner of war held in Rome, has documented the civic and military organization of the Roman Republic. Through the ages, his text, *The Histories,* is preserved. Some Founding Fathers of the Constitution of the United States of America studied and discussed *The Histories.* They got inspiration by its analysis of division of powers in the Roman Republic. This is an amazing link between two societies of different periods, societies which some of us think are the most admirable ones in world history.

The governing arrangement of the Roman Republic worked well for a while, but during the social unrest that prevailed during the first century BCE, several dictators refused to step down at the end of their terms, among them Caius Magnus, and Cornelius Sulla. They had not only learned the use of rule by cruelty on the battlefield, they had also been able to amass fortunes

from plunder of the defeated enemies, thus becoming independent of the taxation income in Rome. They continued in power beyond the statutory six months. When the war lord Caius Julius Caesar subsequently appointed himself dictator for life, the republicans eventually had had enough and assassinated Caesar. The term dictator, which had previously commanded respect, became a term of aspersion.

Caesar did not have a biological son, but had adopted his nephew Caius Julius Caesar Octavianus. Supported by the soldiers who had been loyal to Caesar and who could be paid by the estate he had left, Octavianus seized power. After the defeat of the republicans at Filippi, Octavianus shared power with Caesar's general Marcus Antonius and another general, Lepidus. The friendship of this gang of three did not last long; after yet another civil war Antonius was defeated at a large naval battle at Actium.

Rome was now in turmoil, and Octavianus, who had assumed the name Caius Julius Caesar, was determined to set things right. He began by formally reinstating the Roman Republic, a popular measure. The different groups in Rome thought that they had regained their autonomy; no one had absolute power.

However, gradually, but within the framework of the constitution of the republic, Caius began to appropriate leadership in all the important sectors of society. He was already *imperator*, commander-in-chief. He was appointed *princeps senatus*, "the first in the senate" (thereof the word "prince"). This did not mean that he became president of the senate, but that when the senators were assembled Caius would be the first to give his opinion and to vote — a shrewd way of swaying opinion in the direction he wanted. He also succeeded in getting himself appointed *tribunus plebes*, a kind of ombudsman for the people, a position that had long been available in the Republic. The people's tribune had the opportunity to veto important decisions. He was also inviolable and could not be removed from office. In addition and very significant, he became the high priest, *pontifex maximus*, a kind of archbishop who officiated at the most im-

portant offerings to the gods. (The term survives today as a designation for the Pope.) Although the Republic still existed formally, as a holder of these offices Caius now had total control of its central zone, that is, what we call absolute power. He made this power hereditary, and founded the Julian dynasty of emperors. Its last ruler was Nero.

Many historians write about Caius, that the once reckless and ruthless youth matured into one of the wisest rulers in history. In time, the senate awarded the honorary title *pater patriae*, "the father of the fatherland," as well as the new title *augustus*, "the venerated." Caius is known to history under this title, not his name.

Augustus, as we thus call him, demonstrates a model for transformation of a many-splendored republic with power sharing into a hereditary authoritarian state. His power was ultimately based on military achievements, as had also been the case of most of his republican predecessors. Augustus' power, however, absorbed the whole Roman society. He demonstrated that a single determined person could kidnap all realms of a society, a process often attempted in history. If successful, such a ruler gets the multiple honors of all the different reward systems of his society.

Today we would call this a "cult of personality of a fascist ruler." Most scholars of the history of antiquity celebrate Augustus as a creator of a good society, as did my late friend Erland Kruckenberg, who taught me much about Roman history, and who would recognize some of his formulations above. However, on the glory of Augustus and his empire we disagreed.

A ruler (*Führer*) is essential in this process. Usually he (it is rarely a she) obtains help from relatives and friends, or by a party of loyalist, or by a military junta, or maybe by former colleagues in the secret police. Some intellectuals and some jurists usually seem to appear who believe that the ruler represents the future, and they give justifications to his takeover.

To be sure, the rise of Augustus benefited his times, not only him personally. However, in the end, Roman society of emper-

ors did not maintain the freedom, flexibility, and vitality of its Republican days, and it apparently lost much of its moral fiber. The sense morale is that the augusti of human history should not necessarily be venerated.

In political science, we refer to self-rule by assemblies of citizens driven by serious passions and patriarchal values, as in Periclean Athens and in the Roman Republic, as "republicanism." It dispenses with emperors, kings, and aristocracies. Republicanism denies the premise that political sovereignty, but not necessarily other forms of authority, should be based on kinship.

Republicanism had an impact on the American Revolution and it was, without a doubt, even more of an inspiration for the French Revolution. For one, Thomas Paine promoted republicanism in both of these revolutions. In the books entitled *The Many-Splendored Society* we shall return to republicanism in Part 2 of Volume 5 that will deal with the body politic. Here in Volume 1, we shall focus on a much less-observed characteristic of the Roman heritage. We shall look for signs of the rebirth of the Republic's germs of relatively autonomous societal realms, which drowned under the long European spell of Augustus to revive a Roman Empire, not the Roman Republic.

The Differentiation of Europe

In a treatise on the history of world civilizations, Fernand Braudel (1963/1993) characterizes the European one as a variety of groups seeking freedom and independence for themselves: "The history of Europe has everywhere been marked by the stubborn growth of private 'liberties,' franchises or privileges limited to certain groups, big or small. Often, these liberties conflicted with each other or were mutually exclusive."

Behind this mosaic, we can, however, find a grander pattern, summarized in Figure 1.1. The right side of this figure lists the coming and goings of some empires, the traditional way of structuring European history, which gives us some orientation for the message of the figure. The tree is the message. It depicts

the differentiation of social reality into distinct realms in Western Europe. It grows out of the period when, following Augustus, the body politic — or the polity as we say for short — of the Roman Empire reigned supreme and embraced all other realms.

Figure 1.1. The Grand Structuration of Europe.



The Realm of the Polity

In ancient Rome, the polity, i.e. the art of statesmanship, politics, and administration in a broad sense, became supreme and was considered more important than religion, or the fine arts, ethics, or commerce. Administrations, taxation, police procedures, the juridical system were all thoroughly developed. Well-organized armies guaranteed the Roman peace. The state also took considerable responsibility for its citizens, for their activities of needs and lusts, particularly their bread and entertainment. The Roman Empire, which rested on the control by the state of the other spheres of life, eventually adopted the mono-

theistic religion of Christianity, according to the formula "one emperor, one god." This happened under the Emperor Constantine, who also moved the capital from Rome to his new-founded Constantinople, closer to the great centers of Hellenic civilization, Athens, Ephesus, and Antioch.

The Empire split in two, one in the east and one in the west. Eastern Rome survived for a millennium, but Western Rome crumbled. The Frankish Kingdom (484 – 814) was the first of many attempts to revive the Roman Empire in Western Europe. Charlemagne spoke of himself as "king and priest" as an indication of the kind of authority who would rule. Constantine's move of the capital had weakened the dominance of the body politic in Rome and made new openings for the Pope and his men of religion.

The Realm of Religion

After the demise of the West Roman Empire, the integration of Western Europe was maintained and expanded by the Roman Catholic Church. The integrative process was continued by the churches of the Reformation. The most visible signs of a continental integration, the church spires, have always been obvious to any traveler in Europe. Each such tower marks the presence of a local community at the time of its construction. Each such community has had generations of Christian faith, maintained by weekly sermons and by ancient rituals of baptism and Eucharist.

Even today, in south, north, east, and west of Europe, church spires meet the observant eye, although some buildings may have obtained non-religious uses. The great ethnic diversity of Europe has through the centuries been painted over by varieties of Christianity. Historically, resistance to synagogues and mosques has been the rule, and tolerance has been, not absent at all times and places, but shining exceptions.

In medieval Europe, religion sought to liberate itself from all interference from worldly powers. Pope Gregory VII (1021 – 1085) established the authority and leadership of Rome as a real-

ity in the West of the early Middle Ages. His manifest reads: "The Pope is the only human whose feet princes kiss." His German opponent, Emperor Henry IV, who wanted his own government to appoint bishops, was in 1076 obliged to walk barefoot to Gregory in Canossa in Toscana to get his excommunication annulled. This is the most well-known episode in the dramatic and long process of separating the state and church in Europe.

The medieval church wanted, if possible, to control all other institutions. It saw economy, science, art, and ethics as subordinate to the church, and preferably the church should stand above the government as well. In our day, we would associate such religious hegemony over the other institutions of society with some variants of Islam. But in the Middle Ages it was the "Divine State," of Christianity.

Medieval life was a creed: *Credo in unum Deum Patrem omnipotentem.* True, one worked in farming and animal husbandry, in handicrafts and trade, in tax and customs administration, in the duties and contests of a knight. But it was as a pilgrim in this world, seeking divine goals that one engaged in these mundane pursuits. The liturgical year lasted from Advent through Christmas, Lent, Pentecost and the long stretch without major holy days — coinciding with the height of the European agricultural season — to All Saints' Day and a new Advent. This was the rhythm of the medieval epoch. Architecture and sculpture were "Bibles in stone." Literature was pious; music was *Gloria* and *Kyrie eleison*; ethics and statutes were embroidery on the theme of the Ten Commandments; philosophy was theology; paintings showed Mary with the Infant Jesus and other scenes from the world of the Bible and the church. Wars were holy wars to the glory of God. The great cathedral enclosed everyone: its roof was high, accommodating not only priests and celestial beings but also inviting, and reflecting in its nave and transept, the world of the peasantry, bourgeoisie, nobility, and monarchy, all in the heavenly light of stained glass.

The medieval strife between church and state ended differently in Byzantium and Rome, differently in the Greek Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church. In Eastern Europe the state was the victor from the very beginning, and the worldly ruler was also the head of the church. Thus, in most of the Eastern Europe, one single ruling sword prevailed. This "caesaropapism" i.e. the exercise of supreme authority over ecclesiastical matters by a secular ruler, meant that Eastern Europe became structured differently from Western Europe, a difference present to our day. In Western Europe the struggle between church and state ended in a draw. The West-European idea expressed as "two swords," one worldly and one spiritual, prevailed. This abandonment of a single authority over human life is a most significant step in the structuration of Western Europe. Eventually, we would come to see several more independent swords ruling there, more of many-splendor.

The Geography of European Ideas and Trade

The first and main axis of the European history of ideas runs from the south to the north. The intellectual sources of European culture from ancient Athens, Rome, and Jerusalem spread northward. From Jerusalem, the Europe of the Renaissance already had acquired a single God and the Bible. From Rome, it had a legal system and structures of administration. The main inspiration during the Renaissance of new thinking came from the ancient Greeks and particularly from Athens. From here major additions to the symbolic environment came to Europe, in part through Arab channels. For it is to the ancient Greeks we owe philosophy, science, and mathematics, medicine, history and drama, sculpture and poetry. And do not forget republican rule, so different from Imperial Rome (but not from the Roman Republic) and from the kingdoms predominant in the Germanic world.

The Alps had always been in the way of a northward march. However, already at the time of the Roman Empire armies and administrators traveled to the east of the Alps and formed cen-

ters in Budapest, Prague and Vienna. The eastern part of Europe benefited from the long survival of the East Roman Empire with its base in Constantinople, “the Second Rome” and its reach and succession into Russia. Moscow came to call itself "the Third Rome," a source of Russian self-confidence rarely understood outside its borders.

In Western Europe, the influence of Rome had passed to the west of the Alps with Cesar's armies and soon it reached all the way into the British Isles. It developed many centers on the way; eventually, the most important one came to be the Gallic town of Paris. Between Paris and Vienna, an arc of lovely cities — Strasbourg, Bruges, Cologne, Constance, Salzburg, and many others — thrived. The Renaissance reviewed what it saw as its antique heritage. It flowered in Rome itself and in Genoa, Florence, Venice and other places south of the Alps. This was in many ways a new intellectual and cultural legacy that spread northward through France to the British Isles and, with time, to the Nordic regions.

The other axis in European history went from east to west. Here lay the key to commercial development. Of course, the lion’s share of all commerce has always been local, but a good deal of long-distance trading has also occurred. On balance, European commerce traveled from east to west. The Phoenicians and Greeks had the east-west stretch from the Black Sea to the east and west Mediterranean as their trading area. Later Venetian merchants traded with their Islamic counterparts along the trade routes of the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. Goods from the Orient also followed the Danube and Rhine from Constantinople. Considerable commerce moved from the countries around the Baltic to the countries of the North Sea. In the northern half of Europe, grain, timber, copper, iron, herring, potash, charcoal, and hemp moved from the underdeveloped east and north to the commercially developed west. This commerce led to the accumulation of great riches and a bourgeois lifestyle first in Antwerp and then in London.

In passing, we may note that the two axes of the European development show that the common assumption that ideas spread by trade is a half-truth. The history of ideas cannot be explained by economic determinism; the economic factor is one by many.

The Realm of Morality

In the Renaissance, the achieved level of separation of church and state comes to include also a beginning separation of polity and morality. In Florence a radical humanism emerged. Giovanni Pica della Mirandola (1463 – 1494) argued that human beings should be subject to no restraints: they are sufficient unto themselves, they are their own masters, freed from the "scale of nature." He signaled a process of liberation whose end we have not yet seen. Soon Machiavelli (1469 – 527) taught that nobody could have built Sparta or Athens or the republican Rome and at the same time been morally good, least of all in a Christian sense. He showed how one could make political calculations without allowing moral considerations to intervene. Statecraft could then be seen as something separate from morality and religion, an idea full of dynamite that it would take centuries for the world to absorb.

A morality independent of religion had been the rule in ancient Athens. Much less than other achievements of the classical world did this particular message manage to reemerge during the European Renaissance. It was not until the Enlightenment, we saw a secular morality with some intellectual force in Europe. However, a morality independent of the Church has remained a weak streak in European history, a weakness that remains to be redressed.

The Realm of Economy

An economy equipped with some autonomy from other realms has been a growing feature in Europe since the Middle Ages. "All world economies recognize a centre, some focal point that acts as a stimulus to other regions and is essential to the ex-

istence of the economic unit as a whole", writes Fernand Braudel. "Quite clearly in the Mediterranean in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that centre was a narrow urban quadrilateral: Venice, Milan, Genoa, Florence" (Braudel 1949/1972, 387). In all these cities representatives of government, religion, and the economy balanced one another, and none achieved hegemony. Venice took the early lead with a government that gave favors to craftsmen from other cities to establish themselves there, and with a state-owned shipyard that built and leased merchant ships to the entrepreneurs of the city. The visitor to Piazza San Marco can still see how the church, the palace of the doge (chief magistrate), and the area of various trading houses are equally imposing and keep each other in balance.

Two social innovations assisted the economy in becoming a separate realm: the Limited Liability Company and double entry bookkeeping. The shareholder enterprise separated business capital from family capital. Many budding entrepreneurs could now join in an economic venture without first marrying into a rich family. The economy could grow independently of kinship and household. An entrepreneur, for example an aspiring ship captain without sufficient fortune of his own could be financed and receive a share of the profit from a big trading expedition. The new art of bookkeeping in northern Italy provided commerce and industry with a system of rewards separate from those of the state and the church. Neither church nor state any longer determined who in the business community should receive honors. Distinctions were, simply, linked to satisfactory annual accounts. Thus, the economy began to gain autonomy from state and church.

The constitutional liberalism in the restored English monarchy at the end of the seventeenth century paved the way for economic liberalism. In the latter, the thrust was directed against government intervention in economic life and against private monopolies as guilds, or companies with exclusive royal privileges. Emergent English liberalism thus stood for freedom of trade and freedom of contract. Restrictions from medieval times that re-

quired that businesses be located in cities and not in the countryside were lifted. Slavery was outlawed and free labor became a hallmark of the emergent capitalism. Eventually, the rights of the marketplace became recognized not only for nationals but also for foreigners. International capital and labor from abroad became accepted facts of life.

It took several hundred years before the idea of an independent and decisive role of economic forces in society was accepted. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx shocked the world, less by his call for a proletarian revolution, but more by his "historical materialism," the idea that the economy rather than the church or the state is the author of history.

The Realm of Science

The emancipation of science from religion was also a protracted process. After the death of Copernicus (1473 – 1543), his idea that the sun, rather than the Earth, was the center of the universe was banned by the church. The great physicist and mathematician Galileo Galilei (1564 – 1642) was prevailed upon by the church to deny the testimony of his instruments.

One significant step toward scientific autonomy was taken in London when the secretary of the Royal Society, formally founded in 1660, started to keep notes of correspondents and dates when discoveries and theories were submitted to the Society and published. Newton's *Principia*, for example, was registered on 5 July 1686. Anteriority of discovery became the scientists' criterion for honoring their own: those who first published something new were acclaimed. Those wishing to use another person's discovery for their own reasoning had to acknowledge the originator in a mention, quotation or footnote. Thus, science obtained its own system of reward distinct from those of the state and the church with their hierarchies.

The scientific reward system also became different from the system of the emerging market economy. Scientists gave up property rights in their discoveries, in return for the honorific

reward of having made the discovery, the latter fact to be constantly reiterated in scholarly writings.

The Realm of Art

Also the pursuit of art loosened its ties to other realms. Art and beauty, after the Reformation, was not just an attribute of the Holy or Mighty. It became more and more a property of ordinary real life.

Rembrandt (1606 – 1669) belonged to an early generation of painters, who was neither church nor court painters. He could choose his subjects freely, without reference to religion or government.

Rembrandt still painted biblical scenes such as "The Return of the Prodigal Son" and occasionally classical ones such as "Aristotle Contemplating the Bust of Homer." However, the novelties of his motives are found in his contemporaries, such as scenes with Hendrickje Stofells, the maid who became his wife, and cloth-making burghers ("Staalmeesters") and "The Night Watch." The latter is a company of musketeers in the archer's guild of burghers protecting the merchant sites and assets of their city. The guilds were their own governments, courts of law, army, and police in those days. They were also sponsors of schools and procurers of art.

Rembrandt's famous breakthrough painting, executed at the age of 26, "The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp," reproduced in Figure 1.2, proves not only the artist's freedom but also the new freedom of science. The church had long opposed public dissections, which were considered intrusions into the sanctity of death and the serenity of the grave. With obvious admiration Rembrandt painted his friend, Doctor Tulp, performing a dissection. The painting, showing the bright red of oxygenated blood, is very realistic, as realistic as a professor of anatomy could want. In those days, artists and scientists walked hand-in hand and shared the ambition to tell the truth.

Figure 1.2. Rembrandt, "The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp," Mauritshuis museum, The Hague

Later art freed itself from science as well. Karl Philipp Moritz (1756 – 1793), one of Goethe's friends, a novelist and a professor in the theory of fine arts, broke with the conventional principle that a work of art is a depiction of reality. In *Bestimmung des Zwecks einer Theorie der schönen Künste* (1795) he states: "True beauty consists in the fact of an object meaning only itself, designating only itself, containing only itself, being a whole, realized in itself." (Moritz 1795/1973). In other words, beauty was to be separated from any external description and explanation. Organized music that had long been in the service of the church or state gained its self-governing life in the European cities. Painting became demarcated and independent of any other worldly and holy pursuits and artistic beauty, was redefined from classical symmetry and realism to include any emotively engaging subjective representations from any part of human experience.

The Glorious Revolution

The present overview of the societal realms in Europe that were reaching a bounded independence of one another is, of

course, sketchy in the extreme. It would be entirely incomplete unless we pause to consider the consolidation of liberalism in England and Scotland in the second half of the seventeenth century. This was a turbulent and violent period in England. In half a century, the country underwent two revolutions and two civil wars. The English executed one king and drove another into exil. There was a four-year long experiment in parliamentary, republican government after Charles I's execution. There was another six years of a military-religious protectorate of Cromwell's Puritans when he and a group of his generals ruled the country. They thought of themselves as God's instruments. With such a calling, they fought a holy war, expensive to tax payers, against Papist Spain, and they tried to convert Oxford University to a school for missionaries providing a Puritan-style salvation to the sinful English people. They are a model for what fundamentalist sects of any religion and period want to accomplish. We understand the Muslim Brotherhoods of the 2010s better if we study the English Puritans of the 1650s. A difference is that the Puritan generals were not warlords with soldiers of their own.

In the English years of struggle and turmoil is "The Glorious Revolution" in 1688. This episode was a rather bloodless overthrow of the Catholic King James II of England by a combined force of domestic Protestants and an invading Dutch army of like-minded that established a foreigner, William of Orange, as king of England and Scotland. With him came also a fuller acceptance in London of the bourgeois lifestyle of Antwerp and Amsterdam, and thereby a decline of Puritan living, particularly in the cities. We return to the contrasts and conflicts between the city and the countryside in those days in the section "Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft in Civil Wars" in the next volume of *The Many-Splendid Society* (2: 152-155).

More important, liberal rights for Protestants became rooted in England with the Glorious Revolution. Rule of law (not of men) should prevail. This meant several things. Laws should be clearly articulated. They should be made known to the general public. Retroactive legislation was ruled out. Persons charged of

crimes should have a right to receive notice of their alleged violations. As in Roman times, they should meet their accusers face-to-face in court. They should be heard on matters of both law and facts. A competent judge, not the political rulers of the day, should formulate the court verdicts. In short, rule of law should be there to keep governments from exercising arbitrary power. The Catholics in England, however, had to wait another hundred years for such civic rights, i.e. safety nets for the individual against the government.

In Britain, the Glorious Revolution brought new strides in the differentiation of society. I will use the designation 'glorious revolutions' also in a broader sense of any giant step and consolidation of historical differentiations into societal realms in such a way that no realm is allowed to overwhelm any other. The Glorious revolution did not only overcome dictatorial royal rule. The revolutionary period also overcome dictatorial religious rule by Cromwell's puritans. The notable and characteristic revolution in England marked the birth of an "Anglo-Protestant civilization," to use Samuel Huntington's (2005) designation. This is a precarious and unique strain in European history. It found new strength and expressions outside of Europe, particularly when exported overseas. The North American colonies and the free country of the United States that they formed after the liberation from Britain became a major home for the Anglo-Protestant civilization.

Exporting European Differentiation

The modest level of West European differentiation into societal realms prior to The Glorious Revolution in England was exported to the southern parts of the American continents, while the further differentiation after the Glorious Revolution was exported to the northern parts. Colonies in Latin America thus brought over an earlier European structure than the colonies in north of Rio Grande.

Figure 1.3. Different Levels of European Differentiation Brought to Central and South America and to North America by Colonization.



Strong echoes of this difference remain in the two Americas to this day. There are deep differences between growing up in, say Mexico and in the United States. Some differences are linguistic, economic, and educational, i.e. of a kind that can be erased in two or three generations by policies of integration. Nevertheless, others are more profound, as Octavio Paz (1953) has written, and seems virtually built into life itself. They have roots in the fate of native civilizations and in the different structures imposed by the colonizers.

From the Iberian Peninsula

The European colonists that went overseas met high-level local civilizations in Central and South America: Aztec, Maya, and Inca. These were as sophisticated as their native one in Spain and Portugal. They were diversified into urban and rural segments; their cities had magnificent temples and palaces.

By contrast, the colonists to North America (north of Rio Grande), met other Indians such as the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole. They lived not only from hunting, as was their image in Europe, but had agricultural bases.

They produced enough riches to form population centers in the form of camps or villages, but they did not create what we would call proper cities (2: 148-149).

When invaders conquer a high civilization, three outcomes are possible. The high civilization may absorb the attackers. Unless stopped by the Great Wall of China, the waves of invaders from central parts of Asia, in effect, became Chinese. Alternatively, invaders may establish themselves as a parallel civilization on top of the native one. Alexander the Great replaced the old pharaohs of Egypt with a new dynasty that brought Greek culture and language to the court circles of Egypt; its last ruler was Cleopatra. Something similar but more superficial occurred with the British colonial conquest of India with its superb civilization. The latter did not give in to the colonists and remained reasonably intact when the colonists left. A third outcome is that a high civilization succumbs to the invaders in the same way as underdeveloped civilizations do. This ending comes closest to what happened in Latin America.

The conquistadores crushed the visible parts of great civilizations of Central and South America. Iberian forms replaced Aztec, Maya, and Inca. However, native tongues still carried an invisible heritage from the old civilizations. The big effort to replace them with Spanish or Portuguese took the form of public education, mostly after the liberation from their colonial masters. The Spanish and Portuguese colonists had had only little interest in systematically teaching their language to the natives. However, the new independent nations felt an urgent need for a common language. However, even today a number of mostly smaller native populations have not adopted Spanish or Portuguese.

Charles V's goals for the New Spain were certainly not that it should have differentiated branches of statecraft, religion, and commercial life. The New Spain should be an organic state, graded in titles and ranks, and harmonious. The Latin American societies obtained a foundation of hierarchical institutions that functioned as protective patrons. Private affairs and public ones intertwined. For centuries, the economy remained mercantile

rather than liberal, with many in-between forms of business decisions and political decisions.

From the British Isles

On the North American continent, the Iberian colonial model became firmly set up in Mexico. North of Rio Grande other European governments sponsored settlements. The names of Montreal and Detroit in the northern part of the continent and Baton Rouge and New Orleans in the southern part signal the poles of French settlements. French Canada obtained roughly the same aristocratic and elitist social structure as in the homeland before the French Revolution. The "monseigneurs" was the ruling class.

With the founding of the United States, the Anglo-Protestant civilization developed into a distinctly new republican version (Huntington 2005). Government became limited and required consent of the governed. Economic liberalism with private property and freedom of trade became legally protected as in the mother country. The American Constitution also prohibited any alliance between government and religion, a step toward a many-splendored society never taken in the mother country of Great Britain.

The structuration of North America (north of Rio Grande) is not identical with that of the Old World after the Glorious Revolution. There are many influences from colonists but also indigenous ones. Among the latter, we count “The Frontier,” the open land to the west of European occupation. Its message “Go West Young Man!” channeled both frustrations and ambitions in, largely, constructive ways.

However, in contrast to the native components in Latin America, the emerging North American way of life retained little or nothing of the original civilizations. The United States became engaged in what we nowadays call "ethnic cleansing." Forced relocation of Native American peoples from their traditional areas to remoter reservations elsewhere in the country became official policy that cumulated in the Indian Removal legislation of the 1830s. The legendary Trail of Tears of Cherokees, and the

Long Walk of the Navajos are examples of the effects. Genocide, that is extinction of American Indians, was never official policy. Nevertheless, the words by General Philip Henry Sheridan's at Fort Cobb in 1869 — "the only good Indian ... is a dead Indian" sums up a minority sentiment of those days that opened for overkill in the Indian wars.

The civilization of the United States has been successful and has totally outgrown the label "Anglo-Protestant;" it is embraced by all sorts of people. This strain in history most clearly approaches a Many-Splendored Society. The realms of such a society have economic and religious freedom, civic freedoms and freedom of conscience, academic and artistic freedom. In such a society, it is not enough to embrace rule of law that prohibits retroactive legislation. It must also prohibit legislation that restricts the independence of societal realms, i.e. maintain a high degree of the self-rule that Max Weber called *Eigengesetzlichkeit*. This important notion will reoccur in all volumes of our work. According to Richard Swedberg (2005), Weber's term is best understood, as the inner logic and limited autonomy of a realm. The restriction it imposes on legislators was fully implemented in the Constitution of the United States in the case of the religious realm, and to a great extent to the realm of business, but only loosely or not at all for the other societal realms. The Constitution actually grants the states of the union more autonomy than it gives to the societal realms of American society.

The societal realms have cardinal values of their own, reward systems of their own, and particular versions of rationalism of their own. To achieve a many-splendored status, the Anglo-Protestant civilization would have to cultivate, a clearly defined realm of morality in pursuit of virtue that is independent of religion, something that so far has been underdeveloped.

In addition, and perhaps needless to say, the Anglo-Protestant civilization with its colonial heritage has been too violent in war-driven pursuits in the past to deserve the label "civilized" in full measure. The same can said of the Iberian civilization in Latin America.

In the new century, "Latinos," immigrants from Latin America, has become the largest ethnic group in the United States. The story of the export of European social differentiation to the two continents of the New World thus takes a new chapter.

The experience of the United States, particularly in the roaring 1920s, shows the risk in an Anglo-Protestant civilization of losing what it has achieved of a many-splendored status by making economy a totally dominant institution. In other words, there is a risk in giving the dollar a decisive voice in politics, religion, science, and art. In fact, business leaders have become numerous on the boards of directors of American universities, museums, hospitals, and charitable institutions. In cheap and poor copies of F Scott Fitzgerald, a constant stream of pulp novels and films have appeared in which the heroes almost hear the crackle of dollar bills when they caress the hair of their rich girl friends, and the perfume of these girls carry the scent of money. To have an economy so dominant in all parts of life, even love life, is not many-splendored. In fact, it is almost as un-splendored as its opposite, the communist parts of twentieth century Europe, where governments born in other types of revolutions than the glorious ones dominated over the people's big and small doings and where the realm of the body politic and the realm of the economy merged into socialism.

An Oscillation Ending in a *longue conjoncture*

To sum up the previous section about the contours of modern European social reality: the heritage of the monolithic multifunctional structure of the Roman Empire dominated by the state and later the church has become differentiated into a pluralistic social reality in the form of a six single-function structure: economy, religion, polity, morality, science and art.

Look again at Figure 1.1 showing a Grand Differentiation of Europe. It includes a list of the main empires after the Roman one in Western Europe:

482 – 814. The Frankish Kingdom lasted some 330 years. Its greatest ruler, Charlemagne, professed himself a "king and priest," and the differentiation process we have dealt with here had not begun.

962 – 1250. The medieval German Empire spanned almost 290 years, from the middle of the tenth century to the middle of the thirteenth. It fought, as we have noted, for a draw with the Pope.

1495 – 1620. The full Spanish-Austrian Habsburg Empire lasted well over 100 years. A remaining symbol of this empire, El Escorial outside Madrid, was a royal castle, the home of a bureaucracy that ran a larger part of Europe, a cloister, a propaganda center for the Counter-Reformation, a necropolis. The empire maintained an ambivalent relation to the church; one of its greatest rulers, Charles V, voluntarily abdicated to end his life in a monastery. Internal resistance to the empire was greatest in Italy and the Spanish Netherlands, where the differentiation process into separate societal realms had greatly advanced.

1803 – 1814. The early nineteenth century saw the beginning and end of Napoleon's empire, which lasted for less than 15 years. By this time, the contours in central Europe of differentiated social reality with many realms were clear. Napoleon's main enemy, England, was the most differentiated country at that time.

1939 – 1945. Hitler's conquests lasted five years in the middle of the twentieth century. He drew resistance not only from political bodies but also from the religious, artistic, scientific, and economic communities in Europe and North America with their increasingly differentiated realms.

A grand differentiation of Western Europe has proceeded through a process of oscillation. Over time, attempts to recreate in Europe anything resembling the Roman Empire in scope and political dominance become less and less successful and less and less lasting.

In discovering the "collective destiny of the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century," Fernand Braudel made fruitful use of a

division of history into slow- and fast-moving levels. In our case, the dominant levels fluctuate, not like a sinus curve, but between ever longer and ever shorter periods. The periods — *longues conjonctures*, to use Braudel's (1949/1972) language in which the body politic has a total sway over the entire society become shorter and shorter, and the periods when other realms have a more independent existence become longer and longer. The dominant body politics in Europe may increase in size of territory, number of civil servants, pages of legislation enacted, and taxes collected. However, the average number of years they last before disintegration becomes fewer and fewer. The survival rate of a polity seeking domestic or global hegemony over other societal realms has become ever lower in modern Europe. The spell of Augustus is broken.

The European Union

The latest European attempt to recreate something close to the old Roman and Augustine proportions is the European Union. The emergence of a union of the Western part of Europe became a civilized response to a Europe that has experienced two world wars. This attempt originated in six countries in Western Europe. Eastern and Central European countries could join after the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Coal and Steel Union, like its successors the EEC and the EU, was the fruit of the old rules of diplomacy and treaty making — not the rules of democracy and parliamentary legislation. The father of the European integration process, Jean Monet, did not believe one could achieve European integration merely through democratic elections and parliamentary rule. Consequently, in 1958, the Treaty of Rome had been established on the basis of the rules of diplomacy. The Treaty including the germs of expanding new institutions. First, there was to be a Commission to implement what was in effect a foreign policy agreement on European cooperation, and to develop it further. Second, if the Commission's developmental proposals were approved by a Council of Ministers from the countries that were party to the

agreement, they would become law in the countries belonging to the Union. Third, a special European Court of Justice would have jurisdiction over questions concerning the application of the law. National parliaments would not be able to change such laws without renegotiating the Treaty or leaving the Union.

Notwithstanding efforts by Altiero Spinelli and others who sought to establish a European Parliament with real powers, the European Union began as a diplomatic intergovernmental arrangement. Thus, a democratic deficit was built into the Union from its very inception. An original Assembly of Parliamentarians had only advisory functions. It was eventually upgraded to become a directly elected European Parliament, got its milk teeth, and became a partner to the Commission in terms of framing many proposals submitted to the Council of Ministers. However, elections to the European parliament have often been near-fiascos in several countries. The turnout in various countries has fluctuated from high to very low, and domestic issues, not Pan-European issues, have generally dominated election campaigns.

After its promising start to introduce a custom-union and several other aspects of free trade on the Western European markets and to expand into Eastern Europe, the body politic of EU began showing the conventional political aptitude to apply dirigisme and meddling into non-political societal realms. The unification of Europe is more than a confederation; it has, in time, taken on features of a more genuine political federation, a United States of Europe. This is not unexpected; repeatedly in *The Many-Splendored Society,* will we see a societal realm acting imperialistically and in search of justification for such a stand.

The European Union has paid little attention to the broken spell of Augustus underlying the differentiation of Europe in past centuries. As seen from the version of history that we have reviewed, the path of Europe has been more toward the freedom and federation of non-political societal realms than towards a political confederation or federation of nation states.

The modus vivendi of the European Union became an effort to obtain a favorable position vis-à-vis the United States, Japan, and China in a struggle for hegemony of riches. This narrow message is central to the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, which at the time of this writing is the latest basic legislation of the Union. If this message remains EU's dominant vision, then European historical differentiation is truly let down, and the future will belong to the EU's successor, or to some rising many-splendored competitor on other continents.

2. The Proper Study of Humanity

From our short Introduction about the unique role of language in human societies, and from the glimpse of a strain in European history of many societal realms, we have a focus to pursue two major concerns in our exploration of social reality. The first is to analyze how language shapes social reality and its realms in a variety of long-lasting forms. The second is to find out how one particular form, a many-splendored society of relatively independent realms of science, economy, body politic, art, religion, and morality can emerge and survive.

Both these tasks require familiarity with history, linguistics, sociology of science, political science, aesthetics, sociology of religion, and secular ethics. These fields are not only brainy methodological efforts of social science; they do require study of the human brain and related cognitive science, particularly its creation of language products.

A Short Aid to First-time Readers

While the professional language about social reality is compatible with ordinary language, the layout of a book on social science can differ significantly from pages in a diary, biography, or history book. I will ask the readers to cope with three features that that are different from ordinary books.

First Difference: Cross-references

Unlike a novel or a detective story in which you, the reader, is challenged to keep track of previously introduced characters, intrigues, and investigations, our text contains numerous explicit cross-references, i.e. points referring to previous or following sections or sentences. Such is the nature of theorizing, even postmodern attempts.

Highly informative and grounded ideas hanging together, including their implications, make a 'theory.' To show that the

ideas hang together, we use cross-references. Our theory hangs together very well, and the cross-references are numerous. Starting with a minimum vocabulary of grounded fundamentals, we present layers of detail built up on top of each other. Alternatively, we present an overall system based on subsystems that cannot function without one another, and which may even need the overall system to function. Such undertakings require a large number of cross-references in the text.

We need references in the running text (or in footnotes) to the research cited in the Bibliography in order to show that evidence support our statements. Thus, a distracting number of references to the scholarly literature are interrupting the running text. Readers, who are uninterested in the nitty-gritty congruence of theoretical arguments, may of course ignore the many, admittedly tedious, references.

In presenting thoughts and evidence from other authors, I have tried to cite or refer to those who first formulated the ideas or principles or, at least who formulated them at an early stage, *and* who, at the same time, provided evidence that they understood the importance. At times, I underline the buildup from the past by noting the original year of publication in the Bibliography, in addition to indicating the edition I have used. You will find a greater number of older references in this text than in the majority of texts otherwise up to date in the twenty-first century. I hope this practice will convince readers that there has been a great deal of accumulation of knowledge in the social sciences. I have not felt obliged to include the large numbers of other supporting statements and additional evidence from dates subsequent to the original discovery.

No author, dead or alive, is a supreme lord over his or her own formulations in such stories. New generations create formulations that are their own. As George Herbert Mead (1936, 116) said: "A different Caesar crosses the Rubicon not only with each author but with each generation." I have made several reformulations of the classics of social science and humanities to fit into my schema in order to be more relevant to the contempo-

rary state of knowledge. I treat the classics here, not as monuments, but as stepping-stones. (There are other reasons at other times and to read the classics in original, as we note in the section "Providing a Whole View of Culture by Great Books," beginning on page 4: 183.)

The various volumes of *The Many-Splendored Society* represent divisions of the subject matters that usually are studied on their own. The basis of the majority of our cross-references in the printed version is simply a volume number and a page number. For example, the designation "1: 174" leads you to page 174 in Volume 1, where we state that a universally available wide opening towards freedom, in an otherwise deterministic universe, is secured for humanity through her use of language.

Another basis for cross-references is the numbering of chapters. Tables, figures, and propositions include the sequence number of the chapter in which they first appear. The footer on each page also indicates the id-number and heading of the chapter. While all volumes stand alone, and you can read them on their own, the chapter numbers run unbroken through the first to last volume, also in the interest of unambiguous cross-referencing.

Second Difference: Tables of Words

In our text, several tables do not contain numbers, but words. These tables specify classifications, a backbone of theory in all sciences. As an example, let us choose a table that also hints to the big scope of our effort in *The Many-Splendored Society,* the so-called Periodic Table of Societal Realms. The row "Critical Symbols," a top line in the Table lists the pieces of language that acts as elements of social reality. They serve as basic terms of our theory.

A full explanation of this Table will appear in Volume 2: Chapter 10. It is reproduced here as Table 2.1, somewhat abbreviated:

Table 2.1. Preview of a Periodic Table of Societal Realms.

	Societal realms					
	SCIENCE	ECONOMY	POLITY	ART	RELIGION	MORALITY
Critical symbols	Executive description	Executive evaluation	Executive prescripts	Emotive description	Emotive evaluation	Emotive prescripts
Lifestyles	Learning buffs	Money-centered	Civic-minded	Aesthetes	Believers	Compass ionate
Cardinal values	Knowledge	Wealth	Order	Beauty	Sacredness	Virtue
Strata	Competenc	Class	Power	Taste	Piety	Rectitude
Reward system	Priority of findings	Monetary devices	Positions, tributes	Artistic fame	Reverence	Testi monials
Rationality	Scientific method	Market economy	Democracy	Aesthetics	Theology	Ethics
Freedom	Academic freedom	Free trade	Civic liberties	Artistic license	Religious freedom	Free conscience
Spontan-eous order	Self-correction	Market prices	Public opinion	Art impro-visations	Non-ritual prayers	Unplanned civilities
Organiza-tions	Academies universties	Firms	Public bu-reaucracies	Theatres museums,	Temples	Welfare agency
Networks	Learned societies	Markets	Electorates	Bohemia	Sects	Good neighbors
Mass media	Science journals	Advertis ing media	Tribunes	Stages, novels, exhibits	Holy texts, cults	Heralds
Netorgs	Competing laboratories	B2B markets	Political parties	Schools (=approa ches to art)	Rival con gregations	Contending moral groupings
Makers	Researchers	Entre preneurs	Legislators	Creative artists	Prophets	Sources of hi norms
Keepers	Scholars	(Central) bankers	Judges	Critics	Learned Clerics	Ethicists
Brokers	Teachers	Salesmen	Bureau crats	Performers, entertainers	Preachers	Moralists Carers
Takers	Students	Consumers	Citizens	Fans of culture	Congrega tion folks	Decent people
Providers	Consultants	Outside investors	Legal advisors	Patrons of art	Chaplains to realms	Ethics counselors
Procurers	Research applicants	Deposit bankers	Taxmen	Art suppli-cants	Seeking outsiders	Endorsmnt chasers
Mobilization	Spirit of discovery	Spirit of capitalism	Spirit of politics	Spirit of artistry	Spirit of worship	Spirit of justice

The cells in this kind of table are shorthand to sentences of words. The three cells in the upper left corner is an abbreviation of a sentence reading: "In science, the critical symbols are executive descriptions." To construct a straightforward sentence from a cell in our table of words, you must first read the column heads and, then, the row headings and finally, i.e. at last, you begin to pay attention to the cells in the table. Most people do the reverse in reading tables, and find it often difficult to understand the message of a given cell.

Liberal arts students have a tendency of to skip tables in their readings, and the frames around tables make this easy. We have removed both left side and right side borders of our tables as signs of "Welcome in!" and "Please continue reading!"

The columns in our Periodic Table separate the various language-based societal realms: science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality. The rows of the table separate various attributes or illustrations of what a realm may contain. For example, one row of the table, says that each realm has a "spontaneous order," telling us that far from everything in society is planned. For example, scientists routinely check each other's work; this self-correction implies that mistaken findings do not last long, and what is the "current standpoint of science" materializes spontaneously. In the economy, accepted market prices likewise emerge spontaneously, as do public opinions in the body politic.

Third Difference: Propositions

Some particularly informative sentences in our text are elevated as Propositions and are numbered and named; these are also re-listed at the end of each volume. These sentences formulate certain well-grounded probabilities about social reality, sometimes supported by historical records or records systematically collected by researchers, sometimes simply convincingly declared by famous social scientists. Other considerations and conclusions (derivations), based solely on such Propositions, also carry some credibility, albeit attenuated, and certain such rea-

soned hypotheses may sometimes be included among our Propositions.

The chosen Propositions in this work summarize what I have found belonging to our present knowledge from a scholarly study of society. Our Propositions about social reality are not the same as Laws of nature. The latter are immutable, and calculations and forecasts based on these command credibility; they are genuine predictions. By contrast, certainty is absent in our Propositions about social reality; they are all probabilistic, and they can even be negated or altered by social designs employed by rulers and by free people — but only at a cost and with a human effort.

We introduce our first Proposition, called "The Symbol Rule," on page 1: 61 below, where we also describe the nature of such numbered and named statements. A further important Proposition is number 5:3. "Freedom in Social Reality," found on page 1: 175 below. It deals with the freedom we have as human beings to overrule, at least temporarily, the message in The Symbolic Rule and in any other of our propositions about social reality. Such a possibility is a necessity in social science. It does not exist when we deal with physical and biological reality and their technological applications.

Chapters 1 – 19 in *The Many-Splendid Society,* which are completed at this time of writing (2013), and which contain most of our theory has a total 67 proposition about the creation of social reality and how it works. With their sub-clauses they make 121 separate statements which take-off as testable, and, on first inspection, as reasonably well grounded. Several additional propositions will come in future volumes.

The most important cross-references in a theory refer to its various propositions. *The Many-Splendored Society* includes numerous cross-references. If a relevant proposition belong in another Volume, we do not only make a cross-reference, but we repeat the content of that proposition in the current text, or if need be, we reproduce the entire proposition in a box in the margin as in the Exercise below. This repetition is not only good

for the memory, but is essential in making each volume of the series into a book that you can read on its own.

In the vast amount of past and contemporary literature of social science, there are other schemas of classification and other propositions, many containing a different content and better wording than the ones applied herein. We must mention one impressive early effort, namely, Pitirim A Sorokin's volume (1947) *Society, Culture, and Personality. Their Structure and Dynamics. A System of General Sociology.* It has 48 chapters, a total of 742 double-column pages, and contains 189 propositions in italics, some taken from his earlier works. "General Sociology" was the name of the study of total humanity when Sorokin wrote. It dealt with an indivisible trinity of personality, society, and culture. In the section of society, Sorokin was almost up-to-date also in his treatment of governments and commerce, topics that long ago had obtained their own university departments. Nowadays we would call his effort "General Social Science" rather than "General Sociology," and we would pay more attention to the economy than Sorokin did.

No single scholar in Sorokin's lifetime could be expected to succeed him and continue his type of comprehensive work. To develop such a heritage, Harvard University did establish in 1946 a Department of Social Relations in which psychology, sociology, and anthropology combined and collaborated. Although departments of government and economy also deal with important social relations, they were too independent or powerful to be included. Nevertheless, even without them, the new Department of Social Relations became a very creative structure with scholars such as Gordon Allport, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Talcott Parsons.

In the early 1970s, the Department of Social Relations dissolved into its components. The break-up put General Social Science at Harvard back to square one. A remnant of its hey days is a piece of scholarship by Talcott Parsons and Edward A Shils (1951) *Toward a General Theory of Action* covering levels of culture, society, and personality. It is short on propositions in

comparison with Sorokin. Its classification of social relations, the so-called "pattern variables" (to which also Kluckhohn contributed) has become more used by social scientists than the comparable classification in Sorokin's text.

The urge to move back to departmental originalities is a sad malady at universities. It promotes the establishment of over-specialized top-dog-professors constantly watching their preserves, and it encourages narrowly focused Ph.D. theses. While such a process makes professorial life easier, scientific progress may suffer. In Germany, Max Weber managed to cope with this mold as a private scholar with an astonishing success. See our section on Freebooting Scholars (4: 145-147).

An Exercise in Reading and Using a Proposition of Social Science

A proposition about a complex topic may contain several clauses separated as (a), (b), (c) et cetera, each requiring its empirical support. Such a bundle is sometimes called a social mechanism or a social process. An example is the fundamental mechanism of "Socially Induced Compliance" reproduced here on page 43. We will use a preview of this proposition as an exercise to show how to disentangle the highly informative content of a proposition in social science.

First note that the terms used in a proposition are very general; in 16:5 we find terms, such as persons, encounters, norms (i.e. shared prescriptions), compliance, evaluations, symbolic environment, compensation. All told, these cover a huge amount of social reality. In addition, for example, the term "evaluation" may stand for praise or blame, as well as high rank or low rank in the realms of politics, economy, science, art religion, sports, et cetera. Thus, the Proposition becomes applicable to a large number of situations and events

Second, let us note the various *clauses*. Let us assume that our main character in this drama is one called Ego, and our secondary characters are called Alters. The first two clauses, (a) and (b), of Proposition 16:5 join in interplay between Ego's actions and the reactions of Alters. When Ego receives general appreciation from Alters, this increases Ego's lust to find out and obey the norms that Alters stand for in an encounter. These norms can be anything from abstaining from smoking to prohibiting overtaking a school bus when it has stopped to let children on and off. As Ego complies more and more with the norms of Alters, Ego receives specific appreciation and approval from the Alters. This give and take can go on in several rounds, as is typical in social life, and a whole community can eventually share the same norms. However, if or when Ego disobeys the norms of Alters — lights a cigarette and drives past a stopped school bus discharging children — Ego is met by disapproval from the Alters sitting in the back of the car, as is said in

> Proposition 16:5 anticipated. *Socially Induced Compliance*: (a) The more favorable evaluations a person receives in an encounter, the more he is likely to conform to the prescriptions in the encounter. (b) The more persons comply with the norms (customary prescriptions) in an encounter, the more favorable evaluations they receive from others in the encounter, and (c) the less they comply, the more unfavorable evaluations they tend to receive. (d) When a person in an encounter deviates from its norms, the others in the encounter tend to articulate these prescriptions. (e) A person in an encounter who does not comply with norms of an encounter and consequently thereof hurts other members of the encounters, i.e. victims, is met by an expectation (a new norm) that requires him to compensate the victims in proportion to the damage he has caused. (f) Compensation shall be given not only to the victims, but also to persons in the victims' other encounters who have been affected by the violation (restorative justice). (g) If they are publically visible, the above reactions in (e), (f), and (g) spread to include all other encounters in a shared symbolic environment, including encounters of non-victims and non-affected who have not at all been involved in the original violation. Thus the latter, a general public, also articulate the broken norm as in (d), and they articulate the compensation norm as in (e), and they also articulate the restorative justice norm as in (f) (3: 147-148).

Clause (c). His community, both by a court sentence and a loss of general esteem, may also degrade a violator.

Clause (d) declares that the disobedience of Ego will not only result in degradation of Ego by the Alters, but that the norm itself, will be articulated by the Alters; in various ways they will spread the word "Don't smoke!" and "Don't pass a school-bus!"

Clauses (e) and (f) deal with the consequences for the perpetrators of their violations. Among these are the damage of secondary smoking, and the damage of having frightened all of the children in the school bus, and perhaps hurt some by reckless driving. The degrading of violators is not the only consequence; perpetrators are also expected to obey a new norm to compensate their victims. Clause (f) says that it is not sufficient to compensate the hurt child for pain and suffering; the life of the child's family of parents and siblings are disrupted and compensation is to be made to the family.

Clause (g) in the Proposition 16:5 is particularly interesting. Sanctions and compensations for wrongdoers are called for, also by members in the general public who have not been injured or deprived by the perpetrators! This is how laws and human rights become generally accepted.

As far as I can see, clause (g) has no counterpart in economic theory, and thus indicates that some thinking or advice from economists to politicians may be inadequate and/or incomplete (3: 148-149). To be useful, for example in politics, economic knowledge needs often to be more explicitly complemented by knowledge of propositions in jurisprudence, social psychology, and other parts of general social science.

This ends our exercise in reading Propositions.

We shall now take a drastic step and look into the groundings of social reality, not in excavations and archives, but in the human brain. *The Many-Splendored Society* challenges brain researchers to discover the counterparts in our brains to our processes in social reality. In this way, we will leave the confine of a European perspective from our first chapter and look at the entire humankind. For all of homo sapiens have similar brains.

An Image of the Human Brain [BIO]

To look deeply into the mind and body of human beings is bewildering. To put it frankly, many times, many parts of any human being seem out of sync, yet life can produce fabulous arrangements. A many-splendored life is within reach. Modern brain research has exceptional relevance for the proper study of humanity.

Before the turn of the century, the Swiss Army Knife became a common image used in cognitive science to describe an adult human brain. This knife has many tools inside its enclosure: in addition to a knife blade, it has other instruments such as scissors, tweezers, and a nail file with a screwdriver tip. The user can pull out any or several of these as need be.

In the disproportionally large brain enclosure of a baby and of the child in toddler-years, the very young have a more undifferentiated brain, however, it includes tools for interpreting facial gestures, feelings, and spatial movements. The human brain also has remnants of an old reptilian brain for flight or attack. Continuing in the same enclosure, the more mature human brain adds other tools, in other words, it differentiates. We find tools for hand-signs, pictures, singing, mathematics, and language. All tools in mature human brains come rich with inherited recipes about how we shall use these tools. This is actually something more remarkable than the Swiss Army Knife, which has instructions, if any, printed on a separate piece of paper.

A root of many problems on our way to civilized living is the fact that the longest developmental period of our brains took place before the creatures of the Earth were capable of using language. The full development of societal life as we know it came first with the 'language brain' of Homo sapiens. An expert on the human genome, Francis S Collins, suggests that a mutation in gene FOXP2 allowed human languages to flourish.

In learning to speak, we incorporate a new dimension into our repertoire: the symbol and the codes for its use. These codes are different from the genetic code. The genetic code is internal and

inherited in the human being; symbols are both external and internalized. Genetic codes recombine at the moment of conception, when a new generation begins its journey to succeed its parents. Codes for the use of symbols can produce their combinations at any time. In this circumstance, we shall find one of the secrets of human freedom.

Research with new brain-imaging technology lets us visualize the biochemistry of the brain. For example, we may trace the internal communications — relays of neuron firings — in a brain. Such research shows much flexibility and interchangeability in human brains.

What a brain can manifestly achieve tells an educated layman more about it than the locations and micro-processes in the brain that are the stock-in-trade of brain researchers. For example, the latter tell us that Broca's area and Wernicke's area are essential to the use of language and that a place in the left frontal lobe allows thoughts to transform into words. Abilities and deficiencies in language are affected also by other parts of the Frontal, Parietal and Temporal lobe. However, when we amateurs say 'language brain' we think of the *language functions of the total brain*, not any particular location, or genetic quality. Thus, all those parts and processes of the human brain that are required for speech I shall simply call the 'language brain.' Any one of us can recognize speech as such. Other parts of our intelligence, including many advanced functions, are 'pre-language brains' that existed in some form before the emergence of speech.

Differences between male and female brains lie mainly in processes related to reproduction, with one or a couple of eggs a month during a limited part of her lifetime, and with a multitude of sperms available in most of his days. Very old parts of the brain are at work here. By contrast, the language brains of women and men, late in development of the race, are equivalent with one another. One is not any better than the other is. This is significant, since modern societies are overwhelming dependent on language, and here gender equality: is possible and natural.

To express the emotional state of our mind humans have the many small muscles of the face. A special pre-language brain lets humans communicate by facial expressions, and not only with bodily movements as is normal for many species. Let us call it the 'gesture brain.' Its messages can be attractive as a dance of love and as frightening as a war dance. The stronger the emotions, the more we have to see the whole body in addition to the face, to interpret a gesture right. Gestures have been a part of the human equipment since times immemorial. Their signals have told us to come or go away, to stand up or lay down, and numerous other rudimentary actions. The use of gestures may develop into a kind of 'hand-speak brain' that draws full-fledged symbols in the air. In advanced forms, it allows the deaf to communicate reasonably effectively.

Communications with gestures do not work in the dark, or for use around corners. The 'musical brain' overcomes this drawback. It seems that the Neanderthals could sing, but were very underdeveloped speakers compared to Homo sapiens (Mithen 2005). Their songs may have been wordless. In similar way, babies can communicate by prattling and crowing before they can talk.

The language brain of Homo sapience has developed into the separate uses of speech, prose, script, and reading. Everyday human communication depends heavily on body language, i.e. gestures. The gesture brain and the language brain combine in producing *speech.* We get *prose* when words have replaced all gestures into grammatically correct sentences and established vocabularies. A verbatim account of the words used in an ordinary conversation may be unclear, and sometimes nearly incomprehensible to an outsider who cannot watch face and body gestures of the participants in addition their words. A transcript of a conversation or of an ad-lib speech usually needs "editing" to be understood, although to the participants on the spot it was clear as a bell. The editing replaces gestures with symbols and replaces incomplete (“indexical”) expressions with complete sentences. The result is an account of the conversation in prose.

Prose cannot gesticulate. Speech can sometimes do little else. Speech is speedier than prose. Educators who want to turn all speech into prose cannot count on total success. When a rapid response is required, speech gets the upper hand over prose. Speech also seems better in communicating emotions that does prose.

Prose can be turned into a *script*, written language. Script is understood in the same way as speech and prose is understood. Script can also be read. The most recent achievement of the language brain, only a few thousand years old, is *reading*. It has actually involved a traceable reorganization of the brain of recent generations (Wolf 2007). Many humans, particularly in Africa south of the Sahara, belong to people without written historical records in their own language. Moreover, many persons, who live in societies with written histories, are, nevertheless, unable to read and write. We can record the most recent development of human brains in the statistics about analphabetism. These hard numbers represent actual human progress, not an arbitrary fairy tale dependent on your point of view, as some intellectuals want us to think about social facts.

Our pre-language intelligence also contains some other extraordinary advanced abilities. Here is a 'spatial brain' that lets us understand what is uphill and downhill, lets us estimate many useful things such as the distance we have to walk to get to water, the borderlines of our turf, the size of our cave or hut. It will tell us the arcs of a thrown stone or spear, the operations of a wedge, a plane, a lever. The classical genius of the spatial brain is the master engineer, Archimedes, in the second century BCE.

Visual imagery produces not only our spatial orientation and understanding. We also have a ‘picture brain’ that processes visual information to record, remember, and recognize images. It apparently records somewhat more than that which reaches our consciousness. This fact supports Freud's idea of the existence of something subconscious, but not necessarily his ideas of its often lurid contents. The interpretation of pictures generates

much activity in the left lobe. Maybe brain researchers of the future will be able to show a more rapid grows of the left lobe tan of the right one involved in interpreting speech; thus reflecting the increased consumption of pictures via TV, video, and YouTube, et cetera. (See Figure 4.1 below on page 1: 131.)

Spatial ability is probably the origin also of our 'mathematical brain' with its counting, adding, subtraction, multiplication, division, calculus, all of which have spatial representations in geometry. Euclid, a Greek who lived in Alexandria in the third century BCE, was the pioneer. Now we use also non-Euclidian geometries that test the limits of our mathematical and spatial brains.

It is a common opinion that mathematics is the crown of human achievement. That may be, but the mathematical ability does not seem to be a later achievement than verbal ability. It appears that mathematics does not depend on verbalism. Dyslectics have a brain deficiency that makes their speech and reading difficult. However, dyslectics may be brilliant mathematicians. Both Isaac Newton and Albert Einstein suffered from dyslexia.

Animals are constantly alert for danger. They flee if the danger is big and strong, and fight if it is small and weak. This is governed by a part of the brain stem and the cerebellum that Paul D MacLean back in 1948 named the "reptilian brain," a term that caught on (MacLean 1990). Humans share this part of the brain with other animals that have emerged in earlier stages of evolution. They produce what we characterize as *bodily spontaneities*. Under bodily spontaneity, we thus include, among other things, fleeing and attacking, resting and staying awake, eating and drinking, defecation and urination, sexual behavior, sheltering the body from the elements. Females may give evidence of maternal behavior and provide their offspring with nourishment. To follow a leader totally and blindly is spontaneity of MacLean's reptilian brain. A list of human bodily spontaneities is long and belongs not here, but in a text on biology. We have

listed some with easily observed consequences in society in Table 2.2.

Bodily spontaneity has its own reward system of lusts and pains. It differs from the social rewards of, for example, admiration, praise, honor, criticism, and shame. Spontaneously initiated bodily actions usually end with a sense of relief and/or lust.

Lust is not at all a deadly sin, as the wisdom of past ages holds. The Cambridge philosopher Simon Blackburn has summarized what we can learn from the liberal arts and biology about lust. Lust is a necessary trick of nature to reward us for performing bodily actions necessary for survival. "We are puppets of our hormones and generic programs. But nature repays us with pleasure" (Blackburn 2004, 125). Furthermore, nature increases our chances of survival by giving us a sense of disgust or fear or pain in hazardous and dangerous situations. Such rewards are purely biological, i.e. “hard-wired” in the organism. Quenching one’s thirst with a glass of water, assuaging one’s hunger with a hearty meal, the endorphin high experienced by a jogger, the lovers’ orgasms — all are expressions of inherited biological systems. Lust and the relief of bodily spontaneities drive also several modern lifestyles.

The brain of bodily spontaneities has a fundamental contrast with the language brain. With the symbols of language comes a life of bounded freedom, a creative life beyond the puppets of hormones and generic programs. Any human can actually utter sentences that no one in the world has said before! You may even find some in this book.

None of the sites in the human brain is an island unto itself. For centuries, people have practiced Yoga as a combination of breathing exercises, physical postures, and meditation, in one of humanity’s many attempts to bridge the various sites.

Let us sum up. Our contemporary image of a total human brain comes mainly from the study of a series of interconnected relays of neuron firings. Educated laymen distinguish at least between the reptilian, spatial, pictorial, musical, mathematical, and verbal sub-functions. I hasten to say that such distinctions

are not precise enough for students of biology or genetics, or for professionals in medicine and psychology. However, they suffice for many problems in social science.

Most brain research deals with the functioning of a single brain at a time, and show how the brain affects the behavior of a single individual. Social sciences call on the agenda of brain researchers for projects on how one brain affects another brain, a currently much too small part of the total brain research.

Lifestyles of the Speaking Animal [BIO]

A 'lifestyle' is an enjoyable practice that its practitioners share with one another and for which they develop an affinity.

Personified animals appear in tales told at all times and all over the world. The storyteller Aesop lived 600 years BCE and he is credited with lasting fables such as The Tortoise and the Hare and The Fox and the Grapes. Folklore and fiction elaborate animal traits and abilities, presumed or real, by giving to the animals the gift of speech. George Orwell's *Animal Farm* from 1945 is a best-seller in the genre; a biting satire of the socialist way of life under Stalin.

In fact, man is an animal with language, in which the pre-language brains and the language brain are continually adapting to one another and to external exigencies. This goes on over both evolutionary time and individual lifetimes.

Many areas of community life flow out of needs that may take place unrelated to language processes. Among them are, for example, the realm of courtship and breeding, i.e. attracting mates. Here we also find house-holding, i.e. getting sheltered, fed and sustained with necessities from the produce of a territory. Of special interest is 'welfare house-holding,' help to those who cannot fend for themselves, such as the very young, the very old, and the very sick. Warfare, i.e. using violence to obtain, to expand, and to defend the territory that feeds and houses us, also belongs to fields grounded in genes shared with animals, but

more or less superficially penetrated by the organizing language of human beings.

Table 2.2. Spontaneous Bodily Actions Initiated by the Pre-language Brains and their Modern Elaborations with Language.

SPONTANEOUS BODILY ACTIONS (WITH "LUSTS" OR "PAINS")	ELABORATION INTO MODERN LIFESTYLES BY LANGUAGE ABOUT SPONTANEOUS BODILY ACTIONS
Birth, growth, decay, death	Age-related lifestyles (celebrating youth, middle age, old age)
Sexual maturation	Gender-related lifestyles (masculinity, femininity)
Bodily prowess	Exercise Buffs (sports addicts, moving longer, faster, higher)
Marking territory	Cocooning (my home, my castle)
Finding and maintaining shelter	House Proud (do-it-yourself, interior decorating)
Seeking nourishment	Providers from nature (hunt, fish, farm, garden)
Eating and drinking	Gourmands (Big Mac & Shake) Gourmets
Maintaining body temperature	Attire Conscious (following the fashions)
Cleanliness	Hygiene, Sanitizing, Housecleaning Buffs
Resting, sleeping	Comfort Seekers (coziness in one's home)
Playing, dancing	Game Buffs and Dance Buffs
Courtship and mating	Erotic Driven (femme fatales and he-men)
Caring for, protecting offspring	Child-centered (concerned about children, grandchildren)
Rooming around	Migrants, adventure seekers, flâneurs
Flight	Run-a-ways, escapists (going to, dreaming of far-away places)
Violence, Aggression	Hooligans (enjoying a physical fight), Bullies (degrading others)

In Table 2.2 is a list of instances of bodily spontaneities and their modern elaborations into lifestyles with the help of the language brain. Please read the lines of this table as if they were the essence of paragraphs of running text. Many students of liberal arts routinely skip tables in their reading. In this book, most tables are concise shortcuts to classifications.

The bodily spontaneities in the left column in Table 2:2 have become 'activities of needs and lusts' that at some turn of events during the evolution have proven essential to human survival. We define these activities by an open enumeration; the reader is welcome to join the game of adding to them.

Human life, however, is not just about survival. To be human in the full sense, our life must be not only just surviving, but also about some measure of flourishing. Looking in the right-hand column of Table 2.2 we see the same activities in a modern form elaborated by the specialty of mankind, that is, symbols. To have enough resources — in your household or as an individual — to be able to engage in chosen activities of needs and lusts is an essential human condition.

Novelists and scriptwriters, but also contemporary marketers and advertisers, have studied modern lifestyles like the ones in the right-hand column of Table 2.2. Anthropologists who may have run out of research sites in primitive societies have successfully used their methods to study the lifestyles in conditions of their home country. University psychologists and sociologists have not always been worldly enough to give high priority to this area of study.

However, all seem to agree that symbols usually imbue human bodily activities. For example, many edible substances are not socially defined as "food," and some foodstuffs are taboo, i.e. prohibited in strong language, practices that may add tragedy to starvation. Many kinds of clothing and shelters are reserved for people of a certain age, sex, or status. Symbols imbue also the physical actions that are the core of sports; all sports depend on rules, i.e. prescriptions formulated in language.

Many-Splendored Lifestyles

Lifestyles based on what we have to do to survive, even when they are permeated with symbols, are not the whole story. The full flourishing of mankind involves the exclusive products of

the language brain, the ones that are not mere elaborations around bodily spontaneities.

We find six bundles of talking, reading, and writing — 'discourses' is the technical word — that make up and characterize six such lifestyles that anyone can recognize. They are Learning-Buffs, Money-Centered, Civic-Minded, Aesthetes, Believers, and Compassionate. Unlike the lifestyles of animals, they have no base in any specific bodily spontaneity. If you like fancy words you can say that they belong in "socio-linguistics" rather than "socio-biology."

Learning-Buffs

Modern "Learning Buffs" have expanded the quest for knowledge into a lifestyle. They have dedicated their lives to absorbing ever more knowledge and their self-image is shaped by how much they have learned. We find them in libraries, in study groups, at the bookstore shelves for non-fiction, in archives, and in laboratories. For these individuals, learning is not a phase in life, but a lifelong mission, albeit often as part-time pursuits. Exceptionally eager to uncover facts and connections between them, they apply technical vocabularies, foreign languages, and sometimes mathematics as their refined instruments. Non-professional Learning Buffs subscribe to popular journals, such as *Scientific American* and *National Geographic* or their counterparts in other countries. On the Internet, they frequently consult sources such as Wikipedia. In their reading, they prefer non-fiction to fiction, and in their viewing, they prefer documentaries to entertainment. Many are attracted to careers in education and research. Among learning buffs who become professional scientists, we find those who are fully enveloped in a deep, passionate spirit of discovery.

Aesthetes

Aesthetes have a lifestyle that constantly makes them look for opportunities to stop and contemplate something beautiful or artistic. Aesthetes need art in order to feel good about them-

selves and life, to reveal and tolerate the drabness and imperfections of everyday living. In many ways, it is true that anything — food, pots and pans, furniture, housing, sewing, boxing, sex, conversations, ice hockey, marching, military battles, and what have you — can be more or less artistic. An aesthetic lifestyle can permeate all aspects of living. Search for beauty in hair, face, dress, and home are common aesthetic concerns. The Aesthetes may themselves be performing artists, but need not at all be. If available, they visit art galleries and museums, frequent concerts, the theater, and the ballet. They are informed about dramas on TV and the Internet, or of recent pieces of fiction, have an eye for interesting architecture and for expressiveness in the home. When choosing a vacation destination, they prefer Florence to a beach resort. They are attracted to the realm of art, and some develop a genuine passion for beauty and for its other contemporary expressions.

Money-Centered

The Money-Centered have a lifestyle focused on wealth. They pay attention on making money, saving money, investing money, and perhaps above all to spend money. Quick to spot their own needs or the needs of others, they scan the horizon for quality, novelty, value for money, or outright bargains. They may be quality consumers, or bargain consumers, pioneering consumers, or consumers of the tried and true. Producing or consuming, they know prices, and they can tell what is profitable or not. They may spend more time on the business pages and advertisements of their newspaper than on politics and culture. They are attracted to the realm of economy.

Believers

The Believers want to walk through life in touch with a transcendental virtual reality of heavenly lights and messages. They have a lifestyle concerned with spirituality. They develop their courage to face ultimate issues such as the existence of suffering and death, and the final evaluation of a person's life. They have

well developed cults to cope with the memories of the dead. They are found not only around traditional religions but also among the followers of new belief systems that have gained ground in secularized parts of the world. They are attracted to the realm of religion.

Civic-Minded

The Civic-Minded discuss politics, and they may turn up at demonstrations, for they believe it is important to manifest their views in order to try to influence events; on balance, however, discussions are more important to them than mere manifestations. Nor are they averse to work within their movement or party; they will readily plunge into committee work or act as chairperson. They prefer to associate with like-minded people engrossed in politics and community life, and many of them have little time for small talk. They are attracted to public administration and to the realm of body politic.

Compassionate

The Compassionates practice a lifestyle of doing welfare and doing good. Many are reformers with ethics and virtue as their lodestars. Or, they are Good Samaritans acting spontaneously or consistently to help when they see suffering. Their self-image is that of a person who aims to act decently in all situations, and who strives for a clear conscience. Humanitarian movements, social welfare agencies, voluntary organizations and religious or secular charities are the anvils for their good deeds, not to speak of the many sacrifices made to aid members of their own families. They are attracted to civil society and to the realm of morality.

A Glimpse of Links to Many Splendors

We call the above six lifestyles 'the many-splendored lifestyles.' They are specifically human, in that they exist only where language brains exist. We do not need to deny that rudimentary forms may be found in the animal kingdom, but devel-

oped forms are found only where human language is present. In other words, Learning-Buffs, Business-Minded, Civic-Minded, Aesthetes, Believers, and Compassionate populate social reality. These six characters and their six lifestyles — listed in Table 2.3 —elaborate symbolic communications that we will recognize as different 'discourses.'

The above lifestyles differ in that they prefer different discourses: scientific, artistic, economic, religious, political, and moral discourses, respectively. The six discourses correspond to the six streaks we distilled from the history of Europe that opened our presentation.

Table 2.3. Lifestyles Entirely Dependent on Language and Its Discourses.

	A LANGUAGE PRODUCTS	C MANY-SPLENDORED LIFESTYLES
1	Scientific discourse	Learning-Buffs
2	Artistic discourse	Aesthetes
3	Economic discourse	Money-Centered
4	Religious discourse	Believers
5	Political discourse	Civic-Minded
6	Moral discourse	Compassionate

The letters marking the columns and the numbers marking the rows will be found in The Periodic Table of Societal Realms in Volume 2: 222-223.

The six lifestyles and discourses are all born equally unique in importance. If you suppress anyone of them, you reduce humanity to something less than it has to be. Notice what a varied cast they make. In this variation, one gets a first glimpse of the meaning of a "many-splendored society."

The intellectual process of linking together six historically emerging realms, six many-splendored lifestyles, and six discourses are steps in constructing a theory of social reality. We

continue this reasoning on page 1: 172 when we look for something universal in social reality.

We shall not find the roots of the many-splendored society in the worlds of violence, territorial conquests, flights, migrations, and the other bodily needs and activities such as those listed in Table 2.2 on page 1: 52 above. The roots are in the lifestyles entirely dependent on the discourses of language mentioned here in Table 2.3.

This makes an insight worth contemplating: the unique lifestyles in a many-splendored society are an outflow of the language brain.

3. Language and Its Distortions

Enter the Symbols

We, who are humans, have the capacity for speech because of our genetic equipment. As children we begin to speak, count, sing, and dance as instinctively as a bird builds a nest. The human genome programs a stage for us and an ability to carry out these activities.

The language brain is the main vehicle for our personal and social development and for the development of social reality and culture. Verbal symbols turn out to be much more efficient than animal communication about relationships through fighting, scratching, or grooming one another (Dunbar 1996). In search for knowledge, in economic bargaining, in political deliberations, in artistic, religious and in ethical expressions, symbols can come first, and, thereafter, much of the accomplishment of humanity.

Sending brains transfer a string of symbols, a message, to receiving brains. For this, they need to establish a channel between them, i.e. to be within hearing distance, or use a technical medium of communication. The sender also has to get the receiver's attention. Finally, both sender and receiver must understand a common code, for example an English vocabulary and an English grammar. Six elements — context, message, sender, receiver, channel, and code — make up verbal communication. With these concepts, a great cosmopolitan scholar, Roman Jakobson (1896 — 1982), made an inspiring synthesis of Russian, French, Danish, and American linguistics.

Pre-language brains deal primarily with their own bodies and signal to others how we feel. The situation is different in the language brain. Events in one person's brain may not only guide his own behavior, but also remarkably, impose complex processes in the brains of other human beings. This aspect of brain research, still a small aspect with low priority in the brain labora-

tories, is most relevant to social science. Steven Pinker reminds us in the opening paragraph of an important book:

> As you are reading these words, you are taking part in one of the wonders of the natural world. For you and I belong to a species with a remarkable ability: we can shape events in each other's brains with exquisite precision. I am not referring to telepathy or mind control or the other obsessions of fringe science; even in the depictions of believers these are blunt instruments compared to an ability that is uncontroversially present in every one of us. That ability is language. Simply by making noises with our mouths, we can reliably cause precise new combinations of ideas to arise in each other's minds. (Pinker 1994, 1. Italics added here).

Since the emergence of Homo sapiens in pre-historic times some 400 to 300 millennia ago the tool of "making noises with our mouths" accomplishes this transfer from one brain to another.

Much more recently in human existence, at least less than ten millennia ago, mankind began to open an alternative route of transferring from one brain to another, namely, reading. Probably we learned to read numbers before we learned to understand a script with letters. In the opening paragraph of another important book, Maryanne Wolf states:

> We were never born to read. Human beings invented reading only a few thousand years ago. And with this invention, we rearranged the very organization of our brain, which in turn expanded the ways we were able to think, which altered the intellectual evolution of our species. Reading is one of the single most remarkable inventions in history; the ability to record history is one of its consequences. Our ancestors' invention could come about only because of the human brain's extraordinary ability to make new connections among its existing structures, a process made possible by the brain's ability to be shaped by experience. This plasticity at the heart of the brain's design forms the basis for much of who we are, and who we might become (Wolf 2007, 1).

In historical times, social reality is grounded, not only on talk, but also on script. We tend to think that great civilizations all depend on using script. However, since the others have not left any written records, we cannot be sure of their lack of greatness.

Those who speak very well are said to have "a silver tongue." Articulacy is, of course, a matter of degree and reflects the ability to rise to the situation. Some speakers, like most charismatic leaders, have extraordinary articulacy. Differences in articulacy are related to the nature of mother tongues: the size of their vocabularies, and to their grammatical versatility. Articulacy also depends on the quality of the symbolic environment in place during the speaker's upbringing, and, not the least, articulacy depends on the speaker's considerable verbal intelligence. Do not confuse articulacy with a mere stream of talk. It is not talkativeness. In fact, garrulity is often an enemy of articulacy. The most articulate women and men use periods of silence in their speech, a welcome but rare skill.

Articulacy, we must remember, is no guarantee of veracity or scholarly accuracy. We hear that good diplomats are more articulate than are bad diplomats. What both say should be accurate, but neither has any obligation to tell everything. The graduates of Oxford and Cambridge may learn to be more articulate in English than do the graduates of Ohio State University and University of Texas, but that does not make their actual accounts or statements more reliable.

Let us be formal and pedantic for a moment. The tool of the language brain is the symbol. In this work, we will use a single quote around the more or less familiar words that we make into a formal definition. Thus, a 'symbol' is a device by which we at any time and together with others can represent images or notions. This is the symbol rule:

> *Proposition 3:1. The Symbol Rule:* The language brain produces devices (we call them 'symbols') that are available on any occasion to be taken up by the language brain of others who share a 'symbolic environment' and a common 'social context.'

In this work, we will look for highly informative sentences that contain or imply many insights about social life, and in addition are grounded in some facts and amenable to tests against new facts. We mark them by using a labeled indent in the text. In this volume, there are eleven such proposed 'propositions of social science;' there is a list beginning on page 1: 200.

Our propositions are stochastic in nature. That is, they deal with probable, but not inevitable, actions and events. In the social sciences, we would do well to adopt the current terminology of seismology: it is impossible to predict earthquakes; we can only make forecasts of them. In Nat Silver's words:

> A ***prediction*** is a definitive and specific statement about when and where an earthquake will strike: a major earthquake will hit Kyoto, Japan on June 28.
>
> Whereas a ***forecast*** is a probabilistic statement, usually over a longer time scale: there is a 60 percent chance of an earthquake in Southern California over the next thirty years. (Silver 2012, 149. Italics and bold in the original.)

Many known Propositions combine into social processes and mechanisms, or they are found as assumptions inside the social systems that social scientists have discovered. See a short review by Hedström and Swedberg (1996), or a detailed one by Hedström (2005). Examples are the steps of public opinion formation (presented below beginning on page 1: 184), the self-fulfilling prophesies like runs on a bank or, boom and busts in markets (both reviewed in Volume 5, Part 1).

Propositions about social reality are by no means equivalent to the laws of physics, which are iron-tight. While Propositions, like laws of physics, sum up experiences, they do not necessarily forecast future experiences. Humanity lives in environments full of words. Inside each person there is a set of recipes, or rules of thumb, to cook sentences, some previously unheard of (1: 174). Human beings also have the capacity to use words to design social arrangements for each other; some tried and true, some never before tried. There will always be room for more surprises in social science than in physical science.

Some propositions are counter-intuitive, and they require extra work. Others, like the one above, at first seem more trivial than important. However, the latter is usually due to our inability to analyze the familiar — simply because it is so familiar that we do not seem to bother with a deeper study that often would lead to amazing insights.

We reference our social science propositions by chapter and sequence number. The above Proposition is 3:1, the first in chapter 3. In a systematic study, one may also give proper names rather than mere numbers to important discoveries. This one we call "The Symbol Rule." It presumes a definition of 'symbols' that includes three parts: 'availability on any occasion,' the existence of a 'common context' and a shared 'symbolic environment.' Our convention in this text is to put terms subject to definition in single quotes, as you see in the previous sentence.

Let us look at the three constituent parts of symbols one by one.

Available on Any Occasion

The efficient use of communication by symbols separates the child from the infant, and man from the beast. Of course, babies and animals make use of a variety of sounds that relate their state of mind. For example, babies and animals express some version of "yum-yum" when they satisfy their appetites. However, they hardly converse about the taste of the food once they are satisfied. Their sound "yum-yum" cannot readily at will and on any occasion be used to represent food; mostly it occurs in direct contact with food and satisfaction of hunger (Langer 1948, 85).

Babies and animals may readily express the pleasure of living and the agony of dying. However, the ability on any occasion to talk of and have foreknowledge of birth and death is the privilege of those who have learned to use symbols more efficiently than infants and animals. There is a special opening in the language of religion in most any society to cope with our knowledge that a life spent on this earth has an inevitable end.

Through symbols in speech, writing, drawing, music, dance, we tell each other what we have seen, heard or felt, what we like and dislike, and what we want to be done and want to avoid. Symbols acquaint us with a historical past we have not seen, distant people whom we have never met, and a universe through which we have never traveled. Thanks to symbols, we can know something without personally having experienced it. Symbols, as we soon shall see, also codify societal orders, represent riches, summarize knowledge, embody beauty, define sacredness, and express virtues. They may introduce us not only to the civil but also to whole civilizations.

Having symbols, we can talk about persons who are not present, an absolutely basic fact in the science of humanity. Not only can we tell about their comings, goings and doings and coordinate our activities with them. With the use of symbols comes that very special human activity called gossip. With the use of symbols come also the rankings of our fellowmen. We can tell how much we admire or despise them. The evaluations we give to others, as we shall see, becomes handles to their motivation, for most people would rather be liked than disliked.

Shared Symbolic Environment

We learn about outlines of shared symbolic environments from the geography and history of languages. The size of the geographical territories with a shared symbolic environment varies enormously. In mountainous areas such as Caucasus and Afghanistan, isolated valleys developed different dialects and a mosaic of different languages, although the distances as the crow flies between them are short. The most linguistically diverse area in the world is the island of New Guinea north of Australia, about as large as Texas. Here one million people have some 830 different languages; half of them have only about 500 speakers. A strenuous and mountainous geography is not the cause of this differentiation. It may be a product of past intense wars with unusual combats, from our point of view, about warfare. The combatants seem to have fought to erect barriers be-

tween groups rather than to conquer enemy territory. The highly varied cultures of the many language groups in Guinea have turned the island into the favorite fieldwork location for anthropologists.

A more ordinary warfare is a common background of the large languages. At the turn of the millennium, Mandarin, the largest Chinese language, had about 900 million speakers. English had about 300 million, and so did Spanish. These numbers are triumphs of imperial wars, augmented by a high fertility in conquered territories. However, over half of the world's 6 000 languages have fewer than five thousand speakers. Most of them grow or decline by infiltrations.

People do not move around as easily as do language symbols. A so-called "Matthew effect" accompanies large shared symbolic environments; the larger you are, the easier it is to grow even larger until seas, mountains, desserts, or climate zones raise obstacles. Moreover, also in large symbolic environments looms a vulnerability to infiltration, usually by religious or commercial symbols. Nicholas Ostler (2005) has written a pioneering language history of the world focused on the rise and fall of the "empires of the word" during the past 5 000 years.

Dependent on Social Contexts

In understanding symbols, we are helped by knowing about the larger situation in which they occur. Everyone knows this, but an illustration by G. K. Chesterton from the class society of old England brings it out in a way that social scientists may appreciate:

> Suppose one lady says to another in a country house, "Is anybody staying with you?", the lady doesn't answer, "Yes; the butler, the three footmen, the parlor maid, and so on," though the parlor maid may be in the room or the butler behind her chair. She says: "There is nobody staying with us," meaning nobody of the sort you mean. But suppose a doctor inquiring into an epidemic asks, "Who is staying in the house?", then the

lady will remember the butler, the parlor maid and the rest (Chesterton 1981, 76).

The lady's answers are so-called indexical expressions. We cannot understood them without complementary situational or cultural information. In a series of essays, Erving Goffman (1967) showed that we spend much of our time adding to and remedying such expressions. Knowledge of a context varies between persons and may be more or less accurate. Therefore, the precision in a transfer from one language brain to another is not always perfect.

Some contexts provoke confusions. The meaning recorded by a sending brain is called *Erstsinn,* or "das Gesagte," in traditional German rhetoric. It may not always be identical with *Zweitsinn,* or "das Gemeinte," the meaning in the receiver's brain. Misunderstandings do occur. Most seem innocent. In a German marriage advertisement, Mr. Sender wrote that he was a "pipe smoker," a factual message implying that he wants a wife who is tolerant of smoking and who doesn't mind the extra trouble and costs of a smoker in the house. Miss Receivers — many of them — read the pipe smoker's ad as coming from a "masculine character," in other words, a desirable mate. A *description* "pipe smoker" is taken as an *evaluation* "cozy masculinity" (Stolt und Trost 1976, 32).

In other instances, Stolt (1976) finds that sloppiness in the transfer from one brain to another can spell disaster and vicious confusion. When German medical authorities during the Nazi era said that demented and handicapped had "lebensunwertes Leben" (unfulfillable lives) this phrase was first *descriptive,* as is customary in a science, and then *evaluative* in public opinion indicating inferior people, and soon it also became *prescriptive* for the doctors and paramedics who conducted euthanasia, apparently with a clear conscience. Such a short-circuit turns off the lamp of civilization.

This blurring in the practical use of language is known in rhetoric. Less known is that this particular confusion of descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive language hits the very founda-

tions of society and civilization, thus justifying the label 'vicious confusion.' For, the basic building blocks of society and of the discourses of civilization are precisely this tri-section of descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions and their emotive settings of empathy and trust. (Our formal arguments about this begin on page 1: 168 below.) However, the sad fact is that social science does not yet know how to stop vicious versions of the circle of description–evaluation–prescription. We may again and again make the Nazi mistake. To find the break and the remedy truly deserves a Peace Prize.

To sum up, the Symbol Rule is generally true, but the transfer from one language brain to another is problematic. Pinker overstates it when he says that we can shape events in each other's brains with "exquisite precision." There may be a high level of precision in good legal, scientific, and philosophical discourse, but in the rest of society, the precision may be stumpy.

Enter Vocabularies

Historical Contexts

Lucien Febvre's (1942/1982) study of religious faith of the sixteenth century gives us an important observation about historical contexts. Francois Rabelais, the famous French writer with sympathy for and understanding of the vanity of the human race, lived in the first half of that century. He had been a monk and a physician. He wrote with grotesque exaggeration about the joys of eating and drinking, expressed profound dislike for life in the monasteries, treated schools and the Sorbonne with disdain, and sprinkled his texts with covert political satire. He has often been called a pioneering freethinker by later generations, cutting through the hypocrisy and magic of his time.

Febvre is able to show that Rabelais and his contemporaries were not agnostics denying that God's existence is provable, nor were they atheists denying the existence of deities. Their language resources, inherited from the Middle Ages, simply did not include the linguistic and conceptual tools to make them disbe-

lievers. Rabelais' symbolic environment, which seems so modern, was not comprehensive enough for some modernity of our times; it did not include agnosticism and atheism.

Lack of knowledge about contexts of sentences opens for a wide variety of interpretations. The words of Plato about Socrates and the words by the authors and prophets of the Old Testament (Hebrew Bible) about Abraham and Moses, and the words about Jesus by the evangelists and apostles in the New Testament give us a historical setting that facilitates our understanding. By contrast, Muhammad, we are told, took the messages from Allah, mediated by the Archangel Gabriel, memorized them, and dictated them to scribes who wrote the *suras* (chapters) of the Qu'ran. The suras appear without chronological order, and the paraphernalia of a historical circumstance is sparse. They seem time-less — "eternal," the believers say — coming straight from Allah.

One would perhaps think that words stripped of context would be crystal clear; in fact, they are the most ambivalent. The Qu'ran probably allows for more divergent interpretations than Plato's dialogues and the Bible's narratives that have more detailed contexts. The only help we have in interpreting the Qu'ran is our outside knowledge about medieval Arab customs and vocabularies and some events around Medina and Mecca. The author of the Qu'ran very sparsely gives this aid. Here is one reason why Islam exhibits stronger conflicting interpretations than other religions. Islam has these divergences not only between Sunni and Shia branches, but also between various sects within each of these two main streams of Muhammad's religion, and also between local leaders of prayers in different mosques. The image of a monolithic Islam, common in the Buddhist and Christian world, is wrong.

All actually existing symbolic environments have vocabularies that are temporary and partial. Essential distinctions may be missing. For example, a language in totalitarian countries does not usually distinguish (and do not have to distinguish) between "state" and "society." Everything is the state, every organization,

and every piece of property. Of course, a population in such a society would have a handicap in understanding a book on a many-splendored society with many more societal realms than the body politic. Such handicaps may happen also in non-totalitarian societies.

I am sad to say about my own country, Sweden, that after 75 years of Social Democratic dominance in the twentieth century, the everyday and official Swedish language did no longer distinguish between "state" and "society." The Swedes called both "samhället," i.e. society. In the latter half of the twentieth century, in both public and private contexts, the state in the sense of "samhälle" was all-pervasive in Swedish speech and writing. In other words, the Swedes of the second half of the twentieth century got a socialist bias built right into their mother tongue.

Technological Vocabularies in the Contents of Language [TEC]

Two things stand out about humankind in comparison with the whole animal kingdom, and a third one is most remarkable.

Homo Sapiens are better at using words than are other beings.

Homo Sapiens are better at using tools and technology than are other beings.

Homo Sapiens are superb in using words about their tools and technology.

Vocabularies develop that are useful in the local ways of practical living. As the standard example goes, the northern language group of Inuit developed more names for "snow" than did people less dependent on the varying conditions of snow than the Eskimos.

On the level of everyday life, our practical knowledge of tools and technologies, not the knowledge in philosophy and science, has defined life in our civilizations. In fact, vocabularies of tools and technology have also left marks in the way we address and deal with philosophy itself.

Technology and the symbols we use to describe its applications are not peripheral components of modern life; they are the

very daily life (*Dasein*) of our civilization. Household utensils and office equipment enter our vocabulary more often than do domestic animals and plants. This insight of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, implicit already in his breakthrough work from 1927 (Sein und Zeit) and fully formulated later (1953/1993) took his colleagues by surprise. The technological mode had apparently invaded not only our physical and biological reality, but also our social reality, not the least did it infiltrate intellectual discussions.

In the advancing technology of the past few centuries, measurements by scales abound, such as height, weight, distance, speed, opacity, warmth, and so on. Everyday talk about natural phenomena did change. Sentences became reporting of scores or grades. Nowadays in England, an older generation's lingering and friendly small talk about the weather is a young generation's language of inches of rain, winds in miles per hour, and probabilities of showers, and other expressions borrowed from meteorological newscasts. Nowadays, pollsters in the United States can ask a new generation voters: "On a scale from 1 to 10, how well would you say the President does his job?" Older generations would find such a formulation of a query somewhat odd.

The advance of the Enlightenment transferred the popular scaling of natural phenomena to social phenomena. The transfer required some shortcuts. The scales borrowed from natural science have equal and interchangeable units and fixed zero-points. In taking temperature, the difference of one degree Celsius between 10^c and 11^c is the same the difference between 20^c and 21^c, and all measurements have an anchor in a fixed point, zero, and thus indicate differences from 0^c. Scales used about social phenomenon, however, are not as precise as the scales of natural science, say, a thermometer or speedometer. Social scales may use proxies for units of measurements, such as visible consumer goods to indicate a person's social standing. (In our texts, a scale by use of proxies is illustrated in Figure 10.2 on page 2: 175).

With some exceptions such as the economists' scales of money and the demographers' count of individuals, social scales may have units of "just noticeable differences," and the absolute zero-value is replaced by some "average" of populations, neither of which remain very stable in time or geography. Examples of such scales in social research are measurements of cultural values. The oscillating mentalities of tradition/modernity, fundamentalism/pragmatism, and materialism/humanism described on page 1: 145-150 are illustrations of social scales in this text.

Without the mode of thinking in terms of scales, it would not be possible for us to experience gradations between high and low in regard to class, power, competence, taste, piety, and moral rectitude (2: 171-219). Likewise, we use mental scales to envisage small, medium, and big rewards inside our accustomed range of rewards. In addition, sensing when we have been thrown into the dangerous anomic regions requires us to use some thinking in terms of the scaling of every-day experience (3: 120-125). Social scales, however approximate, also allow us to evaluate whether or not efforts and rewards are within the range of justice or outside it, i.e. how fairly society treats us (3: 118-120).

Scaling with multiple steps is, thus, a part of the language creating our social reality of modern times. The linguistic component of scaling — sentences such as "this is worse," "that is somewhat better" — is, in Heidegger's theory, formed and advanced by our increased daily experience of many technological measurements in modern society.

Enter a New Binary Mode

At the turn of the century — decades after the death of Heidegger — computing and computers have brought a noticeable change in the symbolic environment of advanced countries. The invention and spread of binary scales, i.e. of ones and zeros, had begun to spread and affect social reality.

A conversion of scales into a binary use is typical in the spreading new vocabulary. In earlier generations, looks, smell, taste, and touch, graded the freshness of food. Many provisions

may look and touch deficient, but if they did not smell badly they made good use in cooking. In modern households, a single "Best-before-date" replaces all the traditional measures of usable food. Regardless of the quality of the foodstuff, people use it before its best-before-date, and habitually discard it after this date. The contemporary waste of usable food affects food prices. The volume of waste raises a spectrum of coping with remaining famines.

Our expanding IT industry is a hotbed of thinking in binary terms, and of the use of binary mathematics of 0 and 1. On Facebook, the widespread social product of this industry, you have a choice to turn your "thumb up" to indicate that you like something, be it people, their photos, their messages, and their choices of actions, products, or services. You have no symbol to show that you like something a little, a lot, or in-between. The mixed shades of grey that make up the world of thoughtful people in all civilized countries have drowned in a binary deluge. (On binary developments in technology, see the section called "A Chain of Innovations Making Early Computers," at 4: 190-196.)

In the binary mode, we learn from George L Kelling and James Q Wilson (1992) that the police should show "zero tolerance" of neighborhood crimes, even to repair broken windows on order not to tempt intruders. We increasingly have approached a number of other phenomena from pollution to fattening food with similar black-and-white vigor. Religious fundamentalism, an old typically binary division of believers and infidels, heaven and hell, receives an unprecedented amount of new attention in the media of the new century.

In politics, binary thinking gridlocked the political machinery in Washington for long periods under President Obama. Suppose a problem facing the country has several options for solution plus one option of doing nothing of the sort. Then a compromise is possible. However, if you have only the choice of two options, to accept or do nothing, any use of compromise is ruled out. "Taxpayer protection pledge" united much of the Republican opposition in a dogmatic stance against politicians using any

tax increase to cope with a serious deficit crisis in the economy. When everything is either our way or none, all deals become no deals. The only legislative progress possibly is logrolling. Deals may be struck between a party or party member in a parliament and an opposing party or one of its members whereby a vote is given on a piece of legislation favored by one side on the understanding that the favor will be returned by the opposing side at a another time on another issue. Binary thinking is a poison to democratic processes, all of which, except human rights issues, require not only openness, which can be binary, but also the finding of middle grounds that cannot be binary. Politics in the sense of ordinary give-and-take deals in a binary environment becomes restricted to pure logrolling, not compromising.

What emerges in a binary culture is a mode typical of fundamentalist thinking that everything is "all or nothing," friend or foe. When fundamentalists describe all who are not for us, as against us, then a *vicious confusion* (1: 52) of what is described, evaluated, and prescribed appears easily in their minds. Its ultimate stand is that any enemy deserves removal from the surface of this earth.

Fortunately, binary thinking is not necessarily the lasting fate of humanity. The current development in computer science takes a lead from particle physics. Quantum mathematics explains behavior of particles at the subatomic level. The units in the latter are so-called 'qubits,' i.e. quantum bits. These simultaneously represent any number of possible configurations of properties of particles, while 'bits' of zeros and ones representing only one state at a time.

In a sense, the qubit can be zero and one at the same time. Ambivalences of this kind also seem possible also in social reality. An illustration is the Magdalene character, being at the same time and in the same place both whore and saint.

A computer based on qubits of quantum mathematics would handsomely outperform our present computers based on binary mathematics. A fully verified paper model (that is, equations) exists already of a so-called quantum Turing machine, and at the

time of this writing (2013), the building of real-life machines has started. It involves new forms of qubit transfers and storing. The old transistors and disks belong in the world of bits; the world of qubits needs something very different.

Thus, in Heidegger's shadow, we might hope that our everyday speech and writing might follow suit. Our language stands to move away from the potentially destructive mode of a thinking dominated by terms of all or nothing. A more holistic everyday language would emerge in the era of qubits. Its new vocabulary would be precise, but would not be stuck in reliance on merely thumbs up or thumbs down

Not all adjectives and objects mentioned in the everyday symbolic environment of civilizations receive their meaning from technology, but a significant number of important ones do. With this reservation, Heidegger's surprising thesis is right. Our pessimistic analysis of a contemporary binary dominance is justified by his theory. It is, of course, an open question whether our optimistic view is correct: to expect a future qubital symbolic environment for civilized societies.

Vocabularies of Mundane and Pristine Symbols: The Rise of Intellectuals

Speech gave our ancestors new ways of shaping their relations to one another. Symbols imbued everyday life, mundane symbols shaping mundane life.

When symbols came into human use, some people became especially skilled in their use. They could "reason through" a problem while others had to "muddle through" the same problem. It thus emerged a position that we today call 'intellectual.' The intellectuals sought out meanings in the language in use, reformulated them as precise symbols, and practiced the use of such symbols. They began to talk about the general form of snow, rather than its various weather-bound forms. In this way, they shaped what we shall call 'pristine symbols' to distinguish them from the 'mundane' of everyday use.

The symbolic environment of ancient Athens was probably full of mundane symbols in the ongoing course of commerce, wars, and exigencies of living. Nevertheless, the written records also reveal a strong pristine stream of symbols. Human reason could create a world that was clearer than that found in everyday reality. The white color of the Athenians' dwellings was speckled with gray nuances and spots. However, the ideal form of whiteness contained only white. In everyday experience, the good human being did have some shortcomings. Nevertheless, the ideal form of goodness contained only the good. The world of such forms, a universe of reasoning in pristine symbols, seemed to represent a purer reality than that which was commonplace and mundane in ancient Greece. Plato wrote two scenarios of what he saw as ideal societies, the most important one in a book simply called *Republic* and another, "second-best" version (to use Rhoda Kotzin's words), called Magnesia and found in his book on *Laws.*

In the following centuries, reasoning around ideals gave rise to the Neo-Platonic view that the imperfectly realized forms of the mundane world participate in an intelligible world of ideal forms. These philosophers believed that the imperfect structures strive to realize themselves as their fixed, ideal structures. "Becoming," rather than "being," was their key to history. Thus in Greek and Hellenic civilization, added a vital pristine symbolic environment to the ordinary mundane one. In the 420s, Saint Augustine gave a Christian version of the mundane and pristine in his great narrative about the City of Man and The City of God. Rome had just fallen to the Visigoths, and Augustine personal experience of wicked years there was a model of his mundane City of Man. His vision of a "New Jerusalem" had a huge impact on the Church.

Among the specialist users of pristine symbols, the 'intellectuals,' we find not only the philosophers and sophists of antiquity. Max Weber added the prophets of Judaism (several also recognized by Islam), the Brahmins of Hinduism, the Sanguas of Buddhism, and the Chinese literati. Shmuel N Eisenstadt (1999)

added the Jacobeans of the French Revolution, and laid bare modern twists of fundamentalism among many contemporary intellectuals.

A specialty of man in the entire animal kingdom is the tension created between, on the one hand, his pristine symbolic environments — be they religious, artistic, ethical, scientific-philosophical, or revolutionary — and, on the other hand, his mundane, everyday life and its symbols. On the individual level, the tension between the pristine and the mundane can be resolved by some sort of "salvation," a Christian term given an extended meaning by Max Weber for use in other religions, and eventually also a scientific meaning applicable to secular pursuits. It stands for any reconciliation between the mundane life and the pristine ideals.

Mundane symbols can be both what we called Meadian or Saussurian, as can pristine symbols. However, there seem to be some affinities between the two classifications. In a symbolic environment, the combination mundane-Meadian seems more likely than the combination mundane-Saussurian. And the combination pristine-Meadian seems less likely than pristine-Saussurian. I know of no data documenting this and shall not present it as a formal proposition.

It is difficult to find common patterns in intellectuals as different as, say, Edmund Wilson, Arthur Koestler, Primo Levi, and Leszek Kolakowski. However, on a trivial level, the quarrels that the intellectuals became involved in within their symbolic environments have a limited number of lines, three to be exact. Individuals who habitually stick to mundane symbols criticize intellectuals for being up in the blue and "unrealistic." The intellectuals retort that pristine symbols also are a part of social reality. Intellectuals then follow two additional lines in their critique. The mundane fellows are damned for being earthbound, selfish, and materialistic, i.e. for not being pristine. The fellows in the pristine camp usually meet the criticism of not being pristine enough, i.e. for abandoning their high ideals. You can trace these basic lines of criticisms by intellectuals in scriptures from antiq-

uity, in medieval dissertations, in the polemics of the Enlightenment, up to the most recent issue of *The New York Review of Books* and the editorial and cultural pages of your local paper. In this sense, little is unpredictable about intellectuals. The intellectuals in science are different in their quarrels only in the sense that they have a more agreed upon basis — the scientific method — to guide them into what is acceptable statements. To sum up:

> *Proposition 3:2. Tendencies in Intellectualism:* (a) Over time, any symbolic environment tends to become differentiated into mundane and pristine symbols. (b) Mundane symbols tend to multiply as living conditions multiply. (c) Among skilled symbol users, the intellectuals, there is a spontaneous tendency for pristine symbols to emerge. (d) The consistent users of mundane symbols criticize the intellectuals for being out of touch with reality. The intellectuals tend to criticize the users of mundane symbols for ignoring the pristine ones, and they tend to criticize each other for not being pristine enough.

It should be obvious that I do not use the designation "intellectuals" in its current derogatory sense pertaining to people who pontificate on any topic far outside their own expertise.

Intellectuals are the cultivators of pristine uses of symbols, and among them 'critics' have the most difficult task. They do more than agree or disagree with other public intellectuals. They translate visual and musical into the verbal. They are required to understand in depth the symbolic objects on which they offer reasoned judgments. They separate the genuine from the clichéd or adulterated. They are the scouts in our vibrating symbolic environment. In the ever-shifting Zeitgeist, they help us see the old in the new, and they are the first to spot the truly new. Social science needs to listen to critics. It is no coincidence that our preview of *The Many-Splendored Society* at the end of next chapter rests our case with an American critic, Kenneth Burke (1897 – 1993). His work has fallen fallow for too long.

A critic may have started by dealing with music, literature, paintings, eroticism, morals, politics, or other specialties. How-

ever, some of the most interesting critics do branch out and cross the borders of many genres. Celebrated critics such as Edmund Wilson and Susan Sontag were literary critics who also became voices on war, politics, education, economy, and other realms of life, and who tried their skills as authors of fiction. In Europe, most notably in France, there is a tradition that professors of philosophy branch out to be boundless critics.

When a comprehensive intellectual's system of pristine symbols is reasonably void of magic, spuma, and defensive bilge we like to call it a "philosophy." Philosophy can also be a celebration of mundane symbols and of what they stand for. Nietzsche (1909/1968, sec 10) found "these trivial details — diet, locality, climate, recreation, the whole casuistry of self-love — are inconceivably more important than everything men have hitherto considered essential."

The Tension between the Mundane and the Pristine; the Problem of Praxis

The typical response in in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic world to the tension between the mundane and the pristine has been that intellectuals impose their vision on the practical version of living. A pristine order, as the City of God in Saint Augustine's terminology, was "higher" or "better" than the mundane, the City of Man.

Three important ideas have emerged in this situation.

The first is that man may remodel the world, for example, by wars, politics, or morality, to be in line with a pristine world. The pristine order is to be a pillar of light in the day and a pillar of fire in the night for the mundane order. Here is the origin of the notion that intellectuals — that include philosophers, prophets, ideologues, and lately also scientists and journalists — should guide the world. The intellectuals of Europe and the Middle East have generally tried to impose 'praxis' inspired by their pristine thinking about the everyday world of their societies. Praxis, as I use it, is not only the name of a particular school of Marxism and a cliché of revolutionary Marxism. It is a good

scholarly term for the resulting mundane order of any intellectual recipe,

The second idea is that humanity is accountable to a pristine world. You shall live to please the gods, not only to please yourself and your fellowmen. This applies also to humankind's rulers. Taken to an extreme, this has at times been interpreted that a king rules "by the grace of God," not by the consent of all the governed, or by the consent of some elites among the governed. The king thus can stay in power and ignore opposition — until God withdraws his grace.

The third idea is that the pristine world must approve any new social arrangements in the mundane world. The pristine order thus provides legitimization and justifications of new practices in the mundane world. Thus, intellectuals assume the role of endorsing or disapproving worldly powers. This is acutely tempting for religious intellectuals. Priests officiate at coronations of kings. A supreme ayatollah approves candidates to a Muslim parliament in Iran.

These three ideas all have some magical qualities. They have had great consequences in human history, not the least in the development of European societies. Such things may happen also to ideas that have no base in contemporary science.

The dynamics of the tension between the pristine and mundane is not easy to understand, and it may be counter-intuitive. As tensions build, neither the pristine vision nor the mundane vision is necessarily stable. Praxis rarely works as smoothly as promised by intellectuals. Intellectuals do not only streamline everyday living. They produce unplanned consequences of their planned actions. Such byproducts seem to emerge from implementing virtually any intellectual plan. My tentative hypothesis is that such failures lead intellectuals to reformulations of the pristine; many of them think that failure has occurred because their vision has not been clear and pristine enough. Thus, new intellectual sects are created, more extreme than the old ones. This is counterproductive, and leads in the end to a victory of the mundane over the pristine.

In the history of China, the mundane order generally has had a high status in itself, and its relation to the pristine becomes pragmatic, rather than submissive. Having incorporated some Buddhist ideas that dampened their obsession with hierarchy, the Neo-Confucian literati had a considerable impact on the practical organization of Imperial China, its taxation, land distribution, technology, and examination system for recruitments to the ruling bureaucracy and military. This is worth a closer look on page 1: 120.

Vocabularies with Meadian and Saussurian Symbols

A symbol, we said, is that device by which we on any one occasion can represent an image and/or a notion and use it in conversation with others. This definition hints that there are two kinds of symbols: those related to images and those unrelated to images but found in other notions used in social interactions. I shall call them Meadian and Saussurian to honor two great scholars of the study of symbols. (This does not mean that they have defined symbols exactly as done here.)

> *Proposition 3:3. The Meadian-Saussurian Division:* Symbols divide into (a) those that transmit shared images, here called 'Meadian symbols', and (b) those that transmit notions, here called Saussurian symbols.'

Verbal symbols that r**e**present images are the easiest to deal with. In the spirit of young Wittgenstein, we can say that such symbols depict or note something in the same way as pictures do. A symbol may, in this way, depict reality or fantasy, something present or absent, something in the past or in the future. Its meaning is the image it conveys. "Depict" is a near synonym to "describe," and it brings out that what is described is an image and not just another word, i.e. a Saussurian symbol.

A major analysis of the use of symbols in human affairs by George Herbert Mead (1934), a philosopher in the broad school of American pragmatism, was recorded in a posthumous book *Mind, Self and Society*. We know Mead as the philosophical father of the school of thought about society called "symbolic interac-

tionism," but he has also inspired others (Joas 1993). His analysis of symbols and their meaning leads us to the first part of our definition: a symbol is a device that on any occasion represents an image.

Mead distinguishes between gestures and significant symbols. A gesture is a part of a behavior sequence that signals the total sequence, for example, a dog, baring his teeth and assuming a certain posture, is a gesture meaning "fight" to another dog. Symbols are abundant among men, very rare among animals. Gestures abound among both humans and among other animals.

A Meadian symbol is a gesture that transfers the same meaning in the receiver as it has in the transmitter: "in this case we have a symbol which answers to a meaning in the experience of the first individual and which also calls out that meaning in the second individual" (Mead 1934, 45). A person who cries "fire!" to his neighbor shares images of what is going on within him. In fact, both the one who has seen the actual fire and the one who has only heard the shout of "fire!" react in similar ways, for example, by escaping or by starting extinguishing or rescue work. Mead tries to remain a behaviorist and prefers to talk about their common behavior rather than their commonly held image. We need not put such a restriction on our terminology, and I, nevertheless, will call these symbols 'Meadian.'

Not all symbols have to refer to something fixed outside them. Abstract symbols do not normally evoke images. If we say "Come here" or "Go away" to a baby who just has learned to walk and talk, he or she may not understand. The words "here" and "away" are too abstract. If we say "Go to Mommy" the meaning is clear. "Mommy" evokes a stable image; "here" and "away" do not. Words such as "that" or "which" do not always refer to images but to other words. Some of the latter might, of course, evoke images. Personal pronouns do not by themselves evoke fixed images; the image evoked by "he" or "she" varies by the context. Interrogative pronouns — what? who? how? where? when? and why? — do not evoke permanently fixed images.

When symbols do not evoke fixed images their meaning depends on how they relate to other symbols in the actual use of language. It does, of course, cause a change if we say "Come here" or "Go away." Likewise, "Here in New York" is different from "Away in Dixie." The meaning of “here” and of “away” is given by the differences these words make in presentations. What? who? how? where? when? and why? get different responses about the same event. Hence their meanings are different. The point is simply that the very relations between the symbols can mark out their meaning. This way to define "the meaning of meaning" was launched by Ferdinand de Saussure and presented by his students in lectures that became classic, *Cours de linguistique generale* (1916/1959). His analysis of symbols and their meaning leads us to the second part of our definition: a symbol is a device that on any occasion represents a notion.

The starting point of de Saussure is what he calls “the arbitrariness of the sign.” There are no particular relations between the sounds of the mouth pronouncing the word *child* and its meaning. The word does not look like a child, crawls and walks like a child, cries and smiles like a child. But to the part of mankind that has learned English it means a child. In the English-speaking world, one does not experience the symbol "child" as arbitrary. The original arbitrariness has turned into a "collective representation," to use Émile Durkheim's term. When this has occurred, we have established an addition to our symbolic environment.

Symbols that can replace one another in a number of presentations (some say “arguments”) have the same meaning; symbols that are irreplaceable in presentations have unique meanings. I shall call interchangeable symbols 'Saussurian.' Their meanings are established by testing the interchangeability of the symbols. When "kid" or "youngster" replaces "child” in our tales we use symbols with Saussurian meanings. Legal phrases, bureaucratic and technocratic languages abound with such Saussurian symbols; they talk, for example, about "national security", and "defense," and not about "soldiers," a word with a clearer Meadian

meaning. Such replacements may be elaborate chains. Consider Logos, the most famous one: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."

All symbols that have a Meadian meaning can be used in presentations. Eventually, they may acquire Saussurian meanings as well. It is interesting to note that in such instances the original Meadian meaning seems fresher and more vivid than the Saussurian. In good writing and speaking, we avoid diluted or misplaced metaphors. In short, we stay away from improper Saussurian use of Meadian meanings.

Here is an example from the training of journalists (by Bo Strömstedt, a legendary Swedish editor) taken from an article on public support to culture:

> "A slice of the pie for new subsidies to cultural activity is summarized under the heading State Support for Literature. Last spring, after making some remarkable rounds prior to the Parliament's decision, it did not get an entirely favorable start. The main point is, of course, that the motion was, in essence, swept under the carpet."
>
> In Swedish: "Den kaka inom den nya svenska kulturpolitiken som kan sammanfattas under rubriken statligt litteraturstöd fick efter ganska märkliga turer en inte helt lyckad start i riksdagsbeslutet i våras. Det viktiga var naturligtvis att propositionen i allt väsentligt sopades under mattan."

A slice of pie, summarized as a heading, makes some remarkable rounds before it gets a failed start, and "in essence" is swept under a carpet. In the above text just about every word has lost its original Meadian meaning and, thus diluted, it is used in Saussurian ways. Pie does not mean pie. A round does not mean round. A start does not mean a start. Point does not mean point. Sweep does not mean sweep, and carpet does not mean carpet. At best, we can retain an image — in this case a misleading image — that a few crumbs are left, and then hidden. Such is the nature of dead writing and diluted speech.

Structuralism

Ferdinand de Saussure inspired a school of thought about language called "structuralism." Claude Lévi-Strauss became its leading social scientist. In his theory of social reality, some symbols shape 'myths,' i.e. patterns of thought that are repeated in mankind's time periods and geographical habitations. In this type of theories, man is incidental, a mere accessory that helps certain symbols in their struggle for survival and hinders others. Such a theory may claim to know the future of symbolic environments and social reality by predicting which symbols and which myths will survive.

This may sound like science fiction. But Lévi-Strauss' structuralism shows (or assumes, some skeptics would say) that the webs of symbols he called myths actually do the thinking in man's mind; man does not think in terms of the myths, as is usually assumed (Lévi-Strauss 1958). The anthropologist Mary Douglas followed suit and explored *How Institutions Think* (1987) in a more down-to-earth British manner. A central research task in this endeavor is to find universal myths.

Toward Virtual Realities

The Saussurian chains of meanings may move phenomena from immediate reality to a "hyperreality and simulacra," a process identified by Jean Baudrillard (1981). Derivatives traded on the financial markets are hyperreal; traders deal with them as real without thinking about their underlying instruments of debts, rents, and properties, often without even knowing them. A "simulacrum" is a copy more perfect than the original, like Disneyland.

In the market and media research inspired by Baudrillard, we have indeed noticed that many modern consumers no longer could distinguish between imitation and reality — and that a sizable group preferred the imitations (or "improvements") because they seem more real than life. In other words, sophisticated consumers do not necessarily consider the "natural" product

as the best; some looks for products, while copied from nature, are improvements on nature.

On the Internet, a straight webcam recording of what happens in a room soon becomes as boring as a surveillance camera in a bank. However, if a TV-producer improves on reality by placing people on an island with opportunities for unselfishness and meanness, romance and repulsion, and also gives them some rules for competition and ostracism, then this becomes a hyper-reality — without being all-fiction, like a script for a play or a film.

The many computer games that emerged before and after the turn of the century easily became hyper-real for the participants. For example, games marketed as Sims, empower players to create worlds of their imagination, including strategic life-simulations of conflicts and love in the small world, or alternative historic developments of larger parts of society and empires. Many games include old myths. They imitate the past of humankind's reality, often in settings of the future. These worlds of simulation involve synthetic visual and audio presentations and sometimes operations of other senses. They constitute what we loosely call 'virtual reality.' Many participants perceive these copies of reality as more real, manageable, and/or attractive than the present reality.

It is common to treat virtual reality as a part of social reality. Perhaps, as it develops far beyond the use of symbols, it may be reasonable to see it as a separate reality on par with the physical, biological, and social reality. An interesting test will be whether animals other than Homo sapiens can develop virtual realities.

In Volume 6 of the present work dealing with art, religion, and morality we will learn to identify many of elements of these societal realms as virtual reality. In the global financial crisis 2008 – 2009, it became obvious that large-scale virtual realities had slipped into the financial world; we will deal with such events in Volume 5. In general, I think it would do economists good to understand better that our surrounding world of symbols also include virtual symbolic activity.

Semiotics

A healthy child of structuralism is the theory of signification called semiotics. In America, it is linked to the work by its pivotal philosopher of pragmatism, Charles S Peirce (1908/1992-98). In Europe, it has had intellectual victories in Copenhagen under Louis Hjelmslev and in Paris under Agidas Julien Greimas. The latter invented a basic tool called the "semiotic square" (Greimas 1966). It is based on the idea that signs have no meaning in themselves but get meanings through their *relationships*, as Hjelmslev said, or their *differences*, as Saussure had put it earlier.

Figure 3.1. Semiotic Square of Femininity vs Masculinity.



The semiotic square is an aid that sensitizes us to the concepts hidden inside the language we use. It actually helps us to develop theories. Needless to say, there are other ways to achieve such skills, for example, by following a master teacher, such as Barney Glaser (1978), through the steps of finding a grounded social theory. Nevertheless, to use semiotic squares might be your crib, particularly if you believe in the premise of this book — seen, for example, in discussions started on page 1: 3 and on page 1: 174 — that a theory of social reality does hide inside the language we use.

Greimas' starting point are any opposites found in language such as truth vs. untruth, masculine vs. feminine, life vs. death, good vs. evil, in short, anything that can fit the "S1 versus ~S1" formulae. He added contrary notions and complementary notions and placed all four signs in the corner of a square as in Figure 3.1. If we take the opposites concepts femininity and masculinity, and place them into a semiotic square, we obtain a pay-off in the form of two new concepts "the bisexual" (S1+ ~S2) and "the asexual" (~S1+S2) in addition to the original ones, "femininity" and "masculinity".

The exercise reminds us of the bi-sexual person who is both masculine and feminine, and of the a-sexual one who is neither masculine, nor feminine. One can use Greimas' semiotic square to make clarifications and innovations in social reality, for example, to provide a normative environment that has a place for a-sexual and bi-sexual persons.

Since we deal with emergent aspects of social reality that may be blocked to a reader imbued with strict schoolbook logic it is advisable to use notions such as “What seems to be” and “What seems not to be” in our semiotic squares.

Sociologists may take notice that a fourfold table — found in abundance in their writings — contains less information and creative inspiration than a semiotic square. Market researchers and product developers show the way here for a more constructive social science; they use semiotic squares to find out cornerstones of markets and to explore whether or not the possibilities

of consumer goods are exhausted. To quote French market analyst Christine Woesler Panafiey (2007): "Innovations often come about through the fusion of opposites or on the negation poles. To name but one example: water is the opposite of perfume, but all the 'waters' such as 'Eau de Kenzo' or 'Eau de Rochas' which were developed in the category of light perfume as followers to '4711-Kölnisch Wasser' are non-perfume/perfume."

Several of our arguments in *The Many-Splendored Society* are informed, implicitly or explicitly, by semiotic squares. In the next Volume, they will be used explicitly to divulge some available communication structures. In Volumes 4, 5 and 6 that deal with societal realms and their cardinal values, we will use semiotic squares to expose deformations of knowledge, beauty, wealth, sacredness, order, and virtue.

The squares we employ are of the simplest kind and built on the mere presence, emergence, or absence of attributes. We will not make them more complicated for our readers and ourselves by using other logical and mathematical operators.

Distortions in Language

Following leads from Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz, the German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1981/1987) defined one context as "*Lebenswelt*," (life-world). The life-world of daily activities is imbued with the traditions from past generations in rendering accepted interpretations of symbols. In the life-world, their meanings are self-evident. Not so in the "system-world" of modern institutions. Modernization and globalization reduce the sway of the shared meanings of the life-world. Mankind's present disorientation in the universe of meanings is a price paid for the diversity occurring when a modern world of institutional and rational systems colonizes the life-worlds. This is not an entirely hopeless situation. In later writings, Habermas (1992) has explored the opportunities for democratic discourse to overcome in a rational way such difficulties of diverse meanings.

Any such undertaking is not easy. What we shall describe as spuma, magic, and defensive bilge fill a fair share of humanity's daily chattering. They stream through modern media in the form of trash journalism, bureaucratic jargon, tricky legal parlance, cheap political rhetoric, medical quackery, stupid commercial advertising, quasi-religious persuasions, and idiotic texts appearing even in very good pop music. What in this flow of words stands to reason and what can be put aside?

Enter the Spuma [BIO]

In the fifth chapter of an important book by Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate. The Modern Denial of Human Nature 2002), he shows that brain research is more than conventional biology. It enables us to reach new understandings in the liberal arts and to formulate some laws of social science. Here is my version of two of its ideas:

> *Proposition 3:4. The Spuma Rule and The Civil Rule:* Human activities separate into: (a) spontaneous bodily actions governed by the pre-language brains, activities which humans may decorate by use of symbols, and (b) symbol-based actions governed by the language brain, which generates a person's own symbol-based activities as well as such activities in other human beings living in the same symbolic environment.

This distinction is actually two propositions that require support from empirical research and cannot be settled by mere inventive terminology. They are based on observable tendencies in human nature, not only a proposed jargon.

The first part of 3:3 above — that spats of spontaneous symbolic activity escort bodily actions, such as sex and violence induced by the pre-language brain — we will call "The Spuma Rule." Moreover, the second one may be elevated as "The Civil Rule." It involves our use of symbols, not acts of violence, to teach, celebrate, and influence others, and also the use of symbols to set behaviors for ourselves and define our identity.

We will use the term 'spuma,' to stand for any froth of symbols, verbal or non-verbal . We will use the Latin spelling spuma rather than the English spume to underline that spuma is a technical term accompanying bodily spontaneity. If you don't want to be quite as serious you can say "balderdash" or "baloney" instead of spuma.

In the midst of the loftiest human pursuit of the human mind, bodily spontaneity is always present. The Cambridge philosopher Simon Blackburn leads us to a quote from Schopenhauer (1819, book 4) about sexual desire permeating almost all human endeavors:

> [It] exerts an adverse influence on the most important affairs, interrupts the most serious business at any hour, sometimes for a while confuses even the greatest minds, does not hesitate with its trumpery to disrupt the negotiations of statesmen and the research of scholars, has the knack of slipping its love-letters and ringlets even into ministerial portfolios and philosophical manuscripts. Quoted in (Blackburn 2004, 263-64).

A well-known example of the intrusion of sex in serious pursuits is offered by a good-hearted, man with great aspirations, the Prophet Muhammad. He hears permission by an archangel to take a child-bride, Aisa, as a wife. He also learns that he will be exempted from the limit of four wives imposed on all other believers. Muhammad's emotional surrender to the lively and witty Aisa is actually a very human episode.

What Schopenhauer said about sex seems to be true for all kinds of bodily spontaneity.

Signals in connection with bodily spontaneity, including even reflection and exchanges, are not unknown in more developed animals. However, they abound in humans. When such signals mixes with the reactions of the reptilian brain, the former usually occurs after, not before, the actual physical behavior. Studying the pre-language parts and language parts of the human brain, a researcher may first read traces in the pre-language brains of actions arising as bodily spontaneity, then, in another part of the brain, he sees the traces of symbols that call for action (Libet

2004). Roughly speaking, the left hemisphere of the brain constantly weaves symbols into a more or less coherent account of the behavior chosen by pre-language brains. The symbols that make up such accounts are mere froth, embellishments of the behaviors already being initiated or even executed. They belong to the broad phenomenon of spuma. Damage in the frontal lobes can make this confusion of memory and imagination bizarre and it spuma diagnosed as 'confabulation.' In a less severe form, it is a distortion of language in everyday-life.

Hunting to kill animals is a natural behavior. It was essential in another time to obtain food for sustenance. The dedicated hunter dresses his hunting habits in the spuma of hunting, the tallyho language. The climax of the hunt is the lustful kick when an animal is in the sight of his gun and he presses the trigger to kill. He may speak rapturously about the joy of hunting: it brings you outdoors and close to Mother Nature. But he hardly reaches the same excitement when he is in the woods without his gun.

The discovery of spuma plays havoc with the assumption that human behavior is caused by the symbols that mankind willfully uses in speech or writing, e.g. the social norms of the Ten Commandments or other symbolic expressions with an imperative function. The dictum that all uniform human behavior has its causes in social norms (Segerstedt, Social Control as a Sociological Concept 1948, 23) has an exception. The dictum does not apply to man's bodily spontaneity, however uniform and shared it may be. Social norms do not initiate such activities. Restrictive norms may sometimes stop them, but social norms do not generate these bodily activities.

To identify spuma is the first skill a student of society must learn. It is a piece of cynicism that separates genuine social reality from window dressing.

We may be lost in people's lamentations arising from their bodily spontaneities. If you hear the words "I love you" you have to decode the message correctly. What does it mean this time? "I am bewitched, bothered and bewildered by you," "I

want to share the rest of my life with you," "I simply want intercourse with you," "I enjoy(ed) our screwing."

[BIO] In studies of sexual behavior that get their data by interviewing adults, the total number of heterosexual intercourses reported by men should be the same as the total number reported by women. However, the numbers do not tally. Men tell about more heterosexual sex than do women. The mean or median between them may be a questionable estimate of the total number of sexual intercourses. Since Alfred Kinsey and his coworkers in (1948) and (1953) had interviewed volunteers in their pioneering works on human sexual behavior, it was easy to suspect that their sampling had been biased by sexually active males. However, using adequate probability sampling, we found the same discrepancy in Sweden: men seemed to inflate their number of heterosexual intercourses, and women perhaps deflate theirs (Zetterberg 1969). The discrepancy has re-occurred in subsequent studies in many countries, leading to an animated methodological debate (for the summary see Fennell (2002, 22-26). We have noted that the difference in reproductive organs make for a major brain difference between women and men (1: 46). Their different bodily spontaneities from reproductive organs apparently produce different sexual spuma that colors what they verbalize about activities such as sexual intercourse.

People also tend to produce spuma when they have developed addictions, e.g. have chemically manipulated their bodies to produce lust when they consume an addictive ware. If you ask an alcoholic why he or she drinks so much, you may hear a lot of spuma. A physician specializing in treating alcoholics may draw correct conclusions about actual alcohol consumption from an alcoholic's verbalizations. Others underestimate intakes of alcohol. A survey researcher asking the general public how much alcohol the respondents drink is usually off by about 50 percent or more when the answers are tabulated and compared to the sales figures for alcohol, a fact discovered by Pernanen (1974).

No spuma is scientific but you can be scientific about spuma. What Francis Bacon called "idols of the market place" was loaded with spuma. The phenomenon of spuma also turns up in what was called "derivations" by the Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto. His term signals that something we say about an action or a person may not be its core, its "residue," but "derivations" such as embellishment, hogwash, bilge, claptrap, or hallelujah-speak. Pareto's main work (Trattato di sociologia generale 1916) has numbered paragraphs. Distinctions are discussed in §119 and 868, classification of residues in §888, and classification of derivations in §1419. Terms such as idols and derivations, however, have other meanings today to most students and a new terminology would be all to the good. We propose 'spuma.' Brain researchers and psychiatrists have the term "confabulation" for more pathological cases.

Embedded in mankind's fierce uprisings, brutal crusades, and violent revolutions is a great deal of spuma. Thus, lofty ideals praise the successes of rebels, crusaders, and revolutionaries. And, the same spuma is sermonized at the burials of those rebels, crusaders, and revolutionaries that met violent deaths in their efforts.

The spuma from past violent uprisings, crusades, and revolutions usually lives on, sometimes for several generations. Almanacs mark memorial days of remembrance for those who have died in a nation's military ventures. The spuma and its echoes may inspire also those who try to live by words. Consider the example when a violent liberation or revolution results in a democratic constitution. Then each forthcoming election represents a welcome celebration of the achievement to create governments that rule by words, not swords. However, each election in such a country is also a reminder of what acts of violence once achieved. Thus, the same spuma may confuse new democratic generations, who may easily become revolutionary romantics.

We may go astray in our study of social reality if we cannot identify the spuma when parents, peers, teachers, pop singers,

newscasters, artists, and priests lament about the economy, politics, morals, ugliness, and health. To cut through spuma is a necessary art for the student of society. Spuma is the sizzle rather than the steak.

Enter Magic

It was a fantastic event when mankind found out that language used by a person can affect the behavior of other people. You say "Welcome to the table!" and people gather at the table. You say "Move this table closer to the window!" and helpful hands move it there. "Help yourself to some wine!" and people serve themselves from your wine. You say "Try this chocolate!" and people put the pieces of dark chocolate into their mouths.

Such experiences make it very easy to believe that language is omnipotent. So you say "Move this mountain!" or "Make this water into wine!" or "Rise, take up thy bed, and walk!" But nothing of the sort happens. You have merely engaged in the magic use of words in the belief that they can affect physics and move mountains, affect chemistry and turn water into wine, affect biology and cure sickness. In advanced forms this is sorcery or witchcraft. If you try to hurt people by magic we call it black magic. If you try to help people, it is white magic. However, it does not matter whether you use advanced sorcery or sophisticated witchcraft, or if you have evil or good intentions.

Consider these simple rules of thumb for the normal use of language:

- Language does not affect physical reality.
- Language may affect the biological reality of humans, but only in special and limited ways specified by "vocabularies of motives," the topic of the entire Volume 3 of *The Many-Splendored Society*. It may affect animals through the process of domestication.
- Language does indeed both define and affect mankind's social reality, but only in ways and circumstances that can be stipulated in the regularities found in structuration, dialectics, and other parts of social science. The "dialectics," mentioned here is

introduced in the next chapter. The “structuration” will be presented in the Introduction of the next volume (2: 1-8) and will remain a recurrent topic in rest of *The Many-Splendored Society*.

Incantations claim to deny the rules of thumb for proper language use and put laws of nature out of play, at least temporarily. Entertainer-magicians use incantations (literally meaning "the singing of a spell on something or someone") to get around the rules for proper language use. They invoke *Abracadabra*, which is an extraordinary interesting Aramaic phrase used by their God: "I will create as I speak." Abracadabra, creating by speaking, could be the title of a book (like this one) on social reality. In a creative sense, abracadabra is a possibility for man in his social reality, but impossibility in his biological and physical reality. More on this in our discussions on Freedom in Social Reality beginning on page 1: 174 below.

A 'myth,' in its popular meaning, is a narrative that in some places violates some of the above rules of thumb for normal use of language. This leaves an awfully large amount of language in the realm of myths. If this is to be our definition, it is clear that a human life without myths is a barren life. Fortunately there are many lively, amusing, entertaining and educating myths. They are found in story-telling, literature, theater, street life, family dinners, and the like, even in professional circles. Mass media without myths would have a limited success compared to those that routinely serve us the myth of the day. Often the myths are rich in content and most often they are cheap to come by.

The splashes of this type of language are particularly broad and vivid in children’s speech and in their preferred reading: Yes, Virginia there is a Santa Claus. In the years after the turn of the century, books on Harry Potter, trained in a magician's school, topped the bestseller lists of children's books in many parts of the world.

Everyone knows that there are many streaks of magic in childhood and primordial societies, but few realize the wide streaks of magic in great civilizations. So, it is easy to fill our lives with myths, and no one should stop us from using this

privilege we have as symbol-using beings. The thing to be aware of, however, is the part of myths that we shall call "magic."

Five Principles of Magic

Ernst Cassirer, a German philosopher in the Kantian tradition, whose ambition was to explore all major forms of symbolism, had to devote the whole second volume of his three-volume work *Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen* (Cassirer 1923-29/2001-02) to "mythical thought." Some samples:

> The whole and its parts are interwoven, their destinies are linked, as it were — and so they remain even after they have been detached from one another in pure fact. Even after such separation the fate of the part hangs over the whole as well. Anyone who acquires the most insignificant bodily part of a man — or even his name, his shadow, his reflection in a mirror, which for myth are also real "parts" of him — has thereby gained power over the man, has taken possession of him, has achieved magical power over him. — — — The workings of this form of thought can be followed in respect to time as well as space: it makes over the intuition of succession and simultaneity in its own mold. — — — Among certain Indian tribes if an enemy's spittle can be obtained, it is enclosed in a potato and hung in the chimney: as the spittle dries in the smoke, the enemy's strength dwindles with it (Cassirer 1923-29/2001-02, II, 51-52).

Cassirer in his groundbreaking work sees myths, including magic, as a form of symbolism with its own principles. He explores these principles as they have appeared in historical perceptions of time and space, and in conceptions of man and fellowman. We select five of his principles of mythical thinking that also are magical, numbered by me so that we can later refer to them. The third principle, as we just learned, is considered the most fundamental. Here is our selection of five principles of magic:

1st principle of magic, or magic(1). *In time, all events that happen simultaneously belong together.* Migrating birds bring with them

the summer when they arrive and later take it with them when they leave. In a magical myth, in contrast to science, correlation is always causation. The postulate in astrology that the sign of the zodiac at your birth affects you in later life is the typical example.

2nd principle of magic, or magic(2). *In space, all things that have once touched each other thereafter hang together*. In the coronation of a king, you transfer the royal attributes of past kings by giving the regalia to the new king: the crown, the scepter, the sword, and the scourge. In alchemy, you can transfer a property of one metal such as its glow into another by a special mixing of the two. At the turn of the century, a number of African males held that HIV/AIDS could be cured by sexual intercourse with a virgin; the purity of the girl would transfer to the smitten male. In myths, unlike in science, even the remotest contact can be seen as causation.

3rd principle of magic, or magic(3). *What holds true for the part always also holds for the whole, and vice versa.* With a strand of hair from a person you get control of the entire person. Merely by knowing someone's name you have an advantage, and still better, if you have an image of the person you can control him or her by manipulating the image. In science, such "holographic" parallels in which the whole has exactly all the properties of its parts are rare; in myths, they are the rule.

4th principle of magic, or magic(4). *All happenings and creations are willed by some being.* There are beings in material things and behind events. There may be a spirit in a tree, a stone, in everything. There are gods who blow the winds from their places in the north, south, east, and west. The ultimate myth is that a being designed or created the entire universe. When Adam Smith wrote that "an invisible hand" set the prices in the economy, he alluded to this magical view of his time. In reality, as he most certainly knew, there was no hand at all. The prices were a spontaneous order, a result of human action but not of human design.

5th principle of magic, or magic(5). *A verbal formula can produce a quick change from anything evil to something good, and vice versa.*

The formula is known to medicine men of yore who could incant it to solve everyday problems in their tribe. In ancient Greece, a "love strike" would bring miraculous benefits. In Medieval Europe magicians outside the Church said "Hocus Pocus," a corruption of the Latin of the priests who said "hoc est corpus," i.e. the magical change of the substances of bread and wine into that of the body and blood of Christ.

The medieval magicians have latter-day counterparts. They may promote quick fixes to personal problems by a new diet. They may solve social issues by slogans about anti-globalization. They may save the planet by abandoning automobiles. They have formulas to turn poverty into riches by neoliberal market shocks or by socialist wage earners' funds. Others have formulas to turn war into peace by making love, not war. Worst of all, some political practitioners of magic promise a blitz war to end all wars. A common denominator of all magical formulas using the fifth principle of magic is that the promised changes are effected straight away, or almost immediately.

When any of these five principles appears in a tale or a myth it turns the tale or myth into a *magical* myth.

Magic is never science. While magic and science are like fire and water, one can nevertheless be scientific about magic. Malinowski (Magic, Science and Religion 1925/1948) discovered that the natives of the Trobriand Islands were quite able to distinguish practical efforts from magical ones. They would scoff if you suggested that they attempt to replace their practices of gardening or fishing with magic. However, at all uncertain turns in their lives, be it unpredictable weather or poor prospects of crop survival, they punctuated their cultivation and fishing with magic.

A second skill a student of mankind must learn is thus to identify magic; the first was the identification of spuma. A common indication of “progress” is the stripping of magic elements from the language of a society. It is not an easy task for there are many magical elements in modern institutions. Natural science, wherever it is taught freely, has done a magnificent job

in eradicating magic from our views on nature; the social sciences have some to catch up in this regard. More on the relation between magic and science in 4: 82.

It is not easy to resist mankind's long romance with magical thinking.

Without the ingrained quick-fix fifth principle of magic, Europeans would not so readily have embraced Socialism. The socialists replaced "Silent night," as the most popular song, by the Internationale. In 1871, Eugene Pottier wrote its magic message: "C'est *la lutte finale* / Groupons-nous et demain / L'Internationale / Sera le genre humain." (In English: “So comrades, come rally / And the *last fight* let us face / The Internationale unites the human race.”) Italics are supplied here. Only a magic(5) fight is sure to be the last one.

Without the ingrained third principle of magic, terrorism would have less appeal. Terrorism is the use of violence guided by the third principle of magic; by destroying a small part you believe that you destroy the whole. The terrorist who pulled the trigger of his gun on the 28th of June 1914 in Sarajevo against the Austrian crown prince and his wife believed in the magic that by destroying this visible pair of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, he would destroy the whole empire. A series of unexpected circumstances led to the First World War, and to the actual fall of the empire. It is the task of serious historians to explain this process by other means than magic; allowing for the important fact that the assassin believed in the magic(3) of terrorist acts.

Without the ingrained fourth principle of magic, the world of the first decade of the twenty-first century would not so readily have accepted the idea that the main cause of global warming is man’s emission of CO_2 into the atmosphere. The non-human processes in nature that affect global temperature were perceived as more marginal. They include cloud formation, solar, volcanic, and oceanographic activities. Scientists advising the United Nations seemed unaware that their CO_2-message on climate change, regardless of the level of support it had from research, played into an old pattern of magic, and for this reason

got a good part of its quick and overwhelming public acceptance. Willy-nilly, the world obtained a magic(4)-supported opinion about global warming from a body of scientists. Due to the publicBig Datas' long experience of magic(1) and magic(2), we have reason to expect similar boosts in public acceptance to other findings, be they true or spurious, from the now fashionable research with "Big Data". See page 1: 179 below.

Of particular importance for social science is the debunking of the fourth principle of magic. For this principle means that the social world has no spontaneous formation: all is willed or designed by some being. This unwarranted superstition turns human history into a story of villains and heroes, and it turns social thinking into conspiracy theories. It ignores the fact that spontaneous orders are not only legion in society but also essential for its functioning. In addition, social scientists can be scientific about them. Examples of such spontaneous orders are public opinion in the body politic, market prices in the economy, Wikipedia's in realms of knowledge. A section on "Spontaneous Orders in Societal Realms" is found in the next Volume of *The Many-Splendored Society: An Edifice Built by Symbols* (2: 219-231).

Enter the Defensive Bilge

In Aesop's fable, the fox that is unable to reach the grapes, attempts to get rid of his resentment at this failure by persuading himself that the grapes were sour and were not what he wanted anyway. Resentment also means that a person inferior on a common scale of evaluation harbors envy of a superior person. This phenomenon obtained its own label from Friedrich Nietzsche when he applied it to resentments in a collectivity. Add an *i* to resentment so that it reads "resentiment." The slaves often develop resentiment, argues Nietzsche. In order to deal with their envy they become collectively convinced that it is good to be humble.

Nietzsche's resentiment belongs to a class of phenomena that we shall call 'defensive bilge.' To sailors, bilge is the water that sloshes inside the boat at its bottom. It is not the real thing, the

waves of the big sea. The bilge in a boat may rise to dangerous levels and it often stinks. For safe and pleasant sailing it is pumped into the ocean. Likewise, the bilge in social reality has a self-deceptive odor. The guardians of honesty and realism pump it out.

Psychoanalysis has filled defensive bilge with sophisticated content. The repertoire of maneuvers for a person with a wounded self-image is much longer than 'sour grapes'. For example, a worker who is doing a poor job may blame it on his poor equipment. Instead of saying, "I have done a poor job," he may say "The tools were no good," i.e. resorting to a 'rationalization,' as this term is used in psychology to designate verbiage of excuses that may sound reasonable. Other steps might lead to the same end. Actions that are incompatible with his favorable self-evaluation tend to be described by the person as acts of other agents: this is the process of 'projection.' Its typical expression is, that "they" are the objects of blame, not "me." Another example is the sexually weak man who never misses an opportunity to tell others of his sexual adventures. To protect the evaluation he enjoys, he pictures his actions as being the opposite of what they really are. Actions that are incompatible with his accustomed favorable self-evaluation and tend to be presented to oneself and to others as opposite to, or different from, what they really are, we label 'inversion.'

In clinical experience one can observe whole chains of defense mechanisms. In our culture, the wife batterer, for example, tends to avoid recognition of his impulses in order to preserve his self-respect (denial). In addition, he may deny that his anger comes from himself, saying by no means, "I am angry," but rather, "You are angry" (projection). Furthermore, he may transfer the latter into "She hates me" (new projection) and thus develops paranoid ideas. All these so-called "defense mechanisms" elaborated by Anna Freud (1942) may be viewed as typical ways in which our perceptions and communications change when our opinion of ourselves is lowered and no other easy design is found to raise it.

The defensive mechanisms in Anna Freud's version early were confirmed by quantitative empirical research (Sears 1951, Ch 7) .

Defensive bilge can be augmented by magic. The fact that Black Africa touches Egypt and has done so for centuries has prompted some beliefs that fit the first and second principles of magic. Many Afro-Americans, like many educated Africans, whose ancestors did not have a written language to document their history, insist that classical Egyptian civilization was the work of black people south of the Sahara. They believe in the defensive bilge that the white Greeks stole this civilization, that Cleopatra was a black woman, that Pallas Athena in the Acropolis was an African black goddess. This defensive magic bilge is heartily endorsed by many Afrocentrists. Its origin, however, is not African, but a white American, Martin Bernal (1987), sinologist at Cornell University, who mistakenly thinks it is science.

In this type of debate, we must stick to the search for the truth and ignore other purposes. Simply, because you believe in empowering black people, you are not allowed to lie and say that Aristotle stole his ideas from the library at Alexandria — the library was not there in his time.

For a student of social reality, it is as essential to be able to identify defensive bilge as it is important to identify human spuma and magic. It is the third and the most difficult skill for students who want to engage in the proper study of mankind, i.e. a study that avoids illusions of language.

Professional public opinion pollsters still lack assessment of the amount of defensive bilge that is included in their reported opinions. For example, they have difficulties in assessing how much of anti-American attitudes recorded around the world are due to defensive bilge with sour grapes about the American wealth and way of life, and how much are due to real grievances. Wall Street's hard sell of toxic subprime mortgage securities to financial institutions around the world, causing a global banking standstill in 2008, was certainly a real grievance, but no pollster could figure out how much anti-Americanism it caused.

Our Master Trends: the Civil and the Rational

In the centuries since the emergence of man on this earth, the size of the human brain and, more important, average brain complexity has increased. This growth has not necessarily occurred continuously but intermittently in periods of leaps and bounds. The parts of the brain that house the language functions have changed the most. We recall that the invention of reading only a few thousand years ago has already left traceable reorganizations of brains in advanced populations (Wolf 2007).

The language brain does not only produce magic, spuma and defensive bilge. Its main task is very different: to govern our own actions as well as the actions of others living in our symbolic environment. This is the core of civilized living, and language is its vehicle. We are not born civil: we become so by learning how to use and react to symbols. For example, a child may be called civil when it has learned to settle a conflict by use of words — even if some words are foul — rather than by the use of fists, thrusts, and kicks. Civilized parents teach their children to argue with words, not by violence. Uncivilized parents allow and encourage their children to use physical strength in their fights.

Pre-language abilities such as muscular strength, mobility, and sexual prowess have lost some of their obvious advantage when language skills become more essential for survival. In an emblematic job classification at the end of the twentieth century Robert B Reich (1992) separates three types of jobs:

physical jobs such as farmer, fisherman, carpenter, weaver, launderer, repairman;

person-to-person service jobs, such as hairdresser, tailor, waiter, nurse;

symbol-manipulating jobs, such as accountants, journalists, lawyers.

A growing number of people are offering the labor market their ability to work with symbols and manipulate them. Fewer people engage in physical jobs in the advanced countries.

The expansion of the symbol-handling activities, i.e. the increased use of language, is a most important development in the modern world. This idea deserves a name of its own, and we call it The Master Trend of Civility. With language comes the issue of rationality, a fact already noted by Heracles. Therefore, a consequence of our master trend of civility is a Master Trend of Rationality.

Proposition 3:5. The Master Trend of Civility and The Master Trend of Rationality: The history of humanity is (a) a slow but in bursts increasing expanse of language-based activities, both in absolute and relative terms, when compared with pre-language activities. Also, the history of humanity is (b) a slow but by bursts increasing proportion of language activities based on rationality, both in comparison with the pre-language activities and in comparison with all language activities.

The work you are reading right now can claim relevance exactly because it focuses on these expanding trends in human life. The symbolic environment of humanity expands and with that comes expanding rationality.

The Axial Age

It is admittedly difficult to conduct research on the existence of long master trend of civility and on the expanding symbolic environment and rationality. Such trends, as we have noted (page 1: 30), do not develop evenly. There are ruptures in the curve. One break that has intrigued scholars is the so called "axial civilizations" of China, India, and the Occident in the period 800 to 200 BCE (Jaspers 1949).

Intense bursts of symbolic activity occurred in this period that expanded symbolizations, in particular, the more rational ones. The thrust of the period is signaled by a progressively swinging time curve in Figure 3.2, which applies to all axial civilizations, not only the one close to the curve. Imperial China, India with developing Hinduism and Buddhism, Persia (Iran) with Zoroas-

trian, ancient Israel during the period of the Second Temple, and not the least, ancient Greece and Rome, all show this pattern.

Figure 3.2. Bursts of Sophisticated but Isolated Symbolic Activity during the first 200 years of the the Axial Age.



A striking fact is that these parallel developments in the millennium BCE occurred without significant mutual contacts between these civilizations, a strange fact, (or coincidence) in human history. Nevertheless, each one of them certainly caused a major upheaval for humankind on its territory. The later Christian and Islamic civilizations do not have this independence; they are, however, highly dependent on a Jewish and Greco-Roman axial heritage.

The great bursts of symbolic activity can crystallize in different directions. All of the axial civilizations experienced swings toward an emphasis on "becoming" rather than mere "being"

(i.e. what we call modernity and begin to discuss on page 1: 135). They seem to grow proportionally more pristine than mundane symbols (see page 1: 74 below). Some but probably not all axial civilizations experienced glorious revolutions with significant steps in differentiation and consolidation of societal realms. (See page 1: 23 on the Glorious Revolution for our paradigmatic European case.) It also seems as if several of the axial bursts in symbolic environments have had counterparts in bursts towards so called Gesellschafts, one of the big master clusters of social organization that we shall discuss under the heading "Folk Life and City Life" (2: 147-151). Another correlate, based on modern data from intelligence testing, is the so-called Flynn effect on intelligence that we soon will discuss (page 1: 172). Ability to operate with symbols is one of the brain activities that enter intelligence quotients. We expect this part of IQ to increase in axial ages.

Is the simultaneous and independent growth of the axial civilizations a natural development or a coincident? The foremost among researchers into this problem is Shmuel N Eisenstadt. In his later works he rejects more explicitly Jasper's assumption of a natural historical transcendence and crystallization into axial civilizations. Instead he puts forward four more circumstantial factors from his studies:

> First, these analyses indicate that the crystallization of any concrete institutional pattern entails, is contingent on, the development of distinct dimensions of social interaction which differ from the general evolutionary tendencies i.e. from the development of new resources and new symbolic orientations. Second, the crystallization of institutional and symbolic formations is effected by distinct types of actors, the emergence of which constitutes a socio-cultural mutation, which is not predetermined by broad evolutionary tendencies. Third, the crystallization of concrete institutional patterns is contingent on the development of patterns of interaction and of mechanisms of control and regulations between major social actors, above all between different would-be elites and between them

and broader social sectors. Fourth, historical contingencies play indeed a very important role in the process of such crystallization (Eisenstadt 2009, 138-39).

Entirely different confirmations of a long master trend of civility can be found watching its predictable consequences. Some are visible in every-day living. For example, in the long run, the victory of the language brain may be confirmed for everyone to see by a victory of the feminist doctrine of equality between the sexes. Women's language abilities are as good (and sometimes better) than men's. This cannot always be said for their physical abilities governed by pre-language brains. A safe forecast that a social scientist can make about the development of modern society based on the master trend of civility is this: the female language brain will come to its rights in social reality. In a world of expanding symbolic environments, it will eventually create equality between the sexes.

As we have seen in recent years, gender equality is speeded up by legislative political activity and designs. Nevertheless, in the very long run its victory is in the cards with or without aggressive feminists and with or without Taliban and other Muslims, who prohibit girls from going to schools. More on these consequences of the master trend of civility in a moment.

Rationality

Let us turn to the Master Trend of Rationality — clause (b) in Proposition 3:5 — that deals with those special parts of language activities that are marked by rationality.

A main key to human history is rationality, which we interpret as an effort to make more effective and consonant the many parts of human existence governed by the language brain. Rationality (and its philosophical system of 'rationalism') has been a striking warping in the fabric of Western culture from its very beginning; no other civilization has so embraced rationality as ours (Weber 1922). Pitirim A Sorokin (1937-41, vol 2, 31) attempted to tabulate the extent to which Western systems of truth and knowledge exhibit traits of rationalism, empiricism, mysti-

cism, criticism, skepticism, and fidelism during each century from 600 BCE to 1900 CE. Rationalism takes first rank in 17 out of these 25 centuries and ranks second in the remaining eight.

Max Weber held that rationality is a double star towards which societal development is heading. On the one hand, the multiplicity of human symbols is arranged into systems, and on the other the great repertoire of action in human life is arranged in uniform institutions. The first star guides a rationalization that secularizes religions, demystifies nature, breaks the enchantment of art, lays bare magic in the pursuit of knowledge and salvation, and removes the sense of drama from power. The second star guides a rationality that elucidates everyday life, organizes working life, ritualizes spiritual life, calculates the steps in business life, and bureaucratizes all aspects of governance.

These processes unfold unevenly and jerkily. They were formulated, fairly naively, by thinkers during the European Enlightenment, and they were developed further by social philosophers who wrote in Charles Darwin's spirit of optimism about progress. It was first through Max Weber that these lines of thought became historically established and many-sided (Roth 1968). This happened when Weber sought to report on the special nature of his own civilization and describe the severe conflicts in our everyday life and our institutions that have been caused by Western rationality.

The development of rationality in its twin forms — systematization of ideas and organization of actions — results in a kind of triumph of reason, and in our culture a triumph of bureaucracy and technocracy. Weber was not gladdened by this fate: as he saw it, it placed man in “an iron cage,” and moved society towards petrifaction, "an icy polar night.” Already in the first decade of the twentieth century, he was able in his 1905 study of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism to outline the typical human being of the twentieth century: "an expert without a heart, a hedonist without moral stature.”

A careful search through Weber's writings finds twelve somewhat different usages of the term "rationality" (Levine 1985, 210). Looking at more recent works on rationality, for example, by Nozick (1993), we find many more, some so specialized that they seem beyond the reach of a public with average education.

Most of his life, Weber perceived rationality as a unitary phenomenon, albeit with several different attributes. The same also holds for the great formalizers of rational choice theory in economics. We shall return in Volume 4–6 to this issue when we deal with different expressions of rationality in the different realms of science, art, economy, religion, polity, and morality. Our conclusion is that they are indeed different from one another. Nevertheless, they all are efficient and consistent uses of language and mathematics. They resist the ever-present spuma, magic, and defensive bilge.

The Specter of Islam: Combatant Fundamentalism

The early efforts to spread the Prophet Muhammad's teachings during three-four centuries after his death were extraordinary successful and soon covered Indian, Persian, Egyptian, Hellenic and European territories. We write "On the Early Replacement of Christianity with Islam" in the chapter on religion in Volume 6, Part 2, of *The Many-Splendored Society: The Pursuit of Sacredness.*

In fact, at that time after the millennium shift in 1000 CE, Muslims touched the heritage from all axial civilizations except the Chinese; (Islam also reached China in a noticeable way but mostly at a later date). This was a totally unique educational situation:

> A Muslim could study, from records preserved on his own soil, the astronomies of India, Babylon, and Egypt; Indian and Persian mathematics; the philosophical concepts of the Greeks; the medicine, geography, astronomy, and mathematics of the Hellenistic age; the botanical, pharmacological, zoological, geological, and geographic lore amassed by the ancient world as a whole (Goldstein 1980, 98).

Bayt al-Hikma, the House of Wisdom in Baghdad, sheltered scholars in this golden age of Muslim learning. Its translators brought Greek philosophy and science to the Arab-speaking world. The House had a leading role in preserving, comparing, and merging contributions of the surrounding axial civilizations. It achieved a synthesis and development of their mathematics and some natural philosophy. It enjoyed protective patronage from the Abbassid rulers. Outwardly, it accommodated enough orthodox Muslim theology to be tolerated also by Muslim fundamentalists of those days.

In Spain, the Caliphate of Cordoba at its 100+ years of peak in the tenth century could exhibit this fantastic human heritage on European soil. This indeed looked like a take-off of high culture and perhaps a many-splendored society. Some of its richness spilled over into the European Renaissance. In the late thirteenth century, at the Court of King Alfonso X, *el sábio* (the Wise), of Castilla and León, advanced versions of Islamic, Christian, and Jewish civilizations reached a peaceable and creative coexistence.

For the Muslim world, unfortunately, this was a short-lived condition. In 1258, The House of Wisdom was destroyed during a Mongol invasion of Baghdad. The Mongols carried out an onslaught on axial civilizations, using military violence in a way we have defined as 'uncivilized' on page 1: 103 above, and will further develop as a theme in Volume 3 of *The Many-Splendored Society*. Primitive Muslim orthodoxy made sure that the defeat became lasting. In all caliphates — Baghdad, Jerusalem, and Cordoba — most Muslim teachers and the Muslim youth stopped studying this heritage from axial civilizations. Instead, they were rewarded for concentrating all study on Islam, to the point of memorizing the Qur'an by rote. The Muslim world had botched their finest hour.

All Muslims worth their salt are fundamentalist in the original sense; they believe that the Qu'ran is the word of Allah, and that reciting of the Qu'ran is the road to a good life on earth and to Paradise. In time, after the death of the Prophet, such doctrines

took precedence over any wisdom handed down from the axial civilizations.

This is a most serious setback in our master trends of civility and rationality. I can think of no greater tragedy in history of ideas than this particular victory of Muslim fundamentalism over several axial civilizations. It shows a frightening weakness of a system in which everything civilized is transmitted, not by genes, but by symbols. In principle, it takes only two mislead generations, equipped with effective persuasion assisted by violence, to wipe out a civilization. We think of a situation when children do not learn civilized living and culture from parents, nor from grandparents. In practice, of course, it takes longer to wipe out a civilization since it involves not only parents but also teachers who educate new generations in schools outside families and households. Also, any thorough change in the symbolic environment needs generations.

Immunities to the ways and views of Muslim rulers are hidden in codes of many native languages in territories that came under Muslim occupation. It may still be worthwhile to search for echoes of axial civilizations between the lines of writings by scholars in old Muslim lands.

At the time of this writing, a specter of terror from a more combatant and persuasive Muslim fundamentalism goes through the world. Can it molest a civilization such as the Anglo-Protestant one we described on page 1: 23. Yes, temporarily, but in the end the Master Trends of Civility and Rationality will reassert themselves. The Chinese, Indian, and Western civilizations will eventually prevail over Muslim fundamentalism. Maybe even Iran can revive some of its Persian heritage scattered by the Ayatollahs. We can again take the position of women as an indicator.

A religious discourse and a societal realm concerned with sacredness is a natural part of any society. Suppression of women, however, is not a genuine part of any sacredness. We may explain it in Volume 7 of *The Many-Splendored Society* as the institu-

tionalization of a version of sexual spuma (1: 92) from males and young mothers.

A strong male hegemony is an entrenched element in Islam, more so than in Christianity and in Buddhism. This hegemony has support from religious practices and teachings in mosques. Courts enforce it with corporal punishments. Unchecked mob violence and explicitly condoned domestic violence back up the male hegemony. All this is on its way out, either to disappear within Islam, or to drag the entire Muslim religion into oblivion.

Such is the hint from the human master trend of civility.

The European Enlightenment

Enlightenment is the word we use about a symbolic environment stripped of magic, spuma, and defensive bilge and instead filled with rationality.

Enlightenment is always a matter of degree. We may cling to the idea that education will give enlightenment to students. However, let us not forget that schools may actually be full of nationalist or ideological baloney. University students and some professors may take the lead in producing defensive bilge against businessmen, or against the United States of America, and often enough against the whole heritage of the Western Enlightenment. Man's language brain is capable of both enlightenment and its opposite. Moreover, we as human beings are responsible for both.

Enlightenment became highly honored in eighteenth century Europe. In England, the philosopher and essayist Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626) laid bare the modern canon of scientific inquiry that is empirically grounded and theoretically consistent. His compatriot philosopher John Locke (1632 – 1704) explained the nature of human understanding of the world and the necessity to limit government to the tasks of defending freedom and property. The French philosopher François-Marie Voltaire (1694 – 1778) denounced bigotry and tyranny, and his compatriot Denis Diderot (1713 – 1784) explained new ideologies and all known

technologies in a monumental encyclopedia. In Germany, Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) wrote a secular philosophy of knowledge and morals, and his compatriot Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767 – 1835) gave universities a structure appropriate for science. In Scotland, David Hume (1711 – 1776) wrote a philosophy of skepticism and his compatriot Adam Smith (1723 – 1790) discovered how markets create wealth without the use of violence and plunder.

The experience of the Enlightenment is a decisive event. To use Ernest Gellner's phrase (Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals 1994, 50), it is a "big ditch," in which new knowledge surpasses all previous knowledge. European history between the ancient Greeks and the Enlightenment is not particularly remarkable compared to the history of other regions of the world. However, from the time of the Enlightenment and its spread to North America, we deal with unique developments, in volume to be sure, but also in kind. These developments are on a scale comparable only to China during the Sung period.

Prior to these Enlightenments, a multitude of intellectual styles could claim superiority. In retrospect, their claims seem rather arbitrary. On this score, the relativism of contemporary multiculturalists is right. After the European Enlightenment, however, there is only one winner on the world scene, regardless of what multiculturalists say in support of the defensive bilge of the losers.

The Master Trends as an Equalizer

With the rationality of the European Enlightenment, the language brain came into renewed focus. We got science and technology, government based on the consent of the governed, business based on negotiations between buyers and sellers in a market economy.

The creators of the Enlightenment whom we have mentioned were men. They were not men prone to use power and violence; such men came later with the French Revolution. With the possible exception of Bacon, who was Baron Verulam, Keeper of the

Privy Seal and Lord Chancellor of England, they were men of gentle dispositions and civil pursuits. They masterminded a great clean-up of spuma, magic, and defensive bilge and opened the doors to great advances in rationality and liberty.

[BIO] The fact that the ones we singled out were all males is probably a circumstance of the long developmental history of thousands of generations, when pre-language brains were a major force in humankind's survival and expansion. These brains ruled over significant differences between the sexes, for example, in muscular size, mobility, and proneness to aggression, and produced unequal life chances for men and women.

By contrast, the intellectual achievements of the fathers of the Enlightenment were products of the language brain, i.e. the more recently developed parts of human anatomy. The language brain shows only trivial differences between women and men compared to the pre-language brains, where more noticeable differences are found. When the Enlightenment makes the language brain an overwhelming force in shaping society, women can assume what they never before had on a large scale, namely large-scale equality between the sexes. Thus the European, white, males who spearheaded the Enlightenment, opened up a new world for women. With the exception of John Locke, they may have done this unwittingly or inadvertently.

Prior to the Enlightenment, generations of European society had a gender lens inherited from the pre-language brains that restricted women's pursuits of language brain activities. Seen through this lens the important and relevant world was the men's world. This has affected the view of numerous problems and their solutions.

The use of this gender lens eased in the twentieth century. Then women and men in the Western world more often were observed through the same lens, as fits the language brain's experience of women's and men's equal ability to use symbols. The generations of the twenty-first century will in all probability eradicate gender restrictions in the pursuit of achievements based on the language brain — in scholarship, business, politics,

art, religion, and morality — provided, of course, that our world becomes and/or remains civilized and enlightened.

In most physical sports, however, where the pre-language brain looms large, it will still be considered fair to let men and women compete separately. The same as is the case for juniors and seniors in sports.

Deficiencies of the Enlightenment

The European Enlightenment had two deficiencies that have become obvious to later observers. First, it did not fully appreciate emotive commitments. Shakespeare's Hamlet says: "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy." And, at least in one context, the great mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal (1623 – 1662) placed the grounds of the heart ahead of the grounds of reason. The European Enlightenment never found the crucial balance of a many-splendored society between the executive realms of science, economy, and polity and the emotive realms of art, religion, and ethics. In all of Europe, but perhaps more in Germanic Europe than in Latin Europe, the Enlightenment harbored men of intellect living coarse emotional lives.

Second, the European Enlightenment did not do a complete job in abolishing magic. It did well to discredit the first four principles of magic that we have identified (turn to page 1: 96 above). The Enlightenment exposed the magical beliefs that all events that happen simultaneously belong together, that all things that have once touched each other thereafter hang together, that what holds true for the part also holds for the whole, and that all happenings and creations are willed by some being, and that none occurs by the mere force of nature. However, the European Enlightenment failed to debunk the fifth principle of magic, that a verbal formula can produce a quick change from anything evil to something good, or vice versa. The magic that you quickly can transform social reality by a revolutionary rhetoric was cheered rather than debunked by many of the standard bearers of the European Enlightenment.

Among the usually mentioned products of the Enlightenment are various beliefs in reason: liberalism and socialism, the market economy and the planned economy, republicanism and modern democracy, all are children of the European Enlightenment. Actually, all these modern phenomena brought by the Enlightenment have been presented as more or less *quick fixes* that would bring a new era of harmony to humanity, not in heaven but on earth. This, however, is not necessarily working in the real world; it has obvious elements of the fifth principle of magic.

The thinkers of the Enlightenment rejected the Christian millennium, the Revelations of St. John. They replaced his eschatological paradise with new utopias of their own. Nazism is usually dismissed as a romantic illusion of race. But Hitler, an intellectually inclined Viennese without formal schooling, traced his racism to what he thought was as much enlightened science as his later highway net of Autobahns and his missile technology. The deeper dependency of Nazism on the Enlightenment has been explored by John Grey (2007, 55-69).

To the cheers of enlightened intellectuals with the slogan "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité" that fired the masses, the French stumbled into a revolution with drastic programs to change the social structure and everyday life.

Alexis de Tocqueville started late in life a major study of the French Revolution. In the first part, he set out to describe the feudal conditions in France that led to the Revolution. He had intended to go on to chart the revolutionary years and then chart the outcome of a new France, and finally compare the results with the society before the revolution. He only completed the first part of the study in 1856 and called it *L'Ancien régime et la Révolution*. In seven short paragraphs in that book — some more found in his collective works (1864-1866/1998-2001) — he hints at anticipated conclusions of his planned work. On balance, he says he would report more similarities of importance than differences. He rejects the notion of quick and, if necessary, cruel fixes to change society. The abolishment of feudalism brought

about by the Revolution was inevitable anyway, and "the old social structure would nonetheless have been shattered everywhere sooner or later." He debunks the common idea that the Revolution was a thorough turnaround of French society. "Radical though it may have been, the Revolution made far fewer changes than is generally believed, as I shall point out later." But there was not much of later detailed analysis. He could hint at an important fact about the power structure of France. The Revolution toppled the centralized power that the Court in Versailles had exercised. However, the revolutionaries actually "sought to increase the power and jurisdiction of the central authority" (Tocqueville 1856/1998, 19-20). This trend has been easy for others to observe in later French society: the continuous prevalence of an exceptionally strong central government and its ideology of dirigisme. Incidentally, such trends are anathemas to a many-splendored society.

To be sure, a long view of history shows great progress by the Enlightenment for the French people, as it does for humanity as a whole. Nevertheless, any grand quick fixes creating a future millennium on earth are as illusory and cruel as they are exciting to the believers. The believers are simply trapped by our fifth principle of magic. On this score, the European Enlightenment failed to be realistic.

Post-Structuralism and Enlightenment

A modern symbolic environment has many voices speaking in Saussurian meanings. Jacques Derrida, a master of the close reading of texts, revealed the hollowness in the practice of singling out a particular symbol in a Saussurian chain of meanings and calling it the beginning, the high point, the ultimate stage. Such judgments from outsiders are common to philosophers and among critics of literature, art, ideology, and architecture. They are often authoritarian and generally impossible to prove. This view gained considerable appeal in the United States after Derrida had applied it to the very Logos itself in a book on grammatology (Derrida 1976).

Derrida's followers, the deconstructionists, drew the ultimate philosophical consequences of an exclusive use of Saussurian meanings and their iterability. If symbols get their meaning only from their place in presentations, meanings may shift from time to time in an arbitrary way. Language, literature, legislation, education and everything else involving symbols are then mere games, often-chaotic games with ever-shifting rules. Thus, deconstructionists believe that there is no certainty in the Enlightenment.

Michel Foucault had arrived at the same conclusion and used it to deny any unitary truths, beauty, and morality. What people talk about as true statements do not tell us how things really are but about who is in command and has the power and the media access to establish the meanings of our symbols. Thus, he believes that there is no truth in the Enlightenment. Art is dismissed in a similar vein. Its beauty, as most see it, is a house of pretty cards set up by the powerful and economically advantaged to uphold their position in the social hierarchy. If so, we must conclude, intellectuals no longer have any protection against spuma, magic, or defensive bilge.

Outside of France, such views were called “post-structuralism.” They have some empirically grounded elements. Post-structuralism cannot be rejected simply by denouncing it as a fitting ideology for nihilists and anarchists. A search for Saussurian meanings is at the bottom of much scholarship in contemporary social science and cultural and literary criticism, too much, at the turn of the century.

In the two decennia before the turn of the century, *games* often illustrated the fashionable idea from post-structuralism that there is no such thing as "the truth" and that any statement about "good" and "evil" is arbitrary. Everything is subject to manipulations, a questionable inspiration for those who have to live real lives in the future.

An Appeal

The rapidity of the spread in the Western world of the relativism of post-structuralism has been amazing. Equally amazing is the self-deception of journalists and educators who think they "liberate" people by the message that whatever passes for truth, morality, and beauty is actually no more than products of arbitrary power.

As we will see when we study the dialectics of priorities in the next chapter, an extreme pragmatism opens the gates for an extreme dogmatism. In the new century, an increasing number of Europeans apparently found the relativistic stand of post-structuralism to be a weak, empty, and out-of-touch philosophy of life, particularly compared to the certainty of, say, Muslim dogma, or the widespread fundamentalisms of environment and gender.

A more viable and lasting critique of poststructuralist views must focus on the fact that all societies also have meanings in the form of shared and stable images. We need a dosage of George Herbert Mead to rescue us from a chaotic abyss of post-structuralism in which social scientists, journalists, and critics of culture lose bearings.

Shall social scientists and humanists follow the lead of George Herbert Mead and the symbolic interactionists and see symbols as a device to evoke grounded images? Alternatively, shall they follow the lead of Ferdinand de Saussure and the structuralists and see the meaning of symbols in the exchangeability of parts in presentations? The obvious answer is that we shall use both. In language — and probably also in other fields such as mathematics, the ballet, and perhaps in music — we find both meanings. That is why we define a symbol as that device by which we on any occasion can represent an image *and/or* a notion used in a presentation.

This definition requires the acceptance of both Meadian and Saussurian meanings. It does not compromise rationality and enlightenment. End of my appeal.

4. Vibrations in Symbolic Environments

The Sung Period

In 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell, and during a few of the following years when the European Union prepared for one of its expansions, there was much interest in my country of Sweden about European identity, and I was asked to lecture on European Civilization. I usually began such lectures by reading from a history book, omitting any reference to the time and place. As in a TV-quiz show, I asked the audience to identify the period and the country, as soon as they could during my reading. Before they hit the right answer, they had usually guessed the Enlightenment in France, or a period in England or New England after industrialization, or Bismarck's welfare state in Imperial Germany, or even the Muslim Caliphates of Baghdad or Cordoba in the Middle Ages. Here is the text that produced this diversity:

> The emperors reestablished the examination system and created a new, complex bureaucracy. Its characteristic and purpose were that all true decision-making was reserved for the emperor himself and his closest adviser. The state also assumed welfare functions . . . the old people's homes, the clinics, the children's homes, the cemeteries. The policy adopted was a kind of secularization . . . . The new bureaucratic and mercantile upper class embraced rationalist ethics. . . . The process of intellectual rationalization reflects the whole development of society. . . . Agricultural rationalization proceeded apace, with increasingly intensive rice-growing and the use of varieties that yielded two or three harvests a year. On this basis /the/ population now, for the first time, topped 100 million. The commercialization of the economy also continued: road and river transport systems were extended and large, multi-decker vessels propelled by blade wheels plied the waterways. Ocean-going ships now used the magnetic compass. . . . Both trade and the taxation system were based more and

> more on monetary thrift, and when metals no longer sufficed, or became cumbersome as means of exchange, there was a switch to the printing of bank-notes. Not only farming and commerce were modernized. It has been calculated that the use of iron and coal grew faster . . . than during the first two centuries of the English Industrial Revolution. Coal increasingly replaced charcoal. Iron was more and more often used for agricultural implements and weapons, in shipbuilding and bridge-building, in pagoda designs and even in images of deities. . . . The old towns walled and divided into various specialized districts, were demolished. Open, functionally mixed towns took their place, some getting populations of a million or more (Holmberg 1982, 170), translated here.

As you have guessed, the above description is of China, specifically, during the Sung Dynasty of 960 – 1200. At that period, China probably accounted for two thirds of the entire world's gross national product, GNP. Technologies, government by bureaucracies, money-based economies, far-flung trade, et cetera are not specialties of Europe. This was more than obvious to Marco Polo, who visited to the Chinese metropolis of Quinsai, now known as Hangzhou, shortly after the period described. China was united, while Europe was split into many parts. Cordoba was giving up its position as the greatest city and Venice, Marco Polo's hometown, assumed its place. Both are celebrated in urban history. However, at the time, Quinsai was the most advanced and prosperous city in the world.

Imperial China, for all its glory, has never been a model of a many-splendored society. All its societal realms have always been subordinate to the emperor; China was (and apparently still is under Communist rule) a single-splendid society. The Emperor was not only the political ruler and military commander; he was also the chief engineer and the supreme scientific authority, the sovereign of trade and industry, and the arbiter of artistic beauty and civic virtue. In time, he also became a god, or at least like a god.

More specifically, as we noted, the Emperor was the chief magician of the empire. The emperors had monopolized the most profound and pristine magic. Most of them delegated the running of the country to the literati, intellectuals certified by examinations to be civil servants. The latter did so with their down-to-earth rationality, which was largely devoid of magic.

All were to know their place and duties in Imperial China. Kong-Fuzi (known in the West as Confucius) not only claimed that the emperor carries out his tasks, and the minister his tasks, but anyone "being filial to your parents and befriending your brothers is carrying out the work of government" (Confucius 1998, analect 2.21). Thus, fathers should carry out their duties and sons do theirs. Brothers do theirs, and sisters stay with theirs. Likewise, students and teachers, and any other positions in society should stick to their assigned duties. The duties were always of reverence and assistance to seniors and superiors. The latter, in turn, had duties of compassion and benevolence toward those in subordinate positions. All in service of the Government, i.e. the Emperor.

Of course, such a single and total hierarchy is incompatible with a liberal society. The recent above-mentioned translation into English of Confucius' sayings (analects) reveals a streak in his thoughts, apparently suppressed by the emperors: insubordination to higher ranks is defensible and even expected in some severe and acute situations. On the surface, this sounds similar to justifications of civil disobedience in modern Western thought, a topic we treat in Volume 3 under the heading "Vocabularies Coping with Degrading" (3: 144-148).

Non-Utopian Intellectuals

The varieties of intellectuals in China, Vietnam, Korea, and their counterparts in Japan, are different from the European, Indian, and Arab intellectuals. Max Weber did not hide his admiration for the Chinese literati. Their example reminds Western, Indian, and Arab intellectuals that in the end non-utopian intellectuals may have more impact on a civilized social order than

radical ones who try to realize their pure ideals of living without hesitation and compromise.

During the twentieth century, utopian intellectuals were common in Europe. They promoted various blueprints of social reality. The fascists wanted a society based on the strength of a unifying national creed and united institutions, all based on a presumed historical heritage and mission. The Nazis wanted a society in which a master race runs all institutions. The communists sought a society based on the revolutionary power and presumed virtues of the working class, whose political party would rule all institutions. The capitalist intellectuals celebrated a society in which markets permeated all realms. Intellectuals in the grips of nationalism, fascism, Nazism, communism, and capitalism battled each other with words over such blueprints. Their masters promoted their different visions with the violence of wars, including two devastating world wars.

Non-utopian intellectuals of the twentieth century, a minority, looked upon all this with thoughtful disdain. They preferred to enjoy the present rather than hope for the blessings of future utopias. They tackled the problems of their societies piecemeal, as pragmatic conservatives, or not at all, as did the nihilists. Their survival and continued efforts as intellectuals undoubtedly benefited from the fact that the more liberal and more democratic side won World War I, and World War II, and the Cold War.

Interestingly enough, the most successful pragmatists at the turn of the century seem to be Chinese. In 1979 Deng Xiaoping, newly empowered leader of the Communist party, gave a speech that promoted more pragmatism for China than any of its classical scholars had dared. He urged the regime to focus on modernization, and let facts — not Marxist ideology — guide its path. "It doesn't matter if it is a black cat or a white cat. As long as it can catch mice, it's a good cat." At that point, China started with conviction on the road to become the industrial factory of the world, and to emerge as one of the fasted-growing markets in the world. It would employ fewer devices than India and Ja-

pan had done to close its home market from imports. China's gross national product (GNP) began to grow up to ten percent a year during a quarter of a century.

Pragmatic and non-utopian intellectuals do not necessarily promote a many-splendored society of independent societal realms of science, art, economy, religion, polity, and morality. China has remained (at the time of this writing) a one-party polity, and it is still very hierarchical.

From Hegel to Marx and Back

Hegel

Brave scholars have tried to find out regularities that apply to the totality of *all* symbolic environments. A memorable and often retold effort to find regularities in total symbolic environments started with Friedrich Hegel (1770 – 1831). He developed his philosophy around the dialectical method that came to bear his name.

When his philosophizing focused on pure thought, i.e. the pure relations of pristine symbols, he found that concepts in any language were not static and concluded. Human reasoning develops through its own inner dynamics. It moves, Hegel asserted, through opposites. No one notion or concept is capable of exhausting all the conditions of existence. Each concept, therefore, points beyond itself to an opposite concept.

However, human thought does not stop at this opposition, says Hegel. Thinking always strives to nullify the dissonance by combining the two opposite concepts into a third, higher concept, which fuses the two opposing ones. An *either/or* becomes a *both/and*. This new thought, in turn, is faced with its opposite; together with the opposite it forms a still higher entity — and so on. Thus a continuous process of development takes place in humans' use of symbols — always through the three steps: thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

Hegel believed that pure thought was a universal "spirit" that governed social reality and its history through the dialectical principle of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Dialectics shape humankind's symbolic environment. It operates through the family, the civil society, and the state; the state was its most complete expression. The spirit of the times writes the cultural history. The spirit of history had moved from Mediterranean antiquity and was located in Western Europe at Hegel's time, and was on its way to North America, which he called "the land of tomorrow."

Generally speaking, philosophers and scholars of social reality and its history have not been convinced by Hegel. His own student, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804 – 1872) rejected his idealism and took a more scientific view that "the spirit" was an illusion: only what we experience by the senses is real. Man is not created in the image of God, but God is created by man and is created in the image of man. There is no spirit above man; it is humanity by itself that pursues the dialectical sequence. Feuerbach dismissed religion but kept morality.

Max Stirner (1806 – 1856) took further steps away from Hegel. He scorned Feuerbach's notion of a "mankind" pursuing moral goals. He held that reality could only be the individual. His philosophy is a consistent celebration of the individual self, totally independent of others, and without any obligation to others. If there is a dialectic, each person has his own.

Marx

Karl Marx (1818 – 1883), the most well-known of Hegel's students, rejected the idealism of his teacher, the moralism of Feuerbach, and the individualism of Stirner.

Marx moved to England in the 1840s, the promised land of liberalism. He used the liberal climate for his own purposes, and quickly came to view liberal ideology as spuma, as a smoke screen that obfuscated reality. At the time, England was not only the land of liberalism but also the land of the steam engine. Half of the population made a living in urban industries and trade,

compared with 10 à 20 percent of the population on the European Continent.

For Karl Marx, the reality he saw in England confirmed the idea that the means of production created new social structures, new occupations, new power factors, yes, even new ideologies. The big divide in industrial society lay between those who owned the machines and tools and those who worked with them. Two new classes were created by this gap: the bourgeoisie and the working class. The family itself mirrored this class society, said Marx' collaborator Friedrich Engels: the husband was the propertied ruler, the wife the property-less proletariat. The entire nature of society appeared to Marx to be determined by the prevailing technology and its masters and owners. He saw the bourgeoisie grow stronger and more independent; the working class grew poorer and more dependent. Industrial society set a new stage for a class struggle, the omnipresent Marxian dynamic in societal life.

Marx fitted the dialectical method to the analysis of shifts in technology, production, and class relations. The class struggles between the advance of the bourgeoisie (thesis) and its demise by the victorious working class (antithesis) would culminate in a proletarian revolution and communist society (synthesis). Morals, culture, religion — nay the entire world of ideas in Hegel's "spirit" — are in Marx's view not causes of but rather reflections of this materialistic dialectic.

By putting Hegel on his feet after having stood on his head, as the common metaphor goes, and using the dialectics on material conditions rather than on symbols and spiritual conditions, Marx achieves a testable theory that can be accepted or rejected by ordinary scholarship. The moving force of history was not any Hegelian spirit, but the technology of production. The latter, owned by the bourgeoisie, the capitalist class, would spread all over the world: "The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish

connections everywhere," Marx and Engels aptly predicted in the *Communist Manifesto*.

This anticipation of the globalization of the market economy proved correct in its broad outline, but we can reject the crucial dialectical part of the theory because its forecasts have not turned out to occur. Contrary to Marx' prediction, the proletarian revolution did not come first to the United States, the most advanced capitalist country; it never arrived there (Lipset and Marks 2000). Neither have the most highly developed industrial nations in Europe, nor in Australia or Japan, seen industrial workers carry out a successful revolution of the Marxist type. Rather, Marxism as a political force has triumphed in some industrially underdeveloped countries. Marxist revolutionaries in Tsarist Russia, Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam, Zimbabwe have, essentially, been supported by an agricultural lower class. Marx' dialectic had not envisioned this outcome, and my reading of Marx suggests that he might actually have forecasted that the latter revolutions would fail, had he known about them.

Not all Marxist predictions have failed like the dialectic certainty that communism will succeed capitalism. The thesis of the primacy of technology in social change has stood the test of time, with the qualification that it is far from the only force of history.

We can raise questions whether or not recent history supports some other important Marxist contentions. The tenet of a universal subordination of ethnic, religious, and gender conflicts to the class conflict has a weakening empirical support. This is also the case for the Marxist thesis of the inescapably worsening misery of the proletariat and its working conditions; new industrial jobs are freer, healthier, and better paid than old ones (2: 159).

Nowadays, few outside the orthodox Marxist camp believe that there exists an all-encompassing master dialectic of the material conditions in a total society. Only limited areas of social reality seem open to dialectics. Furthermore, when a dialectic is located it is not always about one single trend but about several. Furthermore, and most important, the discovered stages of the

thesis and antithesis may be there, but they do not necessarily end in a synthesis.

Intellectual Enemies of Many-Splendored Societies

Hegel and his student Marx, as we have seen, are poles apart in many respects. One more difference between the two should be noted. Each points to one realm in society as the leading one, but they differ in their choice.

In Hegel's world, there are only two societal realms: the state *(der Staat)* and the civil society *(die bürgerlische Gesellschaft)*. In the latter he included family life, trading, farming, and manufacturing (small-scale in his days), as well as artists, priests, and professors. Hegel's firm conviction was that the state held the decisive role in developing a region and a civilization. Hegel's body politic is an imperialist realm, and it runs the risk of developing cancerous politics. A many-splendored society in which the body politic is just one societal realm, equal in importance to several others, was unthinkable to him. No wonder his name often turns up when we search the intellectual roots of Nazism and other recent totalitarian ideologies. A many-splendored society would succumb and deteriorate to state hegemony if Hegelianism would dominate in its central zone.

Marxian theory assumes extraordinary power in the economic realm of a society. In Marx' world, there are only two realms: the economic "base" and its "superstructure." The main trends in politics, art, science, religion, and morality are shaped by the economy; it is what we in this book might call an imperialist realm.

Everything, particularly in a market economy, becomes a commodity and gets a price: friendship, beauty, knowledge, virtue, and salvation. Science becomes applied and is used mostly for economic calculation. Art becomes window-dressing of the rich. Modern art is seen as a critique of capitalism and a forerunner of a socialist society. Religion is seen as an opiate to keep the poor contented. It is striking, that in Marxian thinking the body politic is also determined by its economic base. A govern-

ment of a country is thus seen as the executive branch of the richest class. Therefore, a many-splendored society in which different realms, such as science, art, religion, or morality, have separate and independent developments is ruled out in Marxian analysis. A many-splendored society, however, might succumb to economic hegemony if Marx's philosophy dominates in its central zone.

Let us emphasize that one should not accept a claim that a realm has hegemony in advance of proof. To be sure, money rules supreme in business firms, particularly in a capitalist economy. Nor is there any argument about the fact that a church, a museum, a university, a government agency also has incomes and expenditures. However, the latter fact does not determine the direction of their efforts as it does in business where you above all want to make money. In capitalist business, you also make more money with the money you have, sometimes to the exclusion of anything else.

In the other societal realms than the economy, wealth is not set as the goal of your efforts; wealth is only one among the several resources that enable you to reach your goal. Marxism fails to see that the moneyed class is not the lord of every modern realm. Hegelianism fails to see that the power of the state is not the determinant of all history. It is easier to fathom the parallel conclusion about scientific knowledge; it is used in every realm to facilitate its efforts. Nevertheless, this does not make scientists lords of the entire society.

Measuring Mentalities

Although Hegel has not convinced philosophers and scholars, he has sometimes inspired them. The Russian-American sociologist Pitirim A Sorokin was the first to succeed in measuring and quantifying changes in values as they have occurred in history (Sorokin 1937-41). He classified history on a scale that ranged from “sensate” concerns to “ideational” concerns. In sensate cultures most symbols are what we call Meadian and clearly and closely associated with the evidence of the senses, especially

evidence about practical artifacts and tools used and the pleasure of the senses. Usually they refer to activities of needs and lusts as we discussed on page 1: 51. In ideational symbolic environments, they are more divorced from sensual data; symbols are more often what we call Saussurian and commonly refer to other symbols, often highly charged pristine ideals. By recording the relative prevalence of sensate and ideational symbols, one can describe a prevailing mentality.

The work of Sorokin shows how the Western world has fluctuated between sensate mentality and ideational mentality. Beginning with an ideational symbolic environment of ideas in 600 BCE it oscillated to a sensate symbolic environment when the Roman Empire was at its peak, from there to a new ideational symbolic environment in the late Middle Ages, then to a new sensate symbolic environment in our time. In the 1930s, Sorokin launched the prediction that the pattern would repeat itself with time and that the civilization of the West would next move toward a new ideational symbolic environment, a "New Age."

An essential aspect of Sorokin's theory is that the swings between ideational and sensate mentalities have "immanent causes," i.e. cultural values swing without external influences due to factors that are built into the use of the very expressions for the values. In a swing toward Sorokin's ideational culture, the symbol-system loses touch with everyday realities; the system of values becomes too remote from material and biological conditions to be effective. We then need to formulate more mundane priorities, and give them a more sensate orientation; a sensate mode is given a new opportunity to take over with consistent steps back to an increasingly coherent materialism. However, in the swing toward sensateness, the symbol system loses touch with spiritual reality, and the ideational mode gets a chance to return. The curve swings back to ideational mentality, and so on. This is an idea with roots in the dialectics of Hegelianism. We will shortly formalize such a process in Proposition 4:1 on the Zeitgeist.

Sorokin is particularly honored for his discovery and extensive documentation that the mentalities of different societal realms swing in concert. For example, a sensate mentality in the arts runs parallel with a sensate mentality in government, science and philosophy.

Figure 4.1. Communication Technologies and Value Climates in the Expanding Symbolic Environment.



[TECH] External forces behind the swings also be found. In a comely but imperfect coincidence with Sorokin's main cycle, Marshall McLuhan (1962) also finds turning points in cultural development at about the third or fourth century before Christ, in the mid-fifteenth century, and in the late twentieth century. See Figure 4.1. McLuhan's criterion for change is the technological vehicle by which the important symbols travel. His stages are (1) oral prior to Plato, (2) written until the end of the Middle Ages, (3) printed until the mid-twentieth century, and (4) pictorial, particularly moving pictures in our days. The medium, he argues, is an integral part of the message: the values of oral culture are those of wisdom, the values of written culture are those of knowledge and information. The use of the "hot" medium of

printed text is manly, and drives forward instrumental tasks, while the values of pictorial culture are womanly, using the intimate or "cool" medium of television to express internal states, evoke emotions, and perhaps to maintain harmony and well-being.

Several researchers after McLuhan have stressed the autonomy of media technology more than he did. They have added the burning of messages into silicon chips as an additional stage to his oral-written-pictorial sequence of communication technologies, e.g. Friedrich Kittler (1997). A research race has started to delineate the cultural values and social practices that the new silicon networks will promote or demote. One of the early findings — also observable by anyone using the Internet — is that a lack of normal politeness easily slips into communications by the Internet messaging. We have already presented our understanding of the effect of the binary language of the silicon age on our everyday thinking on page 1: 71 above.

Annales School

One of the last century's major scholarly journals of history was called *Annales* and was founded at the end of the 1920's by two Frenchmen, Lucien Febvre (1878 – 1956) and Marc Block (1886 – 1944). The journal became the base of a major re-orientation of international historical research, the so-called Annales School. The most well-known member and organizer and exporter of the school's methods of writing the history of England and the US were Fernand Braudel (1902 – 1985). He wrote, for example, about the history of the Mediterranean countries in the 1500's, and not just about Spain's and other countries' histories, but about the region's history which was held together, not by any kingdom, but by a common sea, the Mediterranean (Braudel 1949/1972). This history includes not only kings and wars but also politics, economics, religion and the arts, illustrated not only by narratives but also through economic and demographic statistics, analyses of linguistic changes and popular cultural trends and through anthropological observations. The

Annales School's creativity in writing history is related to the fact that it saw their units of historical analysis also outside the boundaries of the state and nation. The school also ignored the boundaries between various social sciences. The school's research usually began with the broad layers at the bottom of society, not at the top. It did all this on the basis of the greatest possible scientific precision.

Two concepts, introduced by the Annales School, are relevant to those of us measuring values. The first is *mentalité* (mentality) and the other is *longue durée* (long duration), sometimes part of *longues conjonctures* (elongated swings). In the study of mentality, the school's historians succeeded in reconstructing the mental approaches and values of the past. We saw an example in Lucien Febvre's analysis of the symbolic environment at the time of Rabelais on page 1: 67.

Some values are short-lived as fashions in clothing, which constantly fluctuate; others are more durable and exist during a longer period, such as our longing after paradise, either in heaven or on earth. The school's focus on what happens in the broad layer of society has implied that its concepts fit the methodology of systematic interviews undertaken with samples of the population, which became so popular in the latter part of the 1900's.

Values represent consistent and sustainable prioritizations during longer periods of our lives. A biographer searches the values of his subject that express the latter's preference in choosing a way through life. A historian in the Annales tradition deals with values that many in a place and position in a society share at a given time. Such values change more slowly than public opinions, but nowadays we study them with similar methods, as we soon shall see.

A first, important notion in a study of contemporary values is achieved through a combination of Annales School's mentalité and longue durée. Of the many mentalities that have colored history, some are long-term, and some of the latter have actually still not ceased to exist; in other words, they are still here today and continue to be present in society.

When we say that value scoping, our method for value measurement, is anchored in the history of ideas, we mean just that. We have not forgotten what was mentalité in the past and what is characterized by longue durée and, therefore, exists in our own time, and will continue to exist at least in the near future. Such values have high priority on the research agenda.

Three Dialectical Priorities

To rescue some kind of dialectic in the study of social reality, we may return to the initial lead of Hegel, and focus on oscillations in total symbolic environments in history, however limited their role may be.

This is our terminology: 'Values' are generalized, relatively enduring, and consistent priorities for how we want to live. Values belong in the "vocabulary of motives," not in the realm of instincts and biological needs. Values reveal humanity's aspirations. Needs reveal any creature's wants. Both values and needs answer the question why we act as we do. To answer such a question may note that 'lifestyles' are bundles of practices centered on some need and/or value. What we persistently enjoy doing is our lifestyle.

In a book on religion, the pragmatist philosopher Charles Morris showed us that at least three dimensions are needed to classify the great religions of the world, a Promethean, a Dionysian, and a Buddhist one (Morris 1942). These three facets also appear in different guises in the social science literature dealing with changes in the climate of values. From the latter, we shall choose three central themes: modernity, instrumentality, and humanism. (See Figure 4.2.) Each poses questions that we can ask about any parts of symbolic environments.

Is it an old being of stable tradition, or a new becoming of modernity for those involved?

Is it fixed in fidelity, or pragmatically flexible?

Is it a focus on people and their inner world, as in humanism, or their outer world and physical things, as in materialism?

We shall ask these questions both of historians and of our contemporaries with the goal of understanding more of the general dialectics of symbolic environments. We can ask the three questions when we study historical sources of a period or a place, and also when we design interview studies to get measures of the values of our contemporaries.

Modernity: Choosing The Old or The New

The key words here are “stability” and “novelty.”

A full analysis of the dilemma of old or new was made in a 1973 book by S N Eisenstadt (Tradition, Change and Modernity) , but the idea is very old. In ancient Greek philosophy, you find a sophisticated discussion of permanence and change. It began in the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, that is, long before Socrates, in what is now western Turkey. There is a permanent or lasting substance, water, behind all changes, said Thales of Miletus. No, said Heraclitus of Ephesus a century later, there is no permanence, rather “everything is flowing” (*panta rhei*). He is credited with the famous statement “You could not step into the same river twice.” Plato cites these words (in the dialogue *Cratylus*) to disagree; forms can be unchanging and permanent, while the mundane world certainly could be varied and shifting.

In the deepest meaning, all belief in progress is based on the progression from existing to being, from traditionalism, where one supports the stable (to " be traditional") to modernism where one welcomes change (to "be modern" as it is called). This is what a number of philosophers talk about as the difference between "being” and “becoming". Such differences emerge in actions. The representations of tradition manage what exists, the representatives of modernity change what exists into something new.

John Stuart Mill argued forcefully that every individual is free to choose change over permanence, becoming over being. In *On Liberty* he writes:

> The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antago-

> nism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement. The spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement; but the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals. The progressive principle, however, in either shape, whether as the love of liberty or of improvement, is antagonistic to the sway of Custom, involving at least emancipation from that yoke; and the contest between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind (Mill 1869, ch 3, 17). Italics supplied.

In the history of ideas, modernity originally took shape in catchwords of the Enlightenment such as "belief in reason" and "technology," which became battering rams against the bulwarks of tradition. In the 1900s new catchwords carried the idea of modernity forward. Nietzsche's contribution was a creative self-realization, the idea of a stellar superman who shapes himself and his world without the constraints of tradition. Josef Schumpeter's contribution was an analysis of the key role of the entrepreneur as a creator of the new and abolitionist of the old in the economy.

Modernity, however, is not just a question of economics; it also has a place in politics. It was, for example, present in the attitudes of the early labor movements, which named their publications "The Progressive," "Avanti," "Vorwärts," and "New Times." Burgeoning modernity also reshaped Western art, opening for new art forms and new ideas about what is good and bad art. Sigmund Freud ushered modernity into our inner lives through his analyses of drives, which allowed man in the early 1900s to recognize his biological self and reject the traditional idea that suffering was good for one's character.

Striving toward novelty is and has always been a movement without a definite end. Thus, to be modern means different things at different points in time. According to Alfred North Whitehead (1925), the core innovation of his times was "the invention of the method of invention," the ultimate theme of modernity.

Today's popular regional and nationalistic values that stress the importance of an individual's roots and ethnic origin are not modernistic but rather express a longing for tradition or stability. Social security may have been a modern value for the first generation in the welfare states, whereas security is a traditional value in the established welfare states.

Vilfredo Pareto formulated a common thread of modernity. He defined the forces of traditionalism as a *consolidation of existing arrangements* ("residue I") and the forces of modernity as an *openness for new combinations* (which he called "residue II"). To be modern is to be open for new combinations, "to become" rather than just "to be" (Pareto 1916, para 2057).

In Pareto's discussion of this distinction as applied in the political sphere, he referred to Machiavelli's well-known political types, the "lion" and the "fox." The first forcefully defends the social order and has implicit faith in his beliefs. The second advances the new with craftiness and cunning and creates new orders. When Pareto discussed economics, these distinctions reappeared in the differences between a "rentier," who invests in order to retain his capital and its yields and the "speculator," who tries to make shrewd investments in order to augment his capital.

Working with Pareto's distinctions, it has occurred to me that persons with a traditional orientation with priority to consolidate existing arrangements ("residue I") are mostly guided by motivations described in Proposition 5:5 below called "Maintenance of the Evaluative Order" in The Many-Splendored Society: Fueled by Symbols. Persons with an orientation of towards openness for new combinations ("residue II") thrive on

motivations framed as Proposition 10:6 "Achieving when Cardinal Values Change" (2: 181).

Instrumentality: Firm Principles or Accepting Compromises

The key words here are "fidelity" and "pragmatism." Max Weber, the great German social scientist, sought the distinctive character of the Western world, compared with other civilizations. Our Western symbolic environment has no monopoly on openness for new impulses and combinations. These were present not only in ancient Athens and in Rome but also in the Indian and Chinese civilizations. Weber found that the distinction lies in our singular form of rational openness.

Marx and Engel in their Communist Manifest had earlier made the observation that everything fixed is volatilized under capitalism: "all that is solid melts into air." Weber's observations were more extensive. He distinguished between acts faithful to chosen goals *(wertrational)*, that is, those based on firm priorities, and pragmatic *(zweckrational)* acts, that is, those based on instrumentality (Weber 1922, 12-13). Modern Western symbolic environments are more instrumental than other great civilizations in which fixed priorities have prevailed to a greater extent, a fact we today see evidence of in the conflicts between Islamic nations and the modern West.

In a social reality that adheres to fixed priorities these are dramatized and norms of conduct are rooted in unconditional moral tenets and ethical principles. It orders: "Always follow the commandments! If not, there is retribution coming, and you will get what you deserve." Such is the rule of fidelity. It is called "deontological ethics" by some philosophers. In ordinary conversations we call it idealism if we like its expressions and dogmatism if we don't. 'Fidelity' has to do with priorities that you are not willing to compromise. These usually include loyalty to one's own family, compassion for the ill, the preservation of our planet for future generations, and any other matters of conscience.

In an instrumental symbolic environment, people compromise about their priorities. Norms of conduct are guided by the pursuit of happiness with responsibility: “Do what you want, but take account of the consequences, and aim at a good outcome!” Such is the rule of pragmatism. 'Instrumentality' includes priorities that you could experiment and compromise with in order to achieve an optimal result. It has an “ethic of responsibility” to talk in Max Weber’s terms, or "consequentialist ethics" to talk in the words of some philosophers. Such priorities usually have to do with practical negotiations, calculations, and technical solutions, very common in the realms of modern business and politics. I usually favor such priorities, and will signal this by calling their use pragmatism rather than opportunism.

In the next chapter, we will argue that rational choice requires more effort than an emotive choice which is more automatic among humans. Adhering to fidelity is often an emotive and almost automatic choice (See below 1: 180 et seq.) To choose pragmatism, by contrast, requires a cognitive effort of considering alternatives. It is no coincidence that the pragmatic culture of the West, as Weber argued, is exceptional in the civilizations of the world.

Fulfillment: Putting Things or People First

The key words here are "materialism" and "humanism."

When we study changes of basic priorities in a much shorter perspective than Sorokin did, the most useful approach is to separate an interest in material and carnal phenomena from the glimmer of non-material priorities that manifests itself in an interest in human beings and their symbol-filled world. In materialistic symbolic environments, the symbols refer to fulfillment of carnal desires and material objects. In a humanistic symbolic environment, the symbols refer to fulfillments as human beings and their involvements in symbol-based activities and lifestyles.

Labels like materialism and humanism, which we have chosen, give rise to many associations, some of them misleading. When value research based on interview surveys appeared in academic

social science (Ingelhart 1971), materialism with its concerns of physical survival, price stability, security and order were opposed to what was at that time called "post-materialism." The latter involved other ways of fulfillments such as concerns for freedom for the common person, as well as modern values of gender equality, environmentalism, et cetera.

Many other designations of fulfillment are in use. One has spoken of "the values of production" (materialistic ones), such as order, punctuality, ambition, efficiency, and other values that facilitate economic growth. These differ from the "values of reproduction" (humanistic ones), such as knowing oneself, empathy, sensitivity, and involvement in people, which facilitate personal growth and a genuine understanding of others. Whatever the terminology, the point is to distinguish between, on the one hand, priorities with a more material-bodily focus, and, on the other hand, a focus on the human mind and its empathy.

In the spectrum of fulfillment, we can single out a difference between "inner-worldly people" and "outer-worldly people." Cues from within themselves guide inner-worldly; external cues govern outer-worldly people. To take an example from daily life: outer-directed people diet and exercise primarily in order to *look* better in their own eyes and in the eyes of others, while the inner-directed people diet and exercise in order to *feel* good. Outer signals govern the former; inner signals govern the latter. This dimension I take as a central one in a modern value scale of humanism, but of course, not in all humanism in the full history of ideas.

The three basic priorities shape the symbolic environment into the three-dimensional value space, seen in Figure 4.2. The combination of pragmatism-humanism has implied that in the Western world we no longer accept that it is self-evident that tradition or class background stands in the way of what we can do with our own lives. Here we recognize the image of current day Western humankind, where the ego is in command forming the body, soul, and close relationships according to a self-determined design.

Figure 4.2. The Three-dimensional Space of a Modern Symbolic Environment



[BIO, NAT] The value space does not float on a calm sea or hover in the thin air. The value space is a crest resting on a foundation of the bodily and ecological conditions of humanity. In Figure 4.2 we have captured only the main thrusts and their oscillations in humankind's symbolic environments in recorded history. Underlying priorities of this kind, not to be forgotten, are man's old conditions of freezing, starvation, rape, and violent struggles for territory and possessions and other aspects of "activities of needs and lusts" (Table 2.2 on page 1: 52).

Eight Mentalities

Comparing the symbolic environments in the eight corners of the value space, we find eight distinct "mentalities," or "climates of values," as some people say. Let us look at their shape in modern Western societies.

- The 'challenging mentalities' of novelty, pragmatism, and materialism. Here we find enjoyment in transactions and the wheeler-dealer that is unafraid of the complexities of life. Pragmatism means that liaisons to products, people, and associations may be short-lived. When someone or something no longer is fashionable or useful, or, no longer generates pleasure or profit, interest changes quickly to something different. The pragmatism of this and the following mentality is conducive to entrepreneurship.
- The 'mingling mentalities' of novelty, pragmatism, and humanism. There is a dislike here of formal rules, but an affinity for flexible informal get-togethers and an openness to new contacts, in particular international and ethnic ones that enrich social life. Here we also often find much knowledge about what is "in" in respect to activities and fashion, but without pronounced materialist ambitions.
- The 'advocacy mentalities' of novelty, faithfulness, and materialism. Here we find a desire for a comfortable modern life, but instead of old-fashioned status symbols, we meet visible convictions — in our days, for example, about poverty at home and abroad, about a sustainable use of resources — and desires to change society in accordance with these convictions.
- The 'soul-searching mentalities' with novelty, faithfulness, and humanism. Here we find a hunt for new intuitive truths and for meaning in life as well as the cultivation of unrelenting sympathy for fellow humans and animals.

The above four mentalities are modern, not traditional. The popular view that modernity is materialistic is a half-truth. Our

three-dimensional space of dialectic priorities provides for humanistic alternatives to modernity.

There exists also a well-known flight from modernity to tradition. If this flight leads to primordial ideas of *Blut und Boden* and to violence as a means of communication, we are faced with a fascist reaction. But there are other forms of tradition. Our distinctions provide four different traditional mentalities:

- The 'upright mentalities' with stability, faithfulness, and materialism. Here we find faith in order, honor, home, material assets, and tough law enforcement.
- The 'homely mentalities' with stability, faithfulness, and humanism. Here lies a deep sympathy for communion with relatives and close friends and a holiday spirit of togetherness.
- The 'matter-of-fact mentalities' with stability, pragmatism, and materialism. Here practical and well-established technical solutions and gadgets dominate living, together with an enjoyment of popular entertainments of yesterday.
- The 'conventional mentalities' of stability, pragmatism, and humanism. Here we find flexible social and civic skills and bonds to childhood friends, neighbors, and coworkers.

The eight mentalities shifts in strength over time and space, but we have found them all represented in Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Latin, Finish-Ugric, Japanese, and Chinese language areas. To know the mentalities is useful for all who want to communicate beyond their familiar turfs, be they educators, journalists, politicians, artists, preachers, or sales clerks.

We can summarize by saying that the dimensions of the value space act as three strings: 'modernity' (stability-novelty), 'instrumentality' (fidelity-pragmatism), and 'fulfillment' (materialism-humanism). The strings oscillate through the symbolic environment causing the above eight combinations — ever shifting in detailed contents, strength, duration, and expression. They provide us with a first formal orientation about the otherwise so

elusive *Zeitgeist*, the social and cultural climates of the times and the space in which man lives.

For a hundred years, sociologists and others have had an understanding that societies are moving from Gemeinschaft (folk life) to Gesellschaft (city life). We will deal in detail with this in next volume beginning on page 2: 150. Among many other things, Gemeinschaft is stability, fidelity, and humanism. With Gesellschaft comes a change to novelty, pragmatism, and materialism.

The three-dimensional view of values proposed here shows that the road from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft is not the only possible path to modernity. It is entirely possible to be modern and embrace humanism rather than materialism. This is a message from social movements that want more recognition of women and children. Modern advocates of human rights also put uncompromising value fidelity ahead of pragmatism. Likewise, it is part of a modern mentality to embrace fidelity to values rather than pragmatism — this is one of the messages from the environmentalist movement. The peace movement can claim that the change to modernity is compatible with both humanism and value fidelity. All these movements are actually part of the modernity of our times, not calls to return to tradition. However, they represent a different modernity without the materialism and pragmatism of the period of the breakthrough into the industrial and parliamentary era.

As a final point, let us suggest that the three dialectic vibrations may hold a special status in social science. They seem to emerge in any symbolic environment, independent of its contexts of groups, networks, classes, and other social structures. When we later, in Volume 3 of *The Many-Splendored Society: Fueled by Symbols,* look at verbal justifications we will find a large number of other changing values and ideologies. To some extent, our three dialectic priorities may also get extra reinforcement or resistance due to conditions prevailing in different social structures, as Marx had assumed. At bottom, however, the dialectic priorities, as Hegel and Sorokin had assumed, are re-

flections of immanent causes of change in the symbolic environment itself. We do not accept the simple-minded Marxian interpretation of the distribution of fulfillment values that the much-cited World Value Survey (Inglehart and Baker 2000) used in placing Sweden in the most modern corner of the world.

Valuescoping

As mentioned, it is possible to use questionnaires in interview surveys to measure values. You make a selection of situations involving everyday priorities, and then ask questions with fixed choices about them, for example, "What do you think is most important for children to learn?" A rule of thumb is that you need at least three situations or conversations involving choice to measure value priorities with any accuracy worth the name. Adding situations does not necessarily change the total picture but, of course, provides greater precision. I usually recommend asking about choices between different types of TV or video programs, choices between different people as company over a weekend, and, most generally, what one would choose if a good fairy gave the respondents three wishes.

You turn the answers to such questions are into scores on the three scales of the value space and document gross value change over time. The value researcher may also compute averages of the three scales to obtain the coordinates in the value space for different groups. These averages are gravity points in the value space for the groups studied. The resulting graphs show distances: the closer the gravity points for any population groups, the more similar they are in their values, and the further away they are in distance the more different their values (Zetterberg 1999, 191-219).

Figure 4.3 Value Change in Sweden 1990-2011



The diagram is based on 39.297 interviews in 1990s and 2000s made by Demoskop and Temo and 3.021 interviews in 2011 made by United Minds, all being research houses in Stockholm. The large number of interviews in the 1990s and 2000s reflects the fact that the values have joined age and sex and education into so called "background factors" in numerous questionnaires. The calibration of the scales sets the 1995 average of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden as 50.

Source ValueScope AB (Zetterberg 2013).

In Figure 4.3 is shown an example from Sweden how this kind of data track value changes over a couple of decades in Sweden, and in Figure 4.4 we show generational differences in values in China at one point in time.

The Swedish measures show a significant rise in pragmatism 1990 – 2011. Activists are rarely pragmatic. The intellectuals and politicians of Sweden devoted much energy in this period to ideologies of neoliberalism, environmentalism, and feminism. Nevertheless, the general population grew more and more

pragmatic. The leading politician of the period was Fredrik Reinfeldt, the most pragmatic of them all.

The Chinese data achieved by the same methodology illustrate the positions in the value space of different generations in 2006, when 1500 interviews among well-to-do (top 20 percent) dwellers in the six biggest cities in China. In Figure 4.4 we see a drastic difference between old and young. The old Chinese hold values of tradition and of fidelity to principles. The young hold values of novelty and pragmatism. Furthermore, the older generation is more concerned with material conditions while the younger clearly have post-material values of humanism.

Figure 4.4. Values Held by The Rich in Six Big Cities of China in 2006



Source: (Lindskog 2007, 42).

Fidelity to the traditional values is apparently eroding in China. The two chock therapies of Maoism to modernize China, first in one Great Leap (1958 – 68), and then in a Cultural Revolution (1968 – 78), did have effects into a modernized value climate. (One should not underestimate the force that communism can exercise in an initial modernizing of an agrarian society.) However, the cruelty of the processes eroded the belief in socialism. Deng Xiaoping's advice to the Chinese people, using the color of cats as an illustration (see page 1: 122), was to try anything that works in making money, but stay out of politics. It resulted in a push for pragmatic values and rampant commercialism. The crushed uprising by students at Tiananmen Square in 1989 had more impact abroad than in China, where it is largely unknown due to censorship. However, in the time-line it coincides with the emergence of a Chinese generation with post-material values of humanism, freedom of speech, equality between the sexes, and care of the environment.

In the dialectic of priorities, a topic to which we now will turn, one can expect that China will for a while pursue this chosen path, but that in due course, it will again emphasize a return to "proper" values.

The Dialectics of Priorities

If no historical turns occur to disturb their course, the changes that basic priorities undergo have so-called immanent causes. Without external influences, they swing back and forth because of factors inherent in the use of their expressions in language and other symbols. In swift steps toward a consistent humanism, the system of symbols they use becomes more Saussurian and too remote from material and biological conditions to be effective; too many contacts with everyday realities are lost. We then need to formulate more everyday priorities in Meadian symbols, and give them a more materialistic orientation. Swift steps back to an increasingly coherent materialism lead, in turn, to a loss of contact with human and spiritual realities. The curve swings back to humanism, and so forth.

It is an open question, whether the contrast between uniformity and individuality belongs in the list of dialectical priorities. Research is still inconclusive as to whether or not the swings between the two have immanent causes located in language, as is apparently the case of the swings stability-novelty, fidelity-pragmatism, and materialism-humanism.

The repeated swings of the Zeitgeist between extremes do not mean that dialectic priorities, at the end of someday, revert to any position we can call "normal." Normality is a movable feast. With several priorities swinging independently of one another, a stable balancing point between the extremes is rare, and if one does appear it may be short-lived. An individual's personal priorities may mature and attain balance with age, but the symbolic environment as a whole does not ever seem to attain mature tranquility.

The typical pattern of priority shifts is to lurch first and learn later, says Daniel Yankelovich (1997). As if all of humankind were adolescents taking exaggerated positions with abrupt switches between them! Like Yankelovich, we must join the many who disagree with Hegel. Instead, we pursue the hypothesis in Proposition 4:1:

> *Proposition 4:1. The Zeitgeist*: In the history of symbolic environments in societies that have many activities beyond those of needs and lusts, there is a tendency to develop a dialectic with a thesis, for example, of being, or fidelity, or materialism, and then a corresponding antithesis, for example, of becoming, or pragmatism, or humanism. Rarely a synthesis of these develops; normally, the first thesis returns and the process starts all over.

Such is the nature of the Zeitgeist in a symbolic environment; it acts like oscillating gas molecules in a closed glass retort that bounce off a wall only to hit the opposite wall. This particular tendency is remarkable in social science in the sense that it is a regularity of total symbolic environments and not restricted to any particular components of the symbolic environment.

An interesting consequence of the Zeitgeist is that heating an argument with extreme zeal, for example, on the blessings of materialism, hastens its bounce to the opposite argument, and thus to its own defeat. In modern marketing of goods and services one is increasingly guided by measurements of the trends in consumer values (Zetterberg 1998), and this may speed up the changes in the Zeitgeist. The swings in the three dimensions we have identified appear to be ever-present, but often latent factors, in our dealings in markets, in politics, and with religion, art, culture, and morality.

Big and Lukewarm Centers vs Small and Convinced Extremes

The dialectic priorities show normal distributions in the population, or, at least they show many people in the middle and fewer at the extremes. They also show the strongest emotive engagement at the extremes and the weakest in the middle. This they share with many scalable attributes in social science. Louis Guttman (1954) discovered this as a mathematical regularity.

The Irish poet William Butler Yeats bemoaned the same. In his day and in his country conflicts got out of hand all too easily.

> *Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;*
> — — —
> *The best lack all conviction, while the worst*
> *Are full of passionate intensity.*

Or, in the language of social science:

Proposition 4:2. The Yeats-Guttman Doctrine: Dialectic priorities approximate a bell-shaped distribution and their emotive intensity approximates a U-distribution.

This doctrine is shown graphically in Figure 4.5. At one extreme there is an opinion or value held with "full of passionate intensity," to quote Yeats; another opinion or value is located in the middle and held by the many people who do good but "lack all conviction." A third opinion or value at the other extreme is also "full of passionate intensity." Here, the extremes frantically battle each other

Figure 4.5. Distribution of People with Positive and Negative Views and the Emotive Intensity with which People hold these Views.



In addition to the immanent causes of priority shifts, there are often unique historic happenings and experiences that contribute to changes of values. See our discussion of the shifting views in different generations in Volume 7 of *The Many-Splendored Society: Life and the Good Life*. There are also special ideologies and values that emerge among Makers, Keepers, Brokers, and Takers of cardinal values. We deal with them in Chapter 11 in Volume 3 of *The Many-Splendored Society: Fuelled by Symbols*.

An Illustration: From Virgil to Luther

Let us briefly look at a change in dialectic priorities that was initiated in Imperial Rome between the reigns of Augustus (21 BCE – 4 CE) and Marcus Aurelius (121 – 180 CE). In these two centuries, the virtues of the Roman Republic were still remembered, but the memory of them gradually faded.

During this period Rome had grown into a city of one million inhabitants, many of whom had emigrated from agricultural regions. In the course of a couple of generations, they had lost touch with the ways of their forefathers, who had secured their

livelihood through farming and raising domestic animals. Many of the new city dwellers were unable to find work in city government, public construction projects, crafts, or commerce. In response to the swelling throngs of restless plebs official steps were taken to provide bread to still their hunger, and to provide spectacles to assuage their unease — the ancients' version of the welfare state and TV networks. Termini, i.e. leisure areas and amusement parks with public baths, were constructed. Augustus began paying physicians from government coffers, and he introduced the *annona,* which developed into a system of coupons that could be exchanged for bread provided by over 250 state bakeries. At times pork and olive oil were also sold at subsidized prices. In other words, conditions made it possible for an urban lower class to scrape by and enjoy city life without having to work very hard.

One of the developments among the masses in this societal structure that had provided for "the activities of needs and lusts" was a version of inwardly-oriented values, putting inner concerns ahead of outer ones.

There are two ancient descriptions of the eruption of the Vulcan Etna, one written by the Greek poet Pindar and the other by Virgil. Pindar writes in Edith Hamilton's (1973, 168) translation:

> *In the darkness of the night*
> *the red flame whirls rocks*
> *with a roar far down to the sea.*
> *And high aloft are sent fearful fountains of fire.*

And Virgil wrote:

> *Skywards are sent balls of flame that lick the stars*
> *and ever and again rocks are spewed forth,*
> *the torn entrails of the mountains,*
> *and molten crags are hurled groaning to heaven.*

Pindar used his senses and recorded what he had seen and heard. Virgil, at a later eruption of the same volcano, used his imagination and recorded his subjective experience.

Roman culture had several layers, including a Dionysian one. However, the most visible layer had become extroverted and hardnosed, concerned with military and economic growth, road building, water and sewage systems, law and order, as well as the family home as a fundament and a castle, and a concern over visible virtues in public places. Pindar's way of describing reality was most akin to this mentality of outer-worldliness. His rendering of the eruption was generated by external cues, a true craftsman's account. The Roman masses, however, followed Virgil, who became popular and truly beloved. Once the people were assured of their daily bread, ever-larger numbers among them could devote themselves to *experience* rather than *achievement*. Inner signals became more important than outer signals. The inner-worldly orientation was later also supported by the spreading Christian religion. The mandate for outer-worldly, pragmatic achievements diminished. It moved from Rome to the provinces, and there and then, its vitality evaporated.

The shift in mentality that had begun at this time did not end with the decline and fall of Rome. Many in the generations that had become accustomed to free bread and organized leisure and other "activities of needs and lusts" did not know how to gain a living from the land and had no longer relatives in rural areas that could shelter them. Starvation decimated the population. One would suppose that the journey to the inner realms of human experience that Virgil had started would thereby have come to an abrupt end and be succeeded by a pragmatic reality orientation. Yet confrontation with grim economic reality did not lead to a return of the old values, at least not for a long time.

The pragmatic mentality and the fondness for novelties in technology and entertainment of the Roman times reverted in early medieval times to dogmatism. The greatest work of medieval scholarship in Europe did not celebrate new discoveries but organized old Christian thoughts from St. Augustine and integrated them with old Aristotelian thoughts under the title *Summa* in the 1260s. The several technological innovations made were poorly exploited, except in agriculture where rotation of

crops and multiple harvests in the new millennium became possible due to a warmer climate. This facilitated a return to growing populations and living standards.

However, the cultural mentality of tradition and inner-worldliness remained. The journeys into the world of inner experience found ever broader roads in the Middle Ages. Leadership passed from outer-directed persons, such as generals and merchants, to inner-directed types. For example, outside a few places such as Genoa, Florence, Milan, and Venice, the city fathers would rather organize processions with colored icons and emblems than far-reaching trade routes. The bishops rose in importance while worldly rulers in Western Europe marched to Rome, Avian, or Canossa to kiss the feet of the Pope.

Inner pursuits were given free rein in Gnosticism, mysticism, and eschatology. God's poor little Saint Francis talked to the flowers and the birds and organized the hippie movement of his time into a monastic order. And at journey's end we find Dante, who, with Virgil as his guide, leads us into the fantastic landscape of the realms inhabited by the souls of the damned and the saved.

There is an important lesson in the above: one cannot assume that the economy rules over cultural mentality. The latter tends to run its dialectic course and change for immanent reasons. Once a new mentality is there, changing economic fortunes — such as agricultural advances in the Middle Age — cannot immediately stop it. The economy may, however, greatly facilitate a dialectic mentality shift that is already on its way.

The Renaissance was ushered in when an outward orientation and an instrumental outlook again became a dominant mentality. Once again, the emphasis was on thinking new and pragmatic thoughts, achieving something visible, and gaining conspicuous recognition and conspicuous rewards. The ideal was to accomplish something beyond tradition and dogma. An important inspiration came from a vision of returning to the antique world. Although he himself preferred the Middle Ages, the historian Jacob Burckhardt in Basel related in such contagious words

about the lively world of *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860/1990) that his vision is still read and reread to capture the new mentality.

There are few smiles on the faces in medieval paintings. Mona Lisa, painted sometime between 1503 and 1505 in Florence by Leonardo da Vinci, has a smile that signals something of her inner world and its enigmatic concerns.

Parallel to the Renaissance of the arts, Luther, Calvin and Zwingli worked in the religious realm, and their Reformation had notable consequences for the general value climate in Europe. By questioning that salvation could be reached by any external acts and rituals, they shifted focus to man's inner world and his convictions. On a previously unknown scale, Europe became populated by inner-worldly persons who felt that they had a special consciousness within themselves; an inner room of an importance that could rival the outside world (Taylor 1989).

Later, the economic base of Europe sweepingly expanded. Its capital financed not only Europe's colonialism, but also its industrialization and urbanization. Then, materialistic and outer-worldly values were favored. Many Europeans today have adopted a probably mistaken belief that an inner-directed value climate is incompatible with capitalism.

5. Linguistic Forms and Usages

Inspiration from Linguistics

Grammarians — the traditional scholars of communication by language — have long classified the parts of sentences: substantives, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, indicatives, interrogatives, imperatives, exclamations, et cetera. Two fields of scholarship, linguistics and the philosophy of language had several breakthroughs in the middle decades of the twentieth century that lifted the study of language far beyond the level of traditional lexicons and grammars. Let us start our search for scholarly categories for the study of social reality here.

To describe social reality as scientists we preferably need categories that are universal and comprehensive. How can we get them when our subjects of study normally are restricted to symbols that are temporary and partial? What is the difference between ordinary language in a society and the language used by scientists, scholars, and critics in the study of that society? Anthropologists have contributed to our understanding of this by developing a distinction originally proposed by the linguist Kenneth L Pike (1954) between *emic* and *etic* language. In 1988, 600 members of the American Anthropological Association debated this topic for four-hours. The debate presented the state of the art and a growing consensus on this topic (Headland, Pike and Harris 1990).

The Emic and the Etic

Emic sentences are those that tell how a particular people who live in the world see their world. These sentences consist of verbalized beliefs, values, standards, descriptions of techniques, et cetera. They include also the spuma, magic, and defense bilge of this people. Studies based solely on *participation* use only emic sentences and result in emic propositions and conclusions.

Etic sentences, by contrast, contain additional information besides emic communications. They are sentences of an observer or analyst rather than that of a mere participant. They form the language of science, scholarship, and cultural criticism rather that of mere reporting by a participant.

Etic observation may contradict emic truths. The Aztec religion in pre-Columbian Mexico was a solar religion. The sun god was the source of life. Belief in him incited the Aztecs (or Mexicas as many modern scholars say) to dominate their region as the sun dominated the sky. If he was to return with light and warmth each day, this sun god required a daily sacrifice of a human being from the Aztecs. In other words, loud voices threatened an ecological disaster unless they had their ways, a familiar magic of all times, including our own.

The invading Spaniards with roots in medieval Catholicism might well have known of the sacrificial rites of Abraham and Jesus and others. But Aztec sacrifices were alien. Moreover, the navigators and officers from the Spanish ships that had crossed the Atlantic with the Spanish invaders of the Aztec region had learned to think differently about the movements of the celestial bodies. Their etic conclusion was that the Aztecs were wrong; the sun would rise without a human sacrifice. Their grounded disbelief in Aztec magic gave them a sense of superiority, a common sentiment when Europeans ventured to new worlds in the era of colonialism.

Marvin Harris requires that the analyst also be an observer, not only a participant.

> An emic sentence can be proven wrong if it can be shown that it contradicts the participants' sense that entities and events are similar or different, real, meaningful, significant, or appropriate….Etic statements cannot be proven wrong if they do not conform to the participants' sense of what is significant, real, meaningful, or appropriate. They can only be proven wrong by the failure of empirical evidence gathered by observers to support the statement in question (Harris 1999, 31-32).

Not everyone agrees with Harris. Critics may cite museum exhibits divorced from their emic context as a blatant practice revealing Western bias, not its science. There are four possible relations between emic and etic in scholarship.

A first position refers to the scientific method as used in the natural sciences and some social science such as economics. The researcher may use emic language only if observations confirm its statements or if its statements are consistent with propositions confirmed by other researchers using the scientific method. This is also the position of Harris.

A second position is an acceptance of those etic sentences in analyses that are consistent with the researcher's intellectual tradition of choice. This pre-chosen tradition may be Marxism, psychoanalysis, feminism, Thomism, or some other. A Marxist may, for example, reject certain emic reports from the field as 'false consciousness' while accepting others as relevant information about class relations.

A third position refers to poststructuralist philosophy. It dismisses the need for any etic considerations in analyses. It stays entirely with emic expressions. Many modern ethnographic museums take this view, thus attempting to present exhibits without what they see as the bias of Western interpretations.

A fourth position explores the possibility that the emic language actually contains a deep structure that is the appropriate etic language for the proper study of humankind.

All these positions have some merits and drawbacks in different stages in the development of knowledge in social science. The first position makes the established scientific method an ultimate arbiter when emic and etic statements are in conflict. The second one incorporates parts of other people's thinking in our own systems of thought, accommodating multi-cultural theory. The third makes us familiar with other people's thinking but it does not integrate it with our own thinking. The fourth one is a line of reasoning that is least self-evident. We chose to explore it here as a promising strategy in the social sciences.

The young Lévi-Strauss was a proponent of the fourth research strategy. He often said that social reality is like language. With enthusiasm, he tackled primitive thought — with all its emic sentences — to unearth the structure of societies. He was critical of the common idea that European (or Western) history is a model for Third World societies. He set out to discover generalized building blocks and themes for societies, also in any primitive society, and he pursued the latter restlessly. He met criticism for looking for the foundations and scaffoldings of social reality in something behind its everyday language. Anthony Giddens (1987, 195) even declared that "structuralism, and post-structuralism also, are dead traditions of thought." Later in life, Lévi-Strauss tuned down the insistence that the key to social reality was language or something like language, but he never really abandoned this view. However, in editing his oeuvre for an honorable collection to be published after his death, he omitted most of his many investigations of myths from non-literate societies.

Giddens' judgment may be premature. Maybe it is true that Lévi-Strauss' insistence (1958, 206-31) and (1962/1966) on recording and analyzing most every myth in primitive thought is too long a detour to reach the goals of social science. However, a good ambition may still be to find a deep structure in societies, in some measure unconscious for the user, but discoverable by science.

This search goes beyond the usual anthropological ambition, which deals with texts, not language. “The culture of a people is an ensemble of *texts*, themselves ensembles, which the anthropologist strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom they properly belong….As in more familiar exercises in close reading, one can start anywhere in a culture's repertoire of forms and end up anywhere else” (Geertz 1973/2000, 452-453 italics supplied). To deal with *texts*, emic or not, is different from dealing with *language*. Language is based in the biologically given language brain, a human universal. A universally valid science

of social reality may be within reach if we start with language, not texts.

We believe that a new try with social science based on a language model might be more successful than that of Lévi-Strauss if we start with language stripped of magic, spuma, and defensive bilge. Rather than from a long and slow road via storytellers in primordial societies, we will follow a pragmatic rational for the quick seeking of inspiration for the study of social reality from the history of our own civilization and its critics. This can be done without believing that European societies represent some future level of other societies, a mistake that Lévi-Strauss was so eager to avoid. It is risky for social science, however, to dismiss the anthropological concern for less developed societies. Focusing attention to the modernized world is focusing on an outlier. We need Lévi-Strauss' total experiences documented as *Tristes Tropiques* (1955) to come close to the balance he achieved in his thinking about society.

Enter la langue

Our understanding and use of symbols rests not only on what is manifest — the symbol-act and its context — but also on something that is absent from view or hearing. There are hidden semantic and syntactical codes embedded in symbols that are essential to an understanding of them. Ferdinand de Saussure identified a nearly total arbitrariness of signs, but he found little arbitrariness in the way signs combined into sentences. While the number of symbols is virtually indefinite, the number of rules to combine them into sentences is limited. These rules are systemic rather than concrete. They form *la langue* rather than *la parole*, to use de Saussure's classical distinction. We know a system of symbols (la langue) only from the study of the actual and concrete use of its symbols (la parole). Nevertheless, the use of symbols (la parole) is efficient communication only if it conforms, however roughly, to the rule-governed system of symbols (la langue). Langue and parole presuppose one another.

The Chomsky Theses

When mankind was a single local African tribe — if it ever was — it had a single symbolic environment. Even in those days it is likely that infighting over scarce resources began to separate symbols in the in-group and out-group. As parts of the tribe moved in search of greener pastures — the start of the slow process of spreading mankind over the entire globe — they met formidable obstacles of sheer distance, mountains, and oceans that severed them from their past and its symbolic environment. Gestures, the language of the body, have apparently remained roughly the same during humanity's big journey, but not entirely so. Japanese delivering a mournful message ("Your father has passed away") may have a smile on his face, a gesture seen by Europeans (and most Americans) as entirely misplaced, since a smile to them is a gesture accompanying a joyful message. Languages, by contrast, became highly differentiated. They produced the babble in Babel's tower. However, in the past century linguists have brought order into this chaos. Out of their controversies and agreements we can distill two essential theses, both credited to the work of Noam Chomsky.

Languages consist of a limited number of parts: nouns in the form of objects (e.g. *books*), or in the form of persons (e.g. *students*), adverbs *(slowly),* adjectives *(difficult),* verbs *(read),* auxiliary verbs *(should),* et cetera. However, the number of possible unique combinations of them is very large. Most combinations make no sense: for example, *books students slowly should difficult read* are six words that can enter into hundreds of different combinations. The exact number is calculated as a multiplication:

1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 = 720

or, expressed in factorial mathematics: 6! = 720. But at least one combination of 720 makes sense: Students should read difficult books slowly. Why does this particular combination make sense? It happens to follow the rules of langue.

Rules of langue are necessary. Six words gave 720 possible combinations. When a child has learned 60 words, something that usually happens before two years of age, the number of possible combinations is 8 320 987 112 741 390 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000, or 8.32098711274139e+81. Such huge numbers spell a special form of freedom for a language-using animal.

The rules of langue may remain hidden or "unconscious." You may follow them without being aware of them. Millions of people speak in perfectly understandable ways without any conscious knowledge of the rules of any syntax. Moreover, even people who have no formal knowledge of the rules may become dismayed (or amused) when someone breaks them in his speech. Intellectuals, particularly journalists, who thrive on their fluency and creativity in the use of language, often underestimate people in politics and business who have a scrambled syntax or other defects in their speech. For example, they have a hard time discovering any political prowess of a Dwight D Eisenhower or a George W Bush.

Inside man there is a set of recipes, or rules of thumb, to cook new sentences, some previously unheard of, from the words we know. Linguists have called this set of rules a "generative grammar." Such a grammar is not a school grammar prescribing traditional and polite writing. It is a program for producing understandable speech from a vocabulary used in a given symbolic environment, and to understand the same speech when spoken by others in the same symbolic environment. It is a program that allows for improvisations, for freedom.

Children pay attention not only to the images associated with words and to the synonyms of words, but also to the way adults order the common features of their language. Thus children learn not only a vocabulary; they also develop (or "grow") a grammatical system to use the vocabulary. They are born with the instinctive ability to infer the rules from their symbolic environment. They come to use this unconscious generative grammar because they have an inherited ability to do so. Here is the

explanation why young children may say "I have *monies"* and "We *buyed* candy" instead of "I have *"money"* and "We *bought* candy." They have deduced the rules from their symbolic environment but they have not yet found out about exceptions to the rules.

[NAT] [BIO] There is a parallel here between eyes and ears. The physical environment — matter of different kinds and/or waves of different lengths — seems almost infinite in its variety. It is remarkable but true that the pre-language brain finds a structure in this environment mediated by the eyes so that we can see contours, shades, colors, movements, and depth. And it is even more remarkable that the language brain of humans finds a structure in the symbolic environment mediated by the ears so we can understand and speak a language. The parallel between sight and sound, picture and word, fascinated Ludwig Wittgenstein as a young man. He hit the nail on the head in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* when he wrote that our thoughts and representations are best understood as picturing the way things are (Wittgenstein 1922, 2.1).

There are some 6 000 known languages. The various languages, as the school grammarians noted, have common features, i.e. parts of speech such as nouns, adjectives, objects, verbs, prepositions, adverbs, et cetera. The ordering of these features into generative grammars for 6 000 languages differs somewhat between languages, but not very much. In English, we do not say "Knows Erland how to sail a boat?" English verbs (except *do* and *be* and auxiliary verbs) are put after the subject: "Does Erland *know* how to sail a boat?" In French, you may put the verb before the subject: "Erland *sait-il naviguer* un bateau?" In German, the verb at times is put last in the sentence: "Weiss Erland wie man ein Boot *segeln kann?*"

These differences do not change the fact that English, French, and German all have subjects and verbs and other standard features of language, and each has a consistent order that applies to them. The young Chomsky advanced the thesis that the different generic grammars are in fact variations on a single common pro-

totype, a Universal Grammar. Given the huge number of possible combinations of words, the differences between various generative grammars are trivial. Universal Grammar represents an overwhelming communality between them (Chomsky 1955). The mature Chomsky — in the so called P&P model — expressed the language facility, not as generative grammars being variations of a universal one, but as general principles of mankind's biological language faculty, plus a relatively short range of options (parameters) from a subpart of the lexicon and from peripheral parts of the phonology. Any language is fully determined by the choice of values for these parameters (Chomsky 1981). The model shows that the many possible human languages can be reduced to a limed number of fixed and invariant principles with limited options of variation. Here we have the rules of any human symbolic environments.

The proverbial visitor from Mars with his special intelligence knows that the parts of speech in the languages of the universe combine in a huge number of ways and that the rules of combination are legion. However, he would immediately hear that all earthlings, in spite of their varied vocabularies, use one and the same set of dimensions in making their combinations, give or take some local differences they assign to the dimensions.

> *Proposition 5:1. Chomsky's Principles of Learning to Speak*: (a) The language brain of young human beings can (unconsciously) infer the rules of a surrounding symbolic environment. (b) These rules are variations of the values attached to a limited set of dimensions of the language ability inherited by all mankind.

As a rule of thumb, you may assume that a four-year-old child has intuitively learned the grammar of the language in her or his environment.

Although Chomsky (1996) does not express or endorse it, there are good reasons to believe that the language instinct has evolved through natural selection, as have all other complex organs and hard wirings in the brain (Pinker 1994). So far, we do

not have any other scientific explanation for the emergence of such organs other than the one Charles Darwin provided. Natural selection through reproductive advantage may also be an explanation of the special ability of children to learn language. And, if all mankind has a common root in Africa, the common parameters of the speech of all human earthlings may have their beginning there. Contemplating the possible languages in the universe, we may join our imaginary Martian in the belief that all people on this planet, despite different native tongues, have something in common in our spoken words, namely some African parameters.

A Tri-section and a Bi-section of Common Usages of Symbols

Charles W. Morris was George H Mead's student and editor. He became a semiotician and a philosopher in his own right, working in the American pragmatic tradition. In his book, *Signs, Language and Behavior* he divided the actual use of language into a universal and fundamental classification. "These usages may be called in order the informative, the *valuative*, the *incitive*, and the *systemic* uses of signs. These are the most general sign usages; other usages are subdivisions and specializations of these four" (Morris 1946, 95 italics in original).

If correct, Morris' statement is overwhelming in scope and usefulness. However, before putting it to work, we may enter two small objections. His fourth category, the systemic use of language, is not separate from the three others. Nothing can be systemic that is not originally informative, and/or valuative, and/or incitive. The systemic is an attribute of the other three basic usages of communication. It is the attribute of rationalism. A second objection is that Morris immediately obfuscated his big discovery by trying to cross-classify his universal uses of language with the structure of the school grammar of language (1946, 125 et seq.). This produced a confusing 16-fold classification that few except some students of rhetoric have appreciated.

However, in his selection of the informative, valuative, and incitive usages of language as basic to other usages, Morris has

hit home. We can look at any sentences in any language and call them 'descriptions' if they are informative, call them 'evaluations' if they are valuative, and call them 'prescriptions' if they are incitive.

Some usages of words combine into 'descriptions,' for example: "This is a paper on social science." Others are 'evaluations,' for example: "This is a difficult paper." Still others constitute 'prescriptions,' for example: "Read this paper!" The tri-section of descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive usages of language is exceptionally useful when we use language to get something done, to be executive.

As we noted earlier, (see 1: 65 et seq.) symbols depend on contexts. To understand a communication we have to know something about the situation in which it occurs. Given such knowledge of the context, it is usually possible to place any communicative act in an appropriate category, and above all, to understand the intention of a communication and the needs it may reveal.

In real life you cannot readily assume that you can infer from the structure of a sentence what it means in terms of human actions. Already in 1913, the French linguist François Bally, a student of de Saussure and an editor of his work, had shown that such an assumption was questionable. When we say "It is raining," we may actually communicate "It is now raining," i.e. a description; or, "The weather is bad," i.e. an evaluation, or, "Shut the window!" i.e. a prescription (Bally 1913, 23).

David Hume, the great Scottish philosopher had promoted a conscious separation of descriptions from prescriptions. From a description of how society *is* one cannot conclude what a society *ought* to be. Many have tried to disprove this thesis from his third volume of the memorable book with the full title *A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects* (Hume 1739-40/2006). However, Hume's thesis holds, and the exceptions discovered and proposed presume special conditions.

Thinkers have not made similarly powerful separations of evaluations from descriptions and prescriptions, but they are equally essential. For a start, see the comments on Carnap and Hägerström below. Without clear separations, we easily get vicious confusions of the kind justifying the Holocaust, as we discussed on page 1: 66.

If we want to use language, not to get something done but to convey our feelings there are expressions such as “ugh,” “ouch,” “gee-whez.” But you can also let emotive components seep into any symbols. The appearance and presence of Romeo arouses Juliet’s emotive reaction, and Romeo has a similar reaction when Juliet appears. Their budding love stirs the audience. Soon, however, the very names "Romeo" and "Juliet" may become loaded with emotion, even when their bearers are not on the scene. An emotive component has then entered into the words "Romeo” and “Juliet." Humans are able to use words loaded with emotions and thus spread emotion from one person to another by means of symbols, not only by gestures and by wordless melodies. The pragmatic American philosopher Charles Stevenson brought the emotive meanings in language to full attention in his book *Ethics and Language* (1944).

The bi-section between executive and emotive use is normally an analytic one: almost every concrete communication contains degrees of both executive and emotive components. The emotive component in language is more obvious in speech than in script. Speech has mountains, valleys, skies with caressing clouds and frightening thunder. Script lies flat on a surface. The intonation, tempo, pitch, and decibels give speech an emotive capacity that is unmatched by script. Script, of course, has the advantage of being more permanent and it reaches beyond the range of the voice. A theater enjoys the advantages of both script and voice and vision, and is the most powerful form of communication known to humans.

By adding the executive-emotive distinction to the tri-section of descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive communications, we

get a fuller range of usages of human communications, now divided into six types (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. Flow of Communications Separated into Minimum Types

COMMUNICATION	TYPE
"Ouch, I've been hit"	Emotive Descriptive Usage
"Oh, my health is in danger"	Emotive Evaluative Usage
"For goodness sake, help!"	Emotive Prescriptive Usage
"He is an MD"	Executive Descriptive Usage
"He is a good doctor"	Executive Evaluative Usage
"See this doctor!"	Executive Prescriptive Usage

We may read Table 5.1 as a brief outline or a synopsis to a story. The essentials of what we write can be coded into the six categories found in the right-hand column. It is difficult to reduce these six types of communications to a smaller number. Let us mention two questionable attempts.

In pre-war Vienna, the philosopher Rudolf Carnap (1935, 23-24) argued that the value judgment "Killing is evil" is a misleading expression of the prescription "Do not kill!" At the end of the nineteenth century in Uppsala in Sweden, the philosopher Axel Hägerström (1895) had argued that value judgments were expressions of feelings, not of facts. To Canarp we can point out that the phrase "Killing is evil" is ambiguous if given an imperative form. It may mean "Tell your children not to kill!", "Punish the murderers!", or, "Do not use the death penalty!" The same evaluation of killing thus renders different prescriptions. With Hägerström we may argue about the emotive component attached to evaluative and factual statements in moral discourse. They separate by degree but not kind from everyday down-to-

earth language. For example, when a judge in a court talks about killing, it is more factual and less emotive than when a mob shouts about killing.

You may also question if we need more types than the six. For example, are questions — what? who? how? where? when? and why? — a separate type? No, they may usually be formulated as circumlocutions of prescriptions. The what? who? how? where? when? and why? become a prescription: "Tell the doctor what happened!" In British English the question form may at times be used, not to get an answer, but to gain agreement, as in "The weather is nasty, isn't it?"

We can summarize our conclusion about usage of communicative actions as a two-fold proposition.

> *Proposition 5:2. Tri- and Bi-sections of Language Usages* and The Understanding Principle: (a) Any symbolic environment tends to become differentiated by the language brain into a trisection of descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive usages, each of which contains a bi-section of executive and emotive components, i.e. totally six types of usages. (b) The language brain of persons in this symbolic environment has the capacity to differentiate these six usages regardless of their syntax.

The Tri- and Bi-sections of Language Usages and The Understanding Principle have the same status as both Chomsky principles in that they are part of the language instinct and as such automatic and not necessarily conscious. Needless to say, we eagerly await reports by brain researchers that have the instruments to trace and illuminate the processes hypothesized in Propositions 5:1 and 5:2.

The second tendency, here called the Understanding Principle, is a welcome addition to the Symbol Rule (Proposition 3:1) about the transfer of symbols from one brain to another. It makes such transfers independent of the tyranny of school grammar, as Bally illustrated. It must, however be remembered from our presentation of the Symbol Rule that in real life any understanding of

the tri-section between descriptive, evaluative and prescriptive language may be incomplete.

Intelligence

There are individual differences in the capacity to operate with the verbal symbols of descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions. Ordinary intelligence tests measure this capacity. One must then use tests that can isolate the verbal ability from the mathematical and spatial abilities that are components of the total intelligence and included in the rather hodge-podge measure we call IQ.

When you construct modern intelligence tests, you start with a requirement that the distribution of IQ in the larger population follows a symmetrical, bell-shaped curve, a so-called Gaussian ("normal") curve. The mean is set to 100, and the standard deviation from the mean is set to 15 or 16. These requirements have become conventions.

Numerous measurements by IQ-tests show that in our type of society, IQ of biological parents forecast about half of the variations in the IQ of their children. Parents' IQ also has a positive relationship with several measures of success of their children. High-IQ parents have children who *on average, but with many exceptions*, get better grades in school than children of Low-IQ parents do. The same holds for their children's' income levels when the latter have grown to be adults. In the United States, parent's IQ correlates also negatively with their children's teenage pregnancies. It is an undeniable fact that differences in IQ create advantages for some and disadvantages for others.

Not all men are born in an equally sophisticated symbolic environment, nor do all persons who become parents have equal genomes. Thus, not everybody can be born to equal *advantages*. In a good society, all women and men, be they more or less intelligent, can nevertheless be born with equal *rights*. This is a major achievement in lucky parts of the world and in lucky periods of history.

The passing of intelligence between generations is an entirely different issue from the passing of fortunes between generations. Most everywhere in the world, rich and powerful parents give their children property and positions that lower class parents cannot match. Liberal societies, such as the United States, try to counteract the advantage of the children of the rich by high estate taxes. The European continent with its tradition of a legitimate aristocracy has had lower death taxes for centuries. However, you cannot use taxes to change the distribution of IQ.

Unfortunately, many people in the lucky part of the world have never learned to cope with the combination of unequal advantages and equal rights. They tend to get embarrassed.

Those who receive advantages of intelligence may stop treating others with dignity, and become overbearingly bossy. It takes education and effort for the intelligent to maintain dignity; he or she shall never say to another person "you are stupid," but if need be, you may say "What you this time was stupid, wasn't it?"

Those with disadvantages feel degraded. The degraded think that either something must be wrong with them, or something is with their society. Those of the latter view may become radicals without joy, banging their heads against a wall that does not yield. For, everyone must live with some inherited dissonance between levels of intelligence. Since such ambivalence is unavoidable, the best solution is to look for a modus vivendi that accepts some unequal advantages from intelligence, but sticks fully to equal rights.

Intelligence is actually more than a trait of personality and a fact of biology. It is also a major resource for society. Those who manage this resource have special responsibilities. For example, anyone involved in education — school boards, teachers, teacher unions, teachers colleges, departments of education — must cope with the given condition that intelligence is inherited in uneven lots, giving some people advantages and others disadvantages. The saving grace is that all can enjoy the same human rights.

Western publics had a hard time to admit a long review of evidence about human intelligence that appeared in a book written to be accessible to a large public, *The Bell Curve* (Herrnstein and Murray 1994). This work showed that the position on the bell curve of a person or a group influenced many things indeed. The reception of the book made clear that public opinion of those days, like today, do not ready accept such conclusions. Moreover, then and now, readers often forget that intelligence is not a universal good: we have too intelligent tyrants in politics, too intelligent swindlers in the economy, too intelligent cheaters in science, too intelligent black sheep in families, too intelligent terrorists, et cetera. We need resources of intelligence to save society from such evil.

A most interesting finding, reviewed by Herrnstein and Murray, from what now is over a hundred years of intelligence research has come from Japan. The average IQ-scores in Japan had increasing from year to year, the so-called Flynn effect. All advanced countries with data on the IQ trend show the same amazing finding that humanity gets smarter and smarter.

There are many attempts to explain the Flynn effect. Proposition 3:5 on "The Master Trend of Civility and The Master Trend of Rationality" that you just read (on page 1: 104 above) contains my explication of the phenomenon. The last hundred years has seen a big burst in the usually slow expansion of the symbol-handling activities. The big burst has a counterpart in an expansion of advanced brain interactivity, which in turn reflects in IQ-scores.

Discourses

We started our exposé by mentioning the spontaneous bodily actions governed by the pre-language brain: eating and drinking, fighting, intercourse, et cetera. As we already noted, they have, emotive components of lust or disgust that drive us to do what is physiologically required for our sustenance. To these we have now added activities of symbols, differentiated into descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions, each of which contains executive

and emotive components. For emotions are not intrinsically opposed to reason; they may center upon such grounds of reason as descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions.

The discourses of art, religion, and morality differ from those in science, economy, and statecraft in their greater abundance of emotive (expressive) language. The following relations seem empirically valid:

Executive descriptions are particularly common in *scientific* discourse: definitions, laws of nature, and accounts of experimental apparatus.

Executive evaluations are particularly common in *economic* discourse: prices, wages, fees, and capital.

Executive prescriptions are particularly common in *polity* discourse: laws, orders, and treaties.

Emotive descriptions abound in *artistic* discourse: paintings, sculpture, fiction, poetry, dance, and music. The emotive component is exceptionally pure in music and ballet.

Emotive evaluations are particularly common in *religious* discourse: the ultimate evaluation of lives cast upon this world and destined to die.

Emotive prescriptions abound in *moral* discourse: exhortations about charity, uprightness, and duty.

The Tri- and Bi-sections of Language Usages give us the above delineations of discourses in the societal realms of science, economy, polity, art, religion, and morality, respectively. The delineations point to the language in a many-splendored society.

Something Universal in Social Reality [BIO]

The bi-section of executive and emotive communications in a tri-section of descriptions, prescriptions, and evaluations will reoccur many times in this work. As shown in our opening historical review in this book, European history embeds these discourses. It is my assumption that they also are found in other civilizations. *The origins of our bi-section and tri-section are in the*

human language brain itself, not in any specific culture or civilization. This tri- and bi-sections of language usages is a universal aspect of our "understanding principle" (i.e. our Proposition 5:2).

It may happen that similar (but not identical) categories to our tri-and bi-sections emerge also in pre-language contexts. This is particularly the case with evaluations. They may easily be confused with some biological spontaneities and spout reactions to feces, ooziness, sliminess, decay, foulness, and other gory or disgusting aspects of life and death. Martha C Nussbaum (2004) has raised warnings when such visceral reactions enter the language of the law, and when courts of law confuse them with its reasoned evaluations.

Freedom in Social Reality

Shakespeare used about 21 000 separate words in his writings. Of these, he invented about 1 800 words himself. In addition, with words he created characters such as Cleopatra, Falstaff, Hamlet, Lear, Macbeth, Rosalind. Throughout the centuries some in his audiences got to know them and their social worlds better than they knew themselves and their own fellowmen. Certainly, language can create realities in a play on stage. Once we have seen it there, we realize that it also creates, changes, and maintains the social reality of our everyday living.

In a book from the 1920s, suppressed by the Soviet government for its formalist Western tendencies, that became famous in French linguistic circles, Vladimir Propp analyzed 100 Russian fairy tales. He found 31 distinct sub-narratives or plot components. They are of the type "The villain gains information about the victim" (No. 5), "Victim taken in by deception" (No 7), "Hero is tested, interrogated, attacked etc, preparing the way for his/her getting exceptional qualities" (No.12), "Hero and villain join in combat" (No. 16), and "Villain is punished" (No.30) (Propp 1927/1968). These 31 plot components can form a huge number of different narratives or games (= factorial 31 or, 8.222838654177924e+33). Although random tests have shown

that far from all narratives have literary qualities, it is clear that the options are overwhelming to the human mind.

A special human freedom resides in the language brain. We can sum up what we have learned about language in a proclamation of this special freedom available only in the social reality created by human communications:

> *Proposition 5:3. Freedom in Social Reality:* Applying Chomsky's two Rules of Speech Learning, and armed with The Tri- and Bi-sections of Language Usages and The Understanding Principle, human beings are free to use sentences and narratives to reconstruct old social realities, reaffirm existing social realities, and/or create new social realities, even such that are previously unheard of.

This freedom is available when people's selves, their relations to others, and their societies are shaped. In this process, we can choose from a long list of sentences — some of them we shall call vocabularies of motives — to respond to events or to one another. Or, we can create entirely new sentences to build new edifices of social reality.

The fact that anyone of us can bake new sentences that were never heard of before by our fellowmen is one key to our freedom. It opens the excitement of progressive opinions. Moreover, the same freedom finds our way back to the tried and true, i.e. to conservative opinions. Here is excitement in finding lost wisdom in nearly forgotten old words and tales. Obviously, freedom of opinion is the fundamental pre-requisite in all these processes. At any rate, articulate speakers do not have an unalterable destiny. Their fate lies in enduring conversations or dialogues in which they are free to test new ideas and to correct old mistakes.

Those who are free to use language facilities enjoy much freedom in their different discourses: academic freedom, freedom of trade, civic liberties, religious freedom, artistic freedom, and freedom of conscience. They are free to create, change, and maintain social realities. Needless to say, such capacitates are not given to reptilian brains that simply drive creatures into

bodily spontaneities to eat and drink, defecate, urinate, fornicate, nurse, and fight.

The prevalence of human freedom in a symbolic environment means that human history is never fully predictable. The religious prophets and political ideologues cannot be correct when claiming to have found a corset into which future society will fit. We may add this conclusion to what we said about Hegel and Marx on pages 1: 124-129 above. Any social theorist, however learned, who claims to have the one and only master key to the history of social reality is a charlatan.

Freedom and Responsibility Outside of Social Reality?

[TECH] Freedom is absence of coercion. The coercions may be technical constructions. The animal in a cage is not free, nor is the criminal in a prison.

[BIO] Coercions restricting freedom may be part of biological reality, interfering with a person's normal biological processes. A suspect is not free, if the officer who is in charge of an interrogation with him softens his resistance to confess by starving him for days, or keeping him awake for days and nights. Nor is he free if subjected to force drinking until his stomach bursts from osmosis. Torture always belies freedom. Likewise, he is not free if the officer injects him with a truth serum before an interrogation.

Immutable laws of nature govern physical and biological realities. Nor can there be any personal responsibility when events are entirely due to laws of nature. The fact that the language formulating these laws of nature is part of social reality does not mean that they are changeable by the same principles that change social reality. To believe so is to believe in magic.

At times, physical or biological coercions enter into social reality and cancel freedoms in the latter. With the force of domestic violence approved in sharia law, Muslim women may not be free to leave their own house alone, and they have to cover up and to hide the contours of faces and bodies when they are in public places. This is never freedom, regardless of the defensive

bilge expressing its necessity by both men and women in terms of new multi-cultural ideologies or old religious ones.

In social reality, the question of fate and accountability is different from that in biological and physical reality. We have in social reality many law-like propositions of a stochastic nature, found valid in at least some historical circumstances. Social designs of men and women living in the past may at times have modified, sometimes even nullified, these natural tendencies. Also, they are continually modified by those living in the present. In addition, to such modifications we have entirely new creations born in someone's language brain.

We know that man writes about his own history and that such books are sometimes bestsellers. But does man also create his own history? In reading the social science classics from Plato and Ibn Kaldun to Marx and Weber, we repeatedly meet the idea that man indeed shapes his society, but that this occurs under circumstances and restrictions that may be hard as nails. Facing resisting social, physical, and biological conditions, man nevertheless imposes at least some parts of his own design on his social reality and its history. These designs have been in someone's language before they became general parts of social reality. For these designs man, and man alone, is responsible. In traditional terminology, we would say that social designs are expressions of humankind's "free will."

The human freedom to formulate new and previously unheard of sentences is a process that originates in and executes in the brain. This process is available to our consciousness after a short time lag. Experiments by Benjamin Libet and others cited in Wegner (2002) set this lag to about 300 milliseconds. After another and longer lag of time, the process may mobilize our voice organs and be articulated. The latter is not mandatory; we may keep some sentences ("thoughts") for ourselves. Or, we may distort the articulation and produce a confabulation, what we called 'spuma' (pages 1: 63-68). Eventually, after a further lag, some expressions in script may occur.

We may note in passing that Wegener misunderstands the initial lag of the process. He holds that such a lag implies that man has no free will. What we call "free will," however, is located in the beginning of the process before it reaches consciousness. Furthermore, what then becomes conscious can be part of our will to start a new round of the same remarkable brain process; initiating other sentences, some of which may be new and original. The sense moral is that the language-based parts of social science are not subject to determinism in the way of other sciences.

The linkage of freedom and language is why all humans can join in saying: Shame on those who use social designs to deny freedom of speech to a people! And double shame on those who call their enemies among fellow humans for dogs, snakes, cockroaches, and other epithets that signal that they are not human and do not have any resources of language, be it speech or writing. Such a denial is actually one of the vilest social designs we can imagine. Other "hate speech" should definitely remain protected by The First Amendment of the American constitution. The exception should be speech that promotes degrading and mental or physical butchery of individuals, removing from them their very ability to speak, i.e. what the Amendment is protecting.

There are areas of interpenetration between the social, biological, and physical where laws of nature play a significant part, but where the rules governing social reality also play a part. In such areas we have only limited freedom and can demand only partial personal responsibility; leniency due to physical circumstances and to biological factors may often be called for.

Bayesian Probabilities

Although human freedom can create designs changing the likely forecasts formulated in our Propositions, we can still make good use of the probabilities of our Propositions in understanding likely outcomes. The formula to be used was discovered by Thomas Bayes, an English mathematician who lived in the first

half of the eighteenth century. All we have to add to our Propositions are estimates of the strength of the freedom-induced designs that inhibit (or facilitates) the outcome forecasted by our Propositions. These estimates can normally be discovered by investigation; at times, the promoters of a cause happily publicize them. We can add them as a normal conditional probability in using Bayes' theorem.

We begin by making a prior estimate (x), a kind of informed probability or guess based on observations of the likelihood that some ones will exercise their freedom, and succeed to overrule the probable outcome forecasted by our Proposition. Reversely, the prior estimate that the forecast from the proposition will prevail over the social design is thus (1-x). Then, we specify the probable nature of our Proposition in two steps. We enter the probability (y) assigned by our Proposition that its condition will be working and produce the outcome mentioned. Finally, we enter the probability (z) that the condition will be present, but not working to produce the outcome mentioned. We can now estimate the ultimate forecast (U) of the outcome by Bayes-type formula:

$$U = \frac{(1-X)Y}{(1-x)y+zx}$$

Forecasts made this way are wholly empirical. The probable success of a freely made social design is an empirical observation, as are the two conditional probabilities from the established Proposition. A market researcher can continuously forecast the sale of new material products, new services, or new securities by this formula. Eventually, this researcher may learn that the response on his questionnaire of "I will certainly buy it" carries a Bayesian probability of, say, 0.64 for his studied item for sale. When such a number turns up, we expect only two in three who claim that they certainly will buy, will actually do so.

Big Data

This way to use probabilities is to practice science on solid grounds. By contrast, when hundreds or more ad hoc variables

happen to be available, so called "Big Data" (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013) and when researchers go on computerized fishing trips to find unknown relationships, they are indeed on deep waters, trawlers getting big catches, but of what? Here the risk of spurious relations is abundantly higher than in working with Bayesian probabilities. The processes of Big Data identify events that have nothing to do with the problem under study simply because they occur at the same time and place with the problem event. Thus, the First and Second Principle of Magic get active. The messages from "Big Data" scientists' get the a ride on the public's millennia of romance with magic(1) and magic(2) .

Big Data findings, of course, may suggest variable for the Bayesian approach to research, but so far, we have few illustrations of this.

Emotive and Rational Choice

Emotive components of symbols can be positive, i.e. releasing pleasure. For most people the word "garden" is such a symbol. Some other symbols have negative emotive charges and release fear, the word "thunder" for example. These are common emotive meanings. Other emotive charges are idiosyncratic. If the name "Bill" — even as the brand of a bookcase — gives you a sense of boredom, it might be because a person named Bill is one of the greatest bores among your acquaintances. However, regardless how boring they themselves may be, most people give their own name a positive emotive charge.

[BIO] Being different from other animals, human beings with their large prefrontal cortex brain, have an ability to inhibit automatic responses in favor of reasoned ones. We may be the only species that engages in deferred gratification and in effective impulse control. (See clause (c) of Proposition 5:5 on page 190 below.) Nevertheless, it takes a decision or an effort to skip the instinctive immediate emotive choice.

Let us formalize two important discoveries in the everyday use of symbols. The first is that humans register an emotive

meaning quicker than an executive meaning. For example, in any text a reader will notice his or her own name a little more readily than other names. Even names similar to your own may be discovered faster than other names. Psychologists have shown that this holds also in the laboratory when words are flashed on a screen (Jones, et al. 2002). The second discovery is that negative emotive charges in symbols are intrinsically more potent than positive emotive charges. Loss in one stock on the stock market usually gives an investor more grief than the pleasure of a gain of the same amount in another stock; humans value gains and losses differently (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The names of companies in which the investors have losing stocks have bigger negative emotive meaning to them, while the names of the companies where they have winning stocks acquire an additional, but smaller, positive emotive charge. To realize a loss on the market takes more effort for an investor than to take home a gain of the same amount. In a similar vein, a soccer player finds that those missed chances with accompanying boos from the public in a match are not fully compensated by the applause and cheers at the same decibel and length when he scores.

The emotive components in language make choice easy. We choose quickly according to them, giving somewhat greater weight to negative than to positive feelings. Suppose someone asks "Shall we stay in the garden shelter or go inside the house during the thunder storm?" No requirement to reason here. You do not have to consider the quality of the shelter in the lovely garden, nor the risk of becoming wet from the rain before you have to sit down for lunch. Rational or not, you go indoors.

Humans start reasoning and makes so-called rational choices only when no distinctive emotive components are present, or when people suppress these components. Rational choices take time and effort. It would become rather unbearable if choices had to be elicited by reason every time a choice has to be made. However, many people, as we know, make important decisions on the basis of "love at first sight" or "never trust a stranger."

We can be summarize the rules of emotive choice and rational choice in a proposition with three parts:

> *Proposition 5:4. Emotive and Rational Choice:* (a) In scanning a symbolic environment or part thereof man initially reacts to the symbols, if any, that have emotive charges and then to the executive symbols. (b) In this reaction, negative emotive symbols get greater attention than positive emotive symbols. (c) If all symbols are roughly equally executive, i.e. emotive meanings are spread evenly or are absent, man exercises rational choice as otherwise takes place only after overcoming initial emotive reactions.

The healthy life and the favorable circumstances that undoubtedly are a large parts of existence, are not what we first notice when we scan for news. We pay more attention to sickness, separation, sudden deaths, trapped minors, sinking ships, crimes, toppled regimes, et cetera. Moreover, of course, we pay attention to strikes of luck; also something out of the ordinary.

The Rules of Emotive and Rational Choice do not necessarily confirm David Hume's blanket dictum that "reason is the slave of passion." Notice the word "initially" in clause (a) of our Proposition. Reason emerges *initially* as a slave of passion, but it carries a good promise of emancipation from this serfdom of passion. Rational choice requires more effort than an emotive choice that is more automatic. Rational choice requires *concentration*; emotive choice does not. Rational choice is also difficult, for, as its theorists have made clear, it is not easy to define rational behavior on the part of any one person when that very rationality depends on the probable behavior of others. Our organisms seem to have hardwired emotional choice, while rational choice belongs in the precarious realm of human freedom.

Rational choice is the mechanism that always applies; such has been the message from important economists since the days of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) and Kenneth J Arrow (1951). Rational choice theory has since become important in political science (see, for example Peter C Or-

deshook (1986) on how political science used its early formulations). Under the label "public choice," scholars such as Buchanan and Tullock (1962) merged a broad knowledge of democratic politics with some rational choice as used in economics. In sociology, James S Coleman (1990) has effectively applied rational choice to most every aspect of sociology.

There has long been reason to stay skeptical to the extravagance of mankind's ability to make the logical considerations presumed in the theory of rational choice. Charles Stevenson exploration of emotive meanings, mentioned above, was published in 1944, the same year as John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, the basic text on rational choice. Ulf Himmelstrand, a Swedish scholar, used Stevenson's ideas as an inspiration for sociology that also became a call for caution against uncritical use of rational choice. In his *Social Pressures, Attitudes and Democratic Processes* (1960), there are four empirical studies and a theory whose central variable (called "L") explores the latent, independently emotive property of words. This thesis first received recognition as an advance in attitude research. Soon it was also recognized as a model for the study of ideologies, it is true, is no science, but Himmelstrand knew that one can be scientific also as regards ideologies, and then one needs to focus on the emotions awakened by ideas and images of ideologies. Much later, the long-term relevance of this thesis was recognized. Its conclusions imply a correction of the theory on rational choice. Himmelstrand had found emotive cracks in the road of rationality, which, in some circumstances, topple Neumann-Morgenstern's huge carriage.

Emotive choices apply, for example, in the case of love at first sight. The conclusions of rational choice theory remain valid, provided we see them as special cases that do not fall under *initial* reactions as stated in clause (a), nor fall under clause (c) in the above proposition in which the language that presents the choice is stripped of all emotive meanings. The general case is

the more brutal insight: *the emotive choice is the default mechanism for mankind.*

[BIO] The above position is grounded not only in observations of the symbolic environment and studies of the consumption of media content, but also in the physiology of our senses and the workings of our brains. The state of the art in this field of research at the time of the turn of the century is found in *Handbook of Affective Sciences* (Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith 2003). The distinction between rational choice and emotive choice was actually known at the beginning of our chronology in the form of a parable, an old literary form that presents comparisons to teach a lesson. In this parable a father treats a deviant Prodigal Son with an emotive choice, while his well-behaved son is treated with rational choice (Luke 15:11-32).

Emotive and Rational Aspects on Opinion Formation

Daniel Yankelovich (1991) discovered that practically every mature public opinion has passed different stages. When an opinion has passed through all of them, politicians, business strategists, editorial writers, PR-consultants, and leaders of voluntary associations can trust them. An initial immature emotional choice has then in successive steps become a mature rational choice, also supported by new emotive arguments.

I will illustrate this process by the shifting opinions that led Sweden to join the European Union after a referendum in 1994. (I had the personal opportunity to follow these events in the opinion climate in detail.)

Sweden, of course, is a part of the geographical and historic Europe, but the country had rejected an earlier opening to join the European Union when neighboring Denmark became a member. Let us take the opinions about joining as an illustration of the Yankelovich stages that public opinion passes through. There are seven steps:

1. Awareness of an issue. As part of the general internationalizations of the late twentieth century many Swedes in leading positions realized that they had become increasingly dependent on

other parts of the world, and particularly on those countries already in the European Union.

2. Sense that the issue gets on the public agenda. Openings to join the European Union are far between. The country had to decide before the EU-train with new members had left the station. The next chance lay many years in the future. This insight was well established in government circles.

3. Hunting for solutions. The initial emotive reaction of the majority of the public was that a change was unnecessary. The country could cope with internationalization by staying outside the European Union but become more European anyway by increasing its already institutionalized cooperation and integration with its Nordic neighbors. Or, the country could cope with the internationalization by intensifying its work in the United Nations, which is more encompassing than the European Union.

4. Wishful thinking. At this next stage unrealistic emotive arguments abound. Some say that Sweden has a better welfare system than the other countries in Europe so there is no need to join. Others say that Swedes by joining can reshape the European Union so that it becomes more socialist like Sweden.

5. Working out realistic choices. At this stage rational choice begins to enter. Respondents in polls take a little longer time to answer an interviewer's questions. Most people begin to realize that there are clear advantages and clear disadvantages to joining, and they began to assess the pros and the cons, usually without abandoning their initial emotive choice.

6. Cerebral solution. The rational choices now dominate over the emotive ones. On the pro-side a sense crystallizes that pro-arguments, and persons and institutions that support the pro-side, are the better ones. On the con-side the opposite sense crystallizes. At this stage of cognitive decision-making, the polls in Sweden show even sides. However, many who are opposed or uncertain tell the pollsters that they, too, think that the country will eventually join the European Union. This fact hints at the pro-side outcome of the referendum.

7. Mature judgment. At this stage the pros are willing to intellectually and emotionally sacrifice the amount of sovereignty needed for a future in the European Union. And the anti-EUs are intellectually and emotionally ready to give up economic and other advantages of the union in order for their country to stay outside and be independent. These rational choices, in fact, begin to achieve new emotive support; both sides think their choice is best for their children. And both can support their views in debates and conversations also on days when media present news negative to their views.

Public opinion is shaky and unstable unless it reaches the maturity of the seventh stage. In the Swedish referendum, fewer pros than contras reached this stage. The Parliament made the decision to join the European Union, but the majority opinion recorded by the referendum was not mature. For half a decade after the supporting referendum, the Swedish public was more negative to the European Union than any other public in a member country. The pro-EU forces won the referendum but lost, at least temporarily, their cause.

The Swedish referendum of 1994 concerned, among other issues, whether Sweden ought to join the EU in order to influence its development. However, the public had few mature opinions regarding the Union in respect to a common currency, defense policy, veto rights in the Council of Ministers, or whether the EU's future would be a supra-state or an inter-state organization. Some of these questions never reached the first stage of awareness, while others were stuck in the search for solutions and wishful thinking (stages 3 and 4). The polls reported in the media are unreliable at these stages. They record mostly emotive choices, not rational ones.

We can express a similar caution about polls of party or candidate standing between elections. The standard polling question "If the election were held today, which party (or whom) would you vote for?" suffers from the fact that no election is held today. Only during an election campaign are most voters pressed toward rational choices. Even then, of course, they may

be victims of the emotive alternatives presented by political spin-doctors.

This ends our discussion of insights about more or less unconscious language rules with universal properties. We believe that all insights about the workings of the language brain can be generalized to insights about social life. Above all, we must remember that the emergence of language in the evolution presents a huge number of options that define the freedom of man.

A Preview

An immediate question we have to ask is "Why are the distinctions between descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive language in its executive and emotive forms so fundamental for the study of social reality?" There are two answers. The first is that they capture the drama of social life. The second one is that they meet the criteria of being a minimum vocabulary in a social theory.

The American critic Kenneth Burke of the mid-twentieth century penetrated the dramatic uses of language in literature and drama (A Grammar of Motives 1945, A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language 1952, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose 1954, The Rhetoric of Religion. Studies in Logology 1961). His works became an eye-opener for some social scientists.

The eminent anthropologist Clifford Geertz spent the 1960s at the University of Chicago. He developed a symbolic anthropology of culture (Geertz 1973/2000), clearly inspired by writings by Max Weber, but also the dramatics of Kenneth Burke. Burke's analysis of language and literature in society had been smoothly merged by Hugh Dalziel Duncan (1962) into the sociology of symbolic interaction, i.e. ideas emanating from Chicagoan philosopher George Herbert Mead (1934) and Chicagoan sociologist Herbert Blumer (1946).

These hints that Kenneth Burke's ideas apply to social sciences as well as to the humanities are worth noting. Burke's own

commentaries on topics of social science such as the capitalism of his country, like Noam Chomsky's, do not deserve the same scholarly attention as their language theories. However, a social science based on their discoveries can be more advanced than their own forays into social science.

Descriptive Dynamics

We use descriptive language to satisfy our *curiosity* about events. A list of question openers — what? who? how? where? when? and why? — prompt us to describe an aspect of an event: the acts, the actors, the means, the scene, the time, the motivation. Kenneth Burke discovered that together they provide a full account; if the description is to be exhaustive, none of these six questions can be omitted, and to add more questions adds confusion rather than illumination (Burke 1945, xvii).

Use of descriptions allows us to know something without personally having experienced it. Memories need not be hardwired into the human brain and passed on to coming generations by heredity. Language, particularly descriptive language, does the job. Some of this language is mundane and relates to the down-to-earth business of living. Other parts are pristine and we weave them into fantastic webs about the cosmos and Earth, about animals, trees, and plants, about our inner world, about life and death. These tales are passed on to fellowmen and future generations by means of language, sometimes supported by stone settings, sculptures and pictures, sometimes recorded in writing. Their reception, as Burke points out, may be marked by *wonderment* and aha-experiences, or by *fear* and desperation, thus giving an emotive component to many descriptions.

In the 1920s, an American sociologist, William I Thomas, formulated a major descriptive dynamic. "If men define situations as real they are real in their consequences" (Thomas 1928, 572). The cognitions we have of each other's actions in an encounter need not be scientifically correct. To take a more recent example, if a government believes that a state prone to hostilities has weapons of mass destruction, this belief has real consequences

irrespective of the correctness of the belief. One consequence may be a preventive war. Another consequence might be a practice of torture or humiliation to find out about the weapons of mass destruction from prisoners.

Evaluative Dynamics

Use of evaluations allows us to grade and rank tools, food, housing, hunting grounds, soils, transports and other things, but also humans, their actions, and their states of mind. Kenneth Burke argued forcefully that language as such produces human hierarchies, "inevitable in any social relation" (Burke 1954, 294). We may specify this by saying that *evaluative* language produces hierarchies, i.e. divisions into good or bad, beautiful and ugly, right and wrong, rich and poor, well-bred and sloppy, competent and incompetent. In the short term, the effect of belonging to hierarchies in the higher ranks is a feeling of *elation*. In the lower ranks the effect is a state of *humiliation* that at best can be relieved but never fully cured. Both elation and humiliation add emotive components to evaluative language.

Proposition 15:2 anticipated: Threats of Anomie: A sudden relocation of people to anomic ranges of their scales of evaluation slows or stops the functioning of justifying and compelling vocabularies in the society (3: 123).

Proposition 15:3 anticipated: General Achievement Motivation: Within one and the same symbolic environment, persons are likely to engage in those actions within their repertoire of actions, which enhance the evaluation they receive to the extent that the associates in their encounters, in the course of time, use higher anchorage points and/or more inflated units of evaluation (3: 124).

The evaluative language also frames verbal rewards and punishments, i.e. sentences of the type "You are doing well" or "You are doing badly." The rewards of such simple sentences are different from incentives in the form of delivery of food, sex, and bodily comfort. However, they resemble the latter in the crucial respect that they affect how we act: we seek and try to effectuate the rewarded activities in our symbolic environment.

To affect the acting in the animal kingdom, rewards and punishments work only if they are immediate, as dog owners know. In humans, verbal rewards are effective, although attenuated, also when delayed. Deferred gratifications in humans are not restricted to receiving the like of marshmallows, as a famous experiment with four-years old, by Walter Mischel (1972) demonstrated. The reward or punishments may be purely verbal, be evaluations expressed by others.

The Polish social psychologist Andrzej Malewski (1962) studied a girls' camp in his country and found the inevitable: in the course of their time together, the girls developed an informal hierarchy. On the last day of camp, they took a friendly but competitive test. The researcher manipulated the reporting of the results of the test. Some of the girls, who had obtained lower ranks in the informal hierarchy of the camp, received high scores on the test, and vice versa. There was a prize, not only to the winner, but also to everybody. The prizes varied in visible value and attractiveness. The girls could choose their own. The low-ranking girls, who had received winning scores on the test, not knowing that scores were faked, did not as a matter of course pick their prizes from the most valuable category. They had an inclination to choose prizes more consonant with the standing they actually had in the camp community. Likewise, the high-ranking girls, despite their lower scores on this particular test, picked the more valuable prizes. *Be it high or low*, the girls acted to keep their accustomed and already established standing.

Let us formalize the above reasoning and observations in a Proposition. It turns out to one of the more basic statements of social science:

> *Proposition 5:5. Evaluative Motives*. In a normal shared symbolic environment: (a) humans are inclined to act to preserve the customary evaluations they receive in this environment, be these high or low; (b) they are inclined to act so that they avoid direct or indirect degradation, i.e. receiving more unfavorable evaluations than these customary ones; (c) if degraded, they are inclined to act to restore their customary evalua-

tion, and; (d) their effort toward restoration of a loss in evaluation to the customary level may have an immediate or delayed success, but the longer the delay, the less effort the restoration receives.

The first two clauses, (a) and (b), in this proposition say in effect that efforts to preserve the existing evaluations people receive is a default mechanism of humanity. This insight will follow us as a scarlet thread as we move through the human drama in encounters, positions and roles, organizations and networks, and through the grand realms of science and education, politics and legislation, economy, art, religion, and morality. The author does not state these clauses (a) and (b) because he has a conservative bias. They illustrate an empirical fact of a 'status quo bias' when earthlings use evaluative language.

Degradations of people have two different forms, one direct, and in one indirect. The direct id more brutal: "you are not as worthy as us." The indirect way is more insidious: "you have not, like us, kept up with the others, the Joneses, so you are now less worth than us." The scale of evaluation may have changed because of an influx of competent people, of because of inflation in the grading system; our forthcoming Proposition 15.3, reproduced on page 1: 189, specifies how this might happen.

Clause (b) in the Proposition 5.5 tells that we dislike both conditions of degrading. Perhaps direct degrading is somewhat more immediate and deeper unpleasant than the indirect one.

Clause (c) deals with the mobilization of the degraded to restore their standing. Such efforts may engage anything in our repertoire of actions.

The clause (d) in the Proposition 5:5 extends the phenomenon of "delayed gratification" to the world of evaluations. To be able to postpone gratification is a rather unique human quality, not regularly observed among (other) animals. You may successfully assure degraded fellow humans a return to their accustomed level of standing if or when the degraded take remedial actions.

However, the longer the delay is to the return of status quo, less is the likelihood that remedial actions take place.

Please observe that Proposition 5:5 is valid only in a 'normal shared symbolic environment.' Under so-called 'anomic' conditions, i.e. swings to high or low extremes outside peoples accustomed range of evaluations, people lose their bearings, and anything can happen. Our proposition on Threats of Anomie is reproduced here on page 1: 189. We describe this panicky societal poison of anomie in the third volume of *The Many-Splendored Society: Fueled by Symbols* (3: 120-123).

Very few Western social scientists hold that our basic motivation is to maintain our standing. They think the basic motivation is to achieve, not to maintain. However, the urge to enhance and achieve more, as we shall see in our Proposition on General Achievement Motivation, also reproduced here is a special case of Alice in Wonderland running faster and faster to stay in the same place, and thus keeping up with the Joneses (1: 189).

Scholars raised in a Hindu tradition of castes, each of which having their own closed system of standing, or raised in a Buddhist tradition of reducing desires for any standing, have less difficulty in making the urge to maintain standing more fundamental than the urge to enhance standing.

To maintain standing is particularly difficult in risky activities. In a market economy, entrepreneurs enter such risky zones of changing prosperities for their firms. They demonstrate the force of our proposition on Evaluative Motives by rapidly starting new enterprises after most every failure. We see here a social force at work, not a bundle of innate or acquired personality traits said to be typical of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship, as we will further discuss in Volume 5, is also in other ways a bundle of properties of a non-socialist social system: freedom from supervision by superiors, possibilities and opportunities to create values, and, most important a clear public appreciation and high rank in a community. Contrary to popular opinion, apart from experience from coping with risks, the character of entre-

preneurs does not differ much from traits found in control groups of other people.

Jon Elster offers a possible link between the two stands of maintaining and enhancing ones standing. Envy is the central force in his theory of motivation:

> The first urge of envy is not 'I want what he has', but 'I want him not to have what he has, because it makes me feel that I am less'. … (A) weakly envious person does not want anyone to have what he cannot have. A strongly envious person is even willing to give up a part of what he has if that is a condition for bringing others down to his level. In both cases, the concern with self-respect is primary, and redistributive concerns are secondary (Elster 1989, 253).

As a pollster in a welfare state, I have observed that voters are much more likely to be upset by the prospect that their politicians remove a benefit that voters already enjoy, than by a their failure deliver a benefit promised in their election campaign some time ago. Here we see a combined result of Proposition 5:5 and the phenomenon discussed as Proposition 5:4 on page 182 that people value gains and losses differently.

Prescriptive Dynamics

The use of prescriptions allows us in the first place to define that which is "the Negative": all the *Don'ts* that meet us, not only as children but also as adults. "The essential distinction between the verbal and the non-verbal is in the fact that language [— *prescriptive* language we would say —] adds the peculiar possibility of the Negative" (Burke 1952, 252). A non-verbal animal would normally have to use physical restraints to achieve what humans can accomplish by saying "Don't do it!" Man can infuse restrictions into times and places by calling them holidays and holy sites. Tools, houses, land can be called private property to keep others from using them. Bundles of prescriptions form the contracts for the exchange of properties. Equally important, prescriptions set up goals to achieve, actions to perform, standards to meet, ladders to climb. It is obvious that all men cannot obey

all negative and positive prescriptions at all times. In time, prescriptive language, therefore, tends to cause *guilt* in the receiver, as Burke observed. The guilt is an emotive companion of much prescriptive language.

The negative effects of prescriptive and evaluative language can be relieved by other usages of language. New forms of language thus cure the anguish that language has caused men. Kenneth Burke finds ample illustrations in literature and drama, for example, "the cycle of redemption."

The humiliation arising from human deviations from prescriptive norms and from degradations in evaluative hierarchies can be atoned by *mortification*, the self-infliction of punishment for one's shortcomings. In comedy, the hero, like a clown, degrades himself so deeply that his fellowmen laugh and reintegrate him into their companionship. In tragedy, the hero is ultimately forced into exile or death. In all mortifications, you, yourself, pay for your sins. We shall deal more with cycles of redemption in the section on "Victimization and Redemption" in of *The Many-Splendored Society: Fuelled by Symbols* (3: 149-154).

What is the Use?

At this point, it is reasonable to ask: Does it do any good to know propositions about descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive dynamics? What kind of understanding do we get?

As an example, let us restate our last mentioned Proposition 5:5 from page 1: 190, and apply it to events in the European economic crisis of 2010 – 13.

The least gratifying events for people are to be degraded both directly and indirectly; we could record this as (-2) on a scale. The next worse events — marked as (-1) on the scale — are to be either being direct degraded or being left behind when others are being raised. The normal and gratifying is to keep one's standing among equals (±0) on our scale.

In the economic crisis in the European Union of 2010 – 2013, only a few countries stayed on reasonable levels of economic

activity and prospect. Among them were Germany, Poland, Finland, and Sweden. By contrast, Estonia, Latvia, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Italy, and Spain were pushed from ±0 to -2. Some others, among them France and Britain, were pushed from ±0 to -1; they fell below Germany and others in their customary economic league, for example, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries.

We infer from Proposition 5:5 that people who are dropped to levels -2 or -1 do indeed despair there, and that they long back to, and work on, returning to ±0. In the European Union, countries that had accumulated big deficits by excessive borrowing were in the beginning of the 2010s subjected to painful requirements to raise taxes and put restrictions on government expenditures for salaries, pensions, and welfare services in return for emergency loans that saved them from bankruptcy. At the same time, these countries were expected to modernize their old-fashioned ways of collecting tax and of running productive businesses. In return, a delayed gratification would come from the trimmed economies; with an increased productivity, they would soon lift off both old and new debts. Needless to say, the policies were high-handed that deliberately pushed citizens, innocent in state finances, down to levels -2 or -1.

Estonia and Latvia reached the point of restoration after less than two years of steep austerity. They restored a good public mood and much self-confidence. Their delay of gratifications was short. In most of the other European countries forced into severe austerity, did not see the dawn for long, the delays dragged out, and the promise of ever-later gratifications lost its motivational force. In the case of Greece, knowledgeable people calculated in the fall of 2012 that any sustainably low level of debt could not at all be reached for the present generation of Greeks, given the high level of the their debt.

To induce a long time degrading of the majority of Greek adults — from ±0 to -2 on our scale — may have been banking and financial logic, but the result according to our Proposition 5:5 is a desperation, which in the available European repertoire of actions, feeds neo-fascism.

It is not bad to be able to know a proposition of social science that forces you to illuminate this situation from another angle than the banking logic. In 2010 – 11, no European minister of finance, no EU commissioner in Brussels, and no officer of the International Monetary Fund seem to have acted upon such knowledge in dealing with countries facing payment defaults.

Economic degradation on a national scale produces a lack of public confidence in regimes — be they democratic, authoritarian, or dictatorial — and degradation is a threat to the legitimacy of governments. Following the leads of Juan Linz, we will discuss this in Volume 5 of *The Many-Splendored Society: The Pursuit of Wealth and Order*.

Our Theory Program

We said that there are two answers to the question "Why are the distinctions between descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive language in its executive and emotive forms so fundamental for the study of social reality?" The first is that under their headings we capture the drama of social life; a first glimpse of which we have presented. The second answer is that they meet the criteria of being a minimum vocabulary in a social theory.

A second answer to the question "Why are the distinctions between descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive language in its executive and emotive forms so fundamental for the study of social reality?" is that this six-fold classification of language usage serves as the smallest building block for our theory of social reality. Bertrand Russell (1948, 242-43) used to call such terms "minimum vocabularies." He observed that "(t)here is as a rule in a number of ways in which the words used in a science can be defined in terms of a few among them….Such a set of initial words I call a 'minimum vocabulary'." He goes on to explain:

> Let us take geography as an example. I shall assume the vocabulary of geometry already established; then our first distinctively geographical need is a method of assigning latitude and longitude. For this it will suffice to have as part of our

> minimum vocabulary “Greenwich,” “the North Pole,” and “west of”; but clearly any other place would do as well as Greenwich, and the South Pole would do as well as the North Pole. The relation of "west of" is not necessary, for a parallel of latitude is a circle on the earth's surface in a plane perpendicular to the diameter passing through the North Pole. The remainder of the words used in physical geography, such as "land" and "water," "mountain" and "plain," can now be defined in terms of chemistry, physics, or geometry. Thus it would seem that it is the two words "Greenwich" and "North Pole" that are needed in order to make geography a science concerning the surface of the earth, and not some other spheroid. It is owing to the presence of these two words (or two others serving the same purpose) that geography is able to relate the other discoveries of travelers. These two words are involved wherever latitude and longitude are mentioned (Russell 1948, 243-244).

Having read Russell as a graduate student, I started searching and scrutinizing words to see how they would fit a minimum vocabulary for the study of society. Descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive sentences in more or less emotive forms seemed fit for this task; the rest we can borrow elsewhere:

> Communicative actions such as 'descriptions,' 'evaluations,' and 'prescriptions' can in an initial phase of research and study be established as understood. Then they can be used either by biographers and psychologists with a focus on the individual, or by historians and sociologists - anthropologists with a focus on collectivities. Different operations then produce precise scholarly vocabularies.
>
> As a first operation consider any procedure used to find a ‘central tendency.’ Central tendencies of descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions within one individual thus became defined as his ‘cognitions,’ ‘attitudes,’ and ‘expectations.’ Central tendencies of the same action types among an aggregate of individuals become their ‘social beliefs,’ ‘social valuations,’ and ‘social norms.’ Any other operation can be used to ma-

> nipulate the primitives; the outcome is other derived terms. For example, if we select the operation of 'dispersion' of the action types within one individual we get a definition of his 'rigidity'; if 'dispersion' is applied to actions in the aggregate of individuals we obtain a definition of their 'consensus.' We might also apply an operation finding 'proportions' to the primitives. An individual with a high proportion of prescriptions among his actions might be defined as 'dominant.' As the economic geographer divides the earth into production areas, so the sociologist can divide society into realms according to the proportion of actions of a certain type. The realm of society with a high proportion of prescriptions (laws, ordinances, executive orders, platforms, decisions, programs, commands, et cetera) might then be defined as its 'body politic' (Zetterberg 1965, 54-55).

By a series of separate logical or statistical operations, the units of descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions thus begin to define units of a social reality: not only attitudes, valuations, norms, but a host of other terms in the language of social science such as positions, roles, organizations, networks, media, markets and firms, et cetera. Furthermore, by separating the executive and emotive modes of descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions we fill out the needed for a scholarly talk about a many-splendored social reality.

These six building blocks — formed by the tri-section and the bi-section of language — will help us to divide the major discourses and realms in modern social reality. To repeat, discourse about grounded knowledge (science and scholarship) is full of executive descriptions, for example, accounts of methods, facts and generalizations. Economic and business discourses are loaded with executive evaluations, for example, prices and costs. Politics and administration, as mentioned, are connected with executive prescriptions, for example, laws and regulations. Art in all its forms deals with descriptive visions that are emotive, expressive. Religious discourse is characterized by expressive evaluations, for example, ideas about the fundamental value of

mankind and the meaning of life. Moral discourse contains an abundance of expressive prescriptions, ethical aspects of conduct.

Thus, the six communicative acts provide a potential for six fundamental realms in human social reality: economy, polity, science, religion, morality, and art. Together the latter give us a conception of many-splendored societies with varied stratifications, central zones, and a division of labor between creators, preservers, distributors, and receivers of knowledge, order, riches, beauty, sacredness, and virtue.

In the following volumes of *The Many-Splendored Society* we shall continue the theme that all these parts of social reality are constructed by the symbols around us in the form of six communicative acts. By reading this far, some of these symbols should not only be familiar to us from everyday life, but also — at least in some measure — be sufficiently precise and presentable for a serious use in social science. They are a light and highly portable luggage for an interesting journey.

Our journey is not pre-determined and fixed. Journeys into biological and physical realities have predictable or inevitable ends. Social reality is different. Let us not forget that language gives humanity a wide-open crack of freedom in an otherwise deterministic universe.

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The Author

Hans L. Zetterberg, born 1927 in Stockholm, Sweden, came to the University of Minnesota in 1949 and did maintain The United States as his main base for 20 years. He taught sociology at the Graduate School of Columbia University and at Ohio State University, where he was Chairman of the Sociology Department. He was also the head of publishing at Bedminster Press, which had the motto: "Books by scholars for scholars."

In his native country, Zetterberg was the first Chief Executive and organizer of The Tri-Centennial Fund of the Bank of Sweden, one of Europe's larger foundations supporting social science. He turned to the private sector and became a long-established professional pollster, Managing Director and owner of Sifo AB, a company for market and social research. He became Editor-in-Chief of the national daily newspaper, *Svenska Dagbladet*, and further developed his writing to reach an inquisitive general public.

Zetterberg is a past President of The World Association for Public Opinion Research. He is a member of The Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences.

In a multi-volume work in progress, *The Many-Splendored Society*, Zetterberg sums up essential knowledge of social science. His key to social reality is simple and optimistic: if humanity has the capacity to cook previously unheard-of sentences, it also has the capacity to cook and serve social structures and cultures never before seen. However, only a minority of our sentences is new from generation to generation, and it takes effort to create sets of new ones. Societies and their institutions, likewise, can count on both long traditions and on manageable changes. *The Many-Splendored Society* is a great story about this achievement.

The Term in the Title of the Book: “Many-Splendored”

The adjective "many-splendored" in the title of this book dates from the 1950s. A Chinese-born author and physician, Han Sugin, writing in English and French, invented the term and spelled it "many-splendoured." One of her novels was turned into the 1955 film "Love Is a Many-Splendored Thing," set in Hong Kong, starring Jennifer Jones and William Holden. Their many-splendored love in the film struggles to overcome the ingrown distrust of a racially and ethnically different couple and their families. The most memorable scenes in the film are set on the high and windy hills of Hong Kong where the lovers first meet.

Love is a many-splendored thing,
It’s the April rose that only grows in the early spring,
Love is nature’s way of giving a reason to be living,
The golden crown that makes a man a king.

The song won an Oscar, but it is since forgotten. I felt that the adjective in its title, "many-splendored," deserved a longer life. In this book, it stands for a society with personal freedom and a differentiation of six self-governing realms: economy, body politic, science, art, religion, and morality. When these realms are joined in a federated cooperation, we have a many-splendored society, in my view, a good one. Science, art, religion, and morality are as important for humanity as are today's favorites, economy and politics.

Hans L Zetterberg